R. K. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) THE present appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 21. 7. 1998 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8483 of 1993, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy in view of the Full Benchs decision in the case of Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Co-operative Union, 1991 (2)UPLBEC 898. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant/writ petitioner was appointed as Legal Assistant on 4. 12. 1988 in Nawabganj Sugar Mill Company Limited, district gonda, a unit wholly owned and controlled by the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation ). Subsequently vide order dated 6. 7. 1989, he was transferred to Shahganj Sugar Mills, i. e. , another unit owned by the Corporation. His services were confirmed by the Corporation vide order dated 5. 7. 1990. It appears that the appellant-writ petitioner absented himself from duty since 23. 9. 1992. According to him, he was ill and had sent medical certificate along with an application by registered post for grant of necessary leave on 23. 9. 1992 itself. He also sent a telegram to that effect on the same date. As he could not recover from his illness, he intimated the authorities concerned accordingly. However, the Chief manager, of the Corporations Shahganj Sugar Mills vide letter dated 30. 9. 1992 asked the appellant writ petitioner to join the duties immediately, whereupon the appellant-writ petitioner again sent his medical certificate along with letter dated 30. 9. 1992. Subsequently, the appellant-writ petitioner had sent an application along with medical certificate as per the averment made in the writ petition but the same was not received by the respondent No. 2 having been returned undelivered. The respondent No. 2 vide letter/notice dated 22. 10. 1992 directed the appellant-writ petitioner to join his duties within three days otherwise his services shall be terminated. In response to the said notice, the appellant-writ petitioner again sent an application on 13. 11. 1992 along with medical certificate by registered post for extension of his leave, which letter was returned undelivered as according to the appellant-writ petitioner, the respondent No. 2 had refused to receive the said letter. The respondent No. 2 vide order dated 17. 12. In response to the said notice, the appellant-writ petitioner again sent an application on 13. 11. 1992 along with medical certificate by registered post for extension of his leave, which letter was returned undelivered as according to the appellant-writ petitioner, the respondent No. 2 had refused to receive the said letter. The respondent No. 2 vide order dated 17. 12. 1992, terminated his services. The order dated 17. 12. 1992 had been challenged by the appellant-writ petitioner before this Court by means of filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While entertaining the writ petition, this Court had directed the respondents to file a counter-affidavit. After exchange of the affidavits, the writ petition was admitted on 8. 5. 1996 and interim order was also passed on the same day in favour of the writ petitioner. But in Special appeal No. 494 of 1996 preferred by the respondents herein, this Court had stayed the operation of the interim order dated 8. 5. 1996. The aforesaid special appeal was decided on 23. 4. 1998 with the direction for deciding the writ petition expeditiously and the interim order was also vacated. The said writ petition came up for hearing before the learned single Judge, which has been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Chandrama Singh (supra ). ( 3 ) WE have heard Shri R. K. Ojha learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner and Shri S. S. Nigam learned counsel for the respondents. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that the Corporation falls within the meaning of the word state as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, any arbitrary action or order passed by the Corporation can be challenged by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that the writ petition having been admitted and remained pending before this Court for more than 5 years, it could not have been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In support of this plea, he relied upon the following decisions : (1) Hridya Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 , (2) Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1995 All LJ 454. In support of this plea, he relied upon the following decisions : (1) Hridya Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 , (2) Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1995 All LJ 454. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has further contended that he was a confirmed employee of the Corporation and under Clause M (4) of the standing orders applicable to all the sugar mills of the Corporation, no order of dismissal could have been passed unless the employee was informed about the alleged misconduct and given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him arid a proper enquiry has been made by the Manager. According to the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, admittedly in the present case, the appellant-writ petitioner had been dismissed from services without holding any enquiry. Thus, the impugned order of dismissal has been passed in utter disregard and gross violation of the principle of natural justice. In such circumstances, the alternative remedy available to the petitioner is not an absolute bar in entertaining the writ petition. In support of the above submission, he relied upon the following decisions : (1) Ambika Singh v. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and Ors. , (1990) 1 UPLBEC 699, (2) Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors. , (19981 8,scc 1. (3) Satya Ram Yadav v. Deputy Managing Director, U. P. State Warehousing Corporation, lucknow, 2000 (1) ESC 504 (All), (4) State of U. P. and Ors. v. Ali Abbas Abdi, 2001 (2) ESC 619 (All ). (5) Kamta Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U. P.) and Ors. , AIR 1987 SC 2186 . ( 6 ) THE learned counsel further submitted that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chandra Singh (supra) is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as the Full Bench itself had held that the High Court must not allow its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to be invoked if it is established from the material on record that there exists exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances to deviate from well-settled normal rules of relegating the petitioner of alternative remedy provided to him. According to the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, in the present case, there is violation of the principles of natural justice, and therefore, the alternative remedy of raising the dispute before the Industrial tribunal could not be a ground for declining to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India in view of the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool corporation (supra) wherein the Hon. Supreme Court has held that where there has been violation of principle of natural justice, the alternative remedy would not be a bar in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Shri Ojha also relied upon the decision in the case of Rakesh Chandra Gangwar v. State of U. P. and Ors. , C. M. W. P. No. 38619 of 1998 decided on 28. 5. 1999. According to him, this Court had been exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in writ petitions filed by the employees of the corporation where violation of natural justice had been alleged, therefore, the Court should not have dismissed the petition on the ground of alternative remedy inasmuch as admittedly neither any enquiry nor any opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant-writ petitioner before terminating his services. In support of this plea, he relied upon the following decisions : (1) Ambika Singh v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited and Ors. , 1990 (1) UPLBEC 699, (2) Spl. Appeal No. 198 of 1997, Narendra Tyagi v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited and ors. decided on 8. 4. 1997, (3) C. M. W. P. No. 2602 of 1998, Ram Vijay Singh v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited and ors. decided on 9. 2. 1998. (4) Spl. Appeal No. 195 of 1998. U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited, Lucknow and Ors. v. Ram Vijay Singh decided on 13. 5. 1998. ( 7 ) ON the merits of the case, Shri R. K. Ojha submitted that since the services of the appellant-writ petitioner had been terminated without giving any show cause notice or any opportunity of hearing, the said order is liable to be set aside being violative of the principle of natural justice and he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Pathak v. Chairman Indian Oil Corporation, New Delhi and Ors. , 2000 (89) FLR 1112. , 2000 (89) FLR 1112. ( 8 ) SHRI S. S. Nigam learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the appellant-writ petitioner is admittedly a workman as defined under Section 2 (ii) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and, therefore, proper forum for adjudication of dispute is labour court under the provisions of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and not by invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For the aforesaid proposition he relied upon the following decisions : (1) Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Cooperative Union, Lucknow and Ors. , 1991 (2) UPLBEC 898. (2) Scooters India and Ors. v. Vijay E. V. Elder, 1998 SCC (Lands) 1611. ( 9 ) HE further submitted that the principles of service law cannot be applied under labour law and submitted that even if the order of dismissal has been passed without holding any enquiry it cannot be set aside solely on that ground and if no enquiry is found to be held or is found to be defective, then employer has right to lead evidence before the Tribunal/court to substantiate the charges. He relied upon the following decisions : (1) J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1997 (76) FLR 372, (2) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1031 . (3) Cooper Engineering Work Limited v. P. P. Munder, AIR 1975 SC 1900 . ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that despite sending registered letter to the appellant-writ petitioner, he did not join the duties and, therefore, he is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this plea, he relied upon the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University and Ors. v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 . He further submitted that the standing order has no statutory force and, therefore, any violation of it cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the constitution of India. He relied upon the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, AIR 1995 SC 1715 . He further submitted that the standing order has no statutory force and, therefore, any violation of it cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the constitution of India. He relied upon the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, AIR 1995 SC 1715 . ( 11 ) SO far as the question of alternative remedy by way of raising industrial dispute being available to the appellant-writ petitioner is concerned, there cannot be any dispute that the appellant-writ petitioner can raise industrial dispute under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act. The question is as to whether there being an alternative remedy of raising the industrial dispute, the writ petition filed by the appellant-writ petitioner, should have been entertained or not when violation of the principles of natural justice is alleged. ( 12 ) IN the case of Ambika Singh (supra), this Court, in para 6 of the judgment has held as under : "6. Before we had taken up the cases for hearing on merits, learned counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection. The preliminary objection is that since the petitioners have an alternative remedy by agitating the matter before the labour court under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, these petitions may be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. No doubt, the petitioners have an alternative remedy by getting the matter referred to the labour court for adjudication. But, the question is as to whether on the facts on record, we should decline to interfere in the matter on the ground that the petitioners have alternative remedy. In these writ petitions counter-affidavits have already been called for and are filed. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the year of birth of the petitioners have been changed as recorded in their service-books without giving any opportunity to them and for that purpose he does not rely upon any fact contained in the writ petitions or documents annexed therewith but relies only upon facts stated in counter-affidavit and annexures filed along with it. For the purpose of deciding this case, there is no controversy about facts before us nor any inquiry regarding any fact has to be made. For the purpose of deciding this case, there is no controversy about facts before us nor any inquiry regarding any fact has to be made. Only question of law whether impugned order is void being passed against principle of natural justice has to be decided on the basis of a document annexed with the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. No doubt whenever there is disputed question of fact, even if the counter-affidavit is called for, the Courts normally decline to interfere with the matter in case it is found that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to him under law. But in view of the above factual and legal position, we overrule the preliminary objection and proceed to decide these writ petitions on merits. " ( 13 ) IN the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) the Hon. Supreme Court in para 15 of the judgment has held as follows : "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. " ( 14 ) IN the case of Satya Ram Yadav (supra), this Court while following the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra), in para 8 of its judgment, has held as under : "8. The last argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy of appeal or before the State Public Tribunal is also liable to be rejected. The dismissal order has been found to be violative of principle of natural justice. The apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) SCC 1. The last argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy of appeal or before the State Public Tribunal is also liable to be rejected. The dismissal order has been found to be violative of principle of natural justice. The apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) SCC 1. has held that if an order is violative of principle of natural justice in that case even if there is statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner the High Court can interfere without relegating the petitioner to pursue the alternative remedy. " ( 15 ) IN the case of State of U. P. and Ors. v. Ali Abbas Abdi, the Division Bench of this Court, presided over by the Honble the Chief Justice, followed the decision of the Hon Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) and held that inspite of the availability of alternative remedy, if the order impugned, suffers from lack of jurisdiction or is in violation of the principle of natural justice, the High Court can entertain the writ petition and pass appropriate orders. In paras 3, 5 and 6 of the judgment the Division Bench of this Court has held as under : "3. It is true that normally where a statute itself prescribes a remedy, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the constitution of India, and the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may decline to grant relief in the writ petition until such statutory remedy is exhausted. However, this rule of exhaustion of statutory remedy is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and not a rule of law nor it bars the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 in granting relief in appropriate case and exceptional circumstances. " "5. Therefore, it is a well-settled legal position that inspite of availability of alternative remedy if the order impugned suffers from the lack of jurisdiction, or is in violation of principles of natural justice the High Court can entertain the writ petition and pass appropriate orders. " "5. Therefore, it is a well-settled legal position that inspite of availability of alternative remedy if the order impugned suffers from the lack of jurisdiction, or is in violation of principles of natural justice the High Court can entertain the writ petition and pass appropriate orders. In the case in hand the learned single Judge has found that the alleged second departmental proceeding pursuant to the direction of the learned Tribunal was not initiated in terms of the direction after giving appropriate opportunity to the writ petition. It has been found by the learned single Judge that in fact no departmental inquiry was initiated afresh and petitioner was not afforded opportunity to defend as directed by Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 28. 10. 1980, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. " "6. Therefore, when the impugned order was itself found to be in violation of principles of natural justice the learned single Judge has rightly entertained the writ petition. No other point has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. Besides that during course of arguments of this appeal it has been stated at the bar that the writ petitioner has already retired from service. " ( 16 ) IN the case of Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (supra), the Hon. Supreme Court in para 12 of the judgment, has held as under : "12. The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. It is well-established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity such an order could surely be challenged before the high Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. " ( 17 ) IN the case of Chandrama Singh (supra), the Full Bench of this Court in paras 9 and 13 of the judgment has held as under : "9. Having regard to the above noticed decisions of the Honble Supreme Court of India, it is ruled that where a complete machinery/remedy for obtaining relief is provided in statute and such machinery and remedy fully covers the grievance of the petitioner then, unless extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist or the machinery/remedy does not cover the grievance of the petitioner or the machinery or remedy is demonstrated and proved by the petitioner to be inadequate or in efficacious, the petitioner has to be relegated to the alternative remedy and the Court should not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of the grievance by the petitioner. . . . . " "13. The decisions of the Honble Supreme Court of India and this Court, noted above, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the High Court must not allow its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India to be invoked if the petitioner has got an alternative remedy and such remedy is not pleaded and proved to be inadequate or inefficacious, or if it is not established from the material on record that there exist exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances to deviate from the well-settled normal rule of relegating the petitioner to alternative remedy and permit him to by-pass the alternative remedy. The hurdle of alternative remedy cannot be allowed to be skipped over lightly on a casual and bald statement in the petition that "there is no other equally efficacious or adequate alternative remedy than to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. " the petitioner must furnish material facts and particulars to sustain such a plea. " ( 18 ) IN the case of Scooters India and others (supra), the Hon. Supreme Court in para 2 of the judgment has held as under : "2. The above facts alone are sufficient to indicate that there was no occasion for the High Court to entertain the writ petition directly for adjudication of an industrial dispute involving the termination of disputed questions of fact for which remedy under the industrial laws are available to the workman. That apart, the writ petition was filed more than 6 years after the date on which the cause of action is said to have arisen and there being no cogent explanation for the delay, the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of laches alone. It is also extra-ordinary for the High Court to have held Clause 9. 3. 12 of the standing orders as invalid. Learned counsel for the respondent rightly made no attempt to support this part of the High courts order. In view of the fact that we are setting aside the High Courts judgment, we need not deal with this aspect in detail. " ( 19 ) IN the case of J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur (supra) this Court has held that the principle of service law has no automatic application to labour law. ( 20 ) IN the case of Aligarh Muslim University and others (supra), the Hon Supreme Court in paras 21 to 25 of the judgment has held as under : "21. As pointed recently in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, inter- ference under Article 226 is not necessary. As pointed recently in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, inter- ference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A. P. , it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 22. In M. C. Mehta it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin, that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other "de facto" prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, Chinnappa Reddy, J. , followed Ridge v. Baldwin, and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23. Chinnappa Reddy. J. in S. L. Kapoor case laid down two exceptions (at SCC p. 395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that no mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wades administrative Law (5th Edn. , pp. 472-75), as follows : (SCC p. 58, para 31)"it is not possible to lay down rigid Rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. . . . . There must also have been some real prejudice to the complaint; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of nature justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the natural of the inquiry, the Rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth. " since then this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several case. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma. In that case, the principle of "prejudice" has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M. P. 25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M. C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in england by Lord Reid. Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham. Megarry, J. and straughton. L. J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smt. , Wade, D. H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham. Megarry, J. and straughton. L. J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smt. , Wade, D. H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute Rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet some others have applied via media Rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case. " ( 21 ) IN the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) the Hon. Supreme Court in para 32 of its judgment has held as under : "32. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above discussion : (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i. e. , where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2 (k) or Section 2a of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligation created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations, created by enactment like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which can be called sister enactments to Industrial Disputes Act -and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by Industrial Disputes Act, provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of section 2 (k) and Section 2a of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial disputes or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act, otherwise, recourse to civil court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to the Parliament and the State legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/industrial tribunal directly - i. e. , without the requirement of a reference by the Government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2a of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the industrial Disputes Act. (6) The certified standing orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these standing orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mecha- nism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural law and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts, indeed, the powers of the Courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute. " ( 22 ) THUS, from the various decisions referred to above, the following principles emerge regarding maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India : (I) While exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High court may decline to grant relief until such statutory remedy is exhausted. However, this rule is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and not a rule of law nor it bars the jurisdiction of the high Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in granting relief in appropriate case and exceptional circumstances: (II) Alternative remedy is not a bar where a writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights ; or where there is violation of principles of natural justice : or where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. ( 23 ) IN the present case before us, the appellant-writ petitioner has complained that the order of dismissal has been passed against him without giving any show cause notice or opportunity of hearing. Thus, the violation of principle of natural justice has been alleged which falls within one of the exceptions carved out by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra ). Thus, the writ petition is maintainable. ( 24 ) IN the case of Rakesh Chandra Gangwar (supra), this Court has held as follows : "the Courts, as a matter of principle, ought to have regard to the functions being performed by the body whose decision is impugned, rather than the formal source of its power, and this should be so whether or not the body in question is ostensible a "public" or "private" one. In the words of S. Arrow Smith : "the way forward now for the Courts to adopt the same approach to the judicial review of contractual powers as they do to the review of other activities of the government. In other words, they should accept that those powers are reviewable as a matter of principle but that review may be negated or limited by special policy factor, rather than continue searching for some public law element to the decision as the justification for applying public law doctrines to the case before them". See Dee Smith (supra) page 178. In other words, they should accept that those powers are reviewable as a matter of principle but that review may be negated or limited by special policy factor, rather than continue searching for some public law element to the decision as the justification for applying public law doctrines to the case before them". See Dee Smith (supra) page 178. This seems to be in the tune with the jurismetrics of our Constitution. Having thus given my thoughtful consideration to the question of maintainability of the writ petitions, I am of the view that Article 226 of the Constitution which is phrased in a language of very wide amplitude, does not admit of any restraint on the powers of the High Court. In fact the high Courts in India being court of record have plenary powers of unlimited jurisdiction. They are repository of all judicial powers except what expressly excluded. A writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be maintained as against a non statutory body such as a co-operative society not only for performance of its statutory duties but also for the performance of duties of public nature by whatever means imposed. I am further of the view that the duties imposed by certified standing orders are duties of public nature and exercise of power thereunder would be open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution on the touchstone of reasonableness and procedural fairness despite availability of alternative remedy under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The preliminary objection is, therefore, unsustainble. Before parting with the preliminary objection as to reviewability under Article 226 of the constitution of the impugned decision taken by the cooperative society, it would be apt to observe that if, in a given case, it is found that the decision impugned therein has been taken against fundamental principles of reasonableness and procedural fairness, and/or against any provision of certified standing orders, this Court would simply demolish the impugned decision and require the concerned society to take a fresh decision and require the concerned society to take a fresh decision in accordance with law. The submission that by giving such relief the Court would in fact be granting specific performance of contract of service which, in view of the provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1963, is impermissible, is untenable for this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution would quash the decision leaving it to the body concerned to take a fresh decision in accordance with law. The decision in Executive committee, Vaish Degree College v. V. Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 , is thus, distinguishable. " ( 25 ) IT is further found that this Court had been entertaining the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited as would be seen from the judgment of this Court in the cases of Ambika Singh, Narendra Tyagi and Ram Vijay singh (supra ). Thus, from the various principles laid down by this Court in the case of Rakesh Chandra gangwar, it can be safely said that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited as it falls within the term "state" as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. In fact this position has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. ( 26 ) APART from above, we find that the writ petition was filed as far back in the year 1993 and was admitted by this Court subsequently. It remained pending for more than 5 years. In the case of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 , the Hon. Supreme Court in para 12 of the judgment has held as under : "12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the commissioner in revision because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33a of the Act had not expired. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the commissioner in revision because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33a of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income-tax officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits. " ( 27 ) IN the case of Bal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1995 All LJ 454, the Hon. Supreme Court in para 10 of the judgment has held as under : "10. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the High court was not right in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy under Section 68 of the Act specially when the writ petition that was filed in 1988 had already been admitted and was pending in the High Court for the past more than five years. Since the question that is raised involves a pure question of law and even if the matter referred to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act it is bound to be agitated in the court by the party aggrieved by the order of the Chancellor, we are of the view that this was not a case where the High Court should have no-suited the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. " ( 28 ) THERE can be no dispute that the certified standing orders framed by the Corporation under the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, are statutorily imposed condition of services and are binding upon both the employer and the employee though they do not amount to statutory provisions. There is no dispute that in the standing orders framed by the corporation before terminating the service of an employee, opportunity of hearing is required to be given. There is no dispute that in the standing orders framed by the corporation before terminating the service of an employee, opportunity of hearing is required to be given. Even where there was no provision for giving opportunity of hearing to an employee when he had absented himself and such absence is treated as voluntarily abandonment of service, the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Limited, 1993 (67) FLR 111, and a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Pathak v. Chairman, Indian oil Corporation, New Delhi and Ors. (supra) had held that such provision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and employee should be given opportunity of hearing. Admittedly, the corporation is a State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, even if the standing orders are not statutory, any order which has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision of Hon. Supreme court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the petitioner has been removed from service without holding any enquiry. The Court is yet to consider the question of prejudice caused to the petitioner as the writ petition has been dismissed by the learned single Judge on the ground of alternative remedy. ( 29 ) THUS, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of L. Hriday narain (supra) and B. K. Agrawal (supra), we are of the view that since the writ petition was filed in the year 1993 and was also admitted by this Court and remained pending for more than 5 years the learned single Judge was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy of raising an industrial dispute. ( 30 ) ACCORDINGLY, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge. The writ petition shall be heard and decided on merit on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties. ( 30 ) ACCORDINGLY, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge. The writ petition shall be heard and decided on merit on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties. It is made clear that we have not adjudicated the respective contentions on the merit of the case advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. In the result, the special appeal is allowed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. .