KHEM KARAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under Sub-section (2) of Section 72 of the Copyright. 1957 (for short Act of 1957)is directed against the order dated 19. 6. 2000 passed by Copyright Board (for short the Board) in case No. 8 of 1992 under Section 50 of the Act of 1957, by which it refused to expunge the entry No. A-51185-91 made in respect of an artistic work, named "device Two Hukkas" in favour of the respondents. ( 2 ) A brief reference to the facts leading to this appeal has to be made so as to appreciate the matter in controversy. The respondent No. 1 moved one application in April, 1986, under section 45 of the Act of 1957 for registering its copyright in the said artistic work. In the application, the name of the author was shown as Nadeem of Moradabad but the appellants claimed themselves to be the owners of the artistic work. The language was stated to be Urdu. It was also stated that the appellants had first published the artistic work in India in the year 1985. Due to certain defects such as want of certificate referred to in proviso to Sub-section (1) of section 45 of the Act of 1957, no orders could be passed on this application before 23. 10. 1991. ( 3 ) EARLIER, respondent No. 1 had filed one criminal complaint in the Court- of Addl. Chief metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay, accusing the appellants of having committed offences punishable under Section 63 of the Act of 1957, Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (for short Act of 1958) and under Sections 420 and 426 of the indian Penal Code, by deceptively using the Device Two Hukkas tied with a pipe in its consignment to be shipped to foreign countries. The learned Magistrate passed orders for seizure of the goods. The present appellants challenged the seizure order before the Bombay High Court and the High Court modified that order by its order dated 25. 9. 1991. Special Leave Petition No. 4289 of 1991 filed by the appellants was dismissed on 27. 3. 1992 ; whereas the special leave petition filed by the respondent No. 1 was disposed of in the following words : "heard counsel. We are not prepared to interfere at this stage. 9. 1991. Special Leave Petition No. 4289 of 1991 filed by the appellants was dismissed on 27. 3. 1992 ; whereas the special leave petition filed by the respondent No. 1 was disposed of in the following words : "heard counsel. We are not prepared to interfere at this stage. We give liberty to the petitioner to go back to the High Court and ask for better terms to protect the petitioners interest pendente lite. The petitioners may also approach the civil court for relief if the petitioners consider it necessary as an interim measure. Dismissed. " ( 4 ) THE respondents accordingly filed a Civil Suit No. 3 of 1991 in the Court of District Judge, ralgarh, Alibagh and according to the information brought on the record of this appeal, this suit was decreed on 30. 4. 1995 after full contest. Appeal No. 541 of 1995 is pending before the bombay High Court. It would be pertinent to mention that the appellants also succeeded in getting ex-parte decree on 6. 10. 1998 from the Court of IX Addl. District Judge, Lucknow in reg. Suit No. 327 of 1993. The criminal complaint filed before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan magistrate, Bombay has now been dismissed in 1999. ( 5 ) AGAINST the entry No. A-51185 of 1991 made in favour of respondent No. 1 in respect of device Two Hukkas, the present appellants moved one application under Section 50 (b) of the act of 1957 contending, Inter alia : 1. that they export their product under the brand name Al Sheeshtaln meaning two hukkas; 2. that they had already moved one application on 11. 4. 1988 before the Registrar of Trade Marks for registering the said trade mark under the Act of 1958 ; 3. that Sri Nadeem had authorised the respondents for registration of work named "jurak Al junub" and not in respect of Two Hukkas" ; 4. that the work "jurak Al Junub" had never been published by the respondents ; 5. 4. 1988 before the Registrar of Trade Marks for registering the said trade mark under the Act of 1958 ; 3. that Sri Nadeem had authorised the respondents for registration of work named "jurak Al junub" and not in respect of Two Hukkas" ; 4. that the work "jurak Al Junub" had never been published by the respondents ; 5. that registration of work known as Device Two Hukkas with language Urdu was contrary to the authorisation made by Sri Nadeem ; ( 6 ) THAT the registration of copyright was against the search report issued by the Registrar of the trade Marks ; ( 7 ) THAT the Registrar of the copyrights committed gross error of law by not waiting for 30 days as required under Rule 16 (4) of the Copyright Rules, 1958. before passing final orders on the application under Section 45 ; ( 8 ) THAT there was no compliance of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 45; ( 9 ) THAT the effect of the registration of copyrights in favour of the respondents is that the applicant and other similarly situated traders cannot display the name of the product as "jurak" meaning hukka Tobacco Paste. ( 10 ) THAT the entries made by the Registrar of the copyrights in favour of the respondents has created a monopoly of trades in their favour and they had earlier relinquished such monopoly in application No. 439181 made under the Act of 1958. 6. The present respondents filed its reply to the said application under Section 50, on the grounds, inter alia, that they were in trade of Hukkas Tobacco Paste since 1979 ; that their company adopted device of two hukkas tied with pipe and named "jurak Sheshalain" in the year 1985 ; that the applicants attempted to use similar trade mark "jurak Sheeshtain" ; that due to certain inadvertence on the part of the lawyer the language of the work was incorrectly mentioned as Urdu in place of Arabic and correction had already been applied for. 7. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the application of the applicants under Section 50 vide order dated 18. 11. 1993. Aggrieved by this decision of the Copyrights Board, the present respondents filed an appeal before Delhi High Court. 7. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the application of the applicants under Section 50 vide order dated 18. 11. 1993. Aggrieved by this decision of the Copyrights Board, the present respondents filed an appeal before Delhi High Court. The main contention in appeal was that the board did not give reasonable opportunity to the appellants (in that appeal before Delhi High court) to file and prove the deed of assignment, executed by Sri Nadeem in respect of the work in question. The copy of the assignment deed dated 29. 1. 1985 was, however, annexed to the grounds of appeal. Appeal was allowed vide order dated 8. 2. 1995 of which operative portion runs as follows : "accordingly, we set-aside the impugned order dated 18. 11. 1993 passed by the Copyrights board and remit the case back to the Board for fresh adjudication and disposal of the same after giving a reasonable opportunity to all the parties therein to adduce any further evidence on record that the parties wish to produce in their respective cases. With the aforesaid direction and observation, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above but without costs. " 8. The case again went back to the Board and after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties, the Board rejected the application under Section 50 ufde order dated 19. 6. 2000. The main ground taken by the Board is that the respondents were owners of the work in question under Section 17 (b) of the Act of 1957 as Sri Nadeem had designed the artistic work for consideration, at the instance of the respondents. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record as well as the written argument filed by the appellant. 10. Sri Syed Hussaln. the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the order of the Board deserves to be quashed on the simple ground that the Board has travelled beyond the scope of the remand order, by giving decision on all the points and by not confining itself to the question of assignment. We have carefully perused the order dated 8. 2. 1995 passed by Delhi High Court in the appeal, filed by the present respondents and we are of the view that the appellate court remanded the matter for decision afresh, on all the points. We have carefully perused the order dated 8. 2. 1995 passed by Delhi High Court in the appeal, filed by the present respondents and we are of the view that the appellate court remanded the matter for decision afresh, on all the points. The operative portion of the remand order has already been reproduced above. We are not prepared to accept the argument that Delhi high Court remanded the matter only for the purposes of deciding the question of assignment. After the order dated 18. 11. 1993 was set-aside by the appellate court and after the matter was remanded to the Court for fresh adjudication, the Board was perfectly within its jurisdiction in deciding all the points in controversy. None of the conclusions drawn in earlier order dated 18. 11. 1993 remained effective on the board, after the order dated 18. 11. 1993 had been set-aside and the case was remanded back to the Board for fresh decision. In fact this remand order dated 8. 2. 1995 was one under Rule 23a of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. So we find no substance in this argument of Sri Syed Hussain and we are not prepared to interfere with the order under appeal, on that ground alone. ( 11 ) THE next submission is that earlier order dated 18. 11. 1993 was passed by a larger Bench of the Board or larger members of the Board, whereas order dated 19. 6. 2000 had been passed by a smaller Bench and lesser number of members, so the order dated 19. 6. 2000 is not sustalnable from this point of view. According to him, subsequent Board, which consisted of lesser number of members could not have over-ruled the conclusions drawn by the previous Board in its order dated 18. 11. 1993. He has cited Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. A. P. Jaiswal and ors. , (2001) 1 SCC 748 , so as to enforce his arguments. ( 12 ) WE are of the view that argument is fallacious one and is to be rejected. Firstly, the copyright Board is one and value of decision or order is not to be increased or decreased by the number of the members who participate in the decision or order. Secondly, after earlier order dated 18. 11. ( 12 ) WE are of the view that argument is fallacious one and is to be rejected. Firstly, the copyright Board is one and value of decision or order is not to be increased or decreased by the number of the members who participate in the decision or order. Secondly, after earlier order dated 18. 11. 1993 had been set aside in appeal, there was no order in the eyes of law before the board, which decided the matter in June, 2001. The law cited by Sri Syed Hussain is not in the context. Here no existing decision or no operative order of the Board has been departed from or over-ruled in the order dated 19. 6. 2000 of the Board. The argument of Sri Syed Hussain is more technical than real. ( 13 ) IT is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the application under section 45 of the Act of 1957 given by the respondents in April, 1986 was defective as reflected in the Registrars letter dated 20. 6. 1986 and 5. 5. 1987 and so was liable to be rejected on that ground alone and the Registrar committed error by giving time to the respondents-applicants to remove the defects. It is said that there is no provision in the Act of 1957 or in the Rules of 1958 for giving opportunity to remove the defects in the application under Section 45 of the Act of 1957. ( 14 ) THIS argument is also not one which can be accepted. The reason is that there is nothing in the Act of 1957 or in the Rules framed thereunder, which prevents the Registrar from giving an opportunity to the applicant to remove the defects in the application. Moreover, no Rule or provision has been cited, which may provide for rejection of defective application. If in these circumstances, the Registrar gave the opportunity to the applicant-respondents to remove the defects in the application it is difficult to say that he committed any error and it is difficult to interfere with the order on that ground alone. ( 15 ) THE next submission of Sri Syed Hussain is that the certificate given by the Registrar of the trade Marks was factually wrong because the application of the appellant moved on 11. 4. ( 15 ) THE next submission of Sri Syed Hussain is that the certificate given by the Registrar of the trade Marks was factually wrong because the application of the appellant moved on 11. 4. 1988, before the Registrar of the Trade Marks was pending, but no mention of this application has been made in the certificate. According to him. In certificates to be issued under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 45 not only the same or similar trade marks are to be mentioned but the application for such registration has also to be mentioned. He submits that such a defective certificate should not have been acted upon by the Registrar. This point has been dealt with by the Board. According to the Board, the certificate referred to in proviso to Sub-section (1) of section 45 of the Act of 1957, is to be given and considered with reference to the date of the application under Section 45. In other words, the Board took the view as on 4. 4. 1986, when the application under Section 45 of the Act was given, there was no application of the petitioner before the Registrar of the Trade Marks and so the certificate cannot be said to be factually incorrect. ( 16 ) ALTHOUGH the reasoning of the Board on this point, appears to be a little technical, yet we are not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the Registrar should not have acted upon such certificate. The reason is that the Registrar had no reason to doubt the correctness of the certificate, granted by the Registrar of the Trademarks. Secondly, the present appellant whose application of April, 1988 was pending under the Trade Marks Act and who was fighting the matter in the Magisterial Court at Bombay, did not care to raise objection against the correctness of the certificate given by the Registrar of the Trade Marks. This point does not appear to be sufficient enough to interfere with the order of the Board. ( 17 ) THE next submission of Sri Syed Hussaln is that the Registrar committed error by passing orders before expiry of period of 30 days to be computed from 7. 10. 1991, the date on which the certificate referred to in proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 45 was filed. ( 17 ) THE next submission of Sri Syed Hussaln is that the Registrar committed error by passing orders before expiry of period of 30 days to be computed from 7. 10. 1991, the date on which the certificate referred to in proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 45 was filed. He says that it was on this date, i. e. , 7. 10. 1991 that the application under Sub-section (1) of Section 45 became in order. He goes on to argue that earlier to 7. 10. 1991, there was no application in the eyes of law for want of certificate of the Registrar Trade Marks. He has referred to Rule 16 (4), which provides that if no objection to such registration is received by the Registrar of Copyrights within 30 days of the receipt of the application by him, he shall, if satisfied about the correctness of the particulars given in the application, enter such particulars in the register of the Copyrights. The contention of Sri Syed Hussaln is that the Registrar was bound to wait for 30 days after 7. 10. 1991 and he could have passed orders only after expiry of the said period and not before that. According to him, since the order was passed on 23. 12. 1991 for making entry in the register of Copyrights, so it deserves to be set-aside on that ground also. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the date of the application will remain 4. 4. 1986, irrespective of the fact as to when the defects in that application were removed. He has said that the order dated 23. 10. 1991 was passed after expiry of more than 5 years of the date of application. The Board has repelled the contention of the appellant on the ground that rule 16 (4) does not say that the Registrar has to wait for 30 days and also on the ground that the date of application was 4. 4. 1986 and not 7. 10. 1991. ( 19 ) WE find ourselves in agreement with the Board on the point that the date of application will remain 4. 4. 1986 and will not be relegated to 7. 10. 1991, when the certificate from the Registrar of the Trademarks was filed. 4. 1986 and not 7. 10. 1991. ( 19 ) WE find ourselves in agreement with the Board on the point that the date of application will remain 4. 4. 1986 and will not be relegated to 7. 10. 1991, when the certificate from the Registrar of the Trademarks was filed. We find ourselves unable to endorse the reasoning that Rule 16 (4)does not provide for passing orders after thirty days of the receipt of the application. A combined reading of Sub-rules (4)/ (5) of Rule 16, leaves no manner of doubt that the Registrar has to wait for thirty days, after receipt of the application under Sub-section (1) of Section 45. If the reasoning of the Board that the Registrar may pass orders even within a period of thirty days is accepted, the very object of the Rules 16 (4) will be defeated. ( 20 ) WITHOUT dwelling at length, we would like to say that the true interpretation of Rules 16 (4)/{5) of the Rules, 1958 is that the Registrar has to wait for thirty days after receipt of the application and it cannot pass orders before the expiry of thirty days. Since in this case, the application was given on 4. 4. 1986 and only certificate was filed on 7. 10. 1991, so the period of thirty days was to be counted from 4. 4. 1986 and not from 7. 10. 1991 and in this way, the order passed on 23. 10. 1991 was not open to challenge on the ground that the same had been passed in breach of Rule 16 (4) of the Rules. 1958. ( 21 ) IT has also been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that notice should have been issued to all concerned, after 7. 10. 1991, the date when the application was brought in order. We are not convinced by this argument for the reasons stated above. The date of the application was 4. 4. 1986 and notices had already been issued to Sri Nadeem and he had already Hied no objections. Rules did not require a fresh notice after defects were removed. ( 22 ) THE main submission of Sri Syed Hussafn is that the Board has travelled beyond the pleadings of the parties by carving out a case under Section 17 (b) of the Act of 1957, in place of a case of assignment. Rules did not require a fresh notice after defects were removed. ( 22 ) THE main submission of Sri Syed Hussafn is that the Board has travelled beyond the pleadings of the parties by carving out a case under Section 17 (b) of the Act of 1957, in place of a case of assignment. He submits that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Om prakash v. Basanthilal, (1999) 9 SCC 618 , no third case could have been carved out by the board. ( 23 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents--applicants has submitted that it was the case of the appellant from the very beginning that Sri Nadeem had designed the artistic work named "device of Two Hukkas for consideration at the instance of the applicants-respondents and he also assigned all his rights in their favour and so it cannot be said that a new case has been carved out by the Board. He has also argued that in the certificate dated 29. 1. 1985 Sri Nadeem had clearly stated that he had designed the said artistic work for consideration of the applicants and further stated that he had assigned all the rights in their favour. ( 24 ) SRI Syed Hussain has contended that the same material which was earlier rejected by the board in 1993, has been accepted in the order dated 19. 6. 2000 on the point that Sri Nadeem designed the artistic work for consideration or assigned rights in favour of the respondents-applicants. He says that original deed of assignment was not filed before the Board after the remand by Delhi High Court, even then the Board has accepted the case of the respondents. ( 25 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties have taken the Court through the written arguments filed earlier before the Board and through other materials on record so as to convince the Court to accept their respective submissions. ( 26 ) THE application dated 4. 4. 1986 moved under Section 45 (1) of the Act of 1957, contained an averment to the effect that author of artistic work named "device Two Hukkas" was Mr. ( 26 ) THE application dated 4. 4. 1986 moved under Section 45 (1) of the Act of 1957, contained an averment to the effect that author of artistic work named "device Two Hukkas" was Mr. Nadeem of Moradabad (U. P.) but the applicants were the owners of the same and these were they who published it for the first time in India in 1985, There is no dispute that in response to the notice issued under Rule 16, Sri Nadeem sent no objection certificate to the Registrar of the Copyright board. Acting on the no objection certificate and other materials, the Registrar of the Copyrights made the disputed entry in the register of the Copyrights. Previously, the Board took the view that no objection certificate from Sri Nadeem did not constitute a valid transfer of the Copyrights nor a case under Section 17 (b) of the Act was made out as in its view, the certificate dated 2. 6. 1992 and the affidavit dated 12. 11. 1992 of Sri Nadeem did not constitute assignment of the copyrights. There is no dispute that writing dated 29. 1. 1985 executed by Sri Nadeem was annexed to the ground of appeal filed before Delhi High Court. Copy of this writing is on record of the paper-book of this appeal at page 97. It reads as follows : "i have designed the label Shishaaltain device of two hukkas as per instructions of M/s. Abdul mujeeb Abdul Wajid Pvt. Ltd. , 101, Padma Palace, 06 Nehru Palace, New Delhi and have received Rs. 150 (Rs. one hundred fifty only) as full and final consideration for the same from them. I hereby assign all copyrights, claims and interest thereto in the same and in their favour. " ( 27 ) BESIDES the copy of the said writing dated 29. 1. 1985, the respondents also filed extract from their account register and some other papers to support their contention that Sri Nadeem has designed the work on their instructions for consideration. There is nothing on the record to show that Sri Nadeem has ever disowned the writing dated 29. 1. 1985 or any other writing or no objection, etc. It is never the case of the appellant that Sri Nadeem did not design the said device or anybody else is its original author. There is nothing on the record to show that Sri Nadeem has ever disowned the writing dated 29. 1. 1985 or any other writing or no objection, etc. It is never the case of the appellant that Sri Nadeem did not design the said device or anybody else is its original author. ( 28 ) THE Board had given cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that Sri Nadeem designed the said artistic work for consideration on the instructions of the respondents--applicants. The factum of first publication of the work in question in the year 1985 by the respondent-applicants could not be successfully challenged. Copy of the application dated 11. 4. 1988 moved by the appellant before the Registrar of the Trademarks even after its amendment, does not say that they were in use of the marks or device, earlier to January, 1988. The applicants-respondents were in use of the said work since 1979 and had also published it in 1985. ( 29 ) IT cannot be said that the Copyright Board has carved out a new case under Section 17 (b) of the Copyright Act. The reason is that the writing dated 29. 1. 1985 has two parts, one of which brings the case under Section 17 (b) and the other under Section 18 read with Section 19 of the act. Under Section 17 (b) of Act of 1957, the person for whom somebody designs a work for consideration, in absence of any agreement to the contrary, becomes the first owner of the copyright therein. ( 30 ) THERE was a foundation for concluding that the case was covered under Section 17 (b) of the act. The law cited by Syed Hussain does not help him because it was the case of the respondents-applicants that Sri Nadeem had designed the said artistic work for them for consideration. Whether this material is acceptable or not is a different question. Unless Sri nadeem disputed the claim of the respondents, the appellant or anybody else had no basis to say that Sri Nadeem had not designed the work for the respondents, for consideration. The circumstances speak in favour of the respondent applicants and against the appellant. Whether this material is acceptable or not is a different question. Unless Sri nadeem disputed the claim of the respondents, the appellant or anybody else had no basis to say that Sri Nadeem had not designed the work for the respondents, for consideration. The circumstances speak in favour of the respondent applicants and against the appellant. ( 31 ) THE argument that the respondent had disclaimed the monopoly under Trademarks Act or the request of the appellant for registration of the Trademark had been accepted by the Registrar of the Trademarks, do not appear to be sufficient enough to interfere with the order under appeal. The Board has considered all aspects of the matter and has given a convincing reasoning for rejecting the case of the appellant. Technicalities or niceties are not to come in the way of justice nor the verdict of the statutory authority is to be set at naught on such grounds. The weighty reasons, given by the Board in its order dated 19. 6. 2000 for concluding that the applicants-respondents are owners under Section 17 (b) of the Act of 1957 can hardly be demolished on technical grounds. The preponderance of the probabilities is in favour of the respondents-applicants, rather than in favour of the appellant. ( 32 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed, but with no order as to costs. .