Judgment 1. This letters patent appeal by respondent no. 7 of CWJC No. 4703/95 is directed against an order by which his promotion to class til post in the Gaya Civil Court has been quashed by learned Single Judge. Meanwhile, the appellant had unsuccessfully moved the learned Judge for review of the order in Civil Review No. 196 of 1997. 2. The Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV) Rules, 1992 contains provisions for recruitment of class III and class IV staff in the civil courts in the State of Bihar. Rules 34 to 36 thereof provide for appointment to class III by promotion from class IV. 20% class HI posts are filled up in that manner from amongst those who possess the minimum educational qualification required for class III post and have put in minimum three years service on class IV post. The qualification for the post of clerk i.e. Class III post is Graduate degree or equivalent degree of a recognised University. 3. In acordance with the said Rules process was initiated to fill up the vacancies in class III posts in the Gaya Civil Courts from amongst class IV employees on 8.9.94. On 16.6.94 applications were invited from the eligible class IV employees. The period for submission of the application was later extended. As per the last notice dated 8.9.94 applications were to be filed by 20.9.94. Out of the candidates who submitted applications 22 were short-listed on the basis of eligibility which were followed by written test on 8.12.94 and interview on 20.6.95. On 28.6.95, 11 class IV employees were promoted. The promotion was challenged by the unsuccessful candidates by filing the writ petition being CWJC No. 4703 of 1995, on 12.7.95. By the order under appeal dated 10.12.96, the learned Single Judge quashed the promotion of three of them, namely, respondent no. 7, the writ-petitioner herein, and respondent nos. 10 and 13. To this extent he allowed the writ petition. In this appeal, we are not concerned with the quashing of the promotion of respondent nos. 10 and 13 though it would not be out of place to mention that the writ petition and the letters patent appeal filed by one of them are said to have been dismissed by this Court. 4. In this appeal, we are not concerned with the quashing of the promotion of respondent nos. 10 and 13 though it would not be out of place to mention that the writ petition and the letters patent appeal filed by one of them are said to have been dismissed by this Court. 4. The ground on which the promotion of the appellant was quashed is that at the relevant time he figured as an accused in a murder case but by suppressing the fact he has secured promotion. The learned Single Judge found that the appellant had, in fact, remained in custody for more than 48 hours for which he was liable to be placed under suspension under Rule 49A(2) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (the CCA Rules, in short). The learned Judge expressed surprise that no departmental proceeding had been initiated nor he was put under suspension. 5. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant cannot be held to be guilty of suppression of fact of his being accused in a criminal case as there was no such requirement. The notice inviting applications contained proforma in which there was no such clause which required the applicant to disclose as to whether he was involved in any criminal case. Therefore, the appellants promotion on that ground could not be quashed. It was also submitted that the learned Judge committed error of record in holding that the appellant had remained in custody for more than 48 hours so as to attract Rule 49A(2) of the CCA Rules. The fact is that on 3.9.92 the appellant surrendered in the Court of C.J.M. Gaya and on the next day i.e. on 4.9.02 he was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, Gaya. He thus remained in custody for 27-28 hours and Rule 49A(2) was, thus, not attracted. 6. There is no dispute that at the relevant time the appellant was an accused in a case under section 302 IPC. From the records it appears that with respect to an occurrence of 31.3.91 Bodhgaya RS. Case No. 29 of 1991 was registered in which the appellant was not only named as an accused : he was, as a matter of fact, described as the main assailant, indeed the sole assailant. From the records it appears that with respect to an occurrence of 31.3.91 Bodhgaya RS. Case No. 29 of 1991 was registered in which the appellant was not only named as an accused : he was, as a matter of fact, described as the main assailant, indeed the sole assailant. The allegation was that he put the pistol on the head of the deceased and shot him dead in cold blood. From the records it further appears that on 2.9.92 the appellant filed surrender-cum-bail petition but did not press the same for undisclosed reasons with the result that the petition was rejected as not pressed. On 3.9.92 he surrendered in the court and filed petition for bail which was rejected. On 4.9.92 he was granted bail by the Sessions Judge Shri Aditya Sharan. We are at a loss to appreciate as to how prayer for bail in connection with murder case was allowed on the first day of hearing without calling for the case diary etc., particularly when the appellant was alleged to be the main assailant. In fact, such accused ordinarily are denied the privilege even by this Court. 7. The case has been instituted. as noticed above on or about 31.3.91. After waiting for about one and a half years, and apparently finding the situation favourable, the appellant decided to surrender and apply for bail. In fact, he did not surrender on the first day when he filed the surrender-cum-bail petition and allowed the same to be rejected. He did so only on the day following. It is really surprising that the appellant obtained the certified copy of the order and filed the application for bail on the same very day i.e. 3.9.92 and succeeded in getting bail on the very next day. The circumstances in which the bail was granted to the appellant are very disturbing and this Court would have considered taking suitable action against the judge concerned on administrative side but for the fact that he has superannuated from service and the event took place 9 years ago. The circumstances in which the bail was granted to the appellant are very disturbing and this Court would have considered taking suitable action against the judge concerned on administrative side but for the fact that he has superannuated from service and the event took place 9 years ago. The circumstances, however, impel us to observe that the grant of bail was a favour shown to the appellant by the then District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, presumably because the appellant happened to be a civil court employee, but law does not make any distinction un the ground of status and the person cannot be given a preferential treatment because he is an employee of the court specially when he is alleged to have committed a serious offence like murder. 8. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that whatever be the circumstances in which the appellant was granted bail, his plea of innocence stood vindicated as he was acquitted by the tria court in the trial which followed, in Sessions Trial No. 201/37 of 1993/95. We are not impressed by the submission. From the records it appears that all the three material prosecution witnesses were gain© over. All three of them, in fact, were dedared hostile. The acquittal not being on merit the appellant cannot argue with conviction that his implication in the criminal case was unfounded. 9. Whatever be the position, so far as the present controversy is concerned, the fact that the appellant figured as an accused in the aforesaid case was not made known to the authorities. It may be useful to notice the relevant part of the affidavit filed by the District Judge, Gaya, as under : "It may further be stated here that no departmental proceeding was ever initiated against the said Sudhir Kumar, respondent no. 7 nor he was ever put under suspension although the case had been pending against him since September 1992 (in fact, since March 1991). The fact that Sudhir Kumar, respondent no. 7 is an accused in a murder case was never brought to the notice of the present District and Sessions Judge, Gaya either by the petitioners or by said Sudhir Kumar or any other staff or person and the present District & Sessions Judge had no knowledge or information about the case prior to receipt of a copy of reply to counter affidavit." 10. The statements leave no doubt that the appointment of the appellant was made in ignorance of the fact that he figured as an accused in a pending case under Section 302 IPC. The so called proforma referred to by the counsel for the appellant was not statutory proforma. The notice merely indicated that the candidates were recquired to furnish some particulars as mentioned therein. We put a pointed question to the learned counsel for the appellant if the appellant could have been appointed or promoted had the fact of his being an accused in a murder case, the alleged killer, been known to the concerned District and Sessions Judge. Counsel, understandably, preferred not to answer the question. In the circumstances we are satisfied that the appellant secured the appointment by suppressing a material fact, which, had the same been known to the appointing authority i.e. District and Session Judge, would have proved fatal to his prospects of appointment by promotion. 11. As regards submission that the appellant was not taken in custody for more than 48 hours and, therefore, the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A of the CCA Rules has no application, and the learned Single Judge thus committed error of record because the appellant remained in custody for only 27-28 hours, it may simply be observed that though for deemed suspension under sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A the government servant must remain in custody-whether on criminal charges or otherwise-for a period exceeding 48 hours, rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code also contemplates deemed suspension of government servant if he is detained in custody until he is released. Thus even if this be accepted that in the instant case rule 49A(2) was not applicable, applicability of rule 99 not being in doubt, it must be held that the appellant remained under deemed suspension during the period when he was in custody between 3.9.92 and 4.9.92. The conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge on the basis of deemed suspension therefore cannot be said to be erroneous or error of record. 12. As a matter of fact, while the appellant herein was facing criminal trial, respondent no. 10 of the connected case already stood convicted at the time of selection while respondent no. 13 was not even eligible for such promotion. 12. As a matter of fact, while the appellant herein was facing criminal trial, respondent no. 10 of the connected case already stood convicted at the time of selection while respondent no. 13 was not even eligible for such promotion. The manner in which the selection was made and ineligible and unsuitable candidates were selected, leaves question mark on the fairness and correctness of the selection process. However, there being no cross-appeal by the writ-petitioners we do not propose to go into larger aspects. As a result of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, while the appellant as well as respondent no. 13 Bijoy Kumar Razak were demoted to class IV posts, respondent no.10 Ajay Kumar was dismissed from service for getting appointment suppressing fact that he was a life convict. 13. In the result, we do not find any error in the order of the learned Single Judge to warrant interference. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.