Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Gaya, dated 21.3.87 in Title appeal no. 10/77, confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.3.76 passed by 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in Mortgage suit no. 2/75. Both the lower courts decreed the plaintiff-respondents suit and hence this second appeal has been filed by the defendants of the title suit. 2. The relevant facts for reference in the second appeal, as per the pleading of the plaintiffs, were to the effect that the ancestors of plaintiff- respondents had executed a usufructuary mortgage dated 11.6.1936 in favour of Jadu Ram as karta of his family consisting of Raghunandan Ram (defendant no. 1) and others. The mortgage money was Rs. 7,425/-. The period of mortgage was for seven years. The mortgagees were given possession of the mortgage property which was a house bearing old holding no. 195 corresponding to new holding no. 407 situated in the Tekari road mohalla, ward no. 4 of Gaya Municipality, in the town of Gaya. The mortgagees were to pay the municipal taxes as also other taxes which they failed to pay. So, the plaintiffs had to bear the cost of rent to the tune of Rs. 452.75 paise plus Rs. 13.52 (moterfa rent). Besides the above, the mortgagees were earning rent from the suit house at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month and, so, their income was sufficient to satisfy the principal amount of loan along with interest. In that view of the matter, the mortgage stood redeemed and, so, the defendant-appellants were liable to give back the possession of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. The plaintiff-respondents had sought recovery of possession of the suit house and they had also sought a direction upon the defendant-appellant to render accounts of the income from the suit house. 3. The defendant-appellant admitted the execution of the mortgage deed and their case was that they were entitled to enjoy the usufruct of the mortgage property and, so, they were not liable for giving any account to the mortgagors. Besides the above, one of the mortgagors, i.e., Rameshwar Bhagat sold half of the suit house to Kedar Nath, son of Raghunandan Ram (defendant no.1) and co-sharer of Jadu Ram. Besides the above, one of the mortgagors, i.e., Rameshwar Bhagat sold half of the suit house to Kedar Nath, son of Raghunandan Ram (defendant no.1) and co-sharer of Jadu Ram. The defendant- appellants were not liable to render accounts of the income because under the terms of the deed they were entitled to enjoy the usufructs of the suit property in lieu of interest. 4. Both the lower courts decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents and directed the defendant-appellant to render accounts of the income which they were realising from the suit house. During the course of submission before this Court, the respondents lawyer referred to Section 11 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974, as also Section 2K of the aforesaid Act and it was submitted that the. mortgagees were not entitled to realise more than double of the original mortgage money along with the interest. Section 2K of the aforesaid Act defined loan which covered even a loan advanced by a casual money lender and not necessarily a registered money lender. Appellants lawyer referred to Section 77 of the T.P.Act and it was submitted that under the law laid down under this section, the mortgagee was not liable to render accounts of the income derived from the mortgaged property. Besides the above, half of the suit property was purchased by one of the co-sharers of the mortgagee Jadu Ram and, therefore, they had acquired title over half of the mortgaged property, which was not liable to redemption. 5. The fact that there was a mortgage in question by the plaintiff- respondents was well admitted and the fact that there was a sale-deed by one of the mortgagors in favour of co-sharer of the mortgagee was also well admitted. The plaintiff-respondents had challenged the concerned sale-deed on the ground that there was no partition among co-sharers of the mortgagors and, therefore, the sale-deed executed in the year 1946 was illegal and void. Hence, the vendee, the co-sharer of the mortgagees, did not acquire any title and since the sale-deed was void there was no question of seeking its cancellation in a suit. The defendant-appellants plea in this connection was that Rameshwar Bhagat, vendor, had already separated from his co-sharers and, therefore, the sale-deed was valid and voidable and not void. Hence, the vendee, the co-sharer of the mortgagees, did not acquire any title and since the sale-deed was void there was no question of seeking its cancellation in a suit. The defendant-appellants plea in this connection was that Rameshwar Bhagat, vendor, had already separated from his co-sharers and, therefore, the sale-deed was valid and voidable and not void. Both the lower courts on the point of separation held in favour of the plaintiff-respondents and against the defendant-appellant, which was a finding of fact and, therefore, it becomes final. So, in view of the findings of the two lower courts the sale- deed executed by Rameshwar Bhagat in favour of the co-sharer of the defendants- mortgagees would be void and hence if the mortgagees remained in possession of the half of the suit property on the basis of a void sale-deed, they would be deemed to be in adverse possession, which, of course, had to be proved by the defendant-appellants. In this connection, it was also the plea of the plaintiff-respondents that since the vendee from Rameshwar Bhagat was a member of the joint family of the mortgagee, his purchase would be for the benefit of the family and, so no question of any adverse possession would be for the benefit of the family and, so, no question of any adverse possession would arise and the mortgagees would be continuing in possession of the suit house as mortgagees. But, however, I am of the opinion that this view advanced by the plaintiff-respondents was not correct. If one of the mortgagees or any of his co-sharer purchases any portion of the mortgaged property, that purchase shall be for the benefit of the purchaser or even if it is for the benefit of all his co-sharers, the vendee would become absolute owner there of and there is no bar to purchase of the mortgaged property by the mortgagees or any of their co-sharers. So, if the plaintiffs plea was that the concerned sale-deed was void, the vendee, in the instant case, the mortgagees would be in possession of the vended property by prescribing hostile title. At this stage, I must refer to the argument of the respondents lawyer that the purchaser shall become the co-owner along with the mortgagees and, so, there was no question of adverse possession. At this stage, I must refer to the argument of the respondents lawyer that the purchaser shall become the co-owner along with the mortgagees and, so, there was no question of adverse possession. In this connection, I am of the opinion that as per the pleading of the plaintiff-respondents themselves, and as per the law that sale by any co-sharer without separation shall become void, the vendee shall not become a co-sharer or co-owner. So, the question of adverse possession is very much relevant in the instant case and the vendee (mortgagees) can very well take the plea of adverse possession alternatively, if they failed to prove their valid title. Adverse possession was very much pleaded in the instant case, but, of course, by way of alternative pleading. An alternative pleading is not barred under the law. Now the question is whether of course, the plaintiff-respondents/ mortgagors had the knowledge of the sale in favour of one of the co-sharers of the mortgagees. In this connection, certain papers filed by the plaintiff-respondents themselves as also the same filed by the defendant-appellant would be relevant. Ext. 4 was an applica- tion filed for entering the name of vendee from Rameshwar Bhagat regarding half of the suit house. Ext. 5 was an application by Yadu Ram, one of the ancestor of vendee Kedar Nath. Then there are certain orders passed by the Municipal authorities (Ext. 8) filed by the defendant- appellants to show that the name of Kedar Nath was directed to be mutated in view of the sale- deed dated 13.3.46 executed by Rameshwar Bhagat. So, it is apparent that mortgagors or their purchasers-in-interest were aware of the application of the vendee of the sale deed from Rameshwar Bhagat when he was seeking mutation of his name in the Municipal records of the suit land to the extent of its half share. In such a circumstance, the plaintiff-respondents were aware of the fact that the vendee from Rameshwar Bhagat was claiming title and, so, the vendee who was admittedly the co-sharer of the mortgagees of the suit house will start prescribing adversely against the plaintiff-respondents right from the date of sale. In such a circumstance, of course, the mortgagees shall perfect their title by adverse possession over half of the suit house. In such a circumstance, of course, the mortgagees shall perfect their title by adverse possession over half of the suit house. That is why perhaps the plaintiff-respondents in their plaint averred that if they were found to be not entitled to redeem whole of the mortgaged property, they sought redemption of only the other half. So they were aware of the adverse prescription of title by mortgagee-defendant-appellant. The finding of the two lower courts in this connection is, therefore apparently and legally erroneous. Hence, this Court can very well interfere with the finding in this behalf. So, I am of the opinion that half of the suit house cannot be redeemed by the plaintiff-respondents. 6. Now, I shall refer to the plea raised by the plaintiff-respondents and the defendant-appellant regarding Section 11 of the Money Lenders Act and Section 77 of the T. P. Act. In this connection, Section 76 and 77 both are relevant. Section 76 refers to liabilities of a mortgagee of usufructury mortgage. His liability has been listed from sub clause (a) to sub clause (I) of the aforesaid section. Clause (b) of Section 76 of T.P.Act refers to the liability of the mortgagee to collect rent and profits of the mortgage-property, Clause(d) has laid down that "he must, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, make such necessary repairs of the property as he can pay for out of the rents and profits thereof after deducting from such rents and profits the payments made in clause C and the interest on the principal money. Clause (g) has enjoined upon the mortgagee to keep an account of all sums, of receipts, and expenditure made by him as mortgagee during the continuance of the mortgage and he also is required to give true copies of such accounts. Clause(h) has laid down that the receipts, i.e., the income from the mortgage property, after deducting the interest of the loan money and the expenditures made by mortgagee towards the management of the property, shall be adjusted towards the interest of the mortgage money and the surplus, if any, which will remain in the hands of the mortgagee shall be paid to the mortgagor. Section 77 of the aforesaid T. P. Act has laid down that nothing in Section 76 clauses B. D. G and H applies to the cases where there is a contract between the mortgagee and the mortgagor that the receipts from the mortgage-property shall, so long as the mortgagee is in possession of the property, be taken in lieu of interest in the principal money or in lieu of such interest and defined portion of the principal. So Section 77 is an exception to the liabilities of the mortgagee as mandated by Clauses B. D. G. H of Section 76. That means, that when there is a contract between the mortgagor and the mortgagee that the mortgagee shall appropriate the income from the mortgage property in lieu of interest or in lieu of interest and certain portion of the principal amount of loan, there shall be no application of Section 76. In the instant case, it was averred by the contesting appellant- defendants that the concerned mortgage deed contained a stipulation that the mortgagee shall enjoy the usufruct of the mortgage-property in lieu of interest. This averment of the defendant was not denied during the course of evidence by the plaintiff- respondents, nor it was submitted before me that there was no such term in the mortgage-deed and a usufructury mortgage, where the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee, normally contains a recital that the mortgagee shall enjoy the usufruct of the property in lieu of interest. So, in view of such a contract and in view of Section 77 of the T. P. Act, the defendant-appellant (mortgagees) were not liable to render any account to the plaintiff-respondents regarding the income derived from the suit property. Now, I shall refer to provisions under the Money Lenders Act to see whether the provisions of this Act had an overiding effect over section 77 of the T.P.Act. In this connection, definition of Money Lender as laid down under Section 2K is to be referred to. Section 2K has defined the word money lender and the definition does not necessarily refer to a professional money lender. Under the definition even a casual money lender shall be covered. In this connection, definition of Money Lender as laid down under Section 2K is to be referred to. Section 2K has defined the word money lender and the definition does not necessarily refer to a professional money lender. Under the definition even a casual money lender shall be covered. But for certain sections of the Money Lenders Act, 1974, or for that matter Money Lenders Act, 1938 or 1939 a registered money lender shall be referred to by Section 2K, and for certain other sections money-lender as defined under the aforesaid Act shall refer to even a casual money lender. In this connection, I am to refer to Section 8 of the aforesaid Act which has laid down that only a registered money lender can maintain a suit for realisation of loan money from a debtor. Section 12 of the Money Lenders Act has laid down that if an agricultural land is subject of any usufructury mortgage and the mortgagee comes in possession, the mortgage shall stand redeemed on the expiry of seven years and the mortgagor shall be entitled to recovery of possession of the mortgaged property. This section has also no reference to a registered money lender. That means, even a casual money lender or creditor can claim redemption of an agricultural land from the mortgagee. So far Section 11 is concerned, all that it has laid down is that the mortgagee shall not be entitled to realise from the mortgagor an amount, double of the amount of the principal loan advanced by him including even the interest. This provision of the Money Lenders Act has been taken advantage of by the respondents lawyer to submit that since the defendant-appellants were receiving an income from the mortgaged property more than the amount which they would be entitled to recover within the meaning of Section 11 of the Money Lenders Act, they were bound to render accounts of the receipts and the expenditures from and over the suit property. I am, however, of the opinion that Section 77 of the T. P. Act and Section 11 of the Money Lenders Act are not at all repugnant to each other. They are independently applicable in their spirit and tenor to the facs of each case. Section 11 of the Money Lenders Act has restricted the amount of loan and interest to be claimed by the mortgagee in lieu of redemption. They are independently applicable in their spirit and tenor to the facs of each case. Section 11 of the Money Lenders Act has restricted the amount of loan and interest to be claimed by the mortgagee in lieu of redemption. Section 77 of the T. P, Act has mandated that the mortgagee shall not be liable to render accounts of receipts and expenditures, if there was a contract that he will enjoy the usufruct of the mortgage property in lieu of interest. So, I fail to understand where there is repugnancy between the aforesaid two provisions of the aforesaid Acts. In the instant case, the defendant-appellants were under the contract entitled to enjoy the usufruct of the mortgage property. So, they would be entitled to receive at least the principal amount of the mortgage and only then the mortgagor shall be entitled to seek redemption of the mortgage property. The defendant-appellants were not claiming any particular amount including the interest of the mortgage-money before granting redemption in favour of the mortgagor. So, there was no question of mortgagee (appellant) rendering any account for the receipts of the mortgage property. 7. I have already held above that the plaintiff-respondents were aware of the sale by one of their co-sharers Rameshwar Bhagat who was one of the mortgagors and who was the father of proforma defendant no.16 and there was a mutation case before the Municipal authorities which was evidenced by the exhibits already referred to above. So, purchase of the 8 anas share (half) of the mortgaged property by one of the co-sharers of the original mortgagee Jadu who had taken the mortgage as karta of the family consisting of himself and Raghunandan Bhagat, deceased defendant no.1 and Munsi Bhagat and others would give an advantage to the mortgagees and if they had remained in possession of the half of the mortgaged property to the knowledge of the plaintiff- respondents which will amount to adverse prescription of title would bring a situation in which the plaintiff-respondents would not be entitled to recover possession of this portion of the mortgaged property. I have already held above that defendant-appellants had perfected their title by adverse possession over half of the mortgaged property. I have already held above that defendant-appellants had perfected their title by adverse possession over half of the mortgaged property. Of course, the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to redeem half of the mortgaged property on payment of the principal mortgage-money minus the rents which they have paid and as per their pleading which I have already stated above. However, the two lower courts had decreed the plaintiff-respondents suit in its entirety and directed that the defendant-appellants shall render accounts of the receipts from the mortgaged- property. This decree was not proper. 8. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed. The plaintiff-respondents shall be entitled to redeem half of the mortgaged-property on payment of the principal mortgaged-money minus Rs. 466/- (rounded off) as rents paid by the plaintiff-respondents as per their pleading. The plaintiff-respondents shall also be entitled to seek partition of the half of the mortgaged property from the defendant- appellants. Preliminary decree shall be prepared accordingly. No order as to cost of this appeal.