JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---In both these applications, the applicants seek quashing of proceedings in Case No. 60(a)/84 which was renumbered as Case No. 17/92 after it is transferred from Bombay to Nagpur, now pending before Special Court, Nagpur. The said proceedings were filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation against, (1) Arunava Chaterjee, (2) Amitava Chaterjee, (3) Applicant K.J. Angore in Criminal Application No. 733/2001 and (4) K.K. Kapse, applicant in Criminal Application No. 2259 of 1998. The prosecution case is that National Savings Organisation, Nagpur was cheated for an amount of rupees 2.8 lacs approximately. The charge-sheet was filed under section 120-B, 420 of I.P.C. read with section 34 of I.P.C. against all the four accused; under sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. against accused Nos. 1 and 2 and under sections 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against accused Nos. 3 and 4, namely, the present applicants. The case was initially filed in the Court of Special Judge at Bombay and it was transferred to Special Judge, Nagpur in the year 1992. The charge has not been framed till to date. 2. Learned Advocate Shri Utpal Rudra argued for the applicants, learned Advocate Shri Govind Mishra argued on behalf of the C.B.I. and learned A.P.P. Shri D.B. Yengal argued on behalf of the State. 3. Learned Advocate for the applicants argued that the prime accused Amitava Chaterjee had already expired; that the F.I.R. was lodged on 11-4-1984 and till to date even charge has not been framed; that the departmental enquiry by Central Vigilance Commission was conducted against both the applicants in which applicant K.J. Angore was completely exonerated for the same charges and applicant K.K. Kapse was exonerated relating to the main charges, but charge in relation to misplacement of file was proved against him. Learned Advocate for the applicants has further pointed out that applicant K.K. Kapse had approached Central Administrative Tribunal by filing original Application No. 951 of 1995 in respect of the charge relating to missing of file and the Central Administrative Tribunal vide order dated 7th July, 1999, exonerated him of all the charges. Learned Advocate for the applicants has further pointed out that applicant K.K. Kapse had approached Central Administrative Tribunal by filing original Application No. 951 of 1995 in respect of the charge relating to missing of file and the Central Administrative Tribunal vide order dated 7th July, 1999, exonerated him of all the charges. Learned Advocate for the applicants has further submitted before me that the C.B.I. had filed a petition bearing Writ Petition No. 2881 of 1999 against the said order of Central Administrative Tribunal before this Court, but the said petition was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 3-4-2001. Learned Advocate for the applicants has further pointed out that the proceedings are pending for almost 17 years now and in the meantime the applicants have undergone considerable sufferings including denial of promotion and they have been exonerated by the Central Vigilance Commission and that the proceedings as against the applicants be quashed. He has placed reliance on (S.G. Nain v. Union of India)1, reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 603. 4. Learned Advocate for C.B.I. has urged before me that the prosecution is not at all responsible for delay and that the delay is on account of the fact that the Special Judge is overburdened with the cases. It is further urged by him that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (Common Cause A Registered Society through its Director v. Union of India and others)2, reported in 1997 Bom.C.R.(Cri) 318 , does apply to the cases falling under the Prevention of Corruption Act and as such quashing of the charge-sheet does not arise. According to the learned Advocate for the C.B.I., the charge-sheet was initially filed in the year 1986 and the matter was transferred to the Special Judge, Nagpur in the year 1992. He, however, could not state as to what had happened during the years 1986 to 1992 when the matter was pending and no record in respect of the same is available. He, therefore, urged that the applications be rejected. 5. Learned A.P.P. submitted before me that the matter pertains to serious offence of corruption and the proceedings should not be quashed and if necessary appropriate directions be given to expedite the trial. Criminal Application No. 2559 of 1998 was filed on 14-12-1998. 6. He, therefore, urged that the applications be rejected. 5. Learned A.P.P. submitted before me that the matter pertains to serious offence of corruption and the proceedings should not be quashed and if necessary appropriate directions be given to expedite the trial. Criminal Application No. 2559 of 1998 was filed on 14-12-1998. 6. Initially this matter was adjourned from time to time to take instructions from the State as to what steps the State proposes to take to meet the pendency of old cases. It was stated that the High Power Committee has been constituted and it appears that nothing further materialised, as can be seen from farad order dated 12th December, 2000. On 10th October, 2000, this Court directed to C.B.I. to file reply on merits which was filed. The matter, therefore, kept dragging without any concrete result and was admitted on 30th July, 2001 after which arguments were heard on 23rd October, 2001. 7. The roznama of the record of the lower Court shows that the matter came up before Special Judge, Nagpur on 33 occasions. The roznama further shows that the present applicants attended the Court on all hearings, but the Special P.P., C.B.I. has hardly put in appearance in the matter except for two occasions that is to day on 19-6-1993 and 1-11-1993. The charge has not yet been framed even though the F.I.R. was filed was back on 11-4-1984 and the charge-sheet was filed in the year 1986. 8. The charge has not yet been framed even though the F.I.R. was filed was back on 11-4-1984 and the charge-sheet was filed in the year 1986. 8. The right to speedy trial is now well established by a large number of pronouncements of the Apex Court including (Hussainara Kahatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Government of Bihar, Patna)3, reported in 1979(3) S.C.R. 169 ; (Hussainara Kahatoon (IV) and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna)4, reported in 1980(1) S.C.C. 98 ; (Kadra Pahadiya and others v. State of Bihar)5, reported in 1983(2) S.C.C. 104 ; (Abdul Rehman Antulay and others v. R.S. Nayak and another)6, reported in 1992(1) S.C.C. 225 ; (Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab)7, reported in 1993(3) S.C.C. 569; (Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar (I))8, reported in 1999(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)1 ; (Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar (II))9, reported in 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)184 and the same has been dealt with at length by me in (A. Jayant Ram Ayate v. The Inspector General of Police Anti Corruption Bureau C.B.I., Nagpur)10, Criminal Application No. 804 of 2001, in which Anti Corruption Bureau, C.B.I., was one of the parties and, therefore, it is not necessary to repeat the same once again in this order. 9. Learned Advocate for the C.B.I. has urged before me that in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Common Cause A Registered Society through its Director v. Union of India and others (supra), the directions in the Rajdeo Sharma's case (I) (supra) do not apply to the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act or cases of misappropriation of public funds or cheating. 10. I have already pointed out that right to speedy trial is now well-settled and this right is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21. The judgment in the Common Cause case (supra) as also in Rajdeo Sharma (I) (supra) are based upon the recognition of the same principle of right to speedy trial. In Rajdeo Sharma (supra) while supplementing the propositions laid by the Constitution Bench in Antulay's case (supra), the Apex Court has pointed out that the above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued in Common Cause case (supra) as modified by the same Bench in (Common Cause Case (II) v. Union of India)11, reported in 1997 Bom.C.R.(Cri) 323. In Rajdeo Sharma (II) (supra), the C.B.I. had sought certain clarification including clarification whether the exception made in para 4 of the Ist Common Cause judgment (supra) and para 3 of the Second Common Cause judgment (supra) would still continue. In the majority judgment, in para 23, it has been pointed out that the judgment in Rajdeo Sharma (I) (supra) has taken care to mention that the directions given therein are only to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay's case (supra) and also in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by the Apex Court in Common Causes cases. In Common Cause case and Rajdeo Sharma (I), time limits have been fixed in respect of certain categories of cases and in Rajdeo Sharma's case, time limit has been fixed after framing of the charge in certain categories of cases during which the prosecution has to complete evidence. Rajdeo Sharma (I) (supra) has been explained further in Rajdeo Sharma (II) (supra). What would be the position if the charge is not framed for the years together for over a decade? Whether such cases can continue indefinitely and the accused be made to appear before the Court without serving any purpose whatsoever? The fundamental right of speedy trial is available in such cases and in a number of cases the Apex Court has quashed proceedings since the trial had been delayed for a considerable period. 11. In S.G. Nain v. Union of India (supra), the proceedings under section 409 of I.P.C. were pending for 14 years in respect of misappropriation of large quantity of sugar, meant for distribution amongst the members of the forces. The Apex Court quashed the proceedings after observing that apart from the mental agony, it must have adversely affected the accused in his service career and in the facts of the case it was difficult rather impossible to arrange a fair trial to the accused after such a long lapse of time and it would be sheer waste of time and money apart from causing harassment to the accused. 12. 12. In (Santosh De v. Archana Guha and others)12, reported in 1994 Cri.L.J. 1975, the Apex Court was dealing with a number of appeals, wherein prosecution had been quashed while dealing with the right of speedy trial in a case under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, wherein the accused was charged for possession of disproportionate assets valued at rupees two lacs, the Apex Court found that the prosecution launched in 1978 was pending till 1993 and yet the examination of witnesses had not begun though final charge-sheet was filed in the year 1990. The accused had, retired from service in November 1991. The proceedings against the said accused had been quashed by the High Court and the Apex Court did not interfere with the order. In the same case, the Apex Court dealt with another matter where incident took place in 1973 wherein F.I.R. was filed under section 307 of I.P.C. and later on converted under section 302 of I.P.C. The case was committed to Sessions Court on 15-7-1974 and no trial took place till 1982. Thereafter four witnesses were examined in two years after which prosecution took 90 adjournments for producing other witnesses including Inquiry Officer. The High Court held that delay in trial was entirely on account of default of the prosecution. The Apex Court held that since there was unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial, that by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. The prosecution in the case before the Apex Court was pending for 14 years and it was found that the delay could not be attributed to the accused and that the charges were framed after a lapse of about eight years of committal of case to the Sessions Court and since the delay was entirely on account of default of the prosecution, the Apex Court held that the order quashing the proceedings was not liable to be interfered with. In the same case, the Apex Court dealt with another appeal where incident took place on 10-7-1976 and charge-sheet for the offences under sections 147, 148, 448, 327 read with sections 34 and 149 of the I.P.C. and under section 27 of the Arms Act was filed on 20-12-1976. In the same case, the Apex Court dealt with another appeal where incident took place on 10-7-1976 and charge-sheet for the offences under sections 147, 148, 448, 327 read with sections 34 and 149 of the I.P.C. and under section 27 of the Arms Act was filed on 20-12-1976. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in 1980 and by 1986 only two witnesses had been examined when proceedings were quashed by the High Court on December 19, 1986. The Apex Court had granted stay, but still further evidence was not recorded. The Apex Court found that 17 years had elapsed and the delay in committal and recording evidence had not been explained. As a result of which, the Apex Court held that in the circumstances right to speedy trial had been breached and quashing of proceedings could not be interfered with. 13. In (Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat)13, reported in 1991(4) Bom.C.R. 414 : A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3400, 14 years had elapsed since the incident and the order according sanction for prosecution under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and section 161 of the Indian Penal Code was found to be bad by the Apex Court. The accused had been convicted for the said offences by Special Judge and the High Court had confirmed the conviction. In this set of facts, it is held that it will not be fair and just to direct that the proceedings may again be initiated from the stage of sanction so as to expose the appellant therein to another innings of litigation and keep him on trial for an indefinitely long period contrary to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution which, as part of right to life, philosophizes early end of criminal proceedings through a speedy trial. Consequently, the Apex Court acquitted accused in the said case since the incident was of 1983 and 14 years had already elapsed. 14. In (R. Mahadevan Iyer v. State of Maharashtra and another)14, reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. 1388, the proceedings could not be completed even after a lapse of 12 years. Consequently, the Apex Court acquitted accused in the said case since the incident was of 1983 and 14 years had already elapsed. 14. In (R. Mahadevan Iyer v. State of Maharashtra and another)14, reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. 1388, the proceedings could not be completed even after a lapse of 12 years. Taking into consideration that a number of witnesses had died and many other had ceased to be in service and there was a possibility of greater number of witnesses not being traceable/available, it was held that there was no possibility of achieving useful result by allowing continuance of prosecution and that the accused was likely to be heavily prejudiced in his defence in respect of incidents extremely old in point of time. The proceedings were, therefore, quashed. 15. In (K.K. Bhardwaj v. Union of India and others)15, reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 570, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court found that criminal trial of offences under sections 409 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was delayed for over thirteen years and out of 13 witnesses cited, evidence of even a single witness was not completed. It was found that the prosecution was not only callous, but also lethargic and the proceedings were quashed. 16. In the case under consideration, even though the F.I.R. was filed on 11-4-1984 and the charge-sheet was filed in the year 1986 and despite lapse of 17 years from the time of incident, not even charge has been framed till today. I have already pointed out that out of total number of 33 hearings on which the present applicants appeared, the Public Prosecutor, C.B.I. was only present on two occasions. Besides this, it is to be noted that the applicants faced enquiry by the Central Vigilance Commission on the same charges and they have been finally exonerated of the charges. The applicants have already suffered a lot including promotions to which they might have been entitled during this period. 17. In this set of facts, I am of the opinion that the right of the accused to speedy trial has been given a complete go bye as a result of which the proceedings of Case No. 60(a)/1984, renumbered as Case No. 17/1992 as against the applicants are required to be quashed. The said proceedings are accordingly quashed and the applications are disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. -----