( 1 ) THE Revision Petitioner is the tenant - respondent in R. C. No. 296/96 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller at Hyderabad and the respondent in R. A. No. 109/98 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes court at Hyderabad, The present Revision is filed under Section 22 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, hereinafter called the "act" for the purpose of convenience, by the tenant as against a reversal order made by the appellate authority in R. A. Nq. 109/98 dated 13-7-2000. ( 2 ) THE facts, in brief, are that the respondent in the present C. R. P. hereinafter called the "landlady", for the purpose of convenience, had filed R. C. No. 296/96, against the Revision petitioner, hereinafter called the "tenant", for the purpose of convenience, seeking relief of eviction on the ground of wilful default and also on the ground of personal requirement. The Court of first instance, on consideration of oral and documentary evidence i. e. , the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 and also R. W. 1 and exs. A-1 to A-3 and Exs. B-1 to B-8 had arrived at the conclusion that the landlady had not established her case for getting the relief of eviction and had dismissed the said R. C. on 30-8-1988 and aggrieved by the same, the landlady preferred R. A. No. 109/98 on the file of the Chief Judge, city Small Causes Court, Hyderabad who had reversed the order passed by the Court of first instance by an order dated 18-7-2000 and aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present Revision. ( 3 ) THE landlady is the owner of Garrage no. 74 at Baghlingampally, Hyderabad and it was let out on a monthly rent of rs. 1,000/- to the tenant, excluding electricity charges and no advance was received by her and the rent of Rs. ( 3 ) THE landlady is the owner of Garrage no. 74 at Baghlingampally, Hyderabad and it was let out on a monthly rent of rs. 1,000/- to the tenant, excluding electricity charges and no advance was received by her and the rent of Rs. 1,000/- was agreed to be payable on or before 5th of every month and the tenant occupied the garage on 1-8-1984, but unfortunately he was a chronic defaulter and he withheld the rents from August 1984 till the filing of the r. C. C. The landlady also pleaded that whenever she had approached the tenant demanding rents, he was behaving in a rash manner and the landlady had requested him to vacate the premises since she was in need of the premises for personal requirement also and the tenant demanded rs. 50,000/- to vacate the premises and it was further stated the rents payable by the tenant for 22 months would come to rs. 22,000/ -. The tenant filed a counter and resisted the same and had stated that the agreed rent is Rs. 800/- per month, exclusive of electricity charges and the rent is payable on or before 10th of every month and he deposited Rs. 10,000/- with the landlady as security, which is refundable at the time of vacating the premises and he had paid the rents regularly from 1-8-1994 onwards. But the landlady had not passed any receipts and she had refused to receive the rents from May 1996 and hence he had sent the rents by Money Order and the landlady had issued a legal notice on 1-5-1996 and a reply was given on 27-6-1996. The tenant also pleaded that in the first week of April, 1996, the landlady demanded him to enhance the rent for which he did not accept and when he tendered the rent on 5-5-1996 she had refused to receive the same and therefore he had sent the rents by Money Order. The tenant filed a suit O. S. No. 1716/96 on the file of IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad for perpetual injunction and an interim order was granted in his favour. It was further pleaded that the rent for the month of May 1996 was sent through money Order and it was received and when the rent for June 1996 was sent by Money order, it was returned as refused. It was further pleaded that the rent for the month of May 1996 was sent through money Order and it was received and when the rent for June 1996 was sent by Money order, it was returned as refused. Similarly, the rents for June and July 1996 also were tendered to the Counsel representing the landlady, but they were also refused and the rent is due only for the months of June and July 1996 and thereafter as per orders in i. A. No. 342/96, he has been depositing the rents into Court and he had denied the personal requirement of the landlady also. The learned appellate authority had dealt with both the points - the ground of wilful default and also the ground of bona fide requirement, and had arrived at the conclusion that both the grounds have been established and had allowed the appeal ordering eviction of the tenant. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the unsuccessful tenant in the appeal. ( 4 ) SRI Sarathy, the learned Senior counsel representing Sri Sham S. Agarwal on behalf of the tenant had made elaborate submissions and had contended that the whole approach of the appellate authority in reversing the well-considered Judgment of the learned Rent Controller is unsustainable in law. The learned Counsel had taken me through the relevant portions of the orders of both the Courts below and had pointed out that the appellate authority had made a perverse order, which is not based on any material. The learned Counsel also had submitted that it is unbelievable that the landlady would have kept quiet if no rents had been paid even from the inception of the tenancy and this aspect of the matter clearly shows the conduct of the landlady. The learned-Counsel also had taken me through the documentary evidence i. e. , Exs. B-1 to B-7 and had pointed out that the ground if wilful default cannot be believed at all. The learned counsel also contended that if all the circumstances are taken into consideration, the defence of the tenant alone is believable and the learned Counsel also had pointed to ex. B-8, the office copy of the plaint in o. S. No. 1716/96, the suit for permanent injunction filed by the tenant. The learned counsel also contended that if all the circumstances are taken into consideration, the defence of the tenant alone is believable and the learned Counsel also had pointed to ex. B-8, the office copy of the plaint in o. S. No. 1716/96, the suit for permanent injunction filed by the tenant. The learned counsel also had pointed out the overwriting in the eviction petition at paragraph-8 and had contended that the ground of personal requirement of the landlady in the notice and also in the pleading, the details had not be mentioned and there is no pleading that the garage is required for the purpose of running the advocate s Office of the daughter of the landlady. The learned Counsel also had places strong reliance on Dev Kumar (Died) through L. Rs. v. Swaran Lata (Smt.) and others, M. M. Qasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and others and also Sree Balaji Krishna hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah. The learned counsel also had pointed out several anomalous circumstances which go to show that the case of the landlady cannot be believed at all. ( 5 ) SRI Prabhakar, the learned Counsel representing the landlady had contended that the landlady requires the premises for personal occupation to do the business and also for running Advocate s Office by her daughter and contended that personal requirement may have to be understood in the broad sense and the daughter s practice as an Advocate also will fall within the meaning of personal requirement. The learned Counsel also pointed out that p,w. 1, in her evidence, stated that the shops Jo not belong to her and the learned counsel pointed out the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2 to the effect that Sampurna finance, belongs to a friend of the son of p. W. 2. The daughter of the landlady, a practicing Advocate, was examined as p. W. 3 and the relevant portions of the evidence of P. W. 3 also had been pointed out to me. The learned Counsel also had stated that R. W. 1 in his evidence has stated that the landlady was maintaining a book and she was not passing receipts. But no steps had been taken for summoning the said book and hence an adverse inference has to be drawn. The learned Counsel also had stated that R. W. 1 in his evidence has stated that the landlady was maintaining a book and she was not passing receipts. But no steps had been taken for summoning the said book and hence an adverse inference has to be drawn. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the tenant had not pleaded about any alternative accommodation and availability thereof to the landlady. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to Section 8 of the Act and had contended that the tenant is expected to pay the rents regularly and in case of evasion by the landlady the tenant is expected to follow the procedure under section 8 of the Act and in the absence of the same, such tenant can be termed as a wilful defaulter. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu, Prativa Devi v. T. V. Krishnan, 1992 (2) R. C. R. 148 and also 1999 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 158. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing both the parties at length, now the questions which have to be considered are whether the grounds taken by the landlady for eviction had been established and whether the appellate authority had arrived at the correct conclusion in reversing the order of the rent Controller. ( 7 ) THE evidence available on record is that of P. Ws. 1 to 3 and R. W. 1. Ex. A-1 is the office copy of the legal notice dated 1-5-1996. Ex. A-2 is the postal acknowledgment and Ex. A-3 is the rough sketch plan. Exs. B-1 and B-2 are M. O. acknowledgement and M. O. receipt, ex. B-3 is the refused M. O. coupon, Ex. B-4 is the notice dated 1-5-1996 - equivalent to ex. A-1, Ex. B-5 is the reply notice dated 27-6-1996, Ex. B-6 is the postal receipt, ex. B-7 is the returned postal cover and ex. B-8 is the office copy of the plaint in o. S. No. 1716/96. The landlady was examined as P. W. 1, who had categorically deposed in support of her case. A-1, Ex. B-5 is the reply notice dated 27-6-1996, Ex. B-6 is the postal receipt, ex. B-7 is the returned postal cover and ex. B-8 is the office copy of the plaint in o. S. No. 1716/96. The landlady was examined as P. W. 1, who had categorically deposed in support of her case. The landlady had specifically stated that the tenancy is oral and the tenant promised to pay the advance amount but he did not pay and the tenant also did not pay any rent since the date of tenancy and had committed wilful default and he was evading to pay the arrears on some pretext or the other and when she visited the house of the tenant, he used to avoid appearance and whenever he made he used to abuse her in a rash and rude manner and hence she was constrained to issue a legal notice ex. A-1. Inspite of the notice the tenant did not vacate the premises and had not paid the arrears of rent and no doubt in pursuance of the Court orders the arrears had been deposited. The landlady also had stated that the tenant demanded rs. 50,000/- to vacate the demised premises. The tenant was examined as r. W. 1 and he had denied the rent of rs. 1000/- per month and had stated that the monthly rent was only Rs. 800/- and through a broker he had approached the landlady who had accepted to let out the premises on payment of Rs. 10,000/- towards deposit and Rs. 800/- per month towards rent and he had paid the amount to the landlady and took the premises on the same day and at that time the landlady and p. W. 3 were present and inspite of his demand, no notice was passed on the ground that there no necessity to pass a receipt and he used to pay rent at the house of the landlady and the landlady was noting payment of rents in her note-book. R. W. 1 also stated that the landlady never passed receipt for payment of rents inspite of demands and the landlady received the rent upto the end of April 1996 and she had demanded to enhance the rent for which he had refused and on 5-5-1996 when he went to tender the rent to the landlady, she refused to receive the rent and hence he was constrained to send the rent by M. O. which was refused and the tenant had spoken to exs. B-1 to B-8 and had also stated why he had filed the suit against the landlady. The appellate authority while dealing with point No. 1 on the aspect of wilful default had narrated in detail the evidence of p. W. 1 and also the evidence of P. W. 2 and had recorded the reasons why the claim of the tenant that he had paid an advance or rs. 10,000/- on the day he had entered the demised premises, has to be disbelieved. The learned appellate authority had mainly reversed the findings of the learned Rent controller on the ground that the Court of first instance had based its findings on conjectures and surmises without properly appreciating the evidence. It is also pertinent to note that on this aspect, except the evidence of R. W. 1 there is no other evidence to substantiate the stand of payment of advance, taken by the tenant. It is also pertinent to note that except the oral testimony of R. W. 1, absolutely there is no other evidence to substantiate his contention about the payment of rents. The landlady, as P. W. 1, had denied having received any rents for the said period and a specific stand had been taken that from the beginning the payment of rents had not been made and the behaviour of the tenant was rash and rude in this regard. In fact, the learned appellate authority had recorded convincing reasons at paragraph-10 why exs. B-1 to B-3 cannot be believed and also had recorded a finding that Exs. B-1 to B-3 are fabricated by the tenant to substantiate his false claim that the rent is Rs. 800/- per month only. As against the evidence of r. W. 1, the clear evidence of P. W. 1 is available where there is specific denial of receipt of any rents and also receipt of advance amount. B-1 to B-3 are fabricated by the tenant to substantiate his false claim that the rent is Rs. 800/- per month only. As against the evidence of r. W. 1, the clear evidence of P. W. 1 is available where there is specific denial of receipt of any rents and also receipt of advance amount. The alleged broker who had arranged the transaction had not been examined by the tenant and no further material was placed to substantiate his stand that he had not committed default in payment of rents. Evidently, only on the direction of the Court, the deposit was made and this aspect also shows that the tenant was not inclined to follow the procedure under Section 8 of the Act and the conduct of the tenant and the series of events go to show that the appellate authority on appreciation of evidence had arrived at the correct conclusion on the aspect of wilful default and while exercising revisional jurisdiction, these findings of the appellate authority cannot be said to be perverse and there is no illegality in the approach of the appellate authority. ( 8 ) COMING to the second aspect - the ground of personal requirement, elaborate submissions were made by both the parties. It is contended on behalf of the tenant that that except a bald allegation made in the notice and the pleading there is no specific allegation relating to the requirement of the premises for running the office of the advocate i. e. , daughter of the landlady, who was examined as P. W. 3. In the decision referred (7 supra), the apex Court held that when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requiremrequirement is not bona fide and when the other conditions are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and it is often said by the Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how he can adjust himself without getting possession of the demised premises. However, Sri Sarathy, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant had placed strong reliance on a passage in the decision referred (2 supra) wherein the apex Court at page 1120 was pleased to observe:"before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned judge of the first appellate Court while upholding the claim of personal requirement of respondent 1 has observed as under: "it is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Giridih. . . . . The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No. 47/73 which is Ext. D only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant in the near future is most suitable houses for the plaintiffs". This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of respondents-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole Judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of respondents-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can respondents-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison d etre of the Rent Act. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison d etre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord s claim but in such a situation the court would expect the to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord s greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb the very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the Legislature in enacting the same. The Court must understand the appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of life - shelter - and the way in which one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the globe. In the sociology of Law , edited by Pat Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under:"the prevailing paradigms of neo-classical economics and empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of their historical formation. The force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produce it". The force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produce it". Sri Prabhakar, the learned Counsel placing strong reliance on the decision referred (6 supra), had contended that there is no obligation on the part of the landlord seeking eviction of tenant to aver in the plaint or petition the facts that he is in occupation of the residential premises and that it is not suitable for non-residential purpose. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the personal requirement of the landlady and also the daughter of the landlady who was examined as P. W. 3 had been spoken to by both P. Ws. 1 and 3. P. W. 1, even in chief-examination had stated that she is also in bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal occupation to do business and also for opening of Advocate s office by her daughter. P. W. 1, even in her cross- examination had stated that "it might be true that I have not mentioned about the bonafide requirement of my daughter in Ex. A-1 and I require the demised premises for my business. Witness volunteers, my personal requirement means my daughter s practice". P. W. 1 also had deposed that there are two shops on the ground floor of baghlingampally house and those shops do not belong to her and she had also deposed mat it is not true to suggest that they had let out the premises to one Sampurna Finance and P. W. 1 had further stated that the said business belongs to a friend of her son who was temporarily permitted until he secures another premises without rent. The evidence of P. W. 2 also is clear on this aspect. P. W. 3 is the daughter of P. W. 1 who had specifically stated that she is in bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her practice and she is not having any other place for her practice and the demised premises is suitable for her practice as it is located in a commercial area. In the cross-examination of P. W. 3, no doubt a serious attempt was made to show that she does not bona fide require the premises for her personal occupation and some other alternative accommodation is available to her. In the cross-examination of P. W. 3, no doubt a serious attempt was made to show that she does not bona fide require the premises for her personal occupation and some other alternative accommodation is available to her. However, P. W. 1 and also P. W. 3 had categorically stated that this premises is required bonafide for personal occupation of the business of the landlady and also for running the office of the daughter of the landlady, P. W. 3, who is a practicing advocate. The bona fide personal requirement of a landlord always may have to be appreciated taking the over all facts and circumstances into consideration. It is not doubt true that the details and the particulars had not been mentioned in the notice or the pleadings. But the fact remains that the clear evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 3, supported by the evidence of P. W. 2 is available on record, to substantiate the case of the landlady. The mere fact that the details had not been mentioned, cannot be a ground to totally reject the ground of personal requirement of the landlady. The technical and pedantic approach that the landlady had only specified the personal requirement of the landlady and not the personal requirement of her daughter, in the facts and circumstances of the case, may not be the correct and proper approach while deciding a matter of this nature. Always, the Court has to look into all the facts and circumstances and the complete material available on record while arriving at a conclusion whether the ground of bona fide personal requirement was made out or not. On the strength of the overwhelming evidence available on record, the appellate authority had arrived at a conclusion that the landlady bona fide requires the premises for personal occupation and this finding of fact recorded by the appellate authority, on appreciation of evidence, does not warrant any interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. ( 9 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the Civil Revision petition is devoid of merits and it is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. The Revision Petitioner-tenant is granted six months time for vacating the premises subject to the condition that he continues to pay the rents. ( 9 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the Civil Revision petition is devoid of merits and it is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. The Revision Petitioner-tenant is granted six months time for vacating the premises subject to the condition that he continues to pay the rents. This time of six months is granted at the request of the revision Petitioner-tenant.