Judgment ( 1. ) HEARD the learned counsel for the revisionlst/judgment-debtor as well as the learned counsel representing the plaintiffs/respondents decree-holder. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff/respondent had filed a suit in the year 1986 for the eviction of seven defendants including the applicant from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The defendants were the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased sole tenant, Shri Poptmal. The arrears of rent had been claimed from 1-10-1984. The aforesaid suit, vide the order dated 20-12-1996 passed by the Trial Court had proceeded ex parte against the defendants. During the pendency of the suit in the proceedings under Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, an order had been passed by the Trial Court requiring the deposit of the arrears of rent from 1-10-1984 as pointed out by the learned counsel for the parties, this order had not been complied with and no amount was deposited as directed. ( 3. ) THE plaintiff closed its evidence in the month of January, 1999. No evidence had been led by the defendants in support of their defence. It may be noticed that Suresh, the present applicant/revisionist had filed a separate written statement while Ashok, the defendant No. 5 and Nanakram, Ram- chand, Dayaram and Laxmi Bai, the defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 respectively had filed separate written statements. The Trial Court after framing the necessary issues and considering the evidence and material brought on record decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 9-4-1999. ( 4. ) SUBSEQUENTLY, an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, praying for the setting aside of the decree was filed on 7-1-2000 by Suresh, the defendant No. 4, who is the present applicant The other defendants, however, submitted to the decree passed by the Trial Court. ( 5. ) THE aforesaid application seeking setting aside of the ex parte decree was dismissed in the absence of the present applicant/revisionist vide the order of the Trial Court dated 11-4-2000. Later, the applicant, who had been impleaded as the defendant No. 4, filed an application under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC on 6-5-2000 seeking setting aside of the order dated 11-4-2000 praying for the restoration of the application Filed by him under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, to its original number. Later, the applicant, who had been impleaded as the defendant No. 4, filed an application under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC on 6-5-2000 seeking setting aside of the order dated 11-4-2000 praying for the restoration of the application Filed by him under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, to its original number. This application was filed on 4-5-2000. In his aforesaid application seeking recall of the order dated 11-4-2000 the present revisionist had come up with a case that he had no knowledge that the case was going to be heard by the Court. It was also asserted that the counsel for the revisionist had not given the full information in time and on account of this mistake the revisionist could not appear on the date fixed for hearing which was 11-4-2000. On 5-3-2001, the counsel for the applicant made a statement before the Court that the applicant did not propose to lead any evidence in support of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC. ( 6. ) IT may be noticed at this stage that in the proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, initiated by the present revisionist, on 20-1-2000 after hearing the counsel for the revisionist, the Trial Court had granted an interim order staying execution of the decree subject to the condition that the entire amount due under the decree is deposited within ten days and its receipt is filed on record and further within ten days personal undertaking is filed by the present revisionist alongwith security for Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) ensuring that the possession of the premises in dispute shall not be handed over to any other person and further that he will comply with the decree within a month of the disposal of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC. The revisionist was also required to take the requisite steps to serve the respondents by ordinary process and registered post within three days. ( 7. ) THE revisionist, however, did not comply with the order of the Trial Court and the undertaking etc. , was not furnished. ( 8. ) ON 7-2-2000, however, an application was filed praying for three days further time to comply with the conditions. The Trial Court fixed 8-2-2000 for its disposal. On this date, none appeared to press the said application when it was called for hearing at 11. , was not furnished. ( 8. ) ON 7-2-2000, however, an application was filed praying for three days further time to comply with the conditions. The Trial Court fixed 8-2-2000 for its disposal. On this date, none appeared to press the said application when it was called for hearing at 11. 30 A. M. , and again at 1. 30 P. M. , none appeared to press this application. When it was again called at 3. 00 P. M. , however the wife of the applicant appeared and sought for an adjournment. Although she was not a party in the case, even in the absence of the applicant and his counsel, the Trial Court fixed 11-2-2000 for the disposal of the application. On that date, neither the applicant nor his counsel appeared. The Trial Court, however, fixed 24-2-2000. Then 28-2-2000 was fixed. On both these dates neither the applicant nor his counsel appeared. Thereafter, 1-3-2000 was fixed on which date both the applicant as well as his counsel put in appearance and after hearing them the application was rejected. 8-A. From what has been indicated hereinabove, it is apparent that even when the applicant as well as his counsel were not present and did not appear when the case was called, they were well aware of the dates of adjourned hearing as otherwise they could not have appeared even on 1-3-2000. They were obviously keeping track of the proceedings and the fixing of the various dates of adjourned hearing. ( 9. ) AS has already been noticed hereinabove, the application was rejected on 1-3-2000, observing that although he had prayed for only three days time on 7-2-2000, he had neither furnished the undertaking nor deposited any amount, even though instead of three days he had at his disposal 23 (twenty-three) days by the time the matter was taken up for consideration. ( 10. ) IT may be noticed that even steps were not taken to serve the respondents though specifically directed. The aforesaid order had been passed in the presence of the revisionist as well as his counsel, Shri Jitendra Tiwari. This is noted in the order dated 1-3-2000 itself. After rejecting the application the Trial Court had Fixed 3rd of March, 2000. On that date neither the applicants counsel nor the applicant appeared. The Trial Court on that date fixed 23-3-2000. This is noted in the order dated 1-3-2000 itself. After rejecting the application the Trial Court had Fixed 3rd of March, 2000. On that date neither the applicants counsel nor the applicant appeared. The Trial Court on that date fixed 23-3-2000. On this date again neither the revisionist nor his counsel appeared. The respondent Nos. 2 to 7 remained unserved as no step was taken to serve them. On this date the Trial Court fixed 11-4-2000. On that date also neither the plaintiff nor his counsel appeared when the case was called for hearing at 11. 30 A. M. It was again called at 1. 30 P. M. , but neither the applicant nor his counsel appeared. Thereafter, the case was called at 3. 15 P. M. , but not responded on behalf of the applicant or his counsel. It was again called at 4. 40 P. M. , but neither the applicant nor his counsel appeared. No evidence had been produced in support of the applicants case. In the circumstances the application was dismissed in the absence of the applicant and his counsel. ( 11. ) THE Trial Court vide the impugned order after noticing the aforesaid facts disbelieved the case of the applicant that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. His further case that he had no knowledge that 11-4-2000 had been fixed was also disbelieved. The Trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the applicant had failed to establish satisfactorily sufficient cause for his absence and further that he had failed to comply with the directions of the Court and was not entitled to any sympathetic consideration. In the aforesaid circumstances the application seeking setting aside of the order dated 11-4-2000 was dismissed vide the impugned order. ( 12. ) FEELING aggrieved the revisionist had now approached this Court invoking its revisional jurisdiction envisaged under Section 115, CPC praying for setting aside of the impugned order. ( 13. ) LEARNED counsel for the revisionist has strenuously urged that in the and circumstances of the present case the applicant could not be imputed with the knowledge of the date fixed for hearing and further in any view of the matter the applicant could not be made to suffer on account of the fault of his counsel and his omission to inform him about the date fixed for hearing. ( 14. ( 14. ) THE learned counsel for the plaintiff/decree-holder on the other hand has asserted that in the present case from the very beginning the applicant had adopted a dilatory tactics with the intention to some how or the other prolong the litigation and gain as much time as he could to retain possession of the premises in dispute which had been let out to Poptmal, his predecessor-in-interest without paying any rent and continue to enjoy the said accommodation absolutely free of charges and the application had been filed with a mala fide intention apparent on the record. It is further urged that not only the plaintiff himself but even the counsel engaged by him was present in Court on 1-3-2000 and it was in their presence that 3rd of March, 2000 was fixed and there was no occasion for them for not appearing on the other dates fixed by the Court. It has also been pointed out that even the suit had proceeded ex parte against the applicant and no effort was made to get the order dated 20-12-1996 directing the suit to proceed ex parte against the defendants set aside. Further in spite of the clear directions no effort was made to deposit the arrears of rent and even the current rent was not deposited. ( 15. ) THE contention is that the defaults in appearance on the dates fixed was deliberate and intentional. It is urged that it is not a case where the impugned order can be said to have occasioned a failure of justice or if allowed to stand will result in irreparable injury to the judgment-debtor/applicant specially when other tenants-in-common who had inherited the tenancy from the sole tenant, Poptmal, since deceased, had submitted to the decree and no amount of rent or damages for use and occupation had been deposited right from 1-10-1984 till now. ( 16. ) I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 17. ( 16. ) I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 17. ) IN its decision in the case of Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gajbi v. Kamalabai, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 148 , finding that no material had been placed on record either in the Trial Court or in the High Court, much less in the Supreme Court, to show that the defendants were diligently prosecuting the suit and up-holding the finding of the Trial Court that there was no bona fides or genuineness for their non-appearance on the dates fixed for hearing of the suits and the defendants were intending to prolong the matter, the Apex Court had upheld the order of the High Court declining to interfere in the discretion exercised by the Trial Court while rejecting the application for setting aside the ex parte order indicating that it would not be appropriate to put the clock back to further prolong the matter. ( 18. ) IN its another decision in the case of Salil Dutta v. T. M. and M. C. Private Ltd. , reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 , while distinguished its earlier decision in the case of Rafiq v. Munshilal, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 788 : ( AIR 1981 SC 1400 ), it was indicated by the Apex Court that the ratio of that decision could not be said to be attracted in a case which was not an appeal preferred by a out-stationed litigant but a suit which was posted for final hearing seven years after the institution of the suit. In that case, it has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court that the concerned Advocate had conducted the proceedings in most improper manner and that his absence on the relevant dates and on subsequent dates was not only discourteous but possibly a dereliction of duty to his client and further that the learned Advocate had forgotten his professional duty in not making inquiry from the Court as to what happened on 10th June, 1988, 11th June, 1988 and 13th June, 1988 and further that the Advocate acted in a most perfunctory and unusual manner. ( 19. ) THE Honble Apex Court had indicated in its aforesaid decision that the Advocate is the agent of the party. ( 19. ) THE Honble Apex Court had indicated in its aforesaid decision that the Advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i. e. , the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the Court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the Advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its Advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq (supra) must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. It was also indicated that one thing was clear that the defendants in that case had chosen to non-co-operate with the Court. Having adopted such a stand towards the Court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the Advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature of significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted. ( 20. ) I am clearly of the view that it must be emphasised that it is not the practice much less a rule of procedure that an adjourned date is to be intimated to an absent party. No doubt if a party chooses to apply in person or by a representative at the Court or office he can learn that the order has been passed but he cannot insist upon a communication by the Court about the adjourned date. The underlying principle is that where the existence of the suit/case had been brought to the notice of the defendants/concerned parties by due service of a summons on them it is their duty thereafter to inform themselves of what is being done in the case unless there has been any interruption of the hearing by any stay order or transfer of the case to another Court by a Superior Court without fixing any date of appearance in the Transferee Court. If the suit/case is proceeding in the normal course in that event it is the duty of the party to find out the adjourned dates fixed for hearing. The concerned party in such a case would be deemed to have been informed of the dates of the suit/case and imputed with the knowledge of the adjourned dates. Further, no duty in such cases stand cast upon the Court to inform the concerned party of the adjourned dates when such a party did not conform with the imperative duty of being present in the Court. ( 21. ) AS has already been indicated hereinabove, it is not the practice much less a rule of procedure whereunder an adjourned date is to be informed to an absent party. As has already been noticed hereinbefore, the applicant together with his counsel was present in Court on 1-3-2000 when his application seeking extension of time had been heard. This date which was an adjourned date of hearing had been fixed on 28-2-2000. After rejecting his application, the Trial Court had fixed 3-3-2000 and thereafter had fixed 22-3-2000. The next date fixed was 11-4-2000. The applicant along with his counsel was present on 1-3-2000 and had full knowledge of the next date fixed which was 3-3-2000. Neither the applicant nor his counsel however appeared on the dates fixed subsequent to 1-3-2000. ( 22. ) THERE is nothing to show because the applicant has not offered to give evidence that he was prevented by sufficient cause for being present on the relevant date. He should have been present in Court or should have taken necessary steps for the conduct of the case on the date fixed. If, therefore, the applicant by his own negligence in being absent on the date fixed did not know of the adjourned date he has to thank himself. ( 23. ) TAKING into consideration the facts and circumstances in their totality, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference in the discretion exercised by the Court below in rejecting the application. ( 24. ) THIS revision in the circumstances deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. ( 25. ) THERE shall, however, be no order as to costs. ( 26. ) CIVIL Revision dismissed.