Judgment G. S. SINGHVI, J. 1. This appeal is directed against order dated january 14, 1992 vide which the learned single judge allowed C. W. P. No.10446 of 1990 filed by respondent No.1 and quashed award dated march 27, 1990 passed by Labour Court, bhatinda. 2. Although none has appeared on behalf of the appellant, after hearing learned counsel for respondent no.1 and perusing the record, we are convinced that the impugned order deserves to be set side with a direction that the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 may be decided afresh. 3. A perusal of the record shows that the appellant was appointed as Office Clerk on october 9, 1984 in the employment of modern Rice Mill, Bagha Purana (for short the Mill) which is an undertaking of respondent No.1. He continuously worked in the Mill till March, 1987 when his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act ). The appellant challenged the termination of his service by raising an industrial dispute. During the course of conciliation proceedings, the parties entered into a settlement. The terms of settlement were reduced in writing on March 17, 1988 and were duly signed by the workman-appellant and the representative of the Mill. The appellant was taken back in service w. e. f. October 3, 1998 However, his services were again terminated on April 8, 1989 without any notice or compensation. He challenged the same by raising an industrial dispute which was referred by the Government of punjab to Labour Court, Bhatinda under section 10 (l) (c) of the Act. 4. In his statement of claim, the appellant made the following averments. "1. That I was appointed as Office Clerk by respondent w. e. f. October 9, 1984 and posted in the office of respondent No.3. 2. That I remained in service till March 1987 when my services were terminated illegally, unjustly, unlawfully against the principles of natural justice and in contravention of Sec.25-F of Industrial disputes Act. 3. That I challenged my illegal termination by way of filing demand notice dated january 22, 1987 under Sec.2-A of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the respondents with the information of labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Moga (copy of demand notice dated December 22, 1987 is attached herewith ). 4. 3. That I challenged my illegal termination by way of filing demand notice dated january 22, 1987 under Sec.2-A of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the respondents with the information of labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Moga (copy of demand notice dated December 22, 1987 is attached herewith ). 4. That in pursuance of this demand notice under Sec.2-A of Industrial Disputes Act dated December 22, 1987 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before labour and Conciliation Officer, Moga a settlement under Sec.12 (3) of Industrial disputes Act was effected between me and the respondents in the presence of Labour and Conciliation Officer, Moga on March 7, 1988 wherein it was settled that my services will be reinstated but no wages will be paid for the period during which I remained out of job copy of settlement dated March 7, 1988 is attached herewith. 5. That as per terms and conditions of settlement dated March 7, 1988, I joined my duties as Office Clerk on October 3, 1988 and did my duties very honestly, diligently, efficiently and to the entire satisfaction of the respondent. 6. That during this period after joining on october 3, 1988, I performed all the duties which were asked by respondents like issuing paddy gate pass inward for the month of October, 1988 to April, 1989. Rice gate pass outward for the said period and other works apparently show that I did my duties as required by the respondents. 7. That on April 8, 1989 services were again terminated without any notice, enquiry, charge sheet and compensation without following the principles of natural justice and in contravention of Sec.25-F of industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8. That I have unimpeachable, unblemished and meritorious service of more than 41/2 years to my credit. My work and conduct during the service was quite satisfactory (certificate dated August 28, 1983 to this effect is attached herewith ). 9. That my termination is punitive in nature and has been done without affording me a reasonable opportunity to defend and in violation of principles of natural justice. 10. That my termination is illegal too as my junior Sh. Lakhbir Singh has been retained in service. Hence, the termination of mine is purely an unfair labour practice on the part of respondents and in violation of sections 25-G and 25-H of Industrial disputes Act, 1947. 11. 10. That my termination is illegal too as my junior Sh. Lakhbir Singh has been retained in service. Hence, the termination of mine is purely an unfair labour practice on the part of respondents and in violation of sections 25-G and 25-H of Industrial disputes Act, 1947. 11. That I have put more than 240 days continuous, uninterrupted service with the respondents as required under Sec.25-B of Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, I am entitled to be retained in service and my termination is in violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of Industrial disputes Act, 1947. " 5. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No.1, an objection was raised to the maintainability of the reference on the ground that relationship of master and servant had never existed between the parties. On merits, the following averments were made: "1. That para No.1 of the claim is incorrect. It is further submitted that the workman may work through labour contractor. 2. That the para No.2 of the claim is wrong hence denied. 3. That para No.3 of the claim is admitted as correct. 4. That the para No.4 of the claim is incorrect as desired. It is further submitted that the workman has concealed true facts before Honble Court. The compromise was made in the office of the Labour conciliation Officer, Moga. That workman was kept in service through only labour contractor and during the mills season, as he was working earlier. 5. That the para No.5 of the claim is incorrect as denied. 6. That the para No.6 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 7. That the para No.7 of the claim is wrong hence denied. It is further submitted that the workman dispensing with his service like other casual workers through labour contractor when the season of the mill was off. 8. That the para No.8 of the claim is incorrect and denied. It is further submitted that the manager of the said mill has power to issue the said experience certificate dated August 28, 1985. So the experience certificate is not issued by the markfed. 9. That the para No.9 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 10. That the para No.10 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 11. That the para No.11 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 12. So the experience certificate is not issued by the markfed. 9. That the para No.9 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 10. That the para No.10 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 11. That the para No.11 of the claim is incorrect and denied. 12. That the para No.12 of the claim is incorrect and denied. " 6. The appellant appeared in the witness box to support the averments made in the statement of claim and Sh. Ravinder Singh, manager of the Mill appeared to support the averments contained in the written statement. Their depositions (Annexures P.3 and P.4) are extracted below: "statement of workman-Ramesh Kumar: i was appointed as Office Clerk on october 9, 1984 in Markefed Modern rice Mills, Bagha Purana. I was removed from service by the Administration in march 3, 1987. On December 22, 1987. I filed a case with LCO Moga and on July 1988 both the parties entered into settlement copy of which is attached. In accordance with the settlement, I joined service on October 3, 1988. Again on april 2, 1988 I was removed from the service. Before removing me from service, no notice was issued to me and no enquiry was held. No compensation was given. Service certificate was also not issued to me by the Manager Rice Mills. After removal from service, I did not get any job. When the respondent removed me from service, I was getting a pay of Rs.950.00 per month. Before serving with the respondent, I never worked in Markfed. I have no appointment letter. I did not receive the termination orders. I met M. D. and told him verbally that I have not been paid my pay. In this connection, I wrote a letter copy of which is attached. This is wrong that signatures are forged. It is wrong that respondent never employed me. " Statement of Sh. Ravinder Singh, Manager, markfed Rice Mills, Bagha Purana: "our mill is seasonal, it functions for 5-6 months in a year. After this, the Mill is closed down. We employ casual labour through the contractor. M.1. is a copy of terms/conditions. The worker was never appointed in our mill. The manager has no power to appoint a Clerk. Our all the appointments including Clerks are made from H. O. , Chandigarh. The Manager of the Mill has no power to issue experience certificate. We employ casual labour through the contractor. M.1. is a copy of terms/conditions. The worker was never appointed in our mill. The manager has no power to appoint a Clerk. Our all the appointments including Clerks are made from H. O. , Chandigarh. The Manager of the Mill has no power to issue experience certificate. The worker was not working as Clerk. It is wrong that the worker has worked with us from October 9, 1984 to April 8, 1989. The worker has never worked with us. We had a settlement with the worker before l. C. O. Moga which is binding. Copy duly attested by S. D. M. Moga is attached. Attendance register has not been brought. " After considering the rival pleadings and evidence, the Labour Court recorded the following findings: (i) Relationship of employer and employee existed between the parties and, therefore, reference is maintainable. (ii) The workman had completed one years service as defined in Sec.25-B of the Act and his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F and as such, the action of the employer was liable to be declared as void. (iii) The workman had remained unemployed after the termination of his service and, therefore, he was entitled to full back wages. " 7. On the basis of above mentioned findings, the Labour Court passed award dated march 27, 1990 for reinstatement of the appellant with continuity of service and full back wages. 8. Respondent No.1 challenged the award of the Labour Court in C. W. P. No.10446 of 1990, which was allowed by the Learned single Judge with the following observations: "the claim made on behalf of the respondent has not been controverted by filing any written statement. Even otherwise, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner has worked continuously for a period of 240 days immediately prior to the termination of his services in April, 1989. In this situation, the finding of the learned Labour Court that the workman had completed one year of service as required under Sec.25-B of the industrial Disputes Act or that his services could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the act cannot be sustained. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. " 9. Sh. In this situation, the finding of the learned Labour Court that the workman had completed one year of service as required under Sec.25-B of the industrial Disputes Act or that his services could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the act cannot be sustained. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. " 9. Sh. Amar Vivek, counsel for respondent No.1 candidly conceded that the order under challenge does not contain a finding that the award passed by the Labour court is vitiated due to any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record and that it does not satisfy the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari. He, however, tried to support the conclusion recorded by the learned single Judge by arguing that activities of the Mill are seasonal in nature and, therefore, it was not necessary to comply with the provisions of the Act before discontinuing the engagement of the appellant. Learned counsel also referred to the statement made by the workman to show that his employment was seasonal in character. He then submitted that settlement dated March 17, 1988 (Annexure p.7) cannot be read as entitling the appellant to claim the benefit of continuity of service. 10. We have given serious thought to the submissions of the learned counsel. 11. In Sayed Yakoob V/s. K. S. Radhakrishan, AIR 1964 SC 477, a constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court and laid down the following propositions: "a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. " 12. If the correctness of the order of the :arned single Judge is examined in the light of the above noted propositions, we do not find any difficulty in holding that the learned single Judge has committed a serious error by upsetting the award of the Labour Court simply because the respondent (appellant herein) had not controverted the averments made in the writ petition by filing a written statement. In our opinion, the learned single judge could not have quashed the award without recording a finding that the same was vitiated by an error of law apparent on, the face of the record. 13. We are further of the view that the learned single Judge has erred in holding that the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of applicability of Sec.25-F is incorrect because while doing so, he did not refer to the pleadings and evidence of the appellant and respondent No.1 and the fact that previous termination of the services of the appellant had resulted in settlement in which the employer had agreed to continue the service of the workman. 14. Hence, the appeal is allowed. 14. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside and the case is remanded with a direction that the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 be heard and decided afresh. Liberty is also given to the appellant to file written statement within 4 months. 15. While disposing of the appeal, we take notice of the statement made by Sh. Amar vivek that if the appellant offers himself for employment, he will be engaged in the coming season.