Judgment : 1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.132 of 1986 by the Subordinate Judge, Villupuram on 2.12.1987. 2. Theplaintiffs are the appellants. 3. The plaint averments are briefly as follows. The plaintiffs are sisters. The first defendant is their mother and defendants 2 and 3 are their brothers. Veerasamy Udayar is plaintiffs’ father. The joint family consisting of Veerasamy and defendants 2 and 3 owned extensive ancestral properties. From the income there from, the family purchased various other properties. Veerasamy was the Kartha of the family. He died intestate in or about 1962. At that time, the plaintiffs were minors. After Veerasamy’s death, second defendant, as the eldest male member, was managing the entire properties. In the properties, after Veerasamy’s death, the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 are entitled to the following shares. 1st plaintiff 1/15. 2nd plaintiff i1/15. 1st defendant 1/15. 2nd defendant 6/15.. 3rd defendant 6/15. Defendants 1 and 3 have sold several items of properties belonged to the joint family under sale deeds, dated 28.2.1972, 13.9.1972, 1 1.10.1972 and 8.11.1973, for the purchase of a residential house at Cuddalore to reside and educate the children. Accordingly, on 23.5.1974, Door No.24, Abdul Khader Lane, was purchased by second defendant and the acquisition was out of joint family funds and the consideration received from the sale deeds. As the second defendant was the manager of the joint family, the sale deed was taken in his name. After the purchase, the plaintiffs and defendants were residing there. Even now, except the second plaintiff, all others are residing in the same house in different portions. The second defendant sold away Door No.24, Abdul Khader Lane to the fourth defendant under sale deed, dated 22.9.1983, as if it was his separate property. The property worth about Rs.2,00,000 has been sold for a paltry sum of Rs.47,000. The sale deed is void and is not binding on the plaintiffs or other sharers. The plaintiffs were not aware of the sale and no consideration was passed under the sale deed. On the strength of that sale deed, dated 22.9.1983, the fourth defendant had filed a suit in O.S. No.222 of 1985 on the file of Sub-Court, Cuddalore against the second defendant alone for recovery of possession. The second defendant filed written statement, but later remained ex-parte and suffered an ex-parte decree on 25.8.1986. On the strength of that sale deed, dated 22.9.1983, the fourth defendant had filed a suit in O.S. No.222 of 1985 on the file of Sub-Court, Cuddalore against the second defendant alone for recovery of possession. The second defendant filed written statement, but later remained ex-parte and suffered an ex-parte decree on 25.8.1986. In execution of the decree, the fourth defendant took steps to take delivery. The Amin came on 27.10.1986 for effecting delivery of the property. The plaintiffs were not made parties in the suit. The decree in O.S.No.222 of 1985 is not binding on the plaintiffs. On further enquiry, the plaintiffs came to know that the defendants 1 to 3 have alone partitioned all the joint family properties between themselves under a Registered partition Deed, dated 16.7.1983. The plaintiffs together are entitled to 2/15 share and any partition in their absence is void and not binding on them. Door No.24, Abdul Khader Lane property also has to be included in the family properties. The defendants have acted collusively and are planning to deprive the plaintiffs of their due share. There were no debts due to the family. The plaintiffs are in joint possession. The plaintiffs prayed for a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of their 2/15 share in the suit properties. 4. Thesecond defendant did not appear in the suit and has remained ex-parte. 5. Defendants 1 and 3 have filed separate written statements, but the contents are more or less the same and they are as follows. Veerasamy died intestate in or about 1960 and at that time, defendants 2 and 3 were minors and the mother, namely, the first defendant, was managing the affairs of the joint family. The family was residing in a village and there was no scope for education of the children. So, with a view to settle at Cuddalore and educate the children, the joint family properties were sold and a house was purchased at Cuddalore on 23.5.1974 in the name of the second defendant. The second defendant had no other source of income. The sale deeds specifically recite that the properties were sold for the purpose of purchasing a house at Cuddalore. Hence, Item No. 30 in the suit properties is a piece of Joint family properties. The second defendant had no other source of income. The sale deeds specifically recite that the properties were sold for the purpose of purchasing a house at Cuddalore. Hence, Item No. 30 in the suit properties is a piece of Joint family properties. After the purchase, the family members shifted to Cuddalore and were residing there, without the knowledge and consent of other sharers, the second defendant sold Item No.30 to the fourth defendant on 22.9.1983. Inspite of the sale, the vendee did not take possession and. he was forced to file O.S.No.222 of 1985 impleading the second defendant alone as a party and obtained a decree. As the other sharers are not parties, the decree in that suit is not binding on them. Defendants 1 and 3 are also entitled to a share in all the properties, including Item No.30 and they are prepared to pay the necessary court fees for their share. 6. The fourth defendant has filed a separate written statement and the contentions briefly are as follows. The plaintiffs have come forward with a false case and it is only the second defendant who is prosecuting the suit. The second defendant purchased Item No.30 in the plaint schedule properties under a registered sale deed, dated 23.5.1974 and he was in possession of the same as absolute owner. He sold the property to the fourth defendant under a registered sale deed, dated 22.9.1983, for a consideration of Rs.47,000 and on the same date, an agreement of re-conveyance was brought into existence fixing the time limit for re-conveyance as on or before 21.3.1985. The second defendant failed to exercise his option by allowing the time to lapse and his right got extinguished. After 21.3.1985, the second defendant is only a trespasser with regard to Item No.30 and he is liable for damages for use and occupation. Since the demand for delivery of possession proved futile, the fourth defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.222 of 1985 for recovery of possession and damages against the second defendant herein. In that suit, the present second defendant engaged a leading lawyer at Cuddalore and took several adjournments for filing written statement and filed his written statement on 28.4.1986 in which he has raised several false pleas. Later, during the trial of the suit, the advocate for the second defendant reported ‘no instructions’ and a decree was passed on 25.8.1986. In that suit, the present second defendant engaged a leading lawyer at Cuddalore and took several adjournments for filing written statement and filed his written statement on 28.4.1986 in which he has raised several false pleas. Later, during the trial of the suit, the advocate for the second defendant reported ‘no instructions’ and a decree was passed on 25.8.1986. The fourth defendant was forced to file Execution Petition in E.P.No.186 of 1986 on the file of subordinate Judge, Cuddalore and notice was ordered. The second defendant did not appear in that execution proceedings and the delivery was also ordered. The second defendant, in order to squat on the property endlessly, has filed the present suit through his sisters. The averme nt that Item No. 30 was purchased with the funds raised by the sale of joint family properties and the joint family income is false. The further averment that Item No.30 is also a joint family property is false. The second defendant is the absolute owner of Item No.30 and the plaintiffs have no right in it. The averment that there was no consideration for the sale deed under which the fourth defendant purchased the property is also false. The father of the plaintiffs died in or about 1962 and thereafter there was no joint family at all and the plaintiffs can claim a share only in respect of the properties that were available on the date of death of their father. Any acquisition made thereafter cannot be termed as joint family property so as to enable the plaintiffs to claim a share thereon. The suit is misconceived. 7. The trial court, on a consideration of the matter, came to the conclusion that Item No.30 is not liable for partition and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in that property and at the same time plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of their 2/15 share in items 1 to 29 and granted a decree accordingly. Aggrieved by the rejection of plaintiffs claim with regard to Item No.30 of the suit properties, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. In this judgment, for the sake of convenience, the parties are described as arrayed in the suit. 8. Aggrieved by the rejection of plaintiffs claim with regard to Item No.30 of the suit properties, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. In this judgment, for the sake of convenience, the parties are described as arrayed in the suit. 8. The only point that arises for consideration is whether Item No.30 of the suit properties is liable for partition and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any share in it. 9. There is no dispute with regard to the following facts. The first defendant is the wife of late Veerasamy and the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 are their daughters and sons respectively. Veerasamy as the kartha of the family died intestate in or about 1960. According to the plaintiffs, they and their mother are entitled to 1/15. share individually and the second and third defendants are entitled to 6/15 share each in the properties owned by the family and it is admitted. It is also admitted by defendants 1 and 3 that Item Nos. 1 to 29 of the suit properties are liable for partition and hence a preliminary decree for partition was granted by the trial court with regard to these properties. 10. The dispute is with regard to Item No.30 in the suit properties. Item No.30 is a terraced house with vacant site and it was purchased by the second defendant on 23.5.1974. According to the plaintiffs, some of the joint family properties were sold for the purchase of a residential house at Cuddalore and Item No.30 was so purchased in the name of the second defendant on 23.5.1974 and the acquisition was made out of joint family funds and the consideration received from the sale of the properties. Their further case is that the second defendant was the manager of the joint family and hence the sale deed was taken in his name. Admittedly, Veerasamy died in or about 1960 leaving behind the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiffs seek 1/15 share each in the properties as heirs of Veerasamy. Item No.30 was purchased about 14 years after the death of Veerasamy and the plaintiffs claim share in that item also. 11. According to the plaintiffs, Item No.30 was purchased out of joint family funds and the sale consideration received by defendants 1 to 3. Item No.30 was purchased about 14 years after the death of Veerasamy and the plaintiffs claim share in that item also. 11. According to the plaintiffs, Item No.30 was purchased out of joint family funds and the sale consideration received by defendants 1 to 3. The learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs contends that there was sufficient joint family nucleus from and out of which Item No.30 was acquired in the name of the second defendant and hence it has to be considered as joint family property liable for partition and he relied on decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. The law is well settled and there is no doubt in it. The point to be considered in the present case is whether Item No.30 can be considered as a joint family property liable for partition. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent/4th defendant contends that on the death of Veerasamy there could be no longer a joint family and as per proviso and Explanation-1 to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the shares have to be determined on the basis of a notional partition in the assets of the joint family, existed on the date of his demise and he relied on the following decisions. The first decision that was relied on is State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & others , 98 L.W. (SC) 745, in which, the Apex Court has held that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family property gets fixed on the death of a male member under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act and she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share which would have been notionally allotted to, her as stated in Explanation1 to Section 6 of the Act. The next decision that was relied on is S.Vijayalakshmi and others v. M.G.Ganesa Iyer and others , 97 L.W. 448, in which, this Court has held that the effect of Explanation 1 to Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act is that he shares got determined as on the date of death of the coparcener and the severence though notional has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality and the normal presumptions regarding acquisitions by the kartha could not be invoked with regard to such subsequent acquisitions by the heirs of the deceased coparcener since there is an end of the joint family on the death of the coparcener. 13. In the present case, the disruption of the joint family took place on the death of Veerasamy and the shares got determined as on the date of his death and it is not possible to enlarge the share of the deceased coparcener by taking into account the subsequent acquisitions by the surviving coparceners. Admittedly, Item No.30 was purchased long after the death of Veerasamy and it cannot be made liable for partition for the reasons stated above. 14. Even assuming that Item No.30 is liable for partition, the plaintiffs have to establish that there was sufficient joint family nucleus from and out of which Item No.30 was acquired. It was purchased by the second defendant on 23.5.1974 under Ex.A-1 sale deed. According to P.W.1, the first plaintiff, it was purchased in the name of the second defendant since he happened to be the eldest male member at that time. In the cross-examination, she has stated that she did not know about the details of the purchase under Ex.A-1 and how the consideration of Rs.24,000 was paid. Her testimony does not in any way advance the case of the plaintiffs. Even though it is contended by the plaintiffs that the sale consideration in Ex.A-2 to Ex.A-4 sale deeds was used for purchasing the property under Ex.A-1, no proof is adduced in this regard. It is recited in the above sale deeds that the properties were sold for the purchase of a house at Cuddalore, but still, there is no evidence to show that the above sale consideration was actually used for the purchase of the property under Ex.A-1. It is recited in the above sale deeds that the properties were sold for the purchase of a house at Cuddalore, but still, there is no evidence to show that the above sale consideration was actually used for the purchase of the property under Ex.A-1. It is also pertinent to note that the total consideration received under Ex.A-2 to Ex.A-4 sale deeds was only Rs.6700 and whereas the sale consideration under Ex.A-1 sale deed was Rs.24,000. The plaintiffs have averred in the plaint that Ex.A-1 acquisition was made out of the joint family funds and the sale consideration under Exs.A-2 to A-4 sale deeds. The plaintiffs have not established that the joint family possessed of enough funds for effecting the purchase under Ex.A-1. The plaintiffs have not examined the scribe or attestor of Ex.A-1 sale deed to speak about the sale consideration. The mother is the best witness to speak about Ex.A-1 purchase. Even though she filed written statement in the suit. she did not choose to enter witness box and there was no explanation for it. The plaintiffs have not filed any revenue records to show the income of the properties during the relevant time. The oral evidence of P.W.2 does not inspire confidence, in short, the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden to prove that the family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which Ex.A-1 purchase was made. 15. Admittedly, the second defendant mortgaged Item No.30 to the fourth defendant on 23.6.1983 under Ex.B-1 for a loan of Rs.27,500 and later he has sold it to the 4th defendant on 22.9.1983 under Ex.B-2 sale deed. In the recitals in both the sale deeds, the second defendant has described the property, namely, item No.30, as belonging to him absolutely pursuant to his purchase on 23.5.1974. Conveniently, the second defendant has not chosen to appear in the suit as well as in this appeal. According to D.W.1, the 4th defendant, Item No.30 was purchased and enjoyed by the second defendant and he had mortgaged the same to him under Ex.B-1. Conveniently, the second defendant has not chosen to appear in the suit as well as in this appeal. According to D.W.1, the 4th defendant, Item No.30 was purchased and enjoyed by the second defendant and he had mortgaged the same to him under Ex.B-1. He has further stated that the second defendant sold the same to him on 22.9.1983 for a consideration of Rs.47.000 and on the same date, an agreement of re-conveyance was brought into existence fixing the time limit as on or before 21.3.1985 and the second defendant had failed to exercise his option by allowing the time to lapse and his right got extinguished. It is the further case of the 4th defendant that he was forced to file a suit for recovery of possession against the second defendant in O.S.No.222 of 1985 and he obtained ex-parte decree and in execution of the same, an order of delivery was passed by the court and only at that time, the present suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs at the instance of the second defendant. The fact remains that the plaintiffs have not established that Item No. 30 was purchased by the joint family nucleus as contended by them. In any event, Item No. 30 is not liable for partition for the reasons stated above and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in that property as rightly held by the trial court. 16. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.