P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful tenant in R. C. A 19 of 1987 on the file of the Additional Chief judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad is the Revision petitioner. The respondent in this C. R. P. is the landlord. However, for the purpose of convenience the parties will be referred to as landlord and tenant. ( 2 ) THE landlord filed R. C. No. 223 of 1981 for eviction of tenant from the premises bearing No. 4-2-204 of Sultan Bazar, hyderabad. The case of the landlord is that originally this property belongs to Kishan rao Afzalpurkar and his family members, who sold the property to this landlord and his brothers on 4-7-1980, and this tenant has been the tenant of the premises originally of the original owners and subsequently the tenant was duly attorned after the aforesaid purchase by the landlord and his brothers and in the oral partition dated 8-8-1980 between the landlord and his brothers the petition schedule property had fallen to the share of this landlord and the tenant was also informed about the same and the tenant was paying the rent to the landlord till June 1981 and at the time of filing the eviction petition, the landlord had been staying at Eluru carrying on cloth business. It was also further stated that the landlord and his family members had decided to shift to Hyderabad inasmuch as they belong to trading family after winding-up the business at Eluru and for the purpose of commencing and carrying on the cloth business at the petition schedule property he requires the suit premises for bona fide personal requirement as he has no other non-residential premises of his own in the city and in fact the landlord had also issued a notice to the tenant and instead of complying with the demand, the tenant had issued a reply with all false and untenable allegations. ( 3 ) THE tenant had filed a counter to the effect that he is not aware of oral partition and unless it is prove that this property had fallen to the share of the landlord exclusively, he cannot maintain the eviction petition and the bona fide requirement of the landlord is not at all true and the landlord and his family members has shifted to Eluru long ago and had established their business and the alleged partition and bona fide requirement is only to see that the tenant is thrown out and the tenant has started his business long back, had established reputation in the market and goodwill and if eviction is ordered he will be put to serious loss as there is no other source of living for him. ( 4 ) ORIGINALLY, on behalf of the landlord p. Ws. l and 2 were examined and Exs. P-1 to p-4 were marked and on behalf of the tenant r. W. 1 was examined and Exs. R-1 to R-22 were marked and the following points for consideration were framed. (1) Whether the petitioner requires the suit premises bona fide for the purpose of starting the cloth business as claimed by the petitioner. (2) Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted and if eviction is ordered it will cause hardship to the respondent. (3) To what relief. ( 5 ) THE Rent Controller had dismissed the said R. C. on 22-9-1986 and the landlord preferred R. A. 19-of 1987 which was also dismissed by the appellate authority on 21-1-1994 and aggrieved by the same the landlord preferred CRP 679 of 1994 which was dismissed on 5-2-1997 and review was filed in C. M. P. No. 24728 of 1998 and the same was dismissed on 22-12-1998 and the landlord had preferred Civil Appeal no. 5417 of 1999 before the Apex Court and the same was allowed on 20-9-1999 setting aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the appellate authority and had directed the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merits afresh allowing the application of the landlord for leading additional evidence. In pursuance of the same, again the witnesses were recalled and examined and further Exs. P-5 to P-46 and exs. R-23 and R-24 were marked. In pursuance of the same, again the witnesses were recalled and examined and further Exs. P-5 to P-46 and exs. R-23 and R-24 were marked. The learned appellate authority, Additional Chief judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad by order dated 29-12-2000 has allowed r. A. No. 19 of 1987 directing the tenant to vacate the premises within two months from the date of the said order and the tenant aggrieved by the same had filed the present c. R. P. under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings, (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960 (in short hereinafter referred to as Act for the purpose of convenience ). ( 6 ) SRI Vilas Afzal Purkar representing the Revision Petitioner tenant had made elaborate submissions and had explained about the chequered career of the case. The learned Counsel had pointed out that the order is reversing order and originally the tenant was successful in all the Courts, but however their Lordships of the Supreme court had allowed the appeal for the limited purpose of the appellate authority considering the case of the landlord on the strength of the additional material which may be placed before the Court and the additional material placed before the appellate authority does not in any way improve the case of landlord to substantiate the ground of personal requirement and hence the appellate authority had erred in allowing the appeal on the strength of such material. Learned Counsel had contended that the alleged oral partition set up by the landlord is only with a view to get out of the provisions of the Act and with a view to get the tenant evicted. Learned Counsel also had pointed out that inasmuch as by virtue of this oral partition the right of the tenant will be affected, the tenant rightly had attacked the very oral partition to the limited extent. Learned Counsel also had pointed out that the entire family is a trading family of Eluru and for the purpose of throwing out the tenants the plea of oral partition is set up. Learned Counsel had drawn my attention to the order of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal no. 5417 of 1999 and had explained the scope and ambit of the same. Learned counsel had drawn my attention to the contents of Ex. Learned Counsel had drawn my attention to the order of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal no. 5417 of 1999 and had explained the scope and ambit of the same. Learned counsel had drawn my attention to the contents of Ex. P-2 notice and had contended that what was expressed at the earliest point of time at the best can be said to be only a desire not a need to attract the bona fide personal requirement. Learned Counsel also had pointed out several aspects as to why the plea of oral partition cannot be believed. Learned Counsel had drawn my attention to the pleading and also the dates and had pointed out that even the plan was not filed into Court and the shift of the landlord to hyderabad was in the Year 1990 and all the documents marked as additional evidence relate to the subsequent period which has no relevancy at all and the very fact that exs. R-3 to R-16 were received by satyanarayana Shah goes to show that it is a deliberate plan to throw out the tenants. Learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the evidence of P. W. 2, who is other brother of the landlord. Learned counsel had also contended that all these family members have been running the business and it is only one business and there is no joint plan also to show that each portion was allowed to the brothers. Learned counsel had taken me through the evidence of P. W. I, P. W. 2 and also R. W. I and had commented that inasmuch as this is a matter arising out of a reversing order, the revisional jurisdiction is not restricted only to a question of law and even the evidence can be appreciated to the limited extent in such a reversing order. Learned Counsel also drawn my attention to the averments made in the affidavit in support of the application in la. 56 of 1992 in R. A. No. 19 of 1987. Learned Counsel also had contended that the shift of the family to Hyderabad subsequently is of no consequence. Learned counsel had made an attempt to see that the desire is different from need and the mere expression of desire by the landlord is not sufficient. 56 of 1992 in R. A. No. 19 of 1987. Learned Counsel also had contended that the shift of the family to Hyderabad subsequently is of no consequence. Learned counsel had made an attempt to see that the desire is different from need and the mere expression of desire by the landlord is not sufficient. Though in the case of personal requirement the relative hardship, necessarily, need not be considered by virtue of statutory position as such it being a beneficial legislation, the provisions have to be interpreted in favour of the tenant and aspect of the hardship also can be considered in a matter of this nature. Learned Counsel had contended that all the other matters filed by the other brothers of the landlord were not exclusively decided and hence those cases are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the present dispute. Learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on AIR 1985 SC 207 equivalent to (1985) 1 SCC 251 , (1998) 6 SCC 222, (2001) 3 SCC 445 , and also AIR scw 2001 1267. ( 7 ) SRI Saradhi learned Senior Counsel representing Smt. Jayasree Saradhi representing the landlord had pointed out that all the brothers had purchased the property and had orally partitioned and each of them had given separate notices to the tenants on the same day and the same contention had been raised by other tenants which had been negatived since all the matters were taken by Supreme Court, it can be taken that on the aspect of the plea of partition and the respective mulgies falling to the respective shares of landlord and his brothers it can be taken to be a possession which had been already decided. Learned counsel also had filed a judgment of the supreme Court in petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 6784 of 1999 filed against the judgment in C. R. P. No. 2403 of 1994 which was dismissed. Learned Counsel had also drawn my attention to the dismissal of review reported in 1999 (1) ALT 459 and the Civil Appeal 5417 of 1999 was filed as against the same wherein the Apex Court had rightly sent the matter back to the appellate authority and subsequent thereto the further oral evidence was let in and also the documents were marked. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Ex. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Ex. P-35 which was ultimately confirmed by the Apex court, Ex. P-36, Ex. P-37, Ex. P-38 and ex. P-39 and had contended that all these aspects which are being agitated by this tenant had been deciding even by the Apex court in those decisions and mere fact that the landlords are different and tenants are different may not be of any consequence since the point involved in all these matters is one and the same i. e. , the question of partition between the brothers and the question of bona fide personal requirement for running their respective business. Learned Counsel also had pointed out certain admissions in Exs. P-5 to P-8 and exs. P-9 to P-17 and had contended that the tenant is also fully aware of the bona fide need of the landlord especially in the light of the subsequent events of his shifting to hyderabad. Learned Counsel had referred to the documentary evidence and also had contended that in case of personal requirement the element of relative hardship need not be considered and whether it is considered or not it may not be of serious consequence. Learned Counsel also had contended that the finding relating to bona fide requirement is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered in revision, (1974) 1 scc page 661. Learned Counsel also had submitted that the dire necessity need not be there for invoking ground of personal requirement and placed reliance on AIR 1999 SC 3864 . Learned Counsel also had placed reliance on 1993 (1) ALT 364 and had contended that even future need may be sufficient for establishing the bona fide personal requirement. Learned Counsel on the aspect of the scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction and also on the aspect of subsequent events had placed reliance on several decisions like (1993) 1 SCC 499 , air 1987 SC 1782 , 1994 (4) ALT 642, (1999) 5 SCC 645 , AIR 2001 SC 803 . Learned Counsel on the aspect of the scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction and also on the aspect of subsequent events had placed reliance on several decisions like (1993) 1 SCC 499 , air 1987 SC 1782 , 1994 (4) ALT 642, (1999) 5 SCC 645 , AIR 2001 SC 803 . Learned Counsel also had strongly contended that while appreciating the precedents the strength of the Judges also may have to be looked into and (1993) 1 scc 499 being a judgment of three Benches it is binding on all Courts in India and hence there cannot be any re-appreciation of evidence while exercising revisional jurisdiction and hence the appellate authority had given cogent and convincing reasons which does not warrant any interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. ( 8 ) HEARD both the Counsel and also perused the material available on record. ( 9 ) IN Civil Appeal No. 5417 of 19991 the apex Court made the following order:"after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties we are of the view that without going into the technicalities of the matter, the appellate Court ought to have allowed the application of the appellant for taking on record the additional evidence which was sought to be produced, what would be the effect of the same will be for the Court to decide. We, accordingly, allowed this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the lower appellate Court and direct the lower appellate Court to decide the appeal of the appellant on merits afresh after allowing the application of the appellant for leading additional evidence. The status quo shall be maintained. The lower appellant Court will be at liberty to allow the respondent herein to lead such evidence in rebuttal as it may thing proper. " ( 10 ) FROM the very nature of the order passed by the Apex Court, it is clear that all the orders wherein the tenant was successful had been set aside and hence the appellate authority is entitled to appreciate the material available on record afresh after taking into consideration the additional evidence also both oral and documentary which may be adduced by the parties to the litigation. The appellate authority in paras 12 to 29 had discussed both oral and documentary evidence at length and had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled for the relief of eviction. On the aspect of bona fide requirement in fact the appellate authority himself observed as follows:"bona fide requirement signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. There should be an element of need and landlord must show that he genuinely requires the disputed premises for the purpose of the business, which he proposes to commence. The truth of the assertion and its bona fide character must be established to the satisfaction of the court. The bona fide requirement need not be absolute necessity. Each case necessarily depends upon its own facts. Once the Court is satisfied that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for starting a new business. It is not for the Court to probe into the reasons that prompted the landlord for choosing that particular business or question the prudence or soundness of the proposed venture. Keeping in view of the above settled principles of law it has to be seen whether the landlord established his bonafide requirements or not. " ( 11 ) THUS, the appellate authority also was conscious of the fact that the bona fide requirement signifies that a mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. In ex. P-2 the notice issued by the landlord, it was stated by the landlord as follows:"that you have been the tenant of the shop in the Ground Floor bearing municipal Door No. 4-2-204 of the aforesaid property under the vendors of my client and his brothers on a monthly rental of Rs. 95. 00 (Rupees ninety-five only), exclusive of electricity and water consumption charges which you have to pay, each month s rent payable in advance on or before the 5th of every english calendar month. That the said shop has been taken on lease by you for purposes of your business. 95. 00 (Rupees ninety-five only), exclusive of electricity and water consumption charges which you have to pay, each month s rent payable in advance on or before the 5th of every english calendar month. That the said shop has been taken on lease by you for purposes of your business. That, by letter dated 4-7-1980, you have been attorned by the vendors under the said sale deed to the vendee therein and you have accepted the attornment and thereby you have become the tenant of my client and his brothers under the aforesaid terms and liable to pay the rent for the said building leased out to you, that, in partition between my client, and his brothers, the said shop leased out to you was allotted to the share of my client along with the rent due thereon and thereby client has become the owner of the said shop and that you are liable to pay the rent due to my client. That my client, who belongs to a trading family, proposes to commence cloth business in the said shop leased out to you. That my client has no other building of his own and is of not occupying any non-residential building in Hyderabad and hence requires the leased building for his personal use for carrying on the proposed business. That my client hereby requires you to vacate and deliver possession of the leased property by 5th October 1980. " ( 12 ) THE pleading is also to the same effect. Now the main contention of the tenant is that both in the notice at earliest point of time and also in the pleading what has been expressed is only a desire and there is no element of need. The very fact that the landlord had continued his business and had subsequently shifted to Hyderabad itself shows that there is no bona fide personal requirement as pleaded by the landlord. Even otherwise it is the contention of the tenant that the subsequent events at the best may constitute a fresh cause of action and on the strength of such subsequent events the eviction cannot be ordered. ( 13 ) IN Shiv Sarup Guptha v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta at page 232 the Apex Court while dealing with the bonafide requirement was pleased to observe as follows:"chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean in good faith: genuine". ( 13 ) IN Shiv Sarup Guptha v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta at page 232 the Apex Court while dealing with the bonafide requirement was pleased to observe as follows:"chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean in good faith: genuine". The word "genuine" means"natural : not spurious: real: pure: sincere". In Law Dictionary, mozely and Whitely define bona fide to mean"good faith, without fraud or deceit". Thus the term bona fide of genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by" requires is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase required bona fide"is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. ( 14 ) IT is pertinent to note that apart from the notice and also the pleading, the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 is available on record. ( 14 ) IT is pertinent to note that apart from the notice and also the pleading, the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 is available on record. In fact, P. W. 1 in his evidence also had spoken about the subsequent events and he had clearly stated that when he was examined as a witness before the Rent controller he was staying at Eluru and doing business at Eluru and he used to do cloth business at Eluru and thereafter he had shifted to Hyderabad in June 1990 by winding up his business and he is not having any movable or immovable property or business at Eluru and all his four brothers filed eviction petitions before the Rent controller for eviction of the respective mulgies on the ground of personal requirement for the purpose of carrying on business and the entire family was shifted to hyderabad and he had further deposed that he was staying at Barkatpura during 1980 in rented house and subsequent thereto he had shifted to Durgabai Deshmukh Colony and stayed there till 1985 and thereafter he purchased a house at Shankarmuth, but he had sold away the same in 1989 and he is residing in a rented house and all his brothers had succeeded in getting their respective portions allotted to them and they are doing business and those tenants also fought the litigation upto Supreme Court and altimately had vacated the respective portions and he had further deposed that the tenant had sent rents to his Hyderabad address under exs. P-5, P-6 to P-8 and also by money orders under Exs. P-9 to P-17. Exs. P-21 to p-23 are documents relating to the educational certificates of his daughter and certain other aspects. Exs. P-35 to P-40 are the judgment copies of his brothers and to further substantiate his contention P. W. I also had recalled his brother P. W. 2 who had supported P. W. 1 in all material particulars. P-9 to P-17. Exs. P-21 to p-23 are documents relating to the educational certificates of his daughter and certain other aspects. Exs. P-35 to P-40 are the judgment copies of his brothers and to further substantiate his contention P. W. I also had recalled his brother P. W. 2 who had supported P. W. 1 in all material particulars. ( 15 ) NO doubt by way of rebuttal the tenant as R. W. I stated in his additional evidence that he had got four children and they were separated and the business in the disputed property is a only source and he is personally looking after the business with the assistance of one of his sons and he has nothing to do with the other sons and further he had deposed that there was no partition between the landlord and his brothers and the adjacent mulgies fell vacant belonging to jagannath Shah and Narsingh Shah and both of them are doing business and the said mulgies are joint and there is no partition of two mulgies and even at the time of purchase all his brothers are aware of the fact that he is tenant of the mulgi and that they are living in one building and there is no bona fide requirement as claimed by the landlord. ( 16 ) IN M/s. Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina it was held that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord, the subsequent events are to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still requires the premises in possession of the tenant and in an appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to all the events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceedings before it and mould the relief in the light of those events. ( 17 ) IN Vallampati Kalavathi v. Haji ismail at page 1270 the Apex Court was pleased tc observe at para 13 as follows:"as the language of the Section suggests, the revisonal power vested in the High Court is to be used for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding, and if satisfied that the order/orders suffer any such vice the High Court may pass such order in reference to the proceedings it thinks fit. The expression legality , regularity , or "propriety" are undoubtedly side than mere correction of jurisdictional error. But even such revisional power cannot be exercised to upset the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Forums below merely on the ground that the High Court is inclined to take a different view on the materials on record in the case. We should not be understood to be saying that the concurrent findings of fact can in no case be interfered within revision. For such interference it has to be shown that the findings recorded by the forums below suffer from any inherent defect or are based on inadmissible or irrelevant materials or are so perverse that no reasonable person will come to such conclusion on the materials. " ( 18 ) IN Shaw Wallace and Co. , Ltd. , v. Govindas Purushothamdas it was observed that on a plain reading of Section 25 of tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1960, it is clear that the revisional jurisdiction vested with the High court under the Section is wider than section 115 CPC and the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceeding, of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such orders accordingly. ( 19 ) THE tenant had strenuously contended that there is no clear pleading relating to the bona fide personal requirement and the very fact that the landlord continued at Eluru itself for a long time amply establishes that what was expressed in Ex. P-2 and also in the pleading will be only a desire and not a bona fide personal requirement. P-2 and also in the pleading will be only a desire and not a bona fide personal requirement. Learned Counsel also had pointed out that the very conduct of the landlord in filling the R. C. C. immediately also shows that there are no bona fides. But however, the appellate authority on appreciation of Exs. P-1 to P-4 and also Exs. P-5 to P-46 and also the evidence P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 and R. W. 1 and exs. R-1 to R-24 had recorded a clear finding that the bona fide personal requirement was established by the landlord and it is a finding of fact arrived at by the appellate authority on detailed appreciation of evidence commencing from para 11 upto para 29. In fact the appellate authority as a final fact finding Court had recorded all the facts in detail and had given the reasons as to why the Court was arriving at a conclusion that the ground of bona fide personal requirement had been established by the landlord. Even in CRP 2403 of 1994, which was filed by another tenant against setyanarayana Shah, similar contention had been advanced. But however, this contention had been negatived and the matter was even confirmed by the Apex Court. ( 20 ) IN Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. the Apex court while dealing with the reasonable and bona fide requirement under Bombay Rents, hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) was pleased to observe at para 6 as under: "the word reasonable , in our view, connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word"requirement coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. Aitken v. Shaw 1993 SLT 21; Nevile v. Hordy (1921) 90 LJ Ch 158. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in presenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word bona fide is an additional requirement under sec. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in presenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word bona fide is an additional requirement under sec. l3 (l) (g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive. " ( 21 ) COMING to the facts on hand, what had been expressed by the landlord In ex. P-2 coupled with his pleading and also the evidence of P. W. 1 supported by the evidence of P. W. 2 and also the subsequent events clearly go to show that it is not a mere desire of his running business, but it is a need and such need certainly need not be accompany (sic. a compelling) or absolute or dire necessity. When that being so, if the real (sic. oral) and documentary evidence coupled with the subsequent events are taken into consideration it cannot be said that the landlord failed to establish his bona fide personal requirement. ( 22 ) IN T. Sunil Kumar and another v. M/s. S. G. Edulgi and Sons. It was held that it is not necessary that the need for starting business should exist on the date of suit and the plaintiff can file suit respect of his requirement which is to be in near future. ( 23 ) IN Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel it was held that the finding that the landlord reasonably and bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation is one of the facts. ( 24 ) IN Ubaiba v. Damodaran it was held that even though the revisional power under section 20 of the Act may be wider than that under Section 115 CPC it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the Civil Court under CPC. ( 25 ) IN Bhupendra N. Patel v. Harshavardhan it was held that Revisional powers under Section 22 of the Act are no doubt wider than that of power under sec. ( 25 ) IN Bhupendra N. Patel v. Harshavardhan it was held that Revisional powers under Section 22 of the Act are no doubt wider than that of power under sec. 115 of CPC, but those powers cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction and though interference with finding of fact in revision is not totally ousted it is limited if it is not based on evidence or if it is contrary to law. ( 26 ) IN Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad mirasaheb Kadri while dealing with the revisional powers under Bombay Rents, hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) the Supreme Court was pleased to observe at page 1789 as follows:"the jurisdiction of the High Courts is to correct all errors of law going to the root of the decision which would, in such cases, include even perverse findings of facts, perverse in the sense that no reasonable person, acting judicially and properly instructed in the relevant law could arrive at such finding on the evidence on the record. In this view in our opinion the ambit of the power was expressed in rather wide amplitude. As we read the power, the high Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the Court below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction". ( 27 ) IN Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep shrivastava the Apex Court was dealing with the bona fide need and subsequent events under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) act (13 of 1972 ). Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction". ( 27 ) IN Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep shrivastava the Apex Court was dealing with the bona fide need and subsequent events under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) act (13 of 1972 ). ( 28 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the litigation appears to be a long drawn litigation and the landlord had invoked the jurisdiction of the learned rent Controller in the year 1981. The material available on record shows that as far as his other brothers are concerned they got the possession of respective portions and they have been carrying on their business. It is also relevant to note that almost similar contentions had been raised by the other tenants also and they had fought litigation upto the Apex Court and however ultimately the other brothers were successful in getting possession of their respective portions. Here is a landlord who had pleaded at the earlier point of time his bona fide personal requirement in his notice Ex. P-2 and subsequently in his eviction petition and no doubt he had continued for some time subsequent thereto also at Eluru and this fact by itself cannot negative his bona fide personal requirement. Unless the premises is available, no prudent man would venture to leave business or the place where he was previously residing. But the fact remains that from the beginning, even from the year 1981, it had been and it continues to be the consistent stand of the landlord that he intends to carry on his business in the petition schedule premises. ( 29 ) IN Virbhan v. Balwant Singh it was held as under:"where the landlord residing at gurgaon purchased a house in Delhi and applied for eviction in order to live with his two sons. There is nothing surprising for person living in the muffussil to plan coming over to a metropolitan town like Delhi where exist better avenues of employment. " ( 30 ) IN Pandit Haru Parshad Sharma v. Sri Dhampat Singh and another it was held as follows:"the suitability of the residential accommodation has to be judged from the point of view of the landlord himself, unless that point of view on examination can be found by the Court to be unreasonable. " ( 30 ) IN Pandit Haru Parshad Sharma v. Sri Dhampat Singh and another it was held as follows:"the suitability of the residential accommodation has to be judged from the point of view of the landlord himself, unless that point of view on examination can be found by the Court to be unreasonable. The Court is not expected to impose its own standards on the landlord. It was also held the case has to be examined from the respective of the landlord himself. It is his way of life and his outlook which are the governing factors and the suitability of any particular accommodation or its reasonableness has to be determined from that point of view. " ( 31 ) IN Mandhar Chawla v. Shair Ali it was held that the landlord did not show that he had obtained licence or made any preparations since it is futile to expect that unless the landlord got possession of the premises, then only he can get licence or made any preparations. ( 32 ) IN Penchalaiah v. Ms. Muniruddin it was held that a mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of commencing a new business is not enough and decisive. The truth of the assertion and its bona fide character must be established to the satisfaction of the Court. The bona fide requirement need not be of absolute necessity. It is enough if the requirement is reasonable. ( 33 ) IT is no doubt true that the Act is a beneficiary legislation but that does not mean that the Act is meant only for the tenants and not for the landlords. The Courts are expected to maintain a balance while appreciating the rent control matters. If the landlord is able to establish any one of the grounds of which he can seek the eviction of the tenants, the Courts are expected to give the necessary relief to such landlords also in accordance with law. The very fact that the landlord has been agitating the dispute for such a long time clearly goes to show his necessity to occupy the premises for the purpose of running his own business and definitely such need, necessity of a landlord can be termed to be a bona fide personal requirement within the meaning of the Act. The very fact that the landlord has been agitating the dispute for such a long time clearly goes to show his necessity to occupy the premises for the purpose of running his own business and definitely such need, necessity of a landlord can be termed to be a bona fide personal requirement within the meaning of the Act. Further, the tenant also appears to be an old man of 75 years and his sons are well settled either in employment or doing business and in the light of the said fact also, the well considered order of the appellate authority does not warrant interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under section 22 of the Act. In the light of the clear oral and documentary evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 and also Ex. P-1 to P-46 and r. W. 1 and Ex. R-1 to R-24,i am of the clear opinion that the clear findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority in detail on appreciation of evidence do not warrant any interference by this Revisional Court and hence those findings are hereby confirmed. ( 34 ) FOR the foregoing reasons recorded above, I am of the considered opinion that the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly it is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case no order as to costs. ( 35 ) AS already observed by me, the tenant has been doing business for sufficiently long time in the premises in question and hence in the facts and circumstances of the case, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises.