Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J 1. Petitioner challenges the Circular issued by the Election Commission of India, dated 28th August, 1997, the caption of which reads as under: “Criminalisation of Politics — participation of criminals in the electoral process as candidates - disqualification on conviction for offences - effect of appeal - regarding” That Circular, after referring to the content of Section 8 of Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the judgments of three High Courts regarding the interpretation of some of the sub-sections of the said Section 8, in exercise of the powers of the Election Commission of superintendence, direction and control of preparation of Electoral rolls and conduct of election to Parliament and State Legislatures, directs that all the Returning Officers, at the time of scrutiny of the nominations, must take note of the legal position set out in that Circular and decide accordingly about the validity or otherwise of the candidature of the contestant disqualified under Section 8 of Representation of the People Act. The direction given is as under: “Now, therefore, the Election Commission has, after taking due note and paying due regard to the above judicial pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble High Courts, come to the considered view that the disqualification under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for contesting elections to Parliament and State Legislatures, on conviction for offences mentioned therein, takes effect from the date of conviction by the trial Court, irrespective of whether the convicted person is released on bail or not during the pendency of appeal subject, of course, to the exception in the case of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures under sub-section (4) of me said Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.” 2. It is the content of sub-section (4) of Section 8 that is the foundation for the argument now advanced before us, alleging discrimination against all persons other than sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature, who are convicted of any of the crimes adverted to in Section 8 of the Act and who are prevented - from contesting elections after their conviction, and during the pendency of the appeals or revision preferred by them. The attack is not on the validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8, which carves out a privileged class of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature, who are treated as a class-apart and who are enabled to retain their membership and also contest the election even after their conviction, provided they have preferred an appeal or revision before the expiry of 3 months from the date of such conviction. 3. The reason for the circular issued by the Election Commission being limited in its application to cases of persons convicted, but who are not sitting members of Parliament or of State Legislature, is because of the statutory provision contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which treats such persons as a special class for whom exception has been carved out from the rigor of application of Section 8. It is obvious that the Election Commission has no powers to issue any order contrary to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and, therefore, the circular has necessarily to preserve the privilege conferred on sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature in sub-section (4) of Section 8. 4. As the petitioner has not chosen to question the creation of a privileged class, who share with others the common factor of having been convicted for a crime, which would in the normal course invite disqualification for contesting or from being member of Parliament or State Legislature, the question as to whether sub-section (4) is valid does not arise for consideration here. 5. The argument advanced for the petitioner is that the privilege or concession given to the sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature should be extended to all those convicted of crime, but whose appeals are pending at the time the elections are held, and they should also be permitted to contest the election. 6. Before considering that submission, it is necessary to advert to the content of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 8 deals with “Disqualification on conviction for certain offences”. The object of the Section is plain. Conviction for offences adverted to in that Section shall result in a disqualification. The policy behind the provision is also self-evident. Section 8 deals with “Disqualification on conviction for certain offences”. The object of the Section is plain. Conviction for offences adverted to in that Section shall result in a disqualification. The policy behind the provision is also self-evident. Persons who are required to make law for the governance of the country should not be persons who have themselves bee n found to have violated the law and have been convicted by the duly constituted Courts for the crime with which they are charged. The presence of such persons in Parliament and in the State Legislature and their participation in the deliberations is by Statute regarded as undesirable and, therefore, the disqualification is imposed at the threshold so that such persons are kept completely out of the electoral fray. 7. The argument that conviction, per se, does not and should not disable a person from contesting elections is clearly not one, which is reflected in the Statute. On the other hand, the policy of the law is to keep out all convicts from the electoral fray for the period stated therein. Convicted criminals are not to contest elections. That is the policy of the Statute. The disability will continue for the period specified in the several subsections of Section 8 of the Act. It is the period of six years from the date of conviction where the conviction is under any of the provisions of the Statutes listed in subclauses (a) to (k) of Section 8 (1) of the Act. The disqualification in case of contravention of the laws referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Section 8 (2) accompanied by a sentence of imprisonment of not less than six months, is to commence “from the date of such conviction” and is to continue for a further period of six years after the release of the person. In case of conviction for offences under the provisions of Statutes not adverted in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, the disqualification is to operate in all cases where the person is convicted and is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for not less than two years and the disqualification in respect of such persons is to be operative “from the date of such conviction” and is to continue for a period of six years after their release. 8. 8. The substantive part of Section 8 is what is contained in sub-sections (1) to (3), which enumerate the Statutes and, in some cases, some of the provisions of the Statute, and provide that persons convicted for the offences under the Statutes mentioned in sub-section (1), irrespective of the operation of the sentence, shall be disqualified for six years from the date of conviction; in case of a conviction for crimes under other Statutes referred to in sub-section (2), the disqualification is incurred if the period of sentence imposed is six months or more; and in case of offences under other Statutes, disqualification attaches if the sentence awarded after conviction is two years or more. 9. The common factor in all these three sub-sections is ‘conviction’ for the crime committed under the Statutes. The disqualification in all cases commence “from the date of conviction. In the case of those convicted for crimes under the Statutes or provisions referred to in Section 8 (1), the period of the sentence awarded is immaterial. The policy of the law appears to be that the Statutes enumerated in Section 8(1) are Statutes, the observance of which is essential and crimes committed thereunder are required to be treated with severity and irrespective of the length of the sentence, disqualification is to become operative immediately on conviction. Sub-section (2) categorises certain offences under certain other laws, which are regarded as grave, only if the Court which convicted the person has found that the gravity of the crime committed warrants the imposition of sentence of not less than six months. In case of convictions for offences referred to in subsection (3), the crime is regarded as grave enough to disqualify the person from contesting the election, only when the court convicting the offender has considered it to be necessary to impose a sentence of not less than two years. 10. These sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) sequentially set out the degree of gravity of the offences under the Statutes referred therein, in so far as it concerns the persons suitability for being considered for election to the highest law making bodies in the country. 11. The need for keeping criminals out of the Parliament and State Legislatures is self-evident. 10. These sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) sequentially set out the degree of gravity of the offences under the Statutes referred therein, in so far as it concerns the persons suitability for being considered for election to the highest law making bodies in the country. 11. The need for keeping criminals out of the Parliament and State Legislatures is self-evident. Persons, who have no respect for law, who think nothing of violating it and whose guilt has been established after a full fledged trail in the duly constituted Courts of the country, cannot be, and rightly are not regarded by the law to be suitable to represent the citizens in the law making bodies of the country. Criminals can hardly be regarded as desirable lawmakers under our or any other Constitution, which enshrines Rule of Law. 12. The disqualifications set out in Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 are disqualifications, which the Constitution has empowered the Parliament to determine. Article 102 of the Constitution deals with disqualifications for membership of either House of Parliament. Persons holding office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of a State; persons of unsound mind declared so by a competent Court; undischarged insolvents; persons who are not citizens of India or who have voluntarily acquired citizenship of a foreign State or have acknowledged allegiance or adherence to a foreign State, are disqualified from becoming members of either House of Parliament. By sub-clause (e) of Article 102 (1) a person is also disqualified from being a member of either House of Parliament, “if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament”. So far as the State Legislatures are concerned, Art. 173 of the Constitution sets out the qualification for membership. Art. 173(c) provides that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament”. Art. 173(c) provides that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament”. Having regard to the fact that the law made by Parliament provides not only for qualifications, but also for disqualifications, a person is not eligible to be chosen as a member of the State Legislature unless, in addition to possessing the qualifications, he does not suffer from any of the disqualifications set out either in the Constitution, or in the law enacted by Parliament. 13. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 was enacted even before the very first General Election was held in independent India after the Constitution came into force. From the time of the birth of the Indian Republic, the policy of the Constitution as also of the law made by Parliament has been and continues to be, to keep convicted criminals out of the fora of the Parliament and the State Legislatures. 14. While enacting the Representation of the People Act for reasons which are not clear, sub-section (4) of Section 8 carved out an exception in favour of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures to whom the disqualifications resulting from the application of sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 8, was not to apply for a period of three months from the date of conviction, and in case an appeal or application for revision is preferred by them against the conviction or the sentence, until the appeal or revision is disposed of by the Court. 15. Though it is difficult to see any qualitative difference between persons convicted of crimes at a time when they are members of Parliament or State Legislature and those convicted while they are sitting members, so long as sub-section (4) of Section 8 remains on the statute book, the same has to be given effect to. The vires of that provision not having been challenged in this petition, it is not necessary for the purposes of this petition to consider its constitutional validity. 16. The argument advanced before us that all criminals should be treated alike so far as disqualification is concerned, having regard to what has been challenged, is only superficially attractive. The vires of that provision not having been challenged in this petition, it is not necessary for the purposes of this petition to consider its constitutional validity. 16. The argument advanced before us that all criminals should be treated alike so far as disqualification is concerned, having regard to what has been challenged, is only superficially attractive. The policy of the law being to keep criminals out of the electoral fray, all criminals should be kept out of the electoral fray, if they have suffered the disqualification, provided for in Section 8. That policy is in no way advanced by enabling thousands of criminals to enter the electoral fray because a handful of members of Parliament or Legislature who may have been convicted while they held such office, by virtue of Section 8(4), have been allowed to contest the election. The policy of the law must be given full effect to and that policy is not to be subverted and the statutory provision rendered wholly ineffective by looking at an exception, the validity of which is capable of being questioned, and trying to stretch that into a general rule. 17. All that the Election Commission has done by the impugned Circular, which it undoubtedly had the power to issue, having regard to the wide powers conferred on it by Art. 324 of the Constitution, is to direct the Returning Officers to strictly abide by Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Art. 324 (1) reads thus: “The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and Vice-President held under this Constitution shall be vested in a Commission referred to in this Constitution as the Election Commission.” 18. Having regard to the power vested in the Election Commission to superintend, direct and control the conduct of elections to Parliament and the Legislature of every State, it was certainly within its jurisdiction to direct the Returning Officers who work under its superintendence and control, to strictly abide by Section 8, which in unambiguous terms makes the disqualification effective “from the date of conviction”, except in case of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures. 19. 19. The need for issue of such a circular had arisen by reason of what had been observed by the Election Commission, and to which the circular makes a reference. In the preamble to the circular it is, inter alia, stated as under: “..it has been often observed that even those persons who are not the sitting members of Parliament or State Legislatures on the date of conviction, contest election if they have filed an appeal or application for revision and have been granted bail during pendency of such appeals/revision” The Election Commission took note of the law that had been declared by three of the High Courts in the country, which had held that the pendency of appeal or revision does not have the effect of suspending the conviction even in cases where the sentence had been suspended, and that, therefore, a person whose conviction had not been stayed by superior Court Was disqualified from contesting the election. 20. The law so laid down is in accordance with what the statute itself provides. The Election Commission directing the Returning Officers to follow the statutory provisions was not only permissible but was in fact necessary having regard to what the Election Commission had noticed viz., that persons who were convicted had been in the past allowed to contest despite the conviction not having been suspended, but only on the ground that the sentence had been suspended. 21. That the disqualification is to operate from the time of conviction is evident from the scheme of Section 8 itself. The three subclauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 spell out in the clearest possible terms that the disqualification will be “from the date of such conviction”. It is because of that policy of the Statute disqualification attaches from the time of conviction, that it became necessary to enact sub-section (4) by which despite such conviction, a limited class, viz., sitting members of Parl iament and State Legislatures were not to be regarded as having incurred the disqualification from the date of conviction but only alter the disposal of the appeal or revision, if such appeal or revision was filed within three months of the conviction and also for a period of three months from the date of conviction. Had it been the intention of the lawmakers that mere filing of an appeal or revision should be regarded as having the effect of removing the disqualification imposed by Section 8(1),(2) and (3), it would have been wholly unnecessary to enact sub-section (4) and that provision would become otiose. 22. The policy of the law always has been that disqualification commences from the date of conviction. Merely filing an appeal or revision against the same does not even temporarily erase the conviction. Suspension of the sentence during the pendency of the appeal or revision also does not have the effect of putting the conviction in limbo or temporarily erasing the same. 23. Conviction is the finding that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence. Sentence is the punishment for having committed the crime. Suspension of the sentence only results in the punishment not having to be undergone during the period of suspension. It does not in any manner affect the finding of guilt. Disqualification attaches from the moment of conviction and it is immaterial as to whether the convicted person is or is not undergoing the punishment at the time the election is held. The finding of guilt remains operative despite the suspension of sentence. It is only the competent superior court that can set aside or suspend conviction. Judicial verdicts cannot be set aside by any other authority including Parliament or State Legislature. 24. If the superior Court, having regard to all the circumstances of a given case, suspends the conviction, such a person can be regarded as not being under disqualification at the time of the election. Such a person, would however incur the disqualification the moment his appeal fails. If his appeal succeeds, the conviction stands erased. 25. Learned Counsel submitted that a convicted person whose appeal is pending at the time of election would suffer irreparable injury, if, after the election such persons appeal were to be allowed and the conviction set aside. The right to stand for election is a statutory right. If the policy of the law is to keep convicted criminals out of the electoral arena, a person disqualified at the time of election cannot claim that he should be allowed to contest pending appeal on the ground that the appeal in that persons view is likely to succeed. The right to stand for election is a statutory right. If the policy of the law is to keep convicted criminals out of the electoral arena, a person disqualified at the time of election cannot claim that he should be allowed to contest pending appeal on the ground that the appeal in that persons view is likely to succeed. It is for him to approach the competent Court to suspend the conviction to enable him to contest the election. Though the Criminal Procedure Code does not expressly provide for stay of conviction, it is now settled law that the Appellate or Revision Court empowered to suspend the sentence can also suspend conviction although that power is not to be used for the asking, but with great care and circumspection, having regard to all the circumstances of a given case. If the Court declines to suspend conviction, he must stay out of that election. 26. Elections are held periodically. A successful appeal against conviction will enable the person to contest elections held subsequently. So far as Returning Officers are concerned, it is their duty to ensure that disqualified persons are not allowed to contest. 27. The larger public good is clearly subserved by keeping criminals out of elections by disqualifying them from contesting. A petition which seeks to enable convicted persons to contest election can hardly be termed as a Public Interest Litigation. Public interest is served by keeping them out, and not by bringing them into the electoral fray. 28. We find no merit in this writ petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed.