Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 948 (MAD)

Chandra v. V. Rangachariar

2001-08-21

PRABHA SRIDEVAN

body2001
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner who filed an application under Order 21, Rule 58 C.P.C., is before us with this appeal. 2. The respondent had obtained a decree on 19.2.1982 in O.S. 783/81. The appellants husband was the judgment debtor. The respondent attached four items of property on 28.4.1987 in E.P. 26/87. Thereupon, the appellant filed E.A.169/88 to raise the attachment. The District Munsif, Mannargudi allowed the application in so far as items 2 to 4 of the schedule mentioned properties, but rejected the application in so far as item 1 of the schedule mentioned properties. Against that, an appeal was preferred to the District Judge, Nagapattmam who dismissed the appeal. Against this, the present CMSA has been filed. 3. Notice of motion was ordered on 6.1.1994. Interim stay was also granted for three weeks and the appellant was directed to file an affidavit to show the details of other properties owned by the appellants husband who is the judgment debtor. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that attachment was ordered only on 28.4.1987 whereas the settlement deed was dated 16.6.1976 long before the attachment and therefore, the judgment debtor had no right, title and interest in this property which was attached. According to the learned counsel, the Court below erred in rejecting the application. Learned counsel submitted that when the judgment debtor owns other properties, the respondent ought to have proceeded against those properties and not the property that was settled by the judgment debtor on the appellant. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the appellant was not at all in possession of the suit property. It was only the judgment debtor who was in possession and even the patta had not been transferred and that both the Courts had rightly refused to raise the attachment in view of Sections 53 and 128 of the Transfer of Property Act. He relied on the following judgments: A.I.R. 1960 Madras 536 ( Alamelu v. Meenakshmi ), A.I.R. 1999 Madras 74 ( Shanmugam v. Syndicate Bank ), A.I.R. 1999 Bombay 22 ( Eknath Nana Shinde v. Shankarappa Chanbasappa Shindgi ). 6. The objection that since the attachment was effected in 1987 in respect of the property which had been settled by the judgment debtor on the appellant in 1976 itself, the judgment debtor did not have an attachable interest, appears attractive on first impression. 6. The objection that since the attachment was effected in 1987 in respect of the property which had been settled by the judgment debtor on the appellant in 1976 itself, the judgment debtor did not have an attachable interest, appears attractive on first impression. But it is seen that the suit pro-note was executed in 1975 and the suit was not filed earlier only because of the intervention of several Debt Relief Acts which placed a moratorium on suits against certain “debtors”. Both the Courts had come t o the conclusion that the settlement deed had been executed only with a view to defeat the creditors interest, but actually, there was no intention on the part of the judgment debtor to part with his interest or his possession of the petition mentioned property. 7. Under Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., the Court is empowered to adjudicate upon the claim preferred or objection made to the attachment of any property on the ground such property is not attachable. In this case, the factual finding of both the Courts is that the settlement deed itself was effected only to defeat the interest of the decree holder and that actually, the right, title and interest in the property continued with the judgment debtor. 8. Though P.W.1, the appellant has said in Chief examination that all the properties are only in her possession, in cross-examination, she has deposed that she does not know who is cultivating this property. In the counter filed by the respondent, it was stated that even until 1988, the Adangal extract is only in the name of the judgment debtor and he alone is in enjoyment of the property. This is stated to be the reason why this petition was filed more than one and a half years after the date of attachment. The trial Court also held that in the absence of proof that the judgment debtor had other properties it was not possible to raise the attachment in respect of this property. Both the Courts have rejected the claim made by the appellant on the ground that she has not furnished any proof that her husband owns other properties and that the settlement deed itself had been executed only to defeat the claim of the decree holder. 9. Both the Courts have rejected the claim made by the appellant on the ground that she has not furnished any proof that her husband owns other properties and that the settlement deed itself had been executed only to defeat the claim of the decree holder. 9. In A.I.R. 1960 Madras 536, this Court had held that a marriage settlement made before and in consideration of a marriage is protected, but where there is an intent in the minds of both parties to the marriage to defeat and delay creditors of the settlor.. the settlement is voidable. The learned Judge had considered the various forms, conveyance or transfer of property in fraud of creditors may take, which would include an ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement by a husband on his wife. 10. Both the Courts have held that this settlement has been effected only to defraud the creditors. Apart from stating that the settlement deed is long prior to the date of attachment, the appellant has not taken any steps to prove that the settlement deed was bona fide . The suspicion that it might not be a bona fide transaction is fortified by the fact that though the appellant claims to be in possession of the suit property, she does not know who is cultivating the said land. 11. In A.I.R. 1999 Bombay 22, the judgment debtor had secretly effected mutation in the records in respect of the self-acquired land in favour of his son. The learned Judge held that mutation entry cannot divest title from the respondent in the absence of any document of title. This case does not strictly apply to the present case because here there is a registered sale deed. 12. In A.I.R. 1999 Madras 74, this Court had held that when the deceased settled the suit scheduled properties in favour of the petitioners and they became universal donees as contemplated under Section 128, subsequently, the donor/judgment debtor died and it was held that being the legal representatives of the deceased, they were liable to discharge the liability of the deceaseds property. This may strictly not be applicable to this case but in that case also, the petitioners who were the legal representatives did not prove that the deceased judgment debtor was having any other property either movable or immovable. 13. This may strictly not be applicable to this case but in that case also, the petitioners who were the legal representatives did not prove that the deceased judgment debtor was having any other property either movable or immovable. 13. In this case, though pending CMSA, upon the direction of this Court, the appellant has sworn to an affidavit stating that the judgment debtor had other properties, she had not said anything to that effect when the application under Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., was being adjudicated. It must be remembered that Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., bars a separate suit and all claims and objections are decided by the executing Court before whom the application is filed. If truly the appellants husband who is the judgment debtor had other properties, she should have substantiated the same by oral evidence especially since, in the counter, the respondent herein had clearly stated that the judgment debtor had no other property. Therefore, the affidavit filed here at this stage does not come to the aid of the appellant. There does not seem to be any reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below that the settlement deed was itself executed only to defraud and delay the creditors. The CMSA is therefore dismissed. CMP 222/94 is closed.