JUDGMENT : Satya Brata Sinha, J. This Writ Petition is directed against a Judgment and Order dated 14-12-1998 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench in O.A.No. 1636 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the Original Application filed by the petitioner was disposed of in the following terms: "(a) The applicant may, if so advised, submit an appeal to the appropriate appellate authority against the penalty order dated 4-11-1997 within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (b) His consequential reversion order dated 19-11-1997 is in accordance with the OM dated 14-9-92. (c) If such an appeal is received, the appropriate appellate authority shall consider the same as per rules and on merits expeditiously. (d) The appellate authority shall provide an opportunity of personal hearing to the applicant, if he so desires. (e) The period of the applicant's absence from duty from 12-12-1997 to 31-1-98 (or till a suitable date) needs to be regularised by the grant of such leave as may be entitled to. This should be done within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 2. The fact of the matter is as follows: While the petitioner was working as Inspector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, he was proceeded in a departmental enquiry on the charge that he did not conduct PBC checks in respect of M/s S.K. Textile Industries Private Ltd., and failed to draw adequate number of samples from the said unit. The enquiry officer had exonerated the petitioner of the charges levelled against him. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer and imposed the penalty of reduction of pay of the petitioner by two stages for a period of one year. The said order was, however, set aside by the Tribunal by order dated 23-4-93 in O.A.No. 343 of 1993 with a direction to continue the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of submission of the enquiry report and to intimate him that the disciplinary authority had differed from the findings of the enquiry officer and to give an opportunity to the petitioner to make his explanation the reagainst which was upheld by the Apex Court. Thereafter, the petitioner was given memo dated 6-10-1994 duly enclosing the report of the enquiry officer calling his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 18-11-1994. Thereafter, the petitioner was given memo dated 6-10-1994 duly enclosing the report of the enquiry officer calling his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 18-11-1994. Thereafter the disciplinary authority after recording reasons for disagreement with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer gave another opportunity to the petitioner to submit his explanation by letter dated 8-3-1995 to which the petitioner submitted his explanation on 11-6-1995. 3. While the matter stood thus, the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc basis to the post of Superintendent by order dated 25-2-1994. Thereafter, the petitioner was imposed with the penalty of withholding of one increment of pay for a period of one year from the date of the order dated 4-11-1997. By another order dated 19-11-1997 the petitioner was reverted to the cadre of Inspector of Central Excise. 4. The petitioner contends that after he submitted his explanation, the disciplinary authority by letter dated 10-12-1996 addressed the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). Though the disciplinary was convinced to drop further proceedings, the CVC insisted for imposition of a penalty and it was only at the instance of the CVC, the impugned punishment was imposed. Therefore, there was no independent application of mind on the part of the disciplinary authority. Even though such a contention was raised, the Tribunal did not record any finding to that effect. 5. The short point, which arises for consideration in this application, is as to whether any punishment can be imposed on the basis of the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission? 6. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the petitioner should take recourse to the remedy of internal appeal. While doing so, however, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the matter on merits also and observed that the order of penalty dated 4-11-1997 is on the basis of the charge Memo dated 6-3-1990. 7. In this case, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the respondents did not withhold the promotion of the petitioner. It is true that the order of promotion was ad hoc in nature in the year 1994. 7. In this case, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the respondents did not withhold the promotion of the petitioner. It is true that the order of promotion was ad hoc in nature in the year 1994. However, we may notice that in the counter-affidavit filed in the writ proceeding it was stated that the letter dated 10-12-1996 referred to by the petitioner is a letter addressed to CVC in accordance with the procedure and the disciplinary authority is at liberty to take a final decision irrespective of the advise rendered by the CVC. 8. By order dated 29-6-2001, the respondents were directed to produce the aforementioned letter dated 10-12-1996 referred to in the counter-affidavit. Pursuant to the said direction, the said letter has been produced. The Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Hyderabad who wrote the said letter to the Commissioner (Vigilance) after tracing the history of the matter, observed: The following points are to be kept in mind while passing an order imposing minor penalty (only) stiffer than Censure. (1) This is a case of 1990. (2) The Officer would have got promotion in May, 1992, but for this case. (3) Due to delay in finalising the case, the officer was given adhoc promotion in February, 1994. (4) The officer was in charge of the unit only for a short period i.e. three months. (5) He was not allotted any PBC checks or drawl of samples by his Superintendent. (6) He was allotted other work by the Superintendent. (7) At this stage, if even a minor penalty is imposed on the officer, he has to be reverted back to the grade of Inspector as per DOPST.om. No. 22011/4/91-Estt. (A) dated 14-9-92, and will have to be considered for promotion, only after he completes his punishment. The effect of any penalty at this stage will not be a minor penalty, as the Officer will lose his promotion for about five years. Hence, this will go beyond the spirit of CVC's advice for a minor penalty. After going through the records and the above points, I am of the view that the Officer has undergone enough punishment during this protracted proceedings and penalising him, which will be a major loss to his career, at this stage is not warranted. I propose to drop the proceedings. 9. After going through the records and the above points, I am of the view that the Officer has undergone enough punishment during this protracted proceedings and penalising him, which will be a major loss to his career, at this stage is not warranted. I propose to drop the proceedings. 9. The disciplinary authority, therefore, was of the firm opinion that no further penalty should be imposed. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the impugned order of punishment had been issued at the instance of the Central Vigilance Commission only. The CVC may have certain role to play in a departmental proceeding but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that it cannot be permitted to usurp the role of the disciplinary authority. No administrative action is sustainable where the disciplinary authority had acted pursuant to or in furtherance of any advice or direction issued by any other authority who has no role to play under any statute. 10. The disciplinary authority being a statutory authority must apply its mind to the fact of the matter and arrive at its own conclusion. The authority is not expected to pass an order at the dictation of the CVC nor CVC is expected to issue any direction in this regard. The matter need not be considered in great details by this Court in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank, 1991 (2) SLR 784 = AIR 1991 SC 1507 , wherein Jagannatha Shetty, J, upon taking into consideration the CVC Manual also the directions of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) dated 21-7-1984 and others held: we are not even remotely impressed by the arguments of counsel for the Bank. Firstly, the Bank itself seems to have felt as alleged by the petitioner and not denied by the Bank in its counter that the compulsory retirement recommended by the Central Vigilance Commission was too harsh and excessive on the petitioner in view of his excellent performance and unblemished antecedent service. The Bank appears to have made two representations; one in 1986 and another in 1987 to the Central Vigilance Commission for taking a lenient view of the matter and to advice lesser punishment to the petitioner. Apparently, those representations were not accepted by the Commission. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority therefore have no choice in the matter. The Bank appears to have made two representations; one in 1986 and another in 1987 to the Central Vigilance Commission for taking a lenient view of the matter and to advice lesser punishment to the petitioner. Apparently, those representations were not accepted by the Commission. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority therefore have no choice in the matter. They had to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement as advised by the Central Vigilance Commission. The advise was binding on the authorities in view of the said directive of the Ministry of Finance, followed by two circulars issued by the successive Chief Executives of the Bank. The disciplinary and appellate authorities might not have referred to the directive of the Ministry of Finance or the Bank circulars. They might not have stated in their orders that they were bound by the punishment proposed by the Central Vigilance Commission. But it is reasonably foreseeable and needs no elaboration that they could not have ignored the advice of the Commission. They could not have imposed a lesser punishment without the concurrence of the Commission. Indeed, they could have ignored the advice of the Commission and imposed a lesser punishment only at their peril. The power of the punishing authorities in departmental proceedings is regulated by the statutory Regulation 4 merely prescribes diverse punishment which may be imposed upon delinquent officers. Regulation 4 does not provide specific punishments for different misdemeanours except classifying the punishments as minor or major. Regulations leave it to the discretion of the punishing authority to select the appropriate punishment having regard to the gravity of the misconduct proved in the case. Under Regulation 17, the appellate authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or completely setting aside the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. He has also power to express his own views on the merits of the matter and impose any appropriate punishment on the delinquent officer. It is quasi-judicial power and is unrestricted. But it has been completely fettered by the direction issued by the Ministry of Finance. The Bank has been told that the punishment advised by the Central Vigilance Commission in every case of disciplinary proceedings should be strictly adhered to and not be altered without prior concurrence of the Central Vigilance Commission and the Ministry of Finance. 11. But it has been completely fettered by the direction issued by the Ministry of Finance. The Bank has been told that the punishment advised by the Central Vigilance Commission in every case of disciplinary proceedings should be strictly adhered to and not be altered without prior concurrence of the Central Vigilance Commission and the Ministry of Finance. 11. The Apex Court expressed its surprise as regards the directives issued by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Banking Division) and inter alia observed: The corresponding new bank referred to in Section 8 has been defined under Section 2(f) of the Act to mean a banking company specified in column 1 of the First Schedule of the Act and includes the Syndicate Bank. Section 8 empowers the Government to issue directions in regard to matters of policy but there cannot be any uniform policy with regard to different disciplinary matters and much less there could be any policy in awarding punishment to the delinquent officers in different cases. The punishment to be imposed whether minor or major depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved. The authorities have to exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government. No third party like the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government could dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise their power and what punishment they should impose on the delinquent officer. (See: De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, p. 309). The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters. 12. From the records, it appears that not only the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the CVC but, as noticed hereinbefore, despite the fact that the disciplinary authority had come to a conclusion to the effect that the petitioner should not be imposed with any punishment, the authority inflicted the aforesaid punishment only at the instance of the CVC. Such abdication of power by the disciplinary authority cannot be countenanced. 13. Such abdication of power by the disciplinary authority cannot be countenanced. 13. In S.B.I. v. H.K. Dogra, 1995 (5) SLR 358, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the opinion of the CVC is purely advisory in nature and it cannot act as an appellate authority. Yet again in SP Agarwal v. Municipal Corporation Delhi, 1997(1) SLR 485 the Delhi High Court has clearly held that the advice of the CVC is not binding on the disciplinary authority and it has to apply its own mind independently and arrive at an independent finding appreciating the facts and evidence on record. Even non-consultation with the CVC would not vitiate the disciplinary proceeding. (See State of S.P. v. Dr. Rahimuddin Ramal, (1997) 3 SCC 505 ). It may be one thing to say that a disciplinary authority takes into consideration the advice of CVC while issuing an order of punishment on the basis of the materials placed before it and upon application of its won mind, but, it is another thing to say that it abdicates its statutory power to the CVC and pass an order of punishment although in its opinion no punishment should be imposed on the delinquent officer. The instant case is a glaring example where the disciplinary authority had abdicated its power in favour of the CVC and acted pursuant to or in furtherance of the advice of the CVC. 14. In the aforesaid situation, the disciplinary authority must be held to have committed a jurisdictional error in passing the order. (See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 1969 (2) AC 147 ). The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Tribunal as also the order of the disciplinary authority are set aside. There, shall be no order as to costs.