R. H. ZAIDI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER, by means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, prays for issuance of a writ. Order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 15. 1. 1998 (fax) sent by the Deputy Manager (Vigilance), intimating about imposition of penalty of reduction In pay by one stage for two years having no effect in postponing his future increments after expiry of two years and withholding promotion of the petitioner from Technical assistant Grade II to Technical Assistant Grade I and the detailed order dated 20/21. 1. 1998 passed by the Zonal Manager (North), imposing the aforesaid penalty. Prayer for a direction not to give effect to the aforesaid orders has also been made. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts of the case giving rise to the present petition, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as Technical Assistant Grade III by direct recruitment in the Food Corporation of india. It was on 1. 12. 1980 that he was promoted to the post of Technical Assistant Grade II and was posted at Unit No. 1. Shed No. II of the Food Storage Depot, Rosar Kothi, Shahjahanpur. The duty of the petitioner at the above place was checking of incoming and outgoing stocks and for keeping the quality control of the food grains received at the Food Storage Depot. At the said place, one Shri Raghuvendra Singh was also posted as Technical Assistant Grade-I. There were several sheds at the aforesaid place for storage of goods received from the various units of Food corporation of India. It was on 30. 7. 1987 that 17056 wheat bags were received from Gopal industry, Powayan of Unit-I Shed No. II and Unit No. II, Shed No. III etc. The said stock of wheat was loaded in railway wagons for dispatch to Gorakhpur. According to the petitioner, stock of wheat from Shed No. II where the petitioner was posted was not loaded in any one of two railway wagons, namely wagon Nos. WR 81785 and W. R. 62566. Thus, the petitioner had no concern with the aforesaid loading of wheat, he was not even present at the time of loading of wheat into the wagons. Subsequently, on a complaint received, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and charge sheet was issued to him on 1. 6. 1988. WR 81785 and W. R. 62566. Thus, the petitioner had no concern with the aforesaid loading of wheat, he was not even present at the time of loading of wheat into the wagons. Subsequently, on a complaint received, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and charge sheet was issued to him on 1. 6. 1988. The main allegation levelled against him was that 620 bags of damaged wheat were loaded in the aforesaid wagons. Similar charge sheets were served upon Shri Rajeshwar Singh, Assistant Manager (Depot), Shri Riyaz Akhtar, Technical Assistant Grade-1, Shri R. D. Ram, Technical Assistant, aidal Singh and others (seven persons ). The disciplinary proceedings against the aforesaid persons were held separately and independently from each other. The petitioner submitted his explanation in reply of the charge sheet handed over to him, emphatically denying the loading of sub-standard or damaged wheat. It was stated that he never dispatched the wheat in question. It was also stated the petitioner was posted at Unit-I, Shed No. II, Rosar Kothi, Shahjahanpur wherefrom a separate consignment of only 3330 bags of wheat was dispatched, which was in effectly sound condition in a separate wagon and not in the wagons in question. The inquiry was conducted by Shri Kedar Nath Dhanvik, Deputy Manager (General), Regional Office, Lucknow under the orders of the disciplinary authority (Senior Regional Manager, U. P. Region, lucknow ). The Enquiry Officer after conducting the enquiry against the petitioner came to the conclusion that the wheat in question was not loaded by or in presence of the petitioner at Unit-I, shed No. II, but the same was loaded at other sheds with which petitioner had absolutely no concern. It was also held that 330 bags of wheat dispatched from Shed No. II, Units No. 1 were not loaded in the wagons in question. Having recorded the aforesaid findings. It was held that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved vide report dated 27. 8. 1994. The Senior regional Manager, the disciplinary authority of the petitioner, accepted the equilty report and agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and exonerated the petitioner from the charges, referred to above, vide order dated 4. 5. 1995, which has become final as against the same no appeal or revision was filed by anybody. 8. 1994. The Senior regional Manager, the disciplinary authority of the petitioner, accepted the equilty report and agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and exonerated the petitioner from the charges, referred to above, vide order dated 4. 5. 1995, which has become final as against the same no appeal or revision was filed by anybody. As stated above, the enquiries were held against the persons charged separately, the Enquiry Officer after conducting the disciplinary proceedings against one Shri Aidal Singh, Technical Assistant Grade-III held the charges levelled against him were proved. He was also held guilty of dereliction of his duty while loading sub-standard damaged wheat into the wagons in question, the said findings were also accepted by the disciplinary authority and he was awarded penality of reduction of pay by two stages for three years with cumulative effect. Against the order of punishment passed against shri Aidal Singh, he filed an appeal under Regulation 68 of the Staff Regulations of Food corporation of India, 1971, for short the Regulation, before the Zonal Manager (North), New delhi. On receipt of memo of appeal, the Appellate Authority without examining the record relating to the enquiry conducted against the petitioner, issued fresh memorandum of charges dated 6/9. 11. 1995 to the petitioner in purported exercise of power under Regulation 74 (1), clause (b) of the Regulations, calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why proposed penalty should not be imposed upon him. In the aforesaid, memorandum, vague charges were levelled against the petitioner taking the view that in his opinion, all officials deployed at rail heads and dispatching unit were jointly and collectively responsible for loading of damaged stocks. It was wrongly noticed that common proceeding was held against all the officials of the corporation as actually separate enquiries were conducted against each one of them and separate reports were submitted by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner again submitted his explanation denying the charges levelled against him and asserting that he was not at all responsible for loading of sub-standard wheat. There was nothing on the record to show that the case of the petitioner was similar to the case of Shri Aidal Singh. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that he was not aware of any appeal filed by Shri Aidal Singh and the points raised by him in his defence. There was nothing on the record to show that the case of the petitioner was similar to the case of Shri Aidal Singh. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that he was not aware of any appeal filed by Shri Aidal Singh and the points raised by him in his defence. The petitioner emphasized that he was posted on a different rail head and not at the shed wherefrom the wheat in question was loaded. It was reiterated that the petitioner loaded only 330 bags of wheat from his shed No. II, which were perfectly in good condition, in different wagons and not in wagons in question. He also pointed out that findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were quite correct and there was no justification for issuing second charge sheet to him. It was on 31. 12. 1997 that the petitioner was promoted as Technical Assistant Grade-I from the post of technical Assistant Grade-II by the Food Corporation of India along with other officials. The petitioner was duly intimated about the aforesaid promotion order on 1. 1. 1998 by the District manager of the Food Corporation of India at Bareilly. It was on 15. 1. 1998 that a fax massage was sent by the regional office of the Food Corporation of India, Lucknow with a copy to the district Manager, Food Corporation of India, Bareilly informing that the Zonal Manager has found the petitioner guilty and ordered the imposition of penalty of reduction pay by one stage for two years, which will have no effect in postponing his future increments after expiry of two years. It was also informed through the above message that formal penalty order was being sent separately. It was on 21. 2. 1998 that the above noted order was served upon the petitioner whereby the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Technical Gradc-1 was withheld. As the impugned order was passed without conducting enquiry and without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and to produce evidence in his defence, the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and was also based on wrong facts, the petitioner had no option but to approach this Court and file the present petition. ( 3 ) THE respondents, on receipt of the notice of the writ petition, filed a short counter affidavit, which was taken on record. ( 3 ) THE respondents, on receipt of the notice of the writ petition, filed a short counter affidavit, which was taken on record. By means of the short counter affidavit, the respondents have raised a preliminary objection regarding existence of statutory alternative remedy under Regulations 68 and 69 of the Regulations. It was contended that the present petition was filed without exhaustion of alternative remedy, the same was. therefore, liable to be dismissed. This Court did not, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, attach any wight to the aforesaid preliminary objection and ultimately admitted the writ petition vide order dated 6. 1. 2000 holding that the impugned order was passed wholly without jurisdiction and without following the procedure prescribed for the same. The respondents, thereafter, filed detailed counter affidavit controverting the facts stated in the writ petition, in reply of which a rejoinder affidavit was also filed by the petitioner reiterating and reasserting the facts stated in the writ petition. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. S. K. Mehrotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel for the respondents. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the Enquiry Officer after conducting the enquiry against the petitioner recorded clear and categorical findings that the petitioner was not present at the time and place when the sub-standard wheat bags in question were loaded in the two wagons, referred to above and that 330 bags of wheat were loaded by him in a different wagon which were not found sub-standard or damaged. He was, therefore, not guilty of the charges levelled against him. It was also urged that the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order without following the procedure prescribed for the same wholly arbitrarily and illegally inasmuch as after fresh charge-sheet was issued, the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing nor he was permitted to produce evidence in his defence nor any fresh enquiry was conducted and the said respondent acted in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that the petitioner was also guilty of the charges levelled against him jointly and collectively. According to him, the existence of alternative remedy was not an absolute bar for approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that once the petition was entertained and admitted, the same could not be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In support of his submissions, he cited certain decisions, which I will notice and deal with a appropriate place. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents supported the validity of the impugned order. He vehemently urged that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy. The petitioner had no right to approach this Court straightaway without exhausting the statutory alternative remedy. It was also urged that as Aidal Singh and others were found guilty of charges levelled against them, therefore there was no justification for disciplinary authority to exonerate the petitioner from the charges levelled against him. According to him, the writ petition filed by the petitioner was liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) I have considered the submission made by learned Counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the record. ( 8 ) SO far as the existence of alternative remedy is concerned, there is no doubt that the order under challenge was appealable as appeal was provided against the same under Regulation 69, which reads as under :- "68. Appellate Authorities.--An appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties made by the disciplinary authority shall lie to the appellate authority specified in this behalf in Appendix 2 or to any other authority (not lower in rank than the appellate authority specified in appendix-2) empowered in this behalf by a general or special order of the Board. In other cases an appeal lies to the authority next higher to the authority passing the order. " ( 9 ) IT is well settled in law that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain in a petition and exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There are several exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy. " ( 9 ) IT is well settled in law that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain in a petition and exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There are several exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy. One of the exceptions is that if the writ petition has been entertained and counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed, the same should not be thrown on the ground of existence of alternative remedy. A reference in this regard be made to the decision of the Apex Court in L. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 . In the said decision it was ruled by the Honble Supreme Court as under : "12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained this petition. Hirday Narain could have moved the commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income Tax officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits. The High Court observed that under Section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the jurisdiction of the Income-Tax Officer is discretionary. If thereby it is intended that the income-tax Officer has discretion to exercise or not to exercise the power to rectify, that view is in our judgment erroneous, Section 35 enacts that the Commissioner or Appellate Assistant commissioner or the Income-tax Officer may rectify any mistake apparent from the record. If thereby it is intended that the income-tax Officer has discretion to exercise or not to exercise the power to rectify, that view is in our judgment erroneous, Section 35 enacts that the Commissioner or Appellate Assistant commissioner or the Income-tax Officer may rectify any mistake apparent from the record. If a statute invests a public Officer with authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the case when a party interested and having a right to apply moves in that behalf and circumstances for exercise if the words used in the statue are prima facie enabling, the Courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right-public or private of a citizen. " ( 10 ) SIMILAR view was taken by this Court in Nalni Rajan Vidyarthi v. Chairman, Life Insurance corporation of India, Central Office Bombay and Ors. (1991) 1 UPLBEC 584. In the said decision this Court was pleased to hold as under: "7. I am not inclined to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy before labour Court. After the writ petition was filed parties have exchanged affidavits and the case is ripe for admission hearing. Under the circumstances, it is not proper to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy specially, when there is not disputed question of fact involved. " ( 11 ) IT is also well-settled in law that if an order is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules and regulations the existence of alternative remedy is no bar. While admitting the present writ petition this Court observed as under : ". . . . . . . . The enquiry officer gave a clear cut finding that the petitioner was not on duty when the wheat was being dispatched. While admitting the present writ petition this Court observed as under : ". . . . . . . . The enquiry officer gave a clear cut finding that the petitioner was not on duty when the wheat was being dispatched. On the basis of the finding of enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority exonerated him of the charge levelled against him However subsequently the Zonal manager, on the appeal filed by Aidal Singh, issued, on his own, a show cause notice to the petitioner asking him as to why he should not be dealt with the similar charge and it was thereafter that the Zonal Manager held the petitioner guilty and imposed punishment of reduction in pay be one stage for two years in the present scale of pay. Obviously the decision of the Zonal manager was contrary to all norms and practice as prescribed by the procedure. As a matter of fact he should have followed the entire procedure prescribed for the purpose and unless that course was resorted to he could not have passed an order to the above effect. No evidence was recorded by him nor careful consideration of the exoneration report was taken notice of. " ( 12 ) HAVING made the above noted observations, the writ petition was admitted as the impugned order was passed in violation of principle of natural justice as well as in violation of provisions of Staff Regulations, 1971, for short "the Regulation". In view of what has been stated above preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel has got no force and the same is overruled. ( 13 ) THE impugned order has been passed in purported exercise of power under Regulation 74 (1) (b), which provides as under :-" 74. In view of what has been stated above preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel has got no force and the same is overruled. ( 13 ) THE impugned order has been passed in purported exercise of power under Regulation 74 (1) (b), which provides as under :-" 74. Review.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Board may, at any time either on its own motion or otherwise, call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these regulations and (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case, or (d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit: provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by the reviewing authority unless the employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Regulation 54 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be viewed to any of the penalties specified in those clause; no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in Regulation 58. (2) No proceeding for review shall be commenced until after : (i) The expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) An application for review shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it where an appeal under these regulations. (4) Powers similar to those specified in Clause (1) above may be exercised by the (Chairman), managing Director, Zonal Manager and Regional Manager (Additional/joint Manager) in respect of orders passed by authorities subordinate to them. (3) An application for review shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it where an appeal under these regulations. (4) Powers similar to those specified in Clause (1) above may be exercised by the (Chairman), managing Director, Zonal Manager and Regional Manager (Additional/joint Manager) in respect of orders passed by authorities subordinate to them. " ( 14 ) A reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that basically the power of review is that of the board but the same may also be exercised by the officials mentioned in Sub-regulation (4) of regulation 74 referred to above after following the procedure prescribed under the law. Proviso to Clause (d) of Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 74 of the Regulation clearly provides that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by the reviewing authority unless the employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penality proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Regulation 54 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be viewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses; no such penality shall be imposed except after an Inquiry in the manner laid down in Regulation 58. In the instant case admittedly the respondent No. 1 did not record any reason for discarding the findings recorded by the enquiry officer particularly when validity of the order dated 4. 5. 1995, whereby petitioner was exonerated by the disciplinary authority, was challenged by anybody. It may also by noted that regulation 58 provides procedure for conducting enquiry. Regulation 74 made it compulsory for the reviewing authority before imposing any major penalty to conduct enquiry in the manner laid down by the Regulation 58 and in cases of imposing minor penalties to make a representation. No such enquiry was admittedly held and no effective opportunity to make a representation was afforded to the petitioner, therefore, the order passed by the authority below dated 20/21. 1. 1998 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 15 ) IT may be noted that the appeals were filed by Mr. Aidal Singh and others against the orders passed by the disciplinary authority against them. 1. 1998 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 15 ) IT may be noted that the appeals were filed by Mr. Aidal Singh and others against the orders passed by the disciplinary authority against them. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 issued a fresh memorandum of charges to the petitioner suo moto under misconception of facts of the case and completely ignoring the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer as confirmed by the disciplinary authority to the effect that at the time when the wheat bags in question were loaded, petitioner was not present and that his duty was at Shed No. 2 wherefrom only 330 bags of what were loaded which were never found sub-standard. Although it was noted as under in the impunged order: "no doubt the arrangement made by the AM (OC) was defective, he should have issued written orders for deployment of officials. Even the Disciplinary Authority in his order has admitted that there was no evidence to indicate that the Tas in specific manner were responsible. In the absence of any documentary evidence only collective responsibility could be presumed. " ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents failed to produce any statutory provision or to show that the petitioner was collectively and jointly responsible for the acts done, by the other persons nor any decision to that effect has been placed before this Court. Legally, in service jurisprudence, there is no concept of joint responsibility unless of course the statute or relevant service rules provide for joint or collective responsibility of a Government servant or at least the posting order says so. In the present case, as stated above, no statutory provision or rule has been produced providing joint and collective responsibility of the officers of Food Corporation of india, particularly when they are not posted at one place. Two sheds wherefrom loading of what is stated to have been made are situated at different places, therefore, there was no question of collective and joint responsibility of the petitioner as he was not supposed to supervise the work of officials and activities on the other sheds. The view taken to the contrary by the respondent no. 1 in the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and illegal. ( 17 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. The view taken to the contrary by the respondent no. 1 in the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and illegal. ( 17 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. It is not disputed that wheat bags were received at shahjahanpur railway station from the various units of the Food Corporation of India. There is no finding recorded by the authority below that wheat bags were received in good condition and were not already damaged. It is possible that at the time when the wheat bags were received at the sheds in question they were already in damaged condition, therefore, mere lading of wheat bags into wagon itself cannot be sufficient to make out any ground for taking disciplinary action against any one of the persons deputed at the railway station, particularly, the petitioner who was not deputed at the shed where the loading of wheat bags is stated to have been done, therefore, no case, against the petitioner for taking any disciplinary action was at all made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion the writ petition deserves to be allowed. ( 18 ) THE writ petition succeeds and is hererby allowed. The orders dated 15. 1. 1998 (fax) and 20/21. 1. 1998 passed by the Zonal Manager, contained in Annexures 7 and 8 to the writ petition, are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to hold the post of technical Assistant Grade-1 on which he was promoted, with all consequential benefits within a period of one week from the date a certified copy of this order is communicated to the competent Authority.