ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. The applicant-wife being unsuccessful before the two Courts has come to this Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. making a complaint that the two Courts did not appreciate the law properly, erred in not appreciating that the delay in making the application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. would not defeat the justice for would frustrate the right which the law confers on destitute wife. 2. The applicant-wife made an application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class under Section 125, Cr. P.C. inter alia pleading that the applicant was legally wedded wife of the non-applicant, out of the wed-lock the parties were blessed with a child who was about 20 years of age on the date of maintenance application, the husband was ill-treating the wife and had also developed illicit relationship with one Sukwaro Bai. The applicant when raised objection, she was beaten and was turned out of the house. She also pleaded that she was unable to maintain herself; she had become very weak; her legs had oedema and she was under the treatment of the doctor. She also pleaded that the non-applicant/husband was well-to-do man; his yearly income from agriculture was Rs. 40,000/-; being engaged in the milk business his net earning from the said business was Rs. 5,000/- per month and as he is giving his bullock cart on hire he is earning Rs. 100/- per day, she claimed Rs. 500/- towards maintenance in view of the un-amended law. The application was filed on 23.6.1993. 3. The husband in his reply dated 1.10.1993 stated that he was married to one Sukwaro Bai. Said Sukwaro Bai could not conceive pregnancy, therefore, he contracted the second marriage with the applicant. He, therefore, pleaded that during the life-time of the first wife, he contracted second marriage. Denying the material allegations he submitted that he never ill-treated the wife and he never turned out the wife from his house. Challenging the statement of inability of the wife to maintain herself, he submitted that the wife was a trained labour in Bidi manufacturing and she could easily earn Rs. 150/- per month. He also submitted that the applicant was possessed of her father's one acre land and was earning about Rs. 15,000/- per year. Denying his assets and the income he submitted that he possessed only two acres of land from which his net yearly earning was Rs. 150/- per month. He also submitted that the applicant was possessed of her father's one acre land and was earning about Rs. 15,000/- per year. Denying his assets and the income he submitted that he possessed only two acres of land from which his net yearly earning was Rs. 1,000/-. He denied' the milk business and further submitted that he could give his bullock cart on hire hardly for three days in a month and could earn only Rs. 100/ - from the said vocation. In para 7, he however, submitted that he was ready and willing to maintain the applicant, but the applicant of her own was not ready to come. 4. The applicant-wife examined her own-self and also examined P.W. 2 Puranik Ram and P.W. 3 Prabhuram. The non-applicant examined his own-self and also examined D.W. 2 Jivrakhan Lal and D.W. 3 Devlal Sahu. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court rejected the application despite holding that the applicant was the first legally wedded wife. The Trial Court however held that if she was able to maintain herself for 21 years or more then, she would not be entitled to any maintenance. The order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhamtari, in M.Cr.C. No. 81/1993, on 23.8.1994 was challenged by the applicant - wife before the Revisional Court. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhamtari (Raipur) by his judgment dated 11.12.1995 passed in Cr. Revision No. 5/95 confirmed the order passed by the Trial Court and maintained the dismissal of the application, therefore, the applicant-wife has come to this Court. 5. Mrs. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the two Courts below were absolutely unjustified in rejecting the applicant's application simply on the ground that if she could maintain herself for 21 years then, she was not entitled to any maintenance. According to her if a woman in her youth or young age being in a position to maintain herself does not claim maintenance from the husband, it cannot be said that if she becomes old, weak and fragile she would not be entitled to maintenance even when she is unable to work, earn or maintain herself. She submits that Section 125, Cr. She submits that Section 125, Cr. P.C. does not provide for any limitation for making an application, therefore, the Courts below without taking dogmatic approach should have seen that whether on the date of the application the wife was unable to maintain herself. She also submits that if the allegations of wife are true and the two Courts have found that the defences raised by the husband that the applicant was the second wife is found to be false then, this was also a reason for grant of maintenance. She submits that the wife is entitled to fullest amount as claimed by her from the date of the application. 6. Opposing the application, Mr. M.D. Dhote, learned Counsel for the non-applicant/husband submits that the wife has not brought on record any fact that after 21 long years of separate residence she is unable to maintain herself, therefore, the two Courts below were justified in rejecting her application. He also submitted that the husband was and is ready and willing to keep the applicant with him, but as the wife refused to live with him she is not entitled to any maintenance. 7. I have heard the parties at length. 8. Looking to the questions raised it is necessary to look into the Section 125, Cr. P.C. Section 125. 7. I have heard the parties at length. 8. Looking to the questions raised it is necessary to look into the Section 125, Cr. P.C. Section 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents- (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself; or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter who is attained majority), where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself; or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself; a Magistrate of the First Class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time-to-time direct : Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in Clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation-For the purposes of this Chapter- (a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (19 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. (2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance. (2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance. (3) If any person so ordered fails, without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made : Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due : Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation-If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. Bare perusal of Section 125, Cr. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. Bare perusal of Section 125, Cr. P.C. would show that if a person having sufficient means refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to maintain herself or his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or un-married who is unable to maintain itself, or his legitimate or illegitimate child where such child is by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain himself or herself, a Judicial Magistrate of First Class on proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance towards maintenance not exceeding Rs. 500/- in the whole. It is noteworthy that the figure Rs. 500/- has now been amended to Rs. 3,000/- for the purposes of Chapter-IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A minor would mean a person who under the provisions of Indian Minority Act is deemed not to have attained his majority; wife includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not re-married; such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order or may be made payable from the date of the application itself. 9. A woman who continues to be a wife or a divorced wife is required to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that she is unable to maintain herself and her husband though having sufficient means has neglected or refused to maintain her. The husband may oppose the application on the ground that the wife had no cause to live separately and/or he was ready to maintain the wife provided she lived with him. An application can also be opposed on the ground that she was living in adultery and/or without any sufficient reason she refused to live with her husband or parties were living separately by mutual consent. An application can also be opposed on the ground that she was living in adultery and/or without any sufficient reason she refused to live with her husband or parties were living separately by mutual consent. If the Court records a finding that she had no cause to live separately or without any cause she refused to live with the husband or that she was living separately under a mutual consent or she was living in adultery, Magistrate may reject the application and in a case where maintenance has already been awarded in favour of the wife if either or any ground is proved by the husband, the Magistrate shall cancel the earlier order requiring the husband to pay the maintenance to the wife. 10. Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to alteration in allowance. If the Judicial Magistrate, First Class is satisfied that in view of the change in the circumstances of any person, receiving under Section 125 a monthly allowance, or ordered under Section 125 to pay a monthly allowance, a Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit. If the Magistrate wants to increase the allowance, it shall not exceed the maximum limit. The Magistrate would also be entitled to cancel or vary the order in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court. According to Section 127(3) of the Code, the Magistrate would be entitled to cancel the order of maintenance if he finds that after the divorce the woman has re-married, he may also cancel the order on proof of the fact that she has received the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce, provided that he shall cancel such order in case where such sum was paid at the time of divorce before such order was made, from the date on which such order was made and in any other case from the date of expiry of period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman. The order may also be cancelled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce. 11. The order may also be cancelled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce. 11. Section 126 of the Code provides procedure for dealing with the applications filed under Section 125 of the Code, while Section 128 of the Code deals with enforcement of order of maintenance. 12. Chapter IX which contains Sections 125 to 128 do not talk of any limitation for making an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. The Limitation Act, 1963 also does not provide any limitation for making an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. 13. While considering the application filed under Section 125, Cr. P.C. as already observed a Court is required to see whether the wife has proved that she is unable to maintain herself and the husband though possessed of sufficient means has refused or neglected to maintain her. The Court is also required to see whether in the given case the husband has successfully proved the defences raised by him and also in projecting the grounds for dismissal of the application. As the provisions of the Limitation Act either in general or special are not applicable to an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. the Court is not required to look into the question of limitation, but the Court may say that the delay in making the application was unjustified or the delay has been properly explained, the wife would or would not be entitled to maintenance. This principle, though is not enshrined under the provisions of law, has been applied by the Courts to look into the bona fides of a woman who is seeking maintenance. 14. Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in the matter of Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissali, reported in AIR 1979 SC 362, opined that "welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of the salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature and when the beneficiaries are weaker sections, like destitute women, the spirit of Article 15(3) of the Constitution must belight the meaning of the section. The Constitution is a pervasive omni-presence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure". He also observed that benign provision of Section 125 has the objective to ameliorate the economic condition of neglected wives and discarded divorcees. The Constitution is a pervasive omni-presence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure". He also observed that benign provision of Section 125 has the objective to ameliorate the economic condition of neglected wives and discarded divorcees. In 1882, James Filz James Stephen, who piloted the Code of Criminal Procedure, spoke about Section 488 (Now Section 125) of the Code as under : "The objective of the provision was "preventing vagrancy or at least of preventing its consequence". The provision contained under Section 488 of the Old Code or under Section 125 of the present Code were taken to be "to serve a social purpose" and that if imposed on an individual obligation towards the society to maintain some of his close relations listed in the said section, so as to prevent vagrancy and destitution". It was held by Supreme Court to be a measure which enacts a uniform law applicable to all persons belonging to any community, caste, or religion. It is essentially of a prophylactic nature and cuts across the barriers of religion. It was also held that it contained a moral edict of law and morality could not be clubbed with religion, Section 125, Cr. P.C. was interpreted to mean to serve a social, economic and moral purpose. It was also held that it is also a projection of equality of sexes and protective discrimination in favour of weaker section of the society, viz., neglected wives and discarded divorcees, abandoned children and needy and hapless parents. 15. In the matter of Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and Ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC 1807, the Supreme Court observed as under : "Section 125, Cr. P.C. is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the Constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. There is no doubt that sections of Statutes calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance, so viewed, it is possible to be selective in packing out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause - the cause of derelicts." 16. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance, so viewed, it is possible to be selective in packing out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause - the cause of derelicts." 16. In the matter of Fuzlunbi v. K. Kliader Vali & Am., reported in AIR 1980 SC 1730, the Supreme Court observed that the policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and Section 127(3)(b) takes care to avoid double payment, one under custom at the time of divorce and another under Section 125. It was also observed that a farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equivalent to intelligent acceptance. The Court also observed that this provision is a secular safeguard irrespective of the personal laws of the parties. 17. In the matter of Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Agrawal and Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 446, the Supreme Court while considering the case of child observed as under : "The word "child" is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code itself. This word has different meanings in different context. Where the word "child" is used in conjunction with parentage, it is not concerned with age. In Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code the word is used with reference to the father. There is no qualification of age; the only qualification is that the child must be unable to maintain itself. There is no justification for saying that this section is confined to children who are under the age of majority." The Supreme Court further observed that the word child in Section 488 does not mean a minor son or daughter, real limitation is contained in expression "unable to maintain itself." 18. Section 125 of the Code has now made certain mends and person having sufficient means is required to pay monthly allowance to his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not unable to maintain itself. Section 125 of the Code has made a major change in the erstwhile Section 488 and now two things are required to be proved by a child through his guardian that he is minor and he is unable to maintain itself. 19. Section 125 of the Code has made a major change in the erstwhile Section 488 and now two things are required to be proved by a child through his guardian that he is minor and he is unable to maintain itself. 19. In the matter of Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi and Anr., reported in AIR 1975 SC 83, while considering the provisions of Section 488 of the old Code the Supreme Court observed that "the mere fact that the language of Section 488(1) does not expressly make the inability of a wife to maintain herself a condition precedent to the maintainability of her petition, does not imply that while determining her claim and fixing the amount of maintenance, the Magistrate is debarred from taking into consideration the wife s own separate income or means of support. The objects of the provisions of Sections 488, 489 and 490 being to prevent vagrancy and destitution, the Magistrate has to find out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for such moderate living can be fairly determined, only if her separate income also is taken into account together with the earnings of the husband and his commitments. The object is to compel a man to perform the moral obligation which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children and parents so that they are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime for their subsistence." 20. Section 125, Cr. P.C. and its import and effect again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court observed that Section 125 requires as a sine qua non for its application, neglect by husband or father. The Supreme Court observed that having a social purpose, Section 125 and its sister clauses in their interpretation must receive a compassionate expanse of the sense that the words permit. (supra), the Supreme Court observed that Section 125 requires as a sine qua non for its application, neglect by husband or father. The Supreme Court observed that having a social purpose, Section 125 and its sister clauses in their interpretation must receive a compassionate expanse of the sense that the words permit. The Court in the matter of Bai Tahira (supra), also observed that in this generous jurisdiction, a broader perception and appreciation of facts and the bearing must govern the verdict not chopping little logic or tinkering with burden of proof. 21. The provision for maintenance under Section 125 has apparently been made looking at the peculiar circumstances under which neglected and destituted dependants have been living in society for long. The generous law says that such petition can be filed at the place of residence of the claimants. It would be fallacy of law to deny the said remedy to a neglect and hard pressed wife merely on the ground that she could claim it in a suit filed by the husband or she could claim it from the Civil Court in a petition filed under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. 22. The phrase "having sufficient means" would not signify only visible or tangible means. If one is healthy and able-bodied he must be held to have means to support his wife. The phrase includes a capacity that the onus would also be on that person to prove that he was short of means or had no means, the wife's petition cannot be dismissed simply on the ground that she has failed to prove that the husband was a man of sufficient means or had sufficient means. Once the wife makes allegations that the husband has sufficient means, then, the husband has to show to the Court that he does not have sufficient means. 23. The phrase "neglects or refuses to maintain" in the context of Section 125, in the matter of Bai Tahira (supra), is held to be sine qua non for its application, neglect or refusal to maintain is the first essential to be proved in order to grant maintenance. "Neglects or refuses" would mean and would also cover in its sweep, neglects or refuses to maintain properly. "Neglects or refuses" would mean and would also cover in its sweep, neglects or refuses to maintain properly. Neglect or refusal to maintain the wife may be express or implied, it may be inferred from the proved facts or from the pleadings of the parties, from their conduct, their behaviour and other attending circumstances. Once neglect or refusal to maintain in the past is proved, an offer at the trial to maintain in future would not oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate from making an order for maintenance except in accordance with second proviso to Section 125(3). If the husband pays the wife something which is a mere pittance, something which is insufficient to maintain herself and inconsistent with her needs and at the same time inconsistent with the income of her husband, it can certainly be held that the husband had been neglecting or refusing to maintain the wife. Where the wife is uneducated lady it is not expected of her that she can employ herself gainfully, but even if the wife is an educated lady but unemployed maintenance cannot be refused merely because she is educated and capable of securing employment, wife will be justified on claiming maintenance from the husband in such a case. From the catena of authorities it can be seen that able-bodied husband is required to maintain the wife and is held to be a man having sufficient means, but at the same time an educated woman who is unable to obtain employment, is held to be a woman unable to maintain herself. 24. The expression "having sufficient means" has an altogether different connotation from the expression "unable to maintain". If the wife is able-bodied and possesses an earning potentially, she cannot be presumed to be able to maintain herself. While the able-bodied and healthy man would always be deemed to be a person having sufficient means. In the matter of Madhusudhan Mishra, 1998 Cr. LJ 1247, the Allahabad High Court held that the educated wife if could not gel a permanent appointment giving her satisfactory earning, so as to enable her to maintain herself, the husband would be bound to maintain her and paltry earning by wife would be of no consequence. 25. A woman would be entitled to maintenance if she proves that she is legally wedded wife or was legally wedded with the man and there had been divorce. 25. A woman would be entitled to maintenance if she proves that she is legally wedded wife or was legally wedded with the man and there had been divorce. The second wife whose marriage is contrary to the customs or provisions of law would not be entitled to maintenance from the husband, but illegitimate child begot out of the said relationship would certainly be entitled to maintenance if he proves the requirement of law. 26. An offer by the husband to maintain and wife's refusal to live with him on any alleged just ground or any of the grounds in the explanation has to be considered by the Magistrate not only at the time of enforcement of maintenance order but also when an application made under Section 125(1) is under consideration. If the husband makes an offer to the wife that he is ready and willing to maintain the wife provided she lives with him and the Court is satisfied that the offer is genuine and bona fide, the Court may refuse to award the maintenance, but if the wife proves that the offer is mala fide, moonshine or eyewash, then, or if the wife proves that the husband has contracted second marriage with another woman or has kept a mistress, then the Court shall hold that she has just ground to live separately and may refuse to live with the husband. A wife has a right to the exclusive association of her husband undefiled and unpolluted by other woman. While considering the question of "just ground" for wife's living separately the Court is bound to consider cruel or barbarous treatment, safety of life; inadequacy of food or clothing, etc. A systematic course of ill-treatment, beating, or oppression is a good ground for the wife's refusal. The wife would be well justified in living separately, if the behaviour of the husband or in-laws had made her life a hell. Such tyranny in the husband's household, although not at the hands of the husband but at the hands of the in-laws, obviously comes within the purview of "cruelty'. In maintenance cases the Courts should not be too rigid, dogmatic and technical. The whole approach should be pragmatic, keeping in view the status of the parties, the social environment in which they live and their illiteracy and backwardness. In maintenance cases the Courts should not be too rigid, dogmatic and technical. The whole approach should be pragmatic, keeping in view the status of the parties, the social environment in which they live and their illiteracy and backwardness. When the parties are village folk belonging to the backward society or living in the backward region, evidence of such simple witnesses is often crude and earthy, Radharani, 1986 Cr. LJ 1129 (MP). 27. In the matter of Muslim wife, Gujarat High Court in the matter of Banabibi, 1983 Cr. LJ 1382 (Gujarat), observed that though Muslim is entitled to second marriage, the first wife's claim for maintenance is not barred merely because Muslim Law permits the husband to have four wives at a time. 28. The Courts all through had been observing that the Courts should not be too rigid in the matters of grant of maintenance. 29. So far as the question of applicant being second wife is concerned it should not detain this Court unnecessarily because the wife asserted the fact that she was married first and thereafter another woman was brought. This fact is even admitted by Jivrakhan (D.W. 2), the witness examined by the husband. The fact is further admitted by D.W. 3 Devlal Sahu, witness examined by the husband. The question that whether the wife is unable to maintain herself or not would certainly require consideration by this Court. 30. P.W. 1 Ghurava Bai in paragraph 3 of her statement clearly stated that she is suffering with different ailments. She suffers swelling in her leg, probably she wanted to say that she was suffering with phyleria. In support of her submissions, she submitted a certificate issued by the doctor. Not even a single question was put to the wife in her cross-examination that she was not suffering with ailments. In paragraph 5 it was only suggested to her that she was engaged in making Bidis; she however, denied the said suggestion. It was suggested to her that in the partition the husband had obtained only 2 acres of land. The husband who was vigilant enough to file the copy of notice and its reply, did not choose to file the revenue records relating to his lands. The husband in relation to his income or means simply stated that he hardly earns Rs. 20/- per day. The husband who was vigilant enough to file the copy of notice and its reply, did not choose to file the revenue records relating to his lands. The husband in relation to his income or means simply stated that he hardly earns Rs. 20/- per day. He did not state even a single word about his earnings from his own lands. At this stage, it would be necessary to see that in the pleadings husband stated that from one acre land the wife was earning Rs. 15,000/- per year, while from his two acres land he was earning Rs. 1,000/- per year. The paradoxical pleadings and unintelligible evidence certainly would not help the husband nor can persuade the Court to hold in his favour that he does not have sufficient means. Regarding the wife's inability to maintain herself, he admitted in paragraph 6 of his statement that his wife was unwell, she has swelling in one leg, she was generally sick and was taking regular medication. This admission on the part of the non-applicant/husband if is read in juxtaposition with the statement of the claimant and her witnesses, it would clearly appear that the applicant is unable to maintain herself. D.W. 2 Jivrakhan and D.W. 3 Devlal Sahu did not speak even a single word about the means of the husband or inability of the wife to maintain herself. 31. The evidence available on the record if is simply seen without any application of expertise, it would clearly prove that the husband is a man of means and the wife is unable to maintain herself. The evidence would also show that the applicant was the first married wife; she was turned out of her house and thereafter the husband contracted second marriage. The offer made by the husband that he was ready to maintain the wife if she comes and lives with him, certainly could be turned down by the wife and she would be held entitled to have a just cause in her favour to live separately from the husband. 32. It would also be necessary to refer to a judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1991 Cri. LJ 40, wherein the High Court has held that the phrase "unable to maintain herself" conveys that the means available prior to desertion and would not take within itself the efforts made to survive after desertion. 32. It would also be necessary to refer to a judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1991 Cri. LJ 40, wherein the High Court has held that the phrase "unable to maintain herself" conveys that the means available prior to desertion and would not take within itself the efforts made to survive after desertion. The High Court held that the maintenance cannot be denied to a wife on the ground of her refusal to work in spite of the fart that she was capable of earning. 33. The Bombay High Court in ILR 1985 Bombay 2201 held that where the husband never showed willingness to bring back wife to matrimonial house and also failed to give notice to bring her back to his house, it amounted to neglect and refusal to maintain his wife. 34. The question that the wife is not entitled to maintenance because she has come to the Court after 21 years of the desertion now requires consideration. In 1990 (2) Gujarat LH 447 and 1989 Mah. Law Report 1153, the Courts held that filing of an application for maintenance by wife after 30 years of separate living does not snatch away her right of claiming maintenance unless she has voluntarily given up her right and it is unjust to reject maintenance on the ground that wife has not taken steps claiming maintenance for so many years and son had attained majority. 35. Section 125, Cr. P.C. provides that a wife unable to maintain herself is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband and a mother unable to maintain herself is entitled to claim maintenance from her son/daughter; but the law does not say that a wife in her capacity as a mother before claiming maintenance from her husband as a wife, must claim maintenance from her son. If a person is entitled to maintenance from two persons, then in absence of any embargo on her right, she would be entitled to claim maintenance from either of them. The fact that son has attained majority and had maintained his mother for some time would be no ground to reject the application of the wife qua her husband. 36. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no bar in filing successive applications. The fact that son has attained majority and had maintained his mother for some time would be no ground to reject the application of the wife qua her husband. 36. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no bar in filing successive applications. After the dismissal of the first application, if there are subsequent changes in the circumstances it would be competent for a person to file a fresh application for maintenance. In the matter of Mambekkatu Nanu v. Mambekattar Vassutha, 1984 Cri. LJ 1206 (Kerala), the first application of the wife for maintenance was dismissed as she failed to establish a valid reason for living separately from her husband. She also failed to establish that her husband had neglected or refused to maintain her. Thereafter the husband divorced her, whereupon she filed a second application for maintenance. The husband resisted the wife's application by saying that second application was not maintainable. The High Court observed that wife's second application was maintainable as the first application was filed when she had the status of wife, while second application was made under the personal law when she had ceased to be the wife and was a divorcee. 37. In the matter of Smt. Akan Bala Kalita v. Prabhat Chandra Kalita, 1984 Cri. LJ NOC 210, Gauhati High Court observed that the nature of maintenance proceedings is neither civil nor criminal, but must be held to be a lis appertaining to matrimonial jurisdiction which invests the Courts with powers, albeit limited, to give relief to the aggrieved party. The Court also observed that words "the Magistrate may from time-to-time direct" indicate that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not come to an end after disposal of any particular application. The Court was of the strong view that the Magistrate may entertain subsequent petitions. 38. In the matter of Sunanda v. Chandra Kant, 1989 Cri. LJ 398 Bombay, the High Court observed that despite dismissal of the wife's first application her second application was maintainable because of the passage of time and happening of events subsequent to the dismissal of the wife's first application because passage of time and happening of events constitute a change of circumstances. 39. LJ 398 Bombay, the High Court observed that despite dismissal of the wife's first application her second application was maintainable because of the passage of time and happening of events subsequent to the dismissal of the wife's first application because passage of time and happening of events constitute a change of circumstances. 39. I am referring to filing of second application mainly for the reason that if changed circumstances can permit the wife to bring a second application before the Court and the Court in view of the changed circumstances can grant second application, then why a woman in view of the changed circumstances in the life which may be for variety of reasons cannot come to the Court for the first time after a long time. Assuming that the present applicant's application was rejected on the first occasion and she brought second application in view of the changed circumstances saying that now she is unable to maintain herself and the Court can grant it then why her first application in view of her changed circumstances would not be maintainable. A wife for variety of reasons may not come to the Court to claim maintenance - she might be hoping against the hopes that on one fine morning her husband may come to her door to take her back; she may be of the opinion that she would not claim maintenance from her husband who has turned her out from her matrimonial house unceremoniously. She may not claim from her husband because she feels that she can maintain herself. If she is being maintained by her relations or parents she may not think in the line of claiming maintenance. But if the parents are in not a position to maintain her, her hopes vanish, the husband does not come back or she has become aged, sick and fragile or now feels that she is unable to maintain herself, then, she can certainly came to the Court saying that she is now unable to maintain herself, therefore, the husband who is a man of means must be asked to maintain her. In a case like that, the husband cannot be allowed to say that if the wife had not claimed maintenance for long many years, her right stands forfeited. In a case like that, the husband cannot be allowed to say that if the wife had not claimed maintenance for long many years, her right stands forfeited. The husband will be required to prove that by her acts, deeds or words the wife had surrendered her rights or in view of the defences available to the husband the wife is not entitled to any maintenance. 40. In 1991 Cri. LJ 1533 and 1975 Cri LJ 694, the Courts held that law of limitation does not apply to proceedings under Section 125, Cr. P.C. 41. I am of the considered view that if the second application by the wife would be maintainable before the Court for grant of maintenance because of the changed circumstances, then her first application in view of the changed circumstances in the life would also be maintainable and the Courts would not be justified in rejecting the application simply on the ground of delay. 42. Learned Counsel for the applicant has referred to a judgment of M. P. High Court in the matter of Smt. Kuntibai v. Alakhram, reported in 1998 (MP) Criminal Cases Patrika 307. In the said matter, the High Court observed "the functions of the Magistrate in proceedings under Section 125, Cr. P.C. and the Civil Courts are distinctly different. The Magistrate has to deal with emergency while the Civil Court is to enforce strict legal rights according to personal law of the parties". The Court also observed that the powers vested under Section 125, Cr. P.C. are discretionary and, therefore, if there is inordinate delay in filing an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. by the wife, without there being any cogent reason or explanation for the delay; the Magistrate in the judicious exercise of discretion, would be fully justified in dismissing application. The underlined portion would show that the High Court was of the positive opinion that if there are no cogent reasons for late coming to Court or if delay is not explained the Court would be justified in rejecting the application. Would it not mean that if there are cogent reasons are proper explanation for delay, a Court would be justified in granting maintenance. The judgments of the High Court in matter of Ambaram v. Jankibai, II (1991) DMC 298=1991 (2) MPWN 121, and in the matter of Golla Seetharamulu v. Golla Rathnamma, I (1992) DMC 251=1991 Cri. Would it not mean that if there are cogent reasons are proper explanation for delay, a Court would be justified in granting maintenance. The judgments of the High Court in matter of Ambaram v. Jankibai, II (1991) DMC 298=1991 (2) MPWN 121, and in the matter of Golla Seetharamulu v. Golla Rathnamma, I (1992) DMC 251=1991 Cri. LJ 1533, were distinguished by the learned Judge on the ground that the facts were different. 43 Learned Counsel for the applicant has placed his strong reliance on another judgment of the High Court of M.P. in the matter of Shdkun Bai v. Ramji, reported in 1998 (1) MP Weekly Notes 166. The said matter came to the High Court under Section 482. Cr. P.C. The two Courts rejected the wife's application for grant of maintenance on the ground that the wife had come to the Court almost after seven years of the divorce, therefore, she was not entitled to maintenance. The learned Single Judge observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prescribe any period of limitation for filing of an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C. for grant of maintenance and there could be various reasons for the delay in filing the application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Judge further observed that as under the scheme of the Code maintenance cannot be granted prior to the date of filing of the application, the husband in the event of delay in filing the application, must thank his wife for not approaching the Court early or else he would have to pay the maintenance for that period also. The Court was certain in observing that delay in filing an application under Section 125, Cr. P.C, can never be a ground for debarring the wife, who is otherwise legally entitled to receive maintenance from her husband, from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court was of the view that as rejection of the application was result of grave illegality, the High Court would be justified in granting the petition. 44. Being in respectful agreement with the judgment of the High Court in the matter of Shakun Bai (supra), I hold that a Court shall not be entitled to reject the wife's application simply on the ground of delay. 44. Being in respectful agreement with the judgment of the High Court in the matter of Shakun Bai (supra), I hold that a Court shall not be entitled to reject the wife's application simply on the ground of delay. In our judicial system except in accordance with law of limitation, the limitation or delay would never be allowed to defeat the justice. It would be mockery of law to say that able-bodied woman who could maintain herself for many long years after becoming old, sick and fragile should not be allowed any maintenance because she did not approach the Court at her young age. In a case like that, instead of apathy the Court must have sympathy towards the destitute. The Court must always see that in the given set of circumstances whether the application can be allowed or not. It would be too much to say that a husband who remained out of the clutches of Section 125, Cr .P.C. because of in-action or non-action on the part of the wife would have permanent protection under the hands of the Courts. If the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr. P.C. are summary, then the Court in the summary procedure should not say that the delay would defeat justice, in a case where the matters remain pending in the Court for long many years the Court may allow maintenance from the date of application, but in a case where a person authorised under the law comes to the Court late and requires the Court to award maintenance, cannot say that he must get the maintenance from the date of her desertion. A Court while awarding maintenance to a destitute who is unable to maintain himself/herself does hot oblige that person, but simply follows the mandate given under Article 15(3) and Article 39 of the Constitution of India. 45. In view of the above discussion, I am unable to hold that the two Courts were justified in rejecting the wife's application. 46. What would be the extent of the powers and authority of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. can be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnan and Anr. In view of the above discussion, I am unable to hold that the two Courts were justified in rejecting the wife's application. 46. What would be the extent of the powers and authority of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. can be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnan and Anr. v. Krishnavei and Anr., reported in I (1997) CCR 146 (SC)=AIR 1997 SC 987, the Supreme Court observed that in view of the principle laid down in the maxim ex debito justitiae i.e. in accordance with the requirements of justice, the prohibition under Section 398(3) on revisional power given to the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision. Though the revision before the High Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by Sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court further observed that the power of the High Court of continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 is of paramount importance to examine correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed as also regularity of the, proceedings of all inferior Criminal Courts. The Supreme Court further observed that the revisional power of the High Court merely conserves the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence and that its subordinate Courts do not exceed the jurisdiction or abuse the power vested in them under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the inferior Criminal Courts or to prevent miscarriage of justice. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity or the procedure or to meet out the justice. In addition, the inherent powers of the High Court are preserved by Section 482, the power of the High Court is, therefore, very wide. In addition, the inherent powers of the High Court are preserved by Section 482, the power of the High Court is, therefore, very wide. However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of justice or judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by subordinate Criminal Courts in its juridical process or illegality of sentence or order. 47. In the opinion of this Court, the Courts below did not appreciate that by rejecting the application of the wife they were adding premium to the wrong committed by the husband long years back. The Court must not forget that it has to dispense justice and not dispense with the justice. The approach of the two Courts is absolutely wrong and contrary to law. It tantamounts to miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law. The defences raised by the husband were untenable, therefore, he could not be allowed to say that the delay on the part of the wife in approaching the Court should lead to rejection of wife's application. How can the Court of law irrespective of law of limitation say to a person that it would not open the doors of justice to him because he had come very late to their doors. It is only the law of limitation which puts a lock on the remedies available to a person, but in absence of such a lock, the doors of justice must remain open for all. I am unable to concede to the findings recorded by the two Courts. Setting aside the findings 1 grant this petition of the wife. 48. The question for consideration now would be what should be the amount of maintenance. In the year 1973 almost 28 years back when the money had its own value and power of purchasing, the Legislature thought that a sum of Rs. 500/- would be sufficient enough to a destitute to maintain herself. In the last 28 years prices had been marching on the road of escalation and have still not stopped; the Index number has changed; different Pay Commissions have provided different benefits to the employees and even the cost of living has gone very high. 500/- would be sufficient enough to a destitute to maintain herself. In the last 28 years prices had been marching on the road of escalation and have still not stopped; the Index number has changed; different Pay Commissions have provided different benefits to the employees and even the cost of living has gone very high. The Legislature has recently changed the limit of Rs. 500/- to Rs. 3,000/-. 49. Taking into consideration that maintenance means shelter, food, medicine and every other necessities of life, I am of the opinion that a wife must get such amount so that she may live respectfully and is not required to extend her hands for seeking any help or alms. The wife is entitled to proper maintenance. If simply food, clothing, and shelter are provided to a wife and not other necessities, then it would certainly offend the Constitution of India because in such a case a person may not live respectfully and would be required to live in a shabby manner. 50. Taking into consideration the totality of circumstances and that the husband is a man of means, has good agricultural lands and is also engaged in other vocations of life, if the amount of Rs. 500/- is allowed to the wife as monthly allowance, it would meet the ends of justice. I am restricting the grant of Rs. 500/- only because on the date when the Wife had filed the application any thing beyond Rs. 500/- could not be allowed. I am also of the opinion that the husband must pay the amount from the date of the application because present is a case where grant of maintenance from the date of the application would give some solace to the wife and at her age of fifty plus she would live respectfully and peacefully. 51. The petition is allowed.