Judgment , J. 1. These appeals are directed against order dated March 30, 1991 passed by the learned single Judge in C. W. P. No.199 of 1985, Ajit singh V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, rohtak and another and C. W. P. No.2018 of 1985, The Sonepat Co- operative Sugar Mills ltd. Sonepat V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour court, Rohtak. 2. Appellant-ajit Singh was appointed as legal Assistant in the service of Sonepat co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. , Sonepat on september 27, 1978. His service was terminated on February 9, 1980 without complying with the provision of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act) or holding enquiry in consonance with the rules of natural justice. Immediately thereafter, Shri Vishnu Dutt was appointed on part time basis to do the work which was being done by the appellant. He challenged the action of the employer by raising an industrial dispute which was referred by the State Government to labour Court, Rohtak under Sec.10 (l) (c)of the Act. 3. In his statement of claim, the appellant pleaded that the termination of his service was vitiated due to violation of the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the act. He also accused the management of the mill of adopting unfair labour practice. 4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the management, a preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the reference on the ground that the applicant (appellant) was not a workman within the meaning of Sec.2 (s) of the Act. It was further averred that his services had been terminated in accordance with the conditions of appointment. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the labour Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the applicant does not fall under the definition of workman (OPM)2. Whether the termination of services of the workman is proper, justified and in order? if not, to what relief is he entitled?" 6. By an order dated September 24, 1982, the Labour Court decided issue No.1 in favour of the appellant and held that he is covered by the definition of workman. Thereafter, by an award dated November 13, 1984, it ordered reinstatement of the appellant with 50% back wages. For the sake of reference and convenience, the relevant extracts of the award are reproduced below: "appointment letter issued in favour of the workman, photo copy of which Ex. Thereafter, by an award dated November 13, 1984, it ordered reinstatement of the appellant with 50% back wages. For the sake of reference and convenience, the relevant extracts of the award are reproduced below: "appointment letter issued in favour of the workman, photo copy of which Ex. M. W.1 is dated September 27, 1978. The workman joined his services on September 28, 1978. As per stipulation in the letter of appointment his initial period of probation was one year, which could be extended further by one year by the respondent but the respondent chose to extend the period of probation for two months only, vide its letter exhibit M. W.2/1 dated October 23, 1979 w. e. f. September 28, 1979. The management issued another letter to the workman on January 23/24, 1980 Exhibit m. W 2/3 intimating him that since the board of Directors have decided to abolish the post of Legal Assistant in the respondent-Mill at the close of the current crushing season, so the services of the workman will not be required after that. Copy of the order of termination is Exhibit w.1. The same is dated February 9, 1980. All these facts are undisputed. That would mean that the workman was in the employment of the respondent right from september 28, 1978 to February 9, 1980 and his tenure was definitely more than one year on the date of his termination. The learned authorised representative of the respondent/management tried to bye-pass the provisions of Sec.25-F of the said act by arguing that since there was a stipulation in the letter of appointment issued to the workman that his services could be dispensed with without prior notice during the period of probation, so the workman cannot press into service the provisions of Sec.25-F of the said Act. In my opinion, the contention is absolutely grotesque and fanciful. The same runs counter to the settled position of law handed out in many authorities of various high Courts and the Honble Supreme court of India. In that behalf, a reference can be made to Management of Karnataka state Road Transport Corporation, banglore V/s. M. Boraiah and another, AIR 1983 SC 1320 : 1984 (1) SCC 244 : 1984-I-LLJ-l10. The same runs counter to the settled position of law handed out in many authorities of various high Courts and the Honble Supreme court of India. In that behalf, a reference can be made to Management of Karnataka state Road Transport Corporation, banglore V/s. M. Boraiah and another, AIR 1983 SC 1320 : 1984 (1) SCC 244 : 1984-I-LLJ-l10. The observation made in this authority in para number 13 can be extracted with advantage: "once the conclusion is reached that retrenchment as defined in Sec.2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act covers every case of termination of services except those which have been embodied in the definition, discharge from employment or termination of services of a probationer would also amount to retrenchment. Admittedly, the requirements of Sec.25-F of the industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with in these cases. Counsel for the appellant did not very appropriately dispute before us that the necessary consequence of non-compliance of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act in a case where it applies made the order of termination void. The High Court, in our opinion has, therefore, rightly come to the conclusion that in these cases the order of retrenchment was bad and consequently it upheld the award of the Labour Court which set aside those orders and gave appropriate relief. These appeals are dismissed. There would be one set of costs. Consolidated hearing fee is assessed at Rs.5,000.00. " Other authorities cited on behalf of the workman on this point were State of bombay V/s. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 : 1960-I-LLJ-251; Hindusthan steel Ltd. V/s. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1977 SC 31 : 1976 (4) SCC 222 : 1977-I-LLJ-1; Udaipur Mineral Development syndicate (P) Ltd. V/s. M. P. Dave and others, 1975-II-LLJ-499 (Raj-DB); Santosh Gupta V/s. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 : 1980 (3) SCC 340 : 1980- II-LLJ-72. So, there is no escape from the conclusion that in the process of terminating the services of the workman, the respondent did not comply with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the said Act and as such, his termination/retrenchment was void ab initio and cannot be sustained. So, there is no escape from the conclusion that in the process of terminating the services of the workman, the respondent did not comply with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the said Act and as such, his termination/retrenchment was void ab initio and cannot be sustained. The learned authorised representative of the respondent tried to wriggle out of this unhappy position by arguing that the respondent was constrained to dispense with the services of the workman because no post of Legal Assistant was provided in the respondent-Mill by the Haryana State federation of Co-operative Sugar Mills ltd. , Chandigarh as Apex authority which controls the function of the respondent-Mill and its staffing pattern. Be that as it may the respondent could not dispense with the services of the workman in a summary manner as it did, without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the said act and so the order of termination is held to be illegal and void ab initio. The mala fide nature of order of termination is also apparent from the fact that immediately after dispensing with the services of the workman, the respondent-Mill chose to employ the services of Shri Vishnu Dutt, though on part time basis and this was done, as alleged by the workman just to benefit a favourite of the respondent. I shall refrain passing any observations about the circumstances under which the services of shri Vishnu Dutt were employed by the respondent. Suffice it to say that the conduct of the respondent was most unbecoming in that behalf. So, this issue in its entirety is answered in favour of the workman. (Italicising is ours ). 7. The objection raised by the representative of the employer to its jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference in view of the provisions contained in the Haryana Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 was overruled by the Labour Court with the observation that the said Act had not been given retrospective operation. On the issue of back wages, the Labour Court held that ends of justice would be met by directing payment of 50% back wages. Accordingly, it passed award dated November 13, 1984 for reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and 50% back wages. 8. On the issue of back wages, the Labour Court held that ends of justice would be met by directing payment of 50% back wages. Accordingly, it passed award dated November 13, 1984 for reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and 50% back wages. 8. The appellant filed C. W. P. No.1994 of 1985 for quashing the award to the extent of denial of back wages and respondent No.2 filed c. W. P. No.2018 of 1985 for quashing the award in its entirety. The learned single Judge upheld the findings of the Labour Court that the appellant falls within the definition of workman under Sec.2 (s) of the Act. He also approved the view taken by the Labour Court that termination of the service of the appellant was violative of Sec.25-F of the Act. However, by taking into consideration the averments contained in paragraph 7 (v) of C. W. P. No.2018 of 1985 that the appellant had been appointed as Additional District Attorney in the state Government, the learned single Judge set aside the direction for reinstatement by making the following observations: "the workman had joined the post of Legal assistant on September 28, 1978. His services were terminated on February 9, 1989. He had thus worked for a total of about 17 months. Thereafter, he has been practising as an advocate and had even been appointed as an Additional District Attorney in the year 1985. Taking the totality of circumstances under consideration, I am of the view that the award of 50 per cent back wages from the date of termination to the date of the award viz. November 13, 1984 would be a just and fair compensation to the petitioner. He having been appointed as an additional District Attorney in the year 1985, it would not be in the fitness of things to order his reinstatement into service, especially when from the evidence on record, it is apparent that one Vishnu Dutt had been appointed in his place. " 9. Shri R. K. Malik submitted that the award of the Labour Court did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record warranting issuance of a writ of certiorari and, therefore, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with the direction for reinstatement of the appellant. " 9. Shri R. K. Malik submitted that the award of the Labour Court did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record warranting issuance of a writ of certiorari and, therefore, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with the direction for reinstatement of the appellant. He further argued, that reinstatement with full back wages is the normal rule in the cases of unlawful termination of service and any deviation from that rule can be made only in exceptional circumstances, but the learned single Judge interfered with the award of reinstatement without any rhyme or reason. Shri Malik also assailed the award of the Labour Court to the extent of denial of full back wages to the appellant by arguing that in the absence of any evidence of his gainful employment, the appellant could not have been deprived of his right to get full wages for the intervening period. 10. During the course of hearing, we enquired from Shri Malik as to what the appellant had been doing after termination of his service from the post of Legal Assistant. In reply, the learned counsel stated that after 5 years of the termination of his service, the appellant was appointed as Assistant District attorney under the State Government, but his services were terminated on September 1, 1987 and since then he is enrolled as an advocate. 11. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel. A look at the order under challenge shows that the learned single Judge has upset the award of reinstatement only on the ground that after the termination of his service, the appellant had been appointed as Assistant District Attorney in the year 1985 and he worked on that post till january, 1987. In our opinion, the learned single Judge has committed a serious illegality by upsetting the award of reinstatement ignoring the fact that after January, 1987, the appellant was not holding the post of Assistant district Attorney or any other post under the government or a private employer. We can take judicial notice of the fact that adjudication of the disputes raised under the Act takes years together and during the long interregnum, the workman cannot be expected to sit idle. Rather, he is bound to do something for earning livelihood. We can take judicial notice of the fact that adjudication of the disputes raised under the Act takes years together and during the long interregnum, the workman cannot be expected to sit idle. Rather, he is bound to do something for earning livelihood. If his act of obtaining employment during the pendency of reference, proceedings etc. could be made a ground for interfering with the award of reinstatement, then in all the cases the employer would succeed in persuading the superior Court to pass the order like the one impugned before us. However, that would clearly be against the settled principles of industrial jurisprudence and the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 12. The provisions of Sec.25-F (a) and (b) of the Act have been held to be mandatory -State of Bombay and others V/s. Hospital mazdoor Sabha and others, (supra), State Bank of India V/s. N. Sundramoni, AIR 1976 SC 1111 : 1976 (1) SCC 822 : 1976-I-LLJ-478; Delhi cloth and General Mills Ltd. V/s. Shambu Nath mukherjee, AIR 1978 SC 8 : 1977 (4) SCC 415 : 1978-I-LLJ-l; Santosh Gupta V/s. State Bank ofpatiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 : 1980 (3) SCC 340 : 1980-II-LLJ-72; S. K. Verma V/s. Industrial tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 422 and Mohan Lal V/s. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd. , AIR 1981 SC 1253 : 1981 (3) SCC 225 : 1981-II-LLJ-70. The courts have also held that non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Sec.25-F has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as void ab initio, invalid and inoperative. It is also the consistent view of the courts that relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages must follow as a necessary corollary to the declaration of invalidity of the action taken by the employer in violation of the provisions of section 25-F. In State of of Bombay V/s. The hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others (supra), a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court considered the nature of Sec.25- F (b) and held as under at p.255 of 1960-I-LLJ-251: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . Having regard to the fact that the words used in Sec.25-F (b) are mandatory and their effect is plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that Sec.25-1 covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in Sec.25-F (b), and it is obvious that there are several other cases in which monies become due from the employers to the employees under Chapter V: it is for the recovery of these monies that Sec.25-1 had been enacted. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued Sec.25-F (b ). That being so, failure to comply with the said provisions renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative. " (Emphasis added ). 13. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills V/s. Shambu Nath (supra), a three-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 25-F (a) and (b) are mandatory and an order of retrenchment made in violation of these pre-emptory conditions precedent is liable to be treated as invalid and the workman is entitled to reinstatement with back wages. 14. In Santosh Gupta V/s. State Bank of patiala (supra), a two-Judges Bench of the supreme Court held that termination of the services of a person employed on probation without complying with the mandatory provisions of Sec.25-F was invalid and she was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 15. In S. K. Verma V/s. Industrial tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi (supra), a three-Judges Bench considered the effect of violation of Sec.25-F and gave some illustrations in which a departure can possibly be made from the normal rule of reinstatement with back wages. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment, which are quite instructive, are produced below: "we do not propose to refer to the cases arising under Sec.33 and 33-A of the industrial Disputes Act or to cases arising out of references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Nor do we propose to engage ourselves in the unfruitful task of answering the question whether the termination of the services of a workman in violation of the provisions of section 25-F is void ab initio or merely invalid and inoperative, even, if it is possible to discover some razors edge distinction between the Latin void ab initio and the Anglo-Saxon invalid and inoperative. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of bread and butter statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the etymological excursions. void ab initio, invalid and inoperative or call it what you will, the workmen and the employer are primarily concerned with the consequence of striking down the order of termination of services of the workmen. Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vesting of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted. " In the cases before as we are unable to see any special impediment in the way of awarding the relief. The Labour Court appears to have thought that the award of the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would put these workmen on a par with those who had qualified for permanent absorption by passing the prescribed test and that would create dissatisfaction amongst the latter. The Labour Court appears to have thought that the award of the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would put these workmen on a par with those who had qualified for permanent absorption by passing the prescribed test and that would create dissatisfaction amongst the latter. First, they can never be on par since reinstatement would not qualify them for permanent absorption. They would continue to be temporary, liable to be retrenched. Second mere is not a shred of evidence to suggest that their reinstatement would be a cause for dissatisfaction to any one. There is no hint in the record that any undue burden would be placed on the employer if the same relief is granted as was done in Santosh gupta V/s. State Bank of Patiala, (supra ). (Emphasis supplied ). 16. In Mohan Lai V/s. Management of bharat Electronics (supra), a two-judges bench referred to various judicial precedents and held as under: "where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits, namely, back wages in full and other benefits. " 17. In Gammon India Limited V/s. Niranjan dass, AIR 1984 SC 500 : 1984 (1) SCC 509 : 1984-I-LLJ-233, a three-Judges Bench of the supreme Court described the effect of non-compliance of Sec.25-F in the following words: "where the service of the employee of company was terminated on account of recession and reduction in the volume of work of the company, and the termination of service of the employee did not fall in any of the excluded categories, the termination of his service would amount to retrenchment. That being so, when the pre-requisite for a valid retrenchment as laid down in Sec.25-F was not complied with, the retrenchment bringing about termination of service of employee would be ab into void. " 18. In Hari Palace, Ambala City V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak and another, 1980-II-LLJ-294 (Pandh), a Full Bench of this Court held that the workman is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 19. " 18. In Hari Palace, Ambala City V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak and another, 1980-II-LLJ-294 (Pandh), a Full Bench of this Court held that the workman is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 19. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned decisions, we hold that the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour court did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by the High Court and the learned single Judge has committed a serious legal error by upsetting the same without even holding that it suffered from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record. 20. We are further of the view that appointment of the appellant as Assistant district Attorney for a period of less than 2 years did not warrant interference with the order of reinstatement because no evidence was produced by the employer that after 1987, he was gainfully employed. 21. In so far as the appellants claim for back wages is concerned, we do not consider it proper to interfere with the award of the Labour court because as per his own showing, the appellant had remained employed as Assistant district Attorney albeit for a short period of about 2 years and thereafter, he remained enrolled as an advocate. 22. In the result, L. P. A. No.1356 of 1991 is allowed. The order of the learned single judge is set aside and the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court is restored. L. P. A. No.1311 of 1991 is dismissed. However, it is made clear that the appellant shall be free to avail remedy under section 33-C (2) of the Act for payment of wages for the period between the date of award and the date of physical reinstatement. .