JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been directed against the order of learned Additional District Judge No. 9, Jaipur City, Jaipur dated 30.3.2001 by which he allowed amendment in the pleadings of the plaintiff, Mr. RuleK. Agarwal appeared on behalf of No. 1 on filing a caveat at the admission stage. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. 3. Briefly stated, plaintiff/non-petitioner Thakur Bhawani Singh filed a suit for possession and injunction against defendant No. 6 Jeewan Singh who is petitioner before me. It was alleged in the plaint that Thakur Udai Singh of Malsisar had two sons Bhoor Singh and Chatar Singh. Of the three sons of Bhoor Singh, Shivnath Singh, Bagh Singh and Takhat Singh, Shivnath Singh died in 1947 and Bagh Singh went to Mandrela in adoption and Takhat Singh succeeded in Malsisar. Thakur Chatar Singh had five sons out of whom Har Nath Singh had five sons out of whom Har Nath Singh went in adoption to Dundlod, Ishwar Singh died issue less and Bahadur Singh died in 1972. The other two sons Karni Singh, whose son is defendant No. 6 Jeewan Singh and Devi Singh, whose son is plaintiff. Plaint averred that after the death of Takhat Singh he started looking after his properties. He further claimed that towards end of his days, Takhat Singh was in poor health and under influence of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 who were employees of Takhat Singh had probably sot a trust constituted which was illegal and, therefore, inconsequential. Thus claiming that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 had trespassed and the properties described in Para No. 15 of the plaint, the plaintiff claimed the possession thereof as the sole successor as adopted son of Takhat Singh. Defendant No. 6 filed reply denying the allegations and averring that Takhat Singh died issue-less on 5.5.70 and had executed a will in favour of defendant No. 6. The claim of Bhawani Singh being adopted by Takhat Singh was denied. Thus defendant No. 6 claiming the title of the properties on the strength of the will on the strength of the will prayed for dismissal of the suit. He also challenged the theory regarding the properties having passed to a trust. A number of preliminary objections were taken including as to the jurisdiction, court fee and factum of adoption. Thus defendant No. 6 claiming the title of the properties on the strength of the will on the strength of the will prayed for dismissal of the suit. He also challenged the theory regarding the properties having passed to a trust. A number of preliminary objections were taken including as to the jurisdiction, court fee and factum of adoption. The suit was filed 27 years ago and three witnesses including the plaintiff have been examined. An application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. was filed on 15.2.2001 which has been allowed by the impugned order. The plaintiff wanted an amendment alternative plea that notwithstanding the earlier pleadings he was the sole survivor of the family and hence was the owner of the properties and entitled to institute the suit and have possession of the properties mentioned in the plaint. This was resisted before the trial Court on various grounds but the trial Court allowed the amendment on cost. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in case the amendment is allowed to stand, it will substantially change the nature of the suit. He also drew attention to the statement of Thakur Bhawani Singh wherein he in cross- examination admitted that the family was governed by law of primogeniture provided there was no adopted son. It has been submitted that in view of his admission, the amendment did not deserve to be allowed, much so because it is too late. It has been submitted that this way the plaintiff wants to withdraw his admission and wants to put up a new case which is also barred by limitation. A number of authorities have been cited. In Vijendra Kumar Goel v. Kusum Bhuwania (Smt.) (1997) 11 SCC 457 , suit for declaration and injunction was filed and amendment was sought by plaintiff resulting in conversions of the suit into a suit for specific performance when claim for specific performance had already become barred by limitation. It was held that such amendment cannot be allowed. In Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and Ors. (1996) 7 SSC 486, it was held that an amendment seeking to take away right of the opposite party acquired by bar of limitation cannot take away right of the opposite party acquired by bar of limitation cannot be allowed. It was held that such amendment cannot be allowed. In Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and Ors. (1996) 7 SSC 486, it was held that an amendment seeking to take away right of the opposite party acquired by bar of limitation cannot take away right of the opposite party acquired by bar of limitation cannot be allowed. In K. Raheja Construction Ltd. and Anr v. Alliance minister and others 1995 Supp (3) SCC 17, bar of limitation was considered and it was held that when the suit was filed for permanent injunction restraining defendants from sealing the property and subsequently after seven years it was being converted into a suit for specific performance, for which limitation had already expired, amendment was not allowed. In Kenchegowda (since deceased) by legal representative v. Siddegowda alias Motegowda (1994) 4 SCC 294 , suit was filed by plaintiff for declaration of his title and permanent injunction against sale of suit property by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2. By amendment it was prayed that a decree for partition of one-third share be passed. Such an amendment was not allowed. In Raj Kumar Mohan Singh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar Pashupati Nath Singh and Ors., AIR 1970 Supreme Court 42 , litigation continued for 22 years. Defendant applied in the Supreme Court for amendment of written statement to raise a new contention. That amendment was not allowed at such a late stage. Raj Kumar Tejendra Singh and Ors. v. Dr. Sital Raj Mehta (RLR 1988(1) 523) have been relied in which principles and case law regarding amendment of pleading has been discussed and it was held that when defendant intended to set up a new cause of action and that too after inordinate delay, the amendment is not have been to be allowed. Similarly a number of authorities in favour of the petitioner have been relied in which the general principles of amendment in the pleadings have been discussed. 5. Similarly a number of authorities in favour of the petitioner have been relied in which the general principles of amendment in the pleadings have been discussed. 5. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has also cited a number of authorities including Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors (JT 2001 (2) SC 11) in which the Supreme Court has recently reiterated its view that the dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation and the Court should be liberal in granting prayer for amendment of the pleadings unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. Reliance has also been placed on Haridas Aildas Thadani and Ors v. Godrej Rustom a Kermani, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 319 in which above observations were made. 6. The counsel submitted that merits of the matter cannot be gone into at the time of allowing or disallowing the application. Reliance was placed on N.K. Jain v. Kanhaiya Lal (RLR 1990 (1) 411. It was so held therein that the trial Court should have not gone into merits of the case without allowing the amendment application. It was so held in Mangal Dass Sant Ram Gauda v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1973 Delhi 90, there an amendment of plaint is sought in order to take up a new ground, the Court at that stage cannot consider whether the ground is available to the plaintiff or not and the amendment cannot be refused on the ,round that the new ground is not available to him. Reliance has also been placed on A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 96, in which it was observed that when the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case but, amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of statutory period of limitation. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1267 , it was held that amendment of a plaint, it depends upon the discretion of the Court and that discretion is not be refused on technical ground. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1267 , it was held that amendment of a plaint, it depends upon the discretion of the Court and that discretion is not be refused on technical ground. It was held in T.P. Palaniswami and another v. Deivanaimmal and others, AIR 1984 Madras 19, it was that while deciding an application for amendment, the court is not supposed to go into the merits and demerits of the amendments and express an opinion one way or the other. That could be the subject-matter of scrutiny after the amendment is allowed. 7. So, in view of the above discussion, it is clear that the merits and demerits of the case are not to be seen at this stage. The law about amendment of the pleadings is that the Courts should be liberal. It is admitted fact that the suit is pending for quite some years in the trial Court and a number of issues are there to be decided. 8. The basic objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amendment may take way the right form the defendant-petitioner and that the application is belated one and that the amendment may change the nature of the suit and the new cause of action may be time barred. So far these objections are concerned, I feel that the defendant's right is not being taken away as he has every right to submit amended written statement. The plaintiff is simply expanding a fact in his pleading. Though law of primogeniture might have been a recognised law at the relevant time but presently this Court cannot decide as to what were the rights of the parties as the rights are yet to be decided in the suit. Of course, the petition has been filed after a lapse of quite some years but the defendant has been compensated by cost for the delay. The nature of suit is not being changed as no new relief has been claimed by amendment and there is no new cause of action. Even if it were so, the Supreme Court in Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Rs. The nature of suit is not being changed as no new relief has been claimed by amendment and there is no new cause of action. Even if it were so, the Supreme Court in Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Rs. (supra) has held that question of limitation could be the subject-matter of issue and it has been observed in this judgment that the dominant purpose allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation and the plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable, and hence plea of limitation being disputed could be the matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. In this citation, the Supreme Court has held that even if the amendment sought would change the nature of the suit originally filed, that was not a reason for refusing application for amendment as the dominant purpose of Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. is to minimise the litigation. 9. Consequently, I do not find any jurisdictional error committed by the learned trial Court and hence this revision is without force and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******