JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner herein has challenged the termination of his services on the ground that although, he had completed three years of continuous service as a daily wager in the service of the Rajasthan State Seed Corporation, his services had been dispensed with without complying the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (referred to as I.D. Act for short) and hence he has claimed back wages along with the relief of reinstatement. 2. The petitioner without taking any steps for initiating a reference of the dispute under Section 12 of the I.D. Act had straightway filed this writ petition in the year 1991 which was admitted. 3. After a show cause notice was served on the respondents, a counter affidavit was filed by the respondents disclosing that although they admit the plea of the petitioner to the extent that the petitioner had worked from 1986 to 1989, the fact remains that he had not completed 240 days of continuous service. Besides this, it has also been stated therein that the question of back wages would also be required in the event of reinstatement and all these would require evidence which cannot be led in a writ petition and hence the petitioner should be directed to approach the appropriate forum as he has clearly an alternative remedy. 4. The counsel for the petitioner on the other hand has vehemently argued that the petitioner should not be directed to avail the alternative remedy after the matter was kept pending in this court ever since 1991 and in support of this, he has relied upon several authorities of the Supreme Court. It was further submitted that the question of the period of service rendered by the petitioner with the respondent No. 1, is not disputed and in view of this position, the petitioner's case should be decided by this Court only within the ambit of Section 25F of the I.D. Act which has been violated by the respondents. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it primarily strikes that although as a matter of principle, a case may not be thrown out merely on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy but this principle has to be applied in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it primarily strikes that although as a matter of principle, a case may not be thrown out merely on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy but this principle has to be applied in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the first place, the petitioner herein had made a declaration in the writ petition that he has no other alternative and efficacious remedy but to file this writ petition which is clearly not the correct position as he was having adequate alternative remedy under the I.D. Act. Besides this, the assertion of the petitioner's advocate that the question of his service for 240 days is not a disputed question of fact also does not appear to be correct as it has been clearly asserted in the counter affidavit by the respondents that although the petitioner had worked from 1986 to 1989, he had not completed 240 days of service. So even if it were to be accepted that the petitioner should not be directed to approach the alternative forum of redressal of his grievance, it cannot be ignored that evidence would still be required to be adduced by the petitioner and adequate opportunity will have to be granted to the respondents for rebuttal on the question of the number of days of service rendered by him as also on the fact as to whether he was gainfully employed during all these years in order to compute the backwages as it is clearly not possible for this Court to enter into these disputed questions of fact, in absence of which the controversy cannot be resolved. Perhaps the position would have been different if the question of the services rendered by the petitioner were not disputed or it could be established by some unimpeachable document that no contrary view regarding the services rendered by the petitioner was at all possible. This is clearly not the position in this case and hence it is not possible for this court to entertain this writ petition merely on the ground that the availability of an alternative remedy cannot operate as a bar for entertaining the writ petition if it has been lying pending since long. 6. This writ petition under the circumstances, stands dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******