JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This regular appeal is directed against the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar dated 14.3.1980. The learned Additional District Judge vide his aforementioned judgment and decree has affirmed the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Sub Judge, Amritsar on 9.12.1977. 2. One Mohinder Singh filed a suit seeking declaration that he is owner in possession of land measuring 24 kanals comprised in Killa Nos. 68, 69 and 176 according to the jamabandi for the year 1970-71 situated in village Kallowal, District Amritsar. He further claimed that after declaring him owner and in possession a decree for permanent injunction be issued restraining one Smt. Guro widow of Bansa Singh-respondent No. 2 from dispossessing him or interfering in his possession. The learned Sub Judge after considering the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion that plaintiff Mohinder Singh was not the owner of the land in dispute but he was in possession on the basis that the land was mortgaged to his predecessor-in-interest Sadhu Singh by one Mangta vide mortgage deed dated 13.8.1924. The land which was mortgaged to Sadhu Singh comprised in the old Khasra No. 623 as per jamabandi for the year 1922-23. It is clarified that the land comprising in Killa Nos. 68, 69 and 176 according to jamabandi for the year 1970-71 situated in village Kallowal, District Amritsar was allotted to Sadhu Singh in lieu of the mortgaged land. Mohinder Singh plaintiff and his sister claimed succession in equal shares being the son and daughter of real brother of Sadhu Singh. It was alleged that the mortgage was never redeemed. The learned trial court found that the plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove that he had become owner of the property. However, on the basis of entries in khasra girdawaries produced by the plaintiff-respondent, it was held that his name had always figured therein and earlier to his name, the name of Sadhu Singh used to appear in the column of Agriculture in the kasra girdawaries. It was further held by the trial court that name of Smt. Guro defendant-respondent No. 2 had not appeared at any stage in khasra girdawaries. It is pertinent to mention that Union of India did not contest the suit before the trial Court. It was further held by the trial court that name of Smt. Guro defendant-respondent No. 2 had not appeared at any stage in khasra girdawaries. It is pertinent to mention that Union of India did not contest the suit before the trial Court. The trial Court passed a decree of permanent injunction in favour of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 restraining defendant-respondent No. 2 Smt. Guro from interfering in possession of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 over the suit land and restrained her from dispossessing plaintiff-respondent No. 1 from this land. The prayer of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for a decree of declaration that he was owner of the suit land was declined. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, both plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and defendant-respondent No. 2 filed appeals before the learned District Judge, Amritsar. Deciding both the appeals by a common judgment, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial Court and also repelled the plea of plaintiff- respondent No. 1 claiming that he had become owner of the said land. While rejecting the plea of plaintiff-respondent No. 1, the learned Additional District Judge held as under : "The contention of the leaned counsel for the appellant Mr. Shanti Sarup Adv. that the trial court wrongly gave findings that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit land because the property has not correctly been declared as evacuee property in accordance with the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act. He has also argued that the property was mortgaged and as such did not become evacuee property because the property is composite property and interests have not been separated and no notice under section 7 under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, was issued and, therefore, the order declaring the property to be evacuee is without jurisdiction, and in this behalf he has relied upon A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 106, Dr. Zafar Ali Shah and others v. The Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Jhansi. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this case cannot be accepted, firstly, for the reason that the plaintiff, no where in his plaint has taken the plea that the property is not an evacuee property and has wrongly been declared as an evacuee property by the concerned authorities and this being the position no issue was correctly framed regarding the property being evacuee or not. He has only alleged to have become owner as the property has not been redeemed. However, there cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law as laid down in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 106 (supra). I feel it necessary to mention here that plaintiff even appearing as PW3, in his statement, no where stated that he was not issued notice under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, nor stated that the property was not evacuee property and has wrongly been declared as evacuee property. It is well settled principle of law that a party cannot go beyond the pleadings and no amount of evidence can be looked into if it is beyond the pleadings. The learned counsel for appellant has also relied upon Nur Mohammad v. Union of India, 1976 R.L.R. 498. It is not at all helpful to him because that related to an Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act (64 of 1951). Therefore, I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not become the owner of the property as the property is still under mortgage and the mortgage has not yet been redeemed. The learned Sub Judge, had rightly given his findings that the plaintiff has not become the owner as claimed." 3. So far as the appeal filed by the defendant-respondent No. 2 is concerned, the learned Additional District Judge concluded that she was never delivered possession as the warrants of allotment issued in her favour were not received back after execution. In this regard, the view taken by learned Additional District Judge is as under : "Now coming to the next argument regarding possession, the counsel for the other appellant Smt. Guro has argued that Guro was given possession of the property by the revenue authorities, but she has not been able to bring anything on the record to show that actual possession was delivered. The defendant examined only Ram Dass, Clerk of the Tehsildar (Sales) as DW1 to prove the allotment order Ex.D1 but mere allotment order does not show that the possession has been delivered as according to the evidence, the warrants of allotment had not been received back after execution. The defendant examined only Ram Dass, Clerk of the Tehsildar (Sales) as DW1 to prove the allotment order Ex.D1 but mere allotment order does not show that the possession has been delivered as according to the evidence, the warrants of allotment had not been received back after execution. If she had been actually delivered the possession, then the entries would have been changed in the revenue record at once, because this is a case in which the possession was to be delivered through the Revenue Authorities by the order of the Government. But the perusal of the record i.e. Ex.P-27 the copy of the khasra girdawari, goes to show that the possession is not of Guro. This khasra girdawari relates to the years 1971-73. According to Ram Dass (DW1) allotment order was made on 23.4.1973 and if allotment order had already been put into effect, then as already mentioned above, the entries in the revenue record would have been changed to show that the possession is of defendant No. 1. Perusal of Ex.P- 16, another copy of the kasra girdwari does not show the change in the cultivating possession of Smt. Guro. No other revenue record has been produced by her to show her possession in the land in dispute after 23.4.1973. The patwari who had delivered the possession had not been examined and in fact he was the right person to say as to whether the possession has been delivered and if a party in possession of best evidence, fails to produce the same, for the reasons best known to it, the court can rightly draw an adverse inference against the party. Reference with advantage can be made to Mathura Singh and others v. Gurbachan Singh, (1967)69 P.L.R. 119." 4. The Union of India has filed the present appeal against the aforementioned judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge dated 14.3.1980 claiming that the property after enforcement of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 (for brevity, 1951 Act) has become evacuee property as period of 20 years prescribed in Section 9(2) of 1951 Act puts an end to the rights of the mortgagee and there was no necessity to redeem the mortgage. Section 9 of 1951 Act reads as under : "9. Certain reliefs in respect of mortgaged property of evacuees. Section 9 of 1951 Act reads as under : "9. Certain reliefs in respect of mortgaged property of evacuees. - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or contract or any decree or order of a Civil Court or other authority, where the claim is made by a mortgagee, no mortgaged property of an evacuee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) be liable for the payment of interest at a rate exceeding five per cent per annum simple on the principal money advanced or deemed to have been advanced. (2) Where a mortgagee has taken possession on any terms whatsoever of any agricultural land and is entitled to receive profits accruing from the land and to appropriate the same, every such mortgage shall be deemed to have been taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage and shall be deemed to have been extinguished on the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed or twenty years, whichever is less, from the date of the execution of the mortgage deed; and if the aforesaid period has not expired and the mortgage debt has not been extinguished, the competent officer shall determined the mortgage debt due having regard to the proportion which the unexpired portion of that period bears to the total of that period." 5. A perusal of the above section shows that the competent authority is under an obligation to determine the mortgage debt due. The sub-section postulates that if a period of 20 years has expired, then the mortgage shall be deemed to have been extinguished on the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed or twenty years whichever is less on the presumption that it was a complete usufructuary mortgage. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance 7. It is pertinent to mention that on behalf of Union of India, Financial Commissioner (Taxation) & Deputy Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department was appointed as Assistant Custodian General under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance 7. It is pertinent to mention that on behalf of Union of India, Financial Commissioner (Taxation) & Deputy Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department was appointed as Assistant Custodian General under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. A notification to this effect was issued by the Government of India on 22.9.1970 which has been taken on record as Annexure A. It is because of this delegation of power that present appeal on behalf of Union of India has been filed by the Government Pleader, Punjab and the learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab has appeared, 8. Mr. S.S. Gill, learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab appearing for Union of India has submitted that once the period of twenty years expired in respect of a mortgaged property which is a evacuee property under the 1951 Act, the mortgage stands extinguished. Thereafter, the property vests in the custodian and not in the non-evacuee. For this proposition, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Kharati Lal, A.I.R. 1973 Punjab and Haryana 333. He also relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kundan and others v. Union of India, (1969)71 P.L.R. 106. 9. Mr. Palwinder Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted that although no appeal had been filed by defendant-respondent No. 2, yet the court should remand the case, as Smt. Guro respondent No. 2 was allotted this land as a war widow. It was claimed that husband of respondent No. 2 Smt. Guro, had died in action of Indo-China War of 1962 and the land was allotted to her on 23.4.1975 by the Union of India. This contention of the learned counsel does not deserve to be accepted for the simple reason that no appeal has been filed by her and moreover both the courts below have given concurrent finding that respondent No. 2 withheld the best evidence with regard to delivery of possession to her by Tehsildar, by not producing him. 10. I have considered the argument of Shri S.S. Gill and have not felt persuaded to accept the same. On 2.1.1974 the appellant was proceeded ex parte by the trial Court. 10. I have considered the argument of Shri S.S. Gill and have not felt persuaded to accept the same. On 2.1.1974 the appellant was proceeded ex parte by the trial Court. Before the trial Court, an application was moved by the appellant under Order 9, Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure on 22.5.1976 seeking setting aside of the order dated 2.1.1974. In response to the application plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed his reply. On 1.4.1977 the application was dismissed by the trial Court by passing the following order : "Received by transfer. Be registered. Learned G.P. has made a statement that he does not want to proceed with the application for setting aside ex parte proceedings. The application is, therefore, dismissed. No appearance on defendant No. 2. He is proceeded against ex parte. To come up on 19.4.77 for plaintiffs evidence. In so far as the right of Mohinder Singh to be the owner of the land in dispute is concerned, no proof has been furnished as to how he was the owner. On the contrary, there is an order under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 declaring the property as an evacuee property. On account of these reasons, both the Courts below refused to declare Mohinder Singh as owner of the properly although he was found in possession. Sd/- ASSJ, 1.4.77". In other words, the appellant consciously gave up the contest before the trial Court. Despite the fact that application seeking setting aside of the ex parte proceedings was filed, it was withdrawn and the ex parte order continued. Moreover, there is no issue framed with regard to the nature of land whether it was evacuee or otherwise and there was no pleading before the Court to that effect. In the absence of a specific issue and contested by the appellant as to whether the property was evacuee or not and in the absence of any pleading and evidence, it is impermissible in the regular second appeal to hold that it was evacuee property by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 9(2) of 1951 Act. It insignificant to note that no notice under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was issued to plaintiff- respondent No. 1. A Constitution Bench in the case of Dr. It insignificant to note that no notice under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was issued to plaintiff- respondent No. 1. A Constitution Bench in the case of Dr. Zafar All Shah and others v. The Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Jhansi, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 106 has held that unless a notice is first given under Section 7, the status of the property cannot be determined. Moreover, there is no order on record showing that the land is a evacuee property. Therefore, merely on the basis of statutory provisions contained in Section 9(2) of 1951 Act, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the findings given by the Courts below with regard to possession of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 are perverse or illegal or without any factual foundation about the nature of the property in the pleadings and the evidence led. I am further of the view that as there is no challenge to the ex parte order passed on 2.1.1974, the application filed seeking setting aside of the order having been withdrawn on 1.4.1977, there is no scope in the second appeal to take a different view. 11. In the case of Baddan v. Union of India, 1970 Cr.L.J. 743 this Court has categorically held that Section 9(2) of 1951 Act cannot be invoked without first having recourse to the machinery provided by 1951 Act as the 1951 Act provides to deal with all composite property. Presuming that Section 9(2) of 1951 Act was available to the defendants, there are many other hurdles in their way was have been pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.