P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioner-3rd respondent filed this Revision Petition as against the order made in I. . A. No. 460/94 in I. . A. No. 339/93 in O. S. No. 117 of 1971 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Gooty. ( 2 ) THE application I. A. No. 460/94 was filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein under Order I Rule 10 CPC praying to implead them as respondents 45 to 48 in the final decree proceedings in I. A. No. 339/93 in O. S. No. 117 of 1971 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Gooty. ( 3 ) THE application was filed to implead the aforesaid parties in the final decree proceedings since R-11, the husband of R-1 and father of R-2 to R-4 died and in the absence of those parties there cannot be effective representation and the matter cannot be adjudicated upon. The 3rd respondent alone, in the Court below, had filed a counter raising an objection that an application filed to bring on record the legal representatives of R-11 under Order I rule 10 CPC is not maintainable in law and the legal representatives can be brought on record only under the provisions of order XXII Rules 3 and 4 CPC and not under Order I Rule 10 CPC. The Court below, after hearing the parties at length, had allowed the said application and aggrieved by the said order the present revision is filed. ( 4 ) SRI Nagender Reddy, learned Counsel representing Mr. Prabhakar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner had strenuously contended that this application filed by the legal representatives under Order I Rule 10 cpc is not maintainable and the Court below had totally erred in allowing the application. The learned Counsel also had contended that at best, the legal representatives will be claiming under the deceased R-ll only not having any independent right as such and such parties cannot be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 cpc. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on Morasa Anjaiah v. Kondragunta venkateswarlu (died) and others and had contended that where any of the parties to the suit or appeal dies during the pendency of the suit or appeal, steps to bring his legal representatives on record have to be taken in terms of the provisions of Order XXII CPC. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on Morasa Anjaiah v. Kondragunta venkateswarlu (died) and others and had contended that where any of the parties to the suit or appeal dies during the pendency of the suit or appeal, steps to bring his legal representatives on record have to be taken in terms of the provisions of Order XXII CPC. The learned Counsel also had contended that the procedure cannot be circumvented and legal representatives, not invoking the provisions of Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 cpc, cannot invoke the provisions of order I Rule 10 (2) CPC and hence, the court below had erroneously allowed the application. The learned Counsel further submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground only. ( 5 ) THE facts are not in dispute. The suit is one for partition. The stage of the suit is pendency of final decree proceeding. At the stage of pendency of final decree proceeding, R-11 in the final decree application died and the legal representatives of R-11 filed an application, as stated supra, to come on record and the application was allowed by the Court below. It is pertinent to note that in a suit for partition the principle of dominus litis is not strictly applicable since the plaintiffs and also the defendants will be sharers. In fact, even in Morasa anjaiah s case (supra), the decision on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, at para 27 (4), the Division Bench was pleased to observe:"an administration/partition suit does not abate as a whole due to not bringing on record the legal representative of a deceased party (co-sharer/co-owner) as each party is in the position of the plaintiff and the heir of the deceased co-sharer - co-owner is a necessary party to the suit, he can come on record on his application under Or. 1 Rule 10 c. P. C. " ( 6 ) THAT is the reason why I had already stated that this is a suit for partition and that too it is at the stage of final decree proceeding. ( 7 ) IN Bhagwan Swaroop and others v. Moolchand and others his Lordship d. A. Desai, J. was pleased to observe:"it is true that it was incumbent upon the appellant to implead the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 1 in time. ( 7 ) IN Bhagwan Swaroop and others v. Moolchand and others his Lordship d. A. Desai, J. was pleased to observe:"it is true that it was incumbent upon the appellant to implead the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 1 in time. It is equally true that the appellants were negligent in moving the proper application. We would not question the finding of the high Court that appellant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 knew about the death of the deceased respondent No. l. This being a suit for partition of joint family property, parties are closely interrelated and it is reasonable to believe that at least some of the appellants must have attended the funeral of deceased respondent no. l, as contended on behalf of the contesting respondent No. 2. There is some force in the contention that when a specific provision is made as provided in 0. 22 R. 4, as resort to the general pirate. But the laws of procedure are devised for advancing justice and not impending the same. In sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, kotah (1955) 2 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ), this Court observed that a Code of Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. This was reaffirmed in kallpar Das v. Bimal Krishna Sen (1983) 1 SCC 14 . In a suit for partition, the position of plaintiffs and defendants can be interchangeable. It is that each adopts the same position with the other parties. Other features which must be noticed are that the appeal was filed somewhere in 1972. It had not come up for hearing and the matter came on board only upon the application of the second respondent intimating to the court that the 1st respondent had died wayback and his heirs and legal representatives having not been substituted, the appeal has abated. Wheels started moving thereafter. Appellants moved an application for substitution. The matter did not end there. Heirs of deceased respondent no. l then moved an application for being brought on record. If the application had been granted, the appeal could have been disposed of in the presence of all the parties. Wheels started moving thereafter. Appellants moved an application for substitution. The matter did not end there. Heirs of deceased respondent no. l then moved an application for being brought on record. If the application had been granted, the appeal could have been disposed of in the presence of all the parties. The difficulty High Court experienced in granting the application disclosed with great respect a hypertechnical approach which if carried to end may result in miscarriage of justice. Who could have made the most serious grievance about the failure of the appellants to substitute the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent no. 1. Obviously the heirs of deceased respondent No. l, were the persons vitally interested in the outcome of the appeal. They could have contended that the appeal against them has abated and their heirs has become unassailable. That is not their case. They on the contrary, want to be impleaded and substituted as heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent no. l. They had absolutely no grievance about the delay in bringing them on record. It is the second respondent who is fighting both the appellants and the 1st respondent who wants to derive a technical advantage by this procedural lapse. If the trend is to encourage fair play in action in administrative law, it must all the more inhere in judicial approach. Such applications have to be approached with this view whether substantial justice is done between the parties or technical rules of procedure are given precedence over doing substantial justice in Court. Undoubtedly, justice according to law, law to be administered to advance justice. " ( 8 ) HOWEVER, His Lordship Amarendra nath Sen, J. in his concurring but separate judgment was pleased to observe:"civil Procedure Code requires that in the event of death of a particular party, heirs and legal representatives of the deceased have to be brought on record within a particular period, provided the cause of action survives. If the legal representatives are not brought on record within the stipulated period, certain consequences follow and the action abates either wholly or partially depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The code further provides that an application may be made for setting aside the abatement within a stipulated period. If the legal representatives are not brought on record within the stipulated period, certain consequences follow and the action abates either wholly or partially depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The code further provides that an application may be made for setting aside the abatement within a stipulated period. It is now well settled that an abatement can be set aside at any time even beyond the period prescribed for making an application for setting aside the abatement, if sufficient cause is shown explaining the delay in the making of the application. If, irrespective of the provisions of the code and the merits of the case, abatements are to be set aside as a matter of course merely on the ground that abatement is only a consequence of non-compliance of law of procedure and substantial justice is denied to the parties, the result may really amount to a denial of justice and in an indefinite prolongation of a litigation. The provision fixing a particular time for making an application for bringing legal representatives on record with the consequence of the suit or appeal abating if no application is made within time, have been enacted for expeditious disposal of cases in the interest of proper administration of justice. It is further to be borne in mind that when a suit or an appeal abates, a very valuable right accrues to the other party and such a right is not to be ignored or interfered with lightly in the name of doing substantial justice to the party, as depriving a party of a lawful right created in the interest of administration of justice in the absence of good grounds results in injustice to the party concerned. For doing justice to the parties, the Courts have consistently held that whenever sufficient cause is shown by a party at default in making an application for substitution, abatement will have to be set aside as the good cause shown for explaining the delay in making the application is sufficient justification to deprive the other party of the right that may accrue to the other party as a result of the abatement of the suit or appeal. The courts have also consistently ruled that laches or negligence furnish no proper grounds for setting aside the abatement. The courts have also consistently ruled that laches or negligence furnish no proper grounds for setting aside the abatement. In such cases, a party guilty of negligence or laches must bear the consequence of his laches and negligence and must suffer. In appropriate cases, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court may set aside the abatement, even if there be slight negligence or minor laches in not making an application within the time provided an over all picture of the entire case, requires such course for furthering the cause of justice. When negligence and laches are established on the part of the party who seeks to set aside the abatement the application of such a party should be entertained only in the rarest of cases for furthering the ends of justice only and on proper terms. In the present case, the appeal has been filed against a preliminary decree in a partition suit. A partition suit stands on a peculiar footing. In a partition suit any of the party can claim transposition from the category of the defendant to the category of the plaintiff and vice- versa. With the passing of the preliminary decree, shares of the parties are declared and rights of the parties pending the passing of the final decree are to an extent determined. As a result of the passing of the preliminary decree, certain rights do accrue to the parties subject to the results of the appeal filed. There is no doubt that there has been some amount of negligence on the part of the appellant in not making the application for substitution within time. The appellant had full knowledge of the death of the respondent who was a near relation of the appellant. The application made by the heirs of the deceased for substitution under O. 1 r. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is indeed misconceived and has been rightly held to be so by the High Court. To my mind, it cannot be said that the high Court had acted improperly or illegally in the facts and circumstances of this case is refusing to set aside the abatement. I have my doubts as to whether it is proper for this Court to interfere with such orders passed by the high Court. To my mind, it cannot be said that the high Court had acted improperly or illegally in the facts and circumstances of this case is refusing to set aside the abatement. I have my doubts as to whether it is proper for this Court to interfere with such orders passed by the high Court. " ( 9 ) THE above point came up for consideration in Civil Revision Petition nos. 2325, 3389 and 3390 of 1987 and His lordship Ramanjulu Naidu, following the ratio laid down in Bhagwan Swaroop s case (supra), held that the legal representatives who were not brought on record in time under Order XXII CPC cannot be impleaded as necessary and proper parties under order I Rule 10 CPC. ( 10 ) IN Pulikuntla Papanna and others v. P. Pulikuntla Gangulamma and others, His lordship Rama Rao, J. held that the failure to bring parties on record as legal representatives does not preclude the plaintiff to bring them on record as defendants on a different ground, where the legal representatives in a suit for partition were not brought on record under order XXII CPC, they can be brought on record under Order I Rule 10 CPC. In ramayya v. Chennarayappa the same view was expressed in a suit for mortgage and the deceased mortgagee by his Lordship kondaiah, J. while appreciating the scope of ber I Rule 10 CPC and also the provisions rder XXII CPC. Be that as it may, here the matter is at the stage of final decree proceeding. In such a case, the appropriate provision is Order XXII Rule 10 CPC which deals with creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit. ( 11 ) IN Siddavatam Mohan Reddy v. P. Chinnaswamy and others it was held that a suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of abatement after a preliminary decree was passed for, thereby, rights are accrued to one party and liabilities are incurred by the other and when Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 are not applicable in cases of death, during the final decree proceedings, one has to invoke order XXII Rule 10 CPC to bring the legal representatives on record. It was also observed in the said decision that order XXII Rule 9 CPC is not applicable in case of final decree proceedings. It was also observed in the said decision that order XXII Rule 9 CPC is not applicable in case of final decree proceedings. When that being the legal position, may be that the legal representatives, in their capacity as legal representatives, cannot be brought on record by invoking Order I Rule 10 CPC. But, however, it is a case of final decree proceeding and even to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also to avoid driving the parties to yet another round to litigation, the court below had thought it proper to bring on record these parties who are definitely necessary and proper parties representing the interest of R-11 in the final decree proceedings for having the matter being properly adjudicated. Hence, even in the interests of justice, the impugned order passed by the Court below is sustainable and does not warrant any interference. ( 12 ) BEFORE parting with the matter, I may also make it clear that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 cpc, the revision petitioner has to satisfy the revisional Court that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it will definitely occasion in failure of justice. That additional requirement is not available in the present case and hence on this ground also the Civil revision Petition is bound to fail. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons recorded above, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference under Section 115 cpc and the Civil Revision Petition, being devoid of merits, is accordingly dismissed, but, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.