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2001 DIGILAW 978 (PNJ)

Sukh Ram v. Sarasvati Devi

2001-09-05

R.L.ANAND

body2001
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J. - This is defendants appeal and has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.11.1998 passed by Addl. District Judge, Sirsa, who affirmed the judgment and decree dated 11.10.1995 passed by Senior Sub Judge, Sirsa, who decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration as prayed for. 2. The brief facts of the case are that plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that the sale deeds dated 15.3.1983 and 17.3.1983 are illegal, null and void and have no binding effect on the rights of the plaintiffs. The case set up by the plaintiffs in the trial court was that the land measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas comprised in khasra No. 233/5/1 situated in village Ellenabad was initially owned by Kishan Lal, Rameshwar Dass and Jai Narain and predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants No. 4 to 8. There was a litigation between he aforesaid persons which was the subject matter of civil suit No. 118 of 1970. In that suit the parties arrived at a compromise and vide judgment and decree dated 2.4.1970 the plaintiffs were declared owners in possession of the suit land while Rameshwar Dass and Kishan comprised in khasra No. 233/4/2 located in village Ellenabad. The grouse of the plaintiffs is that in spite of the fact that Kishan Lal was not the owner of the land in dispute, still he sold the property to Prem Parkash, who further sold the property to Sukh Ram. It was also the case of the plaintiffs that no body could pass a better title than that to his vendee. Since Kishan Lal ceased to be the owner of the land in question since 1970, therefore, he could not pass a better title to his vednee who in-turn could not pass a better title to his vendee Sukh Ram. 3. Notice of the suit was given to the defendants. According to the defendants, the land was owned by Kishan Lal, who rightfully sold the same to Pram Parkash and the defendants have purchased this land from Preme Parkash for a valid consideration. 4. From the above pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues :- "1. Whether the sale deeds dated 15.3.83 and 17.3.83 are illegal, void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs as alleged ? OPP 2. 4. From the above pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues :- "1. Whether the sale deeds dated 15.3.83 and 17.3.83 are illegal, void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs as alleged ? OPP 2. Whether plaintiffs and proforma defendants No. 4 to 8 are owners in possession of the suit land as alleged ? OPP 3. Relief." 5. The parties were given chance to lead evidence and on the conclusion of proceedings all the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and vide judgment and decree dated 11.10.1995 the trial court decreed the suit. 6. Not satisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant filed first appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Sirsa, who dismissed the same for the following reasons as contained in para No. 12 of the impugned judgment :- "12. The plea of the plaintiffs/respondents and proforma respondents No. 20 to 24 qua their acquisition of title in the manner indicated in the plaint is supported by adequate documentary material on the file. Before proceeding to refer to it, may be pointed out that the defendant/appellant nowhere specifically denied the factum of impugned compromise, details whereof were indicated in paras No. 1 to 2 of the plaint. The corresponding paras of written statement do not specifically dent the factum and validity of the compromise deed dated 2.4.70. As correctly observed by the learned trial Judge in the course of impugned judgment, a decree would continue to be binding till it is set aside by a competent (sic) conceded case of the parties that the civil court decree dated 2.4.70 had not been set aside by any court till date. Ex. P2 is a copy of the compromise deed which Jai Narain predecessor-in- interest of the plaintiff/respondents and proforma respondents, his son Brahma Nand and Kishan Lal plaintiff/respondent No. 19 has executed. Ex. P5 is the certified copy of the statements which the above indicated three had made in the civil court in the presence of their learned counsel. A perusal thereof would indicate that the land comprised in 233/5/1 fell to the share of Jai Narain; while the land comprised in 233/4/2 fell to the share of the other party to that suit i.e. Kishan Lal (respondent No. 19). Ex. A perusal thereof would indicate that the land comprised in 233/5/1 fell to the share of Jai Narain; while the land comprised in 233/4/2 fell to the share of the other party to that suit i.e. Kishan Lal (respondent No. 19). Ex. P7 is the judgment of the civil court in that suit." Still not satisfied with the judgments and decrees of the courts below, the present regular second appeal. 7-8. I have heard Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Advocate for the appellant, Mr. Ajay Jain, Advocate for the respondents and with their assistance have gone through the records of the case. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued at the first instance that the defendants are the bona fide purchasers for consideration and in the revenue record the name of Kishan Lal figured, therefore, they are protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted for the simple reason that there is no such plea taken up by the defendants in the written statement. There is also no issue to this affect. In these circumstances, I hold that the argument of Mr. Sanjiv Gupta stands in the air and not in the law court. 10. Now it is to be examined whether Kishan Lal, the original vendor, had a valid title so as to pass the same to his vendee or not. As stated earlier, there was a litigation, which was the subject matter of civil suit No. 118 of 1970, which was disposed of on 2.4.1970. During the course of submissions the parties have shown me compromise-deed Ex. P2. A reading of the same would show that this compromise was arrived at between the parties and their statements were also recorded by the court on 2.4.1970. As per the said compromise the land comprised in khasra No. 233/4/2, measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas became exclusive ownership of Kishan Lal and Rameshwar Dass. Similarly, the land measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas comprised in khasra No. 233/5/1 became the ownership of Jai Narain, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants No. 4 to 8. It also shows that both the parties became exclusive owners of their respective khasra numbers allotted as per the compromise. Similarly, the land measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas comprised in khasra No. 233/5/1 became the ownership of Jai Narain, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants No. 4 to 8. It also shows that both the parties became exclusive owners of their respective khasra numbers allotted as per the compromise. In this situation, Kishan Lal was never the owner of khasra No. 233/5/1 and he could not pass a better title to Prem Parkash who in turn also could not pass a better title to Sukh Ram. 11. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit which was disposed of on 2.4.1970 was a suit for permanent injunction. There was no adjudication with regard to the title. I am not in a position to subscribe to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is true that the suit titled Rameshwar Dass v. Jai Narain etc. was for permanent injunction that the plaintiff should not be disturbed from the land measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas comprised in khasra No. 233/4/2 as per the jamabandi for the year 1962-63. There was no difficulty on the part of the parties to come to a compromise vide which this khasra number was given to Kishan Lal and Rameshwar Dass, who surrendered their right, title and interest from khasra No. 233/5/1. In fact, the defendant/appellant wants to take the benefit of the revenue entries which had not been changed by the time when the sale deeds were executed. We all know that the revenue entries do not confer a title and are only a piece of evidence. Once it is established that on 2.4.1970 the parties had become owners of their respective parcels of the land, they could not interfere or alienate that portion of the land which never fell to their shares. In these circumstances, I do not what to differ with the findings of the courts below. Resultantly, this appeal is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.