ORDER: The applicant’s case is that the respondents herein have committed contempt of the order of this Court dated 19.1.1996 in W.P. Nos.10989 and 10990 of 1995. The fourth respondent though shown as a party is given up. 2. The applicant and the first respondent are brothers. They and their father the 4th respondent owned several family properties of which two theatres called Lakshmi Talkies and Little Lakshmi Talkies were also included. There were disputes amongst these three. Since the obtaining of ‘C’ form licence was necessary for running of the theatre and in view of the dispute between the parties, the first respondent herein filed W.Ps. 10989 and 10990 of 1995 for a certiorarified mandamus with regard to licence. The first and the second respondent in the writ petition are the second and 3rd respondents in this contempt petition. The applicant herein was the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent is the father. 3. When the writ petitions came up for hearing, a memo of compromise was filed and the proceedings came to an end. The memo of compromise incorporated several terms which provided for the manner in which the two theatres referred to above would be enjoyed by the applicant, the first respondent and their father. In particular, the first respondent was allowed to continue to operate Lakshmi Talkies for a period of five years which came to an end on 31.12.2000. It was so agreed that he would pay a sum of Rs.20,000 per month to the applicant herein for the aforesaid five year period. The compromise memo also provided for handing over of the said theatre to the applicant on 1.1.2001. Clause 8 of the compromise memo provides that any violation of these terms would amount to contempt of Court. According to the applicant, the first respondent did not hand over possession as agreed and committed default in the monthly payment of Rs.20,000 and had therefore violated the undertaking given to this Court. As far as the 2nd and 3rd respondents are concerned, according to the applicant, they had committed contempt by continuing to put the commercial tax seal on the tickets inspite of the applicant putting them on notice of the terms of the compromise memo filed into Court. 4. As far as the 2nd and 3rd respondents are concerned, according to the applicant, they had committed contempt by continuing to put the commercial tax seal on the tickets inspite of the applicant putting them on notice of the terms of the compromise memo filed into Court. 4. Mr.K.V. Ananthakrishnan, learned counsel for the applicant pointed out to the relevant paragraph in the memo of compromise and submitted that the violation of these terms amounted to contempt. According to him, the memo of compromise cannot be construed to be consent between the parties but an undertaking before Court. Since the Court had passed the order in terms of compromise recording the undertaking given by the parties, it amounted to contempt. He also submitted that inspite of this order of Court, the first respondent had filed two civil suits totally in negation of the order of this Court and nullifying the effect thereof which again amounted to contempt. He referred to the decision in Chhaganbhai v. Soni Chandubhai, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1909, where the Supreme Court held that a deliberate violation of an undertaking given to the Court was the same as breach of an injunction and amounted to contempt. He prayed that the respondents be punished. 5. Mr.K.Alagiriswami, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that there was no contempt at all. The memo of compromise was merely a consent between the parties. No undertaking was given to the Court. The writ itself was for a certiorarified mandamus to the statutory authorities and therefore a compromise of this nature was totally outside the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. At the best, it can be construed as an information given to the Court that the parties had arrived at an understanding. Nothing more than that. He also submitted that in fact, before the five year period came to an end, the first respondent had handed over the sum of Rs.1.00 lakh to the applicant seeking an extension of the lease period. The first respondent had received the sum. Therefore, orally, the parties had agreed to have the period extended. After receiving the money, it ws not open to the petitioner to complain of contempt. The first respondent had received the sum. Therefore, orally, the parties had agreed to have the period extended. After receiving the money, it ws not open to the petitioner to complain of contempt. He would say that even though it was the applicant’s case that this amount had been returned, that has to be proved in the Civil suits which are pending and therefore when the question whether there was an oral extension of lease or not itself is an undecided issue, there cannot be any contempt. He also submitted that assuming the worst that there was no oral extension, all that the first respondent could be accused of was violation of contractual terms for which the applicant had other remedies. According to the learned counsel, by no stretch of imagination, can the first respondent be held to have committed contempt. 6. The main thrust of the argument of the learned senior counsel for the contemner appeared to be that the memo of compromise had nothing to do with the main relief sought for, and therefore any agreement between the parties even though filed into Court, will not amount to an undertaking. So I thought it is necessary to look at the affidavit in support of the writ petition filed by the respondent in W.P. Nos.10989 and 10990 of 1995. His case in the writ petition was that he, his father and the applicant formed a joint Hindu family and there was an oral partition and that originally, the H.U.F. started the Lakshmi Talkies. It is his case that the license was obtained by the father as karta of Hindu Undivided Family. Since his brother and he were minors at that time, their names were not included in the license. Subsequently, according to him, the father had executed a release deed on 1.4.1993 releasing his 1/3rd share in the theatre in his favour. Thereafter, according to the first respondent, his father and brother adopted a hostile attitude to him and he approached the Entertainment Tax Officer to affix the seal. He received a letter from them stating that his father had informed the Entertainment Tax Officer that no person other than him was entitled to have the ticket sealed. This order was passed on 10.8.1995. 7. He received a letter from them stating that his father had informed the Entertainment Tax Officer that no person other than him was entitled to have the ticket sealed. This order was passed on 10.8.1995. 7. The writ was for certiorarified mandamus to quash this letter and for interim injunction restraining the first respondent namely the E.T.O. from refusing to affix the seal on the tickets sold from Lakshmi Talkies and Little Lakshmi Talkies. The father, the 4th respondent herein filed a vacate stay petition and submitted that he was the exclusive and sole licensee licensed under the Cinema Regulation Act for the theatre Lakshmi talkies and Little Lakshmi Talkies. According to the father, the petitioner had no right to obtain the seal from the authorities. He claimed that he alone was the licensee and should be entitled to function and manage the theatre. This counter was filed on 9th October, 1995. To this, a reply affidavit was filed by the first respondent herein praying for the interim order to be made absolute. This was on 8.11.1995. The stand of the authorities was that the petitioner is not entitled for an issue of certiorarified mandamus unless and until he shows that he is the licence holder in Form ‘C’ and until the name of the petitioner appears in the ‘C’ Form license, his application to sealing of tickets cannot be granted. On 19.12.1995, Justice Shivaraj Patil (as he then was) directed the parties to explore the possibility of settlement having regard to the close relationship of the parties and also restraining the applicant and the first respondent from obstructing or preventing the father from going to the theatre or participating in the management of the theatre. It was also specifically stated in this order that after the expiry of the existing tickets, it is open to the father to get the seal of the Entertainment Tax Officer. Thereafter compromise memo has to be seen against this background. The petitioner’s right to have the tickets sealed was on very tenuous ground since the authorities had categorically stated that unless his name appears in the ‘C’ form license, they would not affix their seal on the tickets. Thereafter compromise memo has to be seen against this background. The petitioner’s right to have the tickets sealed was on very tenuous ground since the authorities had categorically stated that unless his name appears in the ‘C’ form license, they would not affix their seal on the tickets. The father who was the license holder had also in no uncertain terms stated that the first respondent herein had no right to have the tickets sealed since his name and his name alone appears in the ‘C’ form license. Perhaps the learned Judge considering the submissions made by the learned counsel who appeared for the first respondent in those writ petitions that it was the case of the first respondent that he had invested huge funds in the theatre, again persuaded the parties to come to a compromise. Were it not for the compromise, the father would not have agreed to allow the first respondent herein to operate the theatre, nor would the authorities have sealed the tickets issued in Lakshmi Talkies and Little Lakshmi Talkies. For five years, the first respondent had enjoyed the benefits of the order passed by this Court pursuant to the compromise memo and now, the first respondent would like this Court to believe that it was a mere understanding between parties and not an undertaking to the Court. To me, it appears to be not only contempt of Court, but contempt for Court. 8. In Gour Gopal v. Shantilatha, A.I.R. 1976 Cal. 475, after punishing the contemners for contempt, the learned Judge said: "It will be a sad day for the Court if the Court allows the solemn undertaking given to this Court to be mere papers signifying nothing. The parties and litigants must know and appreciate that they should not be allowed to treat the solemn undertaking given to this Hon’ble Court like a child’s play. Undertaking to Court and legal rights are entirely different and separate matters." 9. Was the memo of compromise signed by the parties an undertaking? In this regard, the question, "What is an undertaking? came to be considered in the decision in Bajranglal Khemka v. Kapurchand Limited, A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 336, by a Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar (as they were then) and in that question, they differed with a Division Bench judgment in Nisha Kanta’s case, A.I.R. 1948 Cal. In this regard, the question, "What is an undertaking? came to be considered in the decision in Bajranglal Khemka v. Kapurchand Limited, A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 336, by a Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar (as they were then) and in that question, they differed with a Division Bench judgment in Nisha Kanta’s case, A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 294: 49 Crl.L.J. 567, where the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court expressed the opinion that if under the terms of the compromise, the parties should give an undertaking to the Court, then, the compromise should make it clear. If it did not make it clear and compromise merely states that one of the parties undertakes, then, it is a compromise made to the other party and not to the Court. They differed with great respect to the aforesaid view and they held thus: "He has not considered at all as to whether, by long practice understood both by counsel and by Judges, the expression "undertaking" had come to acquire a technical meaning. I am sure, if he had considered that aspect of the case, he would not have come to the conclusion that the only way to construe the expression "undertake" was to give it its plain natural meaning. What is more, there are three judgments of the Calcutta High Court, all delivered by single Judges undoubtedly but all of them sitting on the original side and having experience of the original side practice, which have taken the view that an "undertaking" means an "undertaking to the Court". One was by Gentle J. whose decision was reversed by a Bench in Nisha Kanta’s case, A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 294: 49 Crl.L.J. 567 to which I have just referred; another by Panckridge, J. and the third judgment is of Das, J. which judgment was not cited before that Bench: this is in Prokash Chandra v. Manindra Nath, I.L.R. (1946)2 Cal. 449. Mr.Desai has also relied on the statement of the law as to undertakings that appears in Halsbury’s "Laws of England", Vol. VII, p.35 Halsbury in para 51, puts it this way: "The breach of an undertaking given to the Court by a person or corporation pending proceedings, on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction, is misconduct amounting to contempt". VII, p.35 Halsbury in para 51, puts it this way: "The breach of an undertaking given to the Court by a person or corporation pending proceedings, on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction, is misconduct amounting to contempt". 10 In this case, though the word "undertaking" may not have been used, the fact that the parties affixed their signature to the memo of compromise which incorporated the term that a breach of any of those terms would amount to contempt seems to me clearly to denote an undertaking given to Court. It does not matter the word "undertaking" was not used. Further, because of the memo of compromise, the parties to which were present in Court had admitted to the learned Judge that they agreed to the compromise and had affixed their signature, the Court sanctioned a particular course of action whereby Little Lakshmi Talkies was given to the first applicant herein. Viewed from this angle, the breach of this compromise is clearly and flagrantly breach of an undertaking. 11. In the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner Chhaganbhai v. Soni Chandubhai, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1909, the respondent took up the position that it was a mere agreement between the parties to which an order of the Court had been appended and therefore, there was no breach of undertaking. The Supreme Court held that it was not merely a consent order upon an agreement between the parties but an undertaking to the Court. In this case, it is true that though the scope of the writ petition was with regard to the order of the Entertainment Tax Officer the first respondent had claimed that he was entitled to have this tickets sealed. The father the 4th respondent herein denied the first respondent’s right and claimed to be the sole licensee. Only in view of the compromise between the parties and the terms recorded therein to which the parties agreed to abide before this Court, the learned Judge did not decide whether the first respondent was indeed entitled to the relief prayed for. However, by virtue of the order, he got what he wanted namely the right to be the licensee in respect of Little Lakshmi Talkies and the right to operate Lakshmi Talkies for 5 years. However, by virtue of the order, he got what he wanted namely the right to be the licensee in respect of Little Lakshmi Talkies and the right to operate Lakshmi Talkies for 5 years. Having obtained an order from the Court by representing to the Court that he would conform to a certain course of action and having derived the advantage therefrom, to resile from that position amounts to insulting the dignity of the Court. There can be no doubt regarding that. The solemnity with which the compromise was intended to be acted upon is evident from the clause in the memo of compromise which clearly states that any breach of the terms will amount to contempt of the Court. The learned senior counsel attempted to construe this term as if the parties had vested the contempt jurisdiction to the Court by contract. I do not think so. The parties were aware that they had promised to this Court to act upon the compromise and accordingly an order was passed by this Court. Therefore, they knew that if they swerved from the undertaking, it would amount to contempt and contempt has been committed by the first respondent. He has failed to make the monthly payment of Rs.20,000. He has failed to handover possession of the theatre to the petitioner herein on 1.1.2001. The case that he has now set up of a novation of the contract between the parties cannot be accepted. He has also committed contempt by filing other suits which have the effect of setting at naught this Court’s order. Though the counter filed by the first respondent talks of apology to the Court and highest regard for the Court, there is absolutely no contrition on the part of the first respondent. He is therefore punished for contempt and a fine of Rs.2,000 and simple imprisonment for one week is awarded. He shall also comply with Clauses 5 and 6 of the memo of compromise within two weeks from this date and report the same to Court. As regards the 2nd and 3rd respondent who are the authorities, the memo of compromise which amounts to the undertaking by the parties has been signed only by the applicant herein and the first respondent and their father and therefore, I do not think there is any contempt committed by the authorities. As regards the 2nd and 3rd respondent who are the authorities, the memo of compromise which amounts to the undertaking by the parties has been signed only by the applicant herein and the first respondent and their father and therefore, I do not think there is any contempt committed by the authorities. Therefore, the contempt in respect of respondents 2 and 3 is dismissed.