Judgment ( 1. ) THESE Misc. Appeals are directed against the common impugned order dated 26th Marh, 1996 by District Judge, Sagar. Since similar questions are involved in all these appeals, they are being disposed of by this common order. ( 2. ) THE facts no longer in dispute are that the appellants of all the appeals are tenants of the respondent - Jama Masjid Committee in different suit-shops. It is also not in dispute that the suit-property is Wakf Property. The initial rent of each suit-shop was Rs. 40. 00 per month which was agreed by the parties to be increased to Rs. 180. 00 per month. The appellants filed an application under Section 10 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the act for short) before the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar, for fixation of standard rent of the suit-shops, The Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar by its order dated 1-10-92 fixed the standard rent of each of the suit-shop at Rs. 54. 00 per month. The present respondents preferred appeals under Section 31 of the act before the District Judge, Sagar against the order of Rent Controlling Authority. The District Judge, Sagar by the impugned order allowed all the appeals and directed that the present appellants/tenants are liable to pay the agreed rent of Rs. 180. 00 per month. ( 3. ) IT may be noticed in the above connection that the petitions under Section 10 of the act were filed before the Rent Controlling Authority somewhere in the year 1988. Thereafter, during the pendency of the said petitions before the Rent Controlling Authority and before it passed the order dated 1-10-92 fixing standard rent, the State Government issued notification No. F-24- (4)-83-XXXII-I, dated the 7th September, 1989 whereby properties owned by the Wakf were exempted from the applicability of all the provisions of the act. The District Judge in the impugned order observed that after the issuance of notification as above, the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar ceased to have jurisdiction to fix standard rent and, therefore, he was not legally competent to pass the order fixing standard rend. It was, therefore, held by the District Judge, that the present appellants/tenants shall be liable to pay the agreed rent of the suit-shops. ( 4. It was, therefore, held by the District Judge, that the present appellants/tenants shall be liable to pay the agreed rent of the suit-shops. ( 4. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants submitted that the aforementioned notification of the State Government dated 7-9-1989 exempting the Wakf Property from the applicability of the provisions of the act was issued during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 10 of the act before Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar. The said notification could not have retrospective operation and could not therefore govern or affect the pending proceedings. Therefore, the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar was competent to consider and decide the petition under Section 10 of the act for fixation of standard rent. It was, therefore, urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned District Judge, Sagar was in error in holding that the order dated 1-10-92 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar was without legal competence and jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his submissions relied upon Kishan alias Krishna Kumar etc. vs. Monoj Kumar etc. , ( AIR 1998 SC 999 ) and Sengaineer Pillaiar Temple, Koranad Mayuram vs. Manickam Chettiar [1977 (I) Mad. LJ 425]. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent however submitted that the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar, had the jurisdiction to deal with the petitions under Section 10 of the Act for fixation of standard rent only with regard to such accommodation to which the act is applicable. Since on 1-10-92, the date on which the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar passed the order fixing standard rent, the suit-property stood exempted from applicability of the provisions of the act, hence fixation of the standard rent as provided under Section 7 of the act by the Rent Controlling Authority was without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent in the above context also submitted that the above question has already been settled by this Court in the case of Mohd. Nasir vs. Jama Masjid Committee [1999 (I) MPJR-SN 38] relating to another shop similarly placed as the suit-shops. It was therefore submitted on behalf of the respondent that the District Judge was justified in setting aside the order of the Rent Controlling Authority, fixing standard rent of the suit shops. ( 6. Nasir vs. Jama Masjid Committee [1999 (I) MPJR-SN 38] relating to another shop similarly placed as the suit-shops. It was therefore submitted on behalf of the respondent that the District Judge was justified in setting aside the order of the Rent Controlling Authority, fixing standard rent of the suit shops. ( 6. ) THE question that arises for consideration therefore is : as to whether the Rent Controlling Authority, Sagar, could competently fix standard rent of suit shops as provided under the act, after the notification dated 7-9-1989 of the State Government ? ( 7. ) IT may be mentioned that under Section 2 (h) of the act standard rent has been defined as below:-" standard rent" in relation to any accommodation means standard rent referred to in Section 7 or where the standard rent has been increased under Section 8, such increased rent. " Meaning of standard rent has been given in Section 7 of the act. Section 8 provides for lawful increase of standard rent in certain cases and for recovery of other charges. By Section 10 of the act the Rent Controlling Authority has been empowered to fix standard rent on an application made to it in that behalf. It may further be noticed that Section 28 of the act provides for appointment of Rent Controlling Authority and Section 29 of the act enumerates the powers of the Rent Controlling Authority while Section 30 of the act provides for the procedure to be followed by it. Section 5 provides that notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary no tenant shall be liable to pay to his landlord for the occupation of any accommodation any amount in excess of the standard rent of the accommodation. ( 8. ) FROM the foregoing provisions it is clear that the Rent Controlling Authority is appointed under Section 28 of the act and that as per Section 10 of the act the Rent Controlling Authority has the authority to fix standard rent. Effect of fixation of standard rent as per Section 5 of the act is that the tenant is only liable to pay the rent so fixed, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. Therefore, the agreement between the parties for payment of rent which would have been enforceable under the general law is curtailed and superseded by the above provision which provides for fixation of standard rent by the Rent Controlling Authority. Therefore, the agreement between the parties for payment of rent which would have been enforceable under the general law is curtailed and superseded by the above provision which provides for fixation of standard rent by the Rent Controlling Authority. However, it is clear that the curtailment of the rights of the landlord as above to realise the agreed rent will apply to such accommodations only, which are governed by the act and not in relation to any other accommodation. ( 9. ) IT may be noticed that Section 3 (2) of the act enables the Government to exempt from all or any of the provisions of the act with regard to any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for that institution or nursing home or maternity home. As noticed above, the State Government had issued Notification No. F-24- (4)-83-XXXII-I, dated the 7th September, 1989 which reads :- "in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961), the State Government hereby exempts all the accommodation owned by- (i) the Wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No. 29 of 1954), or (ii) the public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (No. XXX of 1951), for an educational religious or charitable purpose, from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961 ). " The said notification has come into force from the date of its publication in M. P. Rajpatra (Asadharan), dated 7-9-1989. ( 10. ) THUS, the suit accommodation was exempted from the applicability of the provisions of the act with effect from 7-9-1989. It is, therefore, clear that the standard rent could not be fixed nor was payable for the suit accommodation, from the date of notification. In fact, the Rent Controlling Authority which itself was established under Section 28 of the act would not be competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the accommodations which were exempted from the application of the provisions of the act. ( 11. ) THEREFORE, the Rent Controlling Authority could not act and exercise jurisdiction in relation to the suit-shops, from the said date i. e. , 7-9-1989. ( 11. ) THEREFORE, the Rent Controlling Authority could not act and exercise jurisdiction in relation to the suit-shops, from the said date i. e. , 7-9-1989. Consequently, standard rent could not be fixed and was not payable, under the act from the date of aforesaid notification. ( 12. ) IN the case of Mohd. Nasir (supra) this Court has taken into consideration the above aspect of the matter and has held that the Rent Controlling Authority was not empowered to pass an order fixing standard rent with effect from 7-9-1989, with regard to the accommodation, which was of similar nature as are the suit-shops. ( 13. ) IN Sengaineer Pillaiar Temple (supra), which was a case regarding eviction proceedings, decided by the Division Bench of Madras High Court it was held that the pending proceedings of eviction before Rent Controller could competently be decided by it notwithstanding the exemption granted under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the Government notification of the State Government granting exemption from the applicability of the said Act. ( 14. ) IN Kishan alias Krishan Kumar (supra) suit for possession was filed. During the pendency of the suit Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Evic-tion) Act, 1973 came into force. It was contended on behalf of the tenant that in view of the provisions of the Act, the building in the possession of the tenant would come within the fold of the said Act and the tenant therefore has the right of protection afforded by the Act. It was therefore urged in that case that eviction of the tenant could not be directed except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Apex Court held that there js no provision of the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to dispose of the suit validly instituted. It was further observed that it was evident that the said Act did not prevent a Civil Court from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to the date on which the Act had become applicable to the building in question. Therefore, the Civil Court was held competent to try the suit for possession. ( 15. ) THE facts and circumstances in the instant case, are different. Notification dated 7-9-1989 would not operate retrospectively, but prospec-tively from 7-9-1989. Therefore, the Civil Court was held competent to try the suit for possession. ( 15. ) THE facts and circumstances in the instant case, are different. Notification dated 7-9-1989 would not operate retrospectively, but prospec-tively from 7-9-1989. However, the Rent Controlling Authority appointed under Section 28 of the act could not function as such, in relation to the suit accommodation which was exempted from the applicability of the provisions of the act from the date of notification. Since the standard rent was to be fixed under the act and was payable notwithstanding agreement to the contrary between the parties under the act, the fixation of standard rent under Section 10 could only be done if the provisions of the act were applicable to the accommodation in question. However, as already noticed, the Rent Controlling Authority passed the order fixing standard rent after the notification exempting the suit shops from the provisions of the act had already been issued. It is therefore clear that the parties, after the date of notification, would be governed by the general Jaw and payment of rent would be governed by the agreement between them, and the order of the Rent Controlling Authority fixing standard rent would have no effect thereafter. Therefore, the impugned order, setting aside the order of Rent Controlling Authority fixing standard rent was justified. ( 16. ) THE impugned order therefore calls for no interference. These appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed.