Judgment :- S. Sankarasubban, J. This cluster of Writ Appeals arise from a common judgment rendered by Koshy, J. in a number of Writ Petitions. The cause of auction for the Writ Petitions was the order issued by the Central Government increasing the price of rice and wheat. The Government of India, as per letter dated 22.1.1999 informed the State Government that the central issue price of rice and wheat has been revised and directed to fix new prices at FPS level taking into account the revised central issue price with effect from 29.1.1999. The revised central issue price of rice and wheat was communicated by Government of India. 2. In pursuant to the above order of the Central Government, the Commissioner of Civil Supplies issued Ext. P1 proceedings dated 29.1.1999. In Ext. P1, it is stated that the price of rice and wheat has been increased. It is further stated that the closing stock of rice and wheat held with by the distributors on the close of business on 28.1.1999 under different schemes may be assessed and the differential cost collected and remitted to Government account. The notification issued by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies dated 29.1.1999 was challenged in the Original Petitions. 3. According to the petitioners, till 1.2.1999, they have been selling rice and wheat at the old rate and they were aware of the increase in price on 1.2.1999. No additional price was collected till 1.2.1999. Hence, no difference in cost can be collected from the petitioners. The petitioners further challenge clauses 45(8A) and 51(8A) of the Kerala Rationing Order. According to the petitioners, the rice and wheat are purchased by them paying their own money. Thus, the goods become their own property. There is no principal and agent relationship between the Government and the dealers so far as the above goods are concerned. Hence, even though there is rise in price, the petitioners are not liable to pay the differential cost as it is only a benefit that has accrued to them because of their investment. The further contention was that even if the Clauses were valid, it can take effect only from the date of intimation. In this case, according to the petitioners, they got intimation only on 1.2.1999 and hence, from 1.2.1999 only the notification can be made applicable. 4. A counter affidavit was filed by the State Government. The further contention was that even if the Clauses were valid, it can take effect only from the date of intimation. In this case, according to the petitioners, they got intimation only on 1.2.1999 and hence, from 1.2.1999 only the notification can be made applicable. 4. A counter affidavit was filed by the State Government. In the counter affidavit, it was elaborated that the State of Kerala is completely covered by provisions of the Kerala Rationing Order. Under this, the State is under legal obligation to provide its people a definite quantum of rationed articles at the controlled price through a net work of wholesalers and retailers. The stock required for distribution is made available to the State by the Centre by monthly allotment and the same is made available physically by Food Corporation of India. The monthly allotment received from the Centre is sub-allocated to the Districts by the Director of Civil Supplies and the District Supply Officers make Taluk-wise allotment. In order to have an uninterrupted distribution, it is necessary that both the wholesalers and retailers should have sufficient stock with them. The appointment and duties and functions of the Authorised Wholesale Dealers are regulated under clauses 45 and 51 of the Kerala Rationing Order. 5. The counter affidavit then refers to Clause 45(a), which deals with the retailers and clause 51(8A) which deals with the wholesalers. As per these clauses, whenever there is increase in price, the distributor is liable to assess the stock on the previous day and deposit the differential cost to the Government. The Clauses further say that in case there is decrease in price, they are entitled to refund of the amount with regard to the stock that was with him at the time of change of price. It is further stated that these clauses are included as part of the agreement executed by the wholesalers and retailers with the Government. Hence, the further contention is that after having agreed that the differential cost will be paid, the petitioners cannot contend that they will not deposit. So far as the intimation is concerned, the counter affidavit says that on 29.1.1999 itself all the ration dealers were intimated by the Civil Supplies. It is further stated that this was announced in the T.V. and in the AIR. So far as the intimation is concerned, the counter affidavit says that on 29.1.1999 itself all the ration dealers were intimated by the Civil Supplies. It is further stated that this was announced in the T.V. and in the AIR. The Government has also stated that all the National papers had published the news about the increase in price. It is further seen that a meeting was held in the presence of the Food Minister of Kerala and as per the order it was included in the letter No. D 1/99/F&CS/ Dept. dated 15.5.1999. Copy of this letter is produced as Ext. R2(b) along with C.M.P. No. 22502 of 1999. It was agreed that on 29.1.1999 also, the ration dealers could sell the rice and wheat at the old rate. Hence, going by Ext. R2(b), the stock, which was remaining on the night of 29.1.1999 will be taken note of and differential cost should be deposited by the dealers. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both parties, upheld the validity of Clauses 45(8A) and 51(8A). But then held that the Government can realise the differential cost only after the dealers become aware of the same by intimation. It was directed to verify whether any dealer has sold the goods at the old rate before 1.2.1999 and if they have sold at the old rate, then no differential cost can be realised from them. It is against the above decision that appeals have been filed by the dealers. Since the learned Single Judge held that the Government is entitled to realise the differential cost. The Government is aggrieved by the direction of the learned Single Judge that if the stocks up to 1.2.1999 are sold at the old rate, the differential cost need not be collected from the dealers. 6. We heard learned counsel for the petitioners and also the learned Government Pleader. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the Original Petition contended that it is true that they are licensed under the Kerala Rationing Order to sell the rationed articles. But the articles are purchased by them with their own money and hence, they are the owners of these articles. They are not acting as agent of the Government. Hence, the Government cannot direct them to deposit the differential cost. But the articles are purchased by them with their own money and hence, they are the owners of these articles. They are not acting as agent of the Government. Hence, the Government cannot direct them to deposit the differential cost. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. Venkata Subbarao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1773. According to them, the position in the present case is same as that in the above decision of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that the clause similar to Clause 45(8A) was not available in the above Supreme Court decision. The agreement did not provide that in case there is price rice, the dealers should deposit the differential cost. On the other hand, there the agreement only states that the dealers will be bound by the directions of the Government. On the interpretation of the agreement, the Supreme Court held that since there was no principal and agent relationship, the Government cannot compel to pay the differential cost. In the present case, there is some difference, because under sub-clause (8A), the Government has power to realise the differential cost. Learned Government Pleader submitted before us that in a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 383 of 1980, the question investigated was whether there existed a principal and agent relationship between the Government and the ration dealers. On the basis of sub-clause (8A), Malimath, C.J. speaking for the Bench, held that there was a principal and agent relationship and distinguished the decision in A, Venkata Subbarao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1773. In another case, Kerala Flour Mills, Mattancherry, Cochin v. The Board of Revenue (Civil Supplies), Government of Kerala, Trivandrum & Ors., AIR 1990 Kerala 14, a Division Bench of this Court held that the differential cost cannot be realised. But there, the provision similar to sub-clause (8A) was absent. It is seen that similar amendments have been made under the Kerala Kerosene Control Order and this Court took the view that after the amendment the dealers are bound to pay the differential cost. 8. According to us, we need not go into the question whether there is a principal and agent relationship between the Government and the dealer. It is seen that similar amendments have been made under the Kerala Kerosene Control Order and this Court took the view that after the amendment the dealers are bound to pay the differential cost. 8. According to us, we need not go into the question whether there is a principal and agent relationship between the Government and the dealer. As per the agreement, if there is increase in price, the dealers will have to pay the differential cost for the stock that was remaining at the time of increase and if there is decrease in price, they are entitled to refund the amount. This clause is incorporated in the agreement executed by the dealers. We are of the view that after executing such an agreement, now the petitioners cannot turn round and say that they are not liable to pay the differential cost. The contract was executed on the basis of the Rationing Order, which itself has been framed as per the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act. So, it can be said that the contract entered into between the dealers and the Government is a statutory contract. The provisions of the statute constitutes the terms and conditions of the contract. They are binding on both the Government and the licensees. Neither of them can depart from it. In the decision reported in Panna Lai and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1975) 2 Supreme Court Case 633, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "The licenses in the present case are contracts between the parties. The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts. They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others. The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous". 9. According to us, in the light of the express agreement executed between the parties, it is not possible to hold that the petitioners are not bound to pay the amount. Further, we agree with the decision of the Division Bench in O.P. No. 383 of 1980 that there was a principal and agent relationship between the parties. Hence, we hold that Clauses 45 (8A) and 51(8A) of the Kerala Rationing Order are valid. 10. The next question is as to the date from which the petitioners are liable to pay the differential cost. Hence, we hold that Clauses 45 (8A) and 51(8A) of the Kerala Rationing Order are valid. 10. The next question is as to the date from which the petitioners are liable to pay the differential cost. As per the notification, the new rates have come into effect from 29.1.1999. So, the stock at the end of the day on 28.1.-1999 has to be assessed and the differential cost has to be paid as per the notification. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the petitioners got intimation only on 1.2.1999 and according to them, it is only the stock that was available at the end of the day of 1.2.1999 that should be assessed for the purpose of differential cost. So far as this aspect is concerned; there is no dispute that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. V.K. Sukumaran & Ors., (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 400, it is only from the date of intimation that increase in price can be effected. The question is as to when this was intimated. In the present case, Ext. P1 was issued on 29.1.1999. A news item was published in the newspaper on 29.1.1999 itself about the increase in price. It is further seen from the affidavit by the Government that telephonic communication was given to all Taluk Supply Officers for intimating the AWDs and ARDs about the revision of Central issue price of rice and wheat. Hence, the case set up on the basis of the materials given by the Government, we can presume that the intimation was given on 29.1.1999 itself. It is also stated that the publication was made in the T.V. and AIR. Further, the Food Minister called a meeting of the dealers. There, the Government agreed that the dealers can sell the commodities at the old rate, which was prevalent on 29.1.1999 also. So, it emerges that it is only for the stock that was available at the end of the day on 29.1.2001 that will be assessed for the purpose of the differential cost. In the case, Food Corporation of India v. V.K. Sukumaran & Ors., (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 400, the Court referred to a judgment of this Court in O.P. No. 7926 of 1982. We went through the judgment in that Original Petition. In the case, Food Corporation of India v. V.K. Sukumaran & Ors., (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 400, the Court referred to a judgment of this Court in O.P. No. 7926 of 1982. We went through the judgment in that Original Petition. There, we find that a counter affidavit was filed by the Rationing Authorities stating that the dealers were informed about the increase in price only at a later date. It was in that context that the decision was made in that case. So far as the present case is concerned, we are of the view that we need not doubt that the notification issued on 29.1.1999 has not been communicated to the dealers, especially, when such a communication is not given, the State will have to carry a heavy burden. Further, in the light of the development of the communication facilities, we are of the view that the intention would have been given to the dealers on that day itself. Whatever that may be, the Government itself has agreed in Ext. R2(b) that the dealers would be presumed to have sold on 29.1.1999 the stock at the old rate. Hence, we hold that the petitioners are bound to pay the differential cost for the stock that was remaining at the end of the day on 29.1.1999.