BHASKAR BHATTACHARAYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of a tenant /defendant and is directed against the judgment and decree deated April 16, 1990 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 8th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 233 of 1989 thereby affirming those dated May 3, 1989 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 1st Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 21 of 1986. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid suit filed by the respondent for eviction of the appellant on the ground of expiry of lease of 21 years. The said suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement and the main defense taken by the appellant was that the tenancy was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act ("act") and as such in the absence of any notice to quit under S. 13 (6) of the Act or in the absence of existence of any ground mentioned under S. 13 (1) of the said Act, the sauit was not maintainable. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge decreed the suit holding that the Act has no appliction to the fact of the present case. ( 4 ) BEING dissatisfied, the appellant preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court below and by the judgment and decree impugned herein, the said Court has affirmed the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge. ( 5 ) BEING dissatisfied, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. ( 6 ) THE only question that has been raised by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant in this appeal is whether the tenancy in question is governed by the provision contained in the Act? ( 7 ) THERE is no dispute that the lease deed in question was executed by the lessee on February 2, 1965 and the same was executed by the lessor on August 14, 1965 and ultimately the deed was registered on October 14, 1965. It is an admitted fact that in the lease deed it was mentioned that the said lease would be effective from February1, 1965 and the duration would be of 21 yearsfrom that day. It is also undisputed that West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 came into operation from August 24, 1965. It is an admitted fact that in the lease deed it was mentioned that the said lease would be effective from February1, 1965 and the duration would be of 21 yearsfrom that day. It is also undisputed that West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 came into operation from August 24, 1965. ( 8 ) IT appears from the lease deed that in Clause 9 thereof lessee has been given option to determine the lease at any time even before the expiry of 21 years after giving notice of three calendar months in writing to lessor. ( 9 ) RELYING upon the aforesaid Clause No. 9 it has been contended by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the lease having been registered after the coming into operation of West Bengal Premises (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 and there being a clause enabling the lessee to terminate the said lease before the expiration of the period mentioned therein, the tenancy created by the lease should be guided by the provision contained in the Act and thus in the absence of any notice under 13 (6) of the Act or of any ground mentioned in S. 13 (1) of the Act no decree for eviction could be passed by the learned courts below. ( 10 ) TO appreciate the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant the provision contained in S. 3 of the Act is quoted hereunder :"certain provisions of the Act not to apply to certain leases.- (1) The provisions relating to rent and the provisions of S. 31 and 36 shall apply to any premises held under a lease for residential purpose of the lease of the lessee himself and registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, where -a) such lease has been entered into on or after the 1st December, 1948, and b) such lease is for a period of not more than 20 years,and save as asforesaid nothing in this Act shall apply to any premises held under a lease for a period of not less than 15 years. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-sec. (1) but subject to sub-sec. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-sec. (1) but subject to sub-sec. (3) of S. 1, this Act shall apply to all premises held under a lease which has been entered into after the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 :provided that if any such lease is for a period of not less than 20 years and the period limited by such lease is not expressed to be terminable before its expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant, nothing in this Act, other than the provisions relating to rent and the provisions of S. 31 and 36 shall apply to any premises held under such lease. " ( 11 ) MR. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf on the appellant by referring to the provisions contained in S. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act contends that a lease of 21 years can be made only by a registered instrument and thus the lease deed in this case became effective only on registration. The date of registration, Mr. Mukherjee proceeds, being a date after the coming into operation of 1965 Ordinance, it should be held that the lease was validly entered into after the promulgation of 1965 Ordinance. Mr. Mukherjee thus contends that in view of existence of Clause 9 of the deed giving opition to the lessee to terminate the lease before the expiry of the period of 21 years, it should be held that the tenancy is governed by the Act. ( 12 ) MR Dutt, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has however disputed the correctness of the submission of Mr. Mukherjee and by placing strong reliance upon the provisions contained in S. 47 of the Registration Act contends that the moment the deed is registered, it should operate from the date of execution which is admittedly a date prior to the coming into operation of the 1965 Ordinance. Mr. Dutt thus contends that the lease was really "entered into" prior to 1965 Ordinance. ( 13 ) WE are therefore faced with a narrow question viz. whether the date of execution or that of registration is the date when a deed of lease is deemed to be "entered into" within the meaning of S. 3 (2) of the Act? Mr. Dutt thus contends that the lease was really "entered into" prior to 1965 Ordinance. ( 13 ) WE are therefore faced with a narrow question viz. whether the date of execution or that of registration is the date when a deed of lease is deemed to be "entered into" within the meaning of S. 3 (2) of the Act? ( 14 ) BEFORE I proceed to answer the aforesaid question, it will be profitable to refer to the scope of S. 47 of the Registration Act as settled by various judicial decision. ( 15 ) IN case where registration of the deed is compulsory, there is no divesting of interest till registration. But once such document is registered within the time allowed by law, it shall operate from the time it would have commenced to operate it no registration thereof was required. However, transfer though inchoate and ineffective until registered, is not suspended or postponed till the date of registration nor has the executant any power to revoke such transfer as absence of registration during permissible period does not suspend its operation altogether. ( 16 ) IN the instant case, although the deed was executed by the lessee on February 2, 1965, the lessor having executed the same subsequently on August 14, 1965, the deed was registered on October 14, 1965 quite within the time prescribed by S. 25 of the Registration Act. Thus, according to the law stated in S. 47 of the said Act no registration thereof had been required. ( 17 ) ALTHOUGH in the deed it is mentioned that the tenancy would commence from February 1, 1965, a date prior to the execution, in view of S. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, no such date anterior to its execution can be mentioned as the date of commencement of right under the deed. Thus, it should be effective from the date when the lessor put his signature and thus completed the execution of the document. The statements in the deed indicating commencement of its operation from a date before its execution should be ignored because by virtue of a 'transfer' within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, a living person can convey property only in present or in future but not from a day prior to its execution. The statements in the deed indicating commencement of its operation from a date before its execution should be ignored because by virtue of a 'transfer' within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, a living person can convey property only in present or in future but not from a day prior to its execution. At any rate, both the lessee and the lessor having executed the deed prior to the date of coming into operation of the 1965 Ordinance the deed became operative before that day. ( 18 ) THE phrase "a lease which has been entered into" appearing in S. 3 (2) of the Act, in my view, should be interpreted to mean "a lease which has begun to operate" or "a lease which has commenced its operation" and thus the date of registration has no role to play. Even if a lease commences its operation after August 24, 1965 notwithstanding the fact that the same was executed and even registered earlier and the deed contains a provision like Clause 9, the tenant can successfully contend that the tenancy will be governed by the Act. ( 19 ) THEREFORE neither the date of registration nor the date of execution but the date of commencement of the lease is the decisive factor in interpreting the phrase "a lease which has been entered into" appearing in S. 3 (2) of the Act. ( 20 ) IN the instant case, however, such date being one prior to August 24, 1965, the tenant cannot successfully contend that the teneancy is governed by the Act. ( 21 ) I now propose to deal with cases cited by Mr. Mukherjee in support of his contention. ( 22 ) IN the case of Ram Saran v. Domini Kuer, AIR 1961 SC 1747 the question was whether the first demand of pre-emption under Mohammedan law called "talab-i-mowisibat" which has to be made after completion of sale in order that the right may be enforced, was made before or after such completion. The making of demand was not in dispute in that case but the dispute was as to when the sale was completed. ( 23 ) IN anwering such a question the majority of the Bench consisting of five Judges held that S. 47 of the Registration Act has nothing do in deciding when a sale is completed. The making of demand was not in dispute in that case but the dispute was as to when the sale was completed. ( 23 ) IN anwering such a question the majority of the Bench consisting of five Judges held that S. 47 of the Registration Act has nothing do in deciding when a sale is completed. That Section, the Court observed, applies to a document only after it has been registered and object of the Section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property has the overriding effect. Thus, the aforesaid observation made in considering the question of completion of a sale deed cannot have any application in determining the time of commencement of a lease. ( 24 ) IN the case of Hiralal v. Rampadarth, AIR 1969 SC 244 the Supreme Court held that a right of reconveyance under S. 16 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquistion of Surplus Land) Act accrues only when the registration of sale deed is completed as required by Ss. 60 and 61 of the Registration Act and application under S. 16 presented to the Collector prior to such date is premature. The said decision, like the one in the case of Ram Saran (supra) cannot have any application to a case where question is as to the time of commencement of relation between the parties but not of accrual of a right of reconveyance or pre-emption which admittedly arises on completion of registration of the sale. ( 25 ) IN the case of Amar Chand v. Union of India, 142 ITR 402 (Bom) and Divvi Suryanarayana v. Competent Authority, (1979) 117 ITR 278 : (1978 Tax LR1) the question before the Bombay High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court respectively was whether a proceeding under S. 269c of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to a sale deed executed prior to the coming into operation of the said Section on the ground that registration of such deed was completed after coming into operation of that Section. In answering the aforesaid question in affirmative both the Courts held that right to initiate proceeding under S. 269c of the Income-tax Act accrues only on completion of sale and the sale is completed only on registration. In answering the aforesaid question in affirmative both the Courts held that right to initiate proceeding under S. 269c of the Income-tax Act accrues only on completion of sale and the sale is completed only on registration. In such a case by taking aid of S. 47 of the Registration Act,, the petitioners could not say that the sale was completed earlier. Those decisions do not answer the question involved in this case as to the commencement of lease in question. ( 26 ) IN the case of A. P. Chowdhury v. R. R. Basu (1979) 83 Cal WN 527 : (AIR 1979 NOC 86), the question was whether a lease deed which has not at all been registered can be construed as a valid lease deed for 21 years. The Division Bench did not recognise such deed as a valid one. I fail to understand how the said decision can be of any assistance to the appellant when in this case the deed is a registered one. ( 27 ) THUS all the decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee are of no avail to his client. The only point raised by Mr. Mukherjee having failed I find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.