Judgment :- Yasodai alias Poongavanan, the plaintiff is the appellant herein. She filed a suit for partition of her half share in ‘D’ schedule property and for recovery of possession in respect of ‘B’ schedule property contending that she would be entitled to half share in ‘D’ schedule property along with 7th defendant, her brother, after the death of her father and mother and she would be entitled to the entire ‘B’ schedule property, as the said property was settled in her favour by virtue of the settlement deed executed by her parents. 2. The suit was contested by the defendants 2 to 6 contending that the entire properties, namely, ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule properties were purchased by their father, the first defendant, from the 7th defendant, the brother of the plaintiff, in the year 1970 and as such, they would be entitled to claim adverse possession and therefore, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief. 3. In the trial Court, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and Exs.A-1 to A-11 were marked. On the side of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.D-1 to D-76 were marked. The trial Court, on consideration of the materials available on record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Aggrieved by that, the defendants 1 to 6 filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court, which, in turn, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit by holding that the defendants 1 to 6 have prescribed title by adverse possession from 1970 in which year they purchased the suit properties from the 7th defendant. Hence, this second appeal by the plaintiff/ appellant. 5. The counsel for the appellant would raise the following substantial questions of law in the second appeal: • (i) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in dismissing the suit and in holding that the defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession, when the pleadings and proof in this regard is absolutely lacking? • (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court has not committed serious error in dismissing the suit particularly when reliance is placed upon the sale deed executed by Venkatarama Gounder in favour of Rasu Gounder in respect of ‘B’ schedule properties over which he has no title? • (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court has not committed serious error in dismissing the suit particularly when reliance is placed upon the sale deed executed by Venkatarama Gounder in favour of Rasu Gounder in respect of ‘B’ schedule properties over which he has no title? • (iii) Whether the lower appellate Court should not have held that a co-sharer cannot bind any non-alienating co-sharer by selling the entirety of the property and the purchaser can only claim equity to the extent of the share of his vendor and cannot claim adverse title to the non-alienating co-sharer? • (iv) Whether the lower appellate Court had not misconstrued the judgment in Sundaravalli Ammal v. Perumal (1999)1 MLJ. 173 , whether its order is not even otherwise illegal and perverse and liable to be set aside? 6. In elaboration of the above substantial questions of law, the learned counsel for the appellant would argue at length, mainly, contending that even without the plea of ouster or adverse possession and even though when there is no evidence to show that the defendants 1 to 6 were in possession of the suit properties from 1970 onwards, the lower appellate Court wrongly concluded that the defendants 1 to 6 have prescribed title by adverse possession. 7. In order to substantiate the said plea, the learned counsel for the appellant would cite the following decisions: (1) Baijnath v. Jaimangal A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 56; (2) P.Lakshmi Reddy v. L.Lakshmi Reddy P.Lakshmi Reddy v. L.Lakshmi Reddy P.Lakshmi Reddy v. L.Lakshmi Reddy A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314; (3) Narayanamma v. Thabitinaidu A.I.R. 1964 Ori. 212; (4) Balwant Singh v. Mehar Singh A.I.R. 1974 P.& H. 130; (5) Jurmati v. Anwar Rasul A.I.R. 1973 Gau. 90; (6) Mohd. Zainulabudeen v. Sayed Ahmed Mohideen (1990)1 S.C.C. 345 ; (7) Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash (1995)4 S.C.C. 496 ; (8) M.Arthur Paul Ratna Raju v. Gudese Garaline Augusta Bhushanabai M.Arthur Paul Ratna Raju v. Gudese Garaline Augusta Bhushanabai M.Arthur Paul Ratna Raju v. Gudese Garaline Augusta Bhushanabai (1998)7 S.C.C. 103 ; (9) Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000)1 S.C.C. 434 ; (10) Lakshmiammal v. C.P.Nanjappan Lakshmiammal v. C.P.Nanjappan Lakshmiammal v. C.P.Nanjappan (2000)3 C.T.C. 29 ; (11) Kannappan v. Pargunan (2000)2 C.T.C. 219 . 8. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, in justification of the reasonings given by the trial Court in dismissing the suit, would contend that the plaintiff/ appellant did not prove her case by producing acceptable materials. On the contrary, the defendants pleaded various grounds including adverse possession and the same had been established by placing acceptable evidence before the Courts below and as such, the finding given by the lower appellate Court is correct. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. 10. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that she would be entitled to the entire ‘B’ schedule property as per Ex.A-2 and half share in ‘D’ schedule property, since her parents died intestate. 11. On the other hand, it is the contention of the defendants 1 to 6 that though Ex.A-2 dated 30.8.1957 would show that the settlement deed had been executed by the parents of the plaintiff in favour of the plaintiff in respect of ‘B’ schedule property, there is no material to show that the said deed was acted upon, but ultimately, the first defendant, the father of defendants 2 to 4, purchased the said properties in the year 1970 from the 7th defendant Venkatarama Gounder, who is the brother of the plaintiff. 12. It is the specific contention of the plaintiff that the 7th defendant had no title to sell both ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule properties to third party, namely, the first defendant and as such, the lower appellate Court should have rejected the prayer of adverse possession, particularly when the entire sale transaction between the 7th defendant and the other defendants in fraudulent and collusive. 13. On the contrary, the contesting defendants 1 to 6 specifically pleaded that the 7th defendant had instigated his sister, the plaintiff, to file the suit, though he earlier sold the suit properties to the defendants in the year 1970 itself. This plea cannot be rejected outright, since the 7th defendant had filed the written statement adopting the averments of the plaintiff. 14. This plea cannot be rejected outright, since the 7th defendant had filed the written statement adopting the averments of the plaintiff. 14. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that after the death of the parents of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant, the 7th defendant alone was in possession of both ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule properties and he sold the said properties under Ex.B-1 dated 30.4.1970 to the 1st defendant, the father of the defendants 2 to 4. As per the said deed, the 1st defendant was asked to discharge the bogyams made in the year 1969 by the 7th defendant in respect of the suit properties. Accordingly, the said bogyams were discharged and consequently, the original bogyams were obtained by the 1st defendant. These documents were marked as Exs.B-50 and B-51. The other documents, namely, Ex.B-2 patta book, Ex.B-3 U.D.R. Patta, Exs.4 to 42, Exs.B-45 to 49, Exs.53 to B-59 Kist receipts and Exs.B-6- to B-74 house tax receipts would show that a house was constructed by the defendants 1 to 6 in the suit properties and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, though the truth and validity of Ex.A-2 settlement deed was not specifically denied by the defendants 1 to 6. 15. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, there is no material to show that in pursuance of the settlement deed, the plaintiff was put in possession of the ‘B’ schedule property and that the settlement deed was acted upon. As held by the lower appellate Court, except Ex.A-3 joint patta, which was obtained in 1984, there is no other document to show that the ‘B’ schedule property was in possession of the plaintiff at any point of time. 16. On the other hand, the possession of both ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule properties were handed over to the defendants as per Ex.B-1 Sale Deed and the various documents, namely, Exs.B-2 to B-30 pertaining to the years from 1970 to 1989 and Exs.B-31 to B-49 pertaining to the years 1990, 1991 and 1994 and Exs.B-53 to B-75 would clearly show that these properties were in possession and enjoyment of the defendants 1 to 6 from 1970 onwards. Therefore, in my view, the finding given by the lower appellate Court that Ex.A-2 settlement deed was not acted upon by the plaintiff cannot be said to be wrong. Therefore, in my view, the finding given by the lower appellate Court that Ex.A-2 settlement deed was not acted upon by the plaintiff cannot be said to be wrong. 17. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no plea for adverse possession. This is also quite wrong. Since in para 6 of the written statement, the defendants pleaded for adverse possession which is as follows: 18. Furthermore, the issue framed by the lower appellate Court is thus: “Whether the respondents/ defendants have prescribed title to the suit property by way of adverse possession?” 19. Though various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant would show the guidelines given for proving adverse possession and ouster, those decisions would not be of any use to the appellant, as, in this case, the lower appellate Court would, point out that the defendants have proved prescribed title by showing adverse possession against the plaintiff. 20. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the defendants claimed possession by way of purchase made by them from the 7th defendant under Ex.B-1, their possession cannot be held to be hostile to the real owner and since the possession could be referred to a lawful title, it could not be considered to be adverse. 21. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to anothers title. But, in this case, as indicated above, with regard to ‘B’ schedule property, already there had been settlement deed Ex.A-2 in favour of the plaintiff. 22. Similarly, it is not disputed in the fact that the parents of the plaintiff died intestate leaving the plaintiff and the 7th defendant, as their legal heirs. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that the 7th defendant had valid title to execute the sale deed in respect of ‘B’ schedule property and half share of ‘D’ schedule property which belonged to the plaintiff. 23. Under those circumstances, the defendants having purchased the suit properties from the person, namely the 7th defendant, who had no valid title and such being the case, they can claim only adverse possession against the plaintiff. 24. It is held in Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim (1942)2 MLJ. 321 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 23. Under those circumstances, the defendants having purchased the suit properties from the person, namely the 7th defendant, who had no valid title and such being the case, they can claim only adverse possession against the plaintiff. 24. It is held in Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim (1942)2 MLJ. 321 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 622 would hold thus: When one of several co-sharers lets into possession a stranger who proceeds to cultivate the land for his own benefit the other co-sharers must, unless they deliberately close their eyes, know of what is going on, but if they are so regardless of their own interests they must take the consequences. Where a person who is in possession under a usufructuary mortgage granted by one of several coparceners remains in possession of the land and cultivates it for years, a position which we have here, there can be no doubt that the requirements of continuity, publicity and extent for adverse possession are fully complied with.” 25. The Bombay High Court also in Anjanabai v. Jaswantibai A.I.R. 1993 Bom. 134, following the above Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court, would hold as follows: “The very fact that the stranger has been inducted into possession and consequently, the possession of the co-owners terminated would be sufficient to put the other co-owners to notice of the conduct of the alienating co-owners. Therefore, ouster would be to their notice and the possession of transferee would be adverse from the date of possession.” 26. The very same principles have been followed by the Kerala High Court in Karthiyayani v. U.Kallyani Karthiyayani v. U.Kallyani Karthiyayani v. U.Kallyani A.I.R. 1972 Ker. 299. 27. The facts of the case in Sundaravalli Ammal v. Perumal (1999)1 MLJ. 173 would squarely apply to the facts of the present case also. There cannot be any dispute in the fact that the 7th defendant had been dealing with the entire suit properties, both ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule. The above fact is quite evident from the fact that in 1969, the 7th defendant made bogyams in respect of these properties as mentioned in Exs.B-50 and B-51 and those bogyams had been discharged by the 1st defendant, the purchaser, as agreed to by him, when the properties were sold by the 7th defendant to him the father of the defendants 2 to 4. 28. 28. As noted above, from the date of purchase, the defendants 1 to 6 have been in exclusive possession of the suit properties by transferring patta in their name and paying kist and house tax and also putting construction. On the contrary, as indicated above, the plaintiff has not filed any document to show that she was in possession after execution of the settlement deed Ex.A-2 till 1970 and even thereafter till date except Ex.A-3 joint patta, which would not show any exclusive possession by the plaintiff. 29. As laid down by the decisions referred to above, the very fact that the father of the defendants 2 to 4 had been inducted into possession by the 7th defendant in the year 1970 and consequently, the possession of the co-owner, namely, the plaintiff, terminated would be sufficient to put her to notice of the conduct of the alienating to put her to notice of the conduct of the alienating co-owner, namely, the 7th defendant. Under those circumstances, it can be safely held that ouster would be to their notice and the possession of the defendants, namely, the transferee, would be adverse from the date of possession. 30. Under those circumstances, the findings rendered by the lower appellate Court, which is the last Court of facts, to the effect that the defendants 1 to 6 have acquired title by adverse possession with respect to suit properties, namely, both ‘B’ and ‘D’ schedule properties and as such, the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation cannot be said to be perverse or wrong. Hence, this Court would not be inclined to interfere with such a finding by invoking Sec.100, C.P.C. 31. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.18948 of 1999 stands dismissed. No costs.