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2001 DIGILAW 988 (PNJ)

J. S. Sodhi v. Mela Ram

2001-09-06

R.L.ANAND

body2001
Judgment R.L.Anand, J. 1. This is a tenants revision and it has been filed by Dr. J.S. Sodhi son of Inder Singh, against the judgment dated 23.3.2001 passed by the appellate authority, Chandigarh, which affirmed the order dated 29.8.2000, passed by the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh who ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the demised premises on the ground of bona fide need. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Mela Ram respondent-landlord filed the petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as applicable to Chandigarh for the eviction of the petitioner-tenant Dr. J.S. Sodhi from S.C.O. No. 809, Sector 22-A (Ground Floor), Chandigarh and the case set up by the landlord is that he is the landlord and owner of SCO Nos. 809- 810 situated in Sector 22-A, Chandigarh. The petitioner-tenant took the ground floor of SCO No. 809 on monthly rent of Rs. 5500/- in addition to water and electricity charges, for general trade. There was another tenant on the ground floor of SCO No. 810. The landlord specifically alleged that SCO Nos. 809-810 are joint. Further it has been alleged by the respondent-landlord that he earlier filed ejectment application on the ground of non-payment of rent, sub-letting, change of user and materially impairment of the value and utility of the building and the same was allowed on 22.5.1996 on the ground of materially impairment of the value and utility. The tenant filed an appeal against the said order. Further the case set up by the landlord was that earlier the ground of personal necessity of non-residential building was not available to him and as such this ground he could not take in the earlier ejectment petition. Now there is a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court on the basis of which non-residential building can be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity. Hence the present petition. Note : Perhaps the landlord wants to avail the benefit of the famous judgment of Harbilass case, 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 672 (SC). 3. To continue with the pleadings of the landlord it is averred by him that he requires the demised premises for him and for the requirement of his son. He wants complete ground floors of SCO No. 809-810 for personal use and occupation. 3. To continue with the pleadings of the landlord it is averred by him that he requires the demised premises for him and for the requirement of his son. He wants complete ground floors of SCO No. 809-810 for personal use and occupation. He would also file the ejectment application against the other tenant who is in occupation of the ground floor of SCO No. 810, which is adjacent to the demised premises. Highlighting his need the landlord- respondent alleged that at present he is carrying on his business in a small Booth No. 32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh, along with another Booth No. 31, which is owned by his wife. Both the Booths are very small and these are not serving the well established business of the petitioner. It is alleged that respondent-landlords daughter-in-law also owned a small garage No. 2, Sector 22-D, and garage No. 5 which is on rent with the landlord at a monthly rent of Rs. 350/-. That accommodation is being used as a small godown. The entire accommodation does not serve the purpose of the landlord who is well established businessman and as per his status and flourishing business, he requires a complete ground floor of the demised premises including the portion in occupation of another tenant on the ground floor i.e. SCO No. 810. It was further averred that at present the son of the landlord is doing the business along with him. The landlord wants to settle his son independently for the purpose of his business. After getting the premises vacated he would sit himself on the demised premises and his son will look after the business already being run in Booth No. 31 and 32, which are too small in which even 4/5 customers cannot stand at one point of time. Sufficient accommodation is available only in SCO No. 809-810 which includes the demised premises. It is further alleged by the landlord that he does not own or occupy any other non- residential premises within the urban area of Chandigarh except Booth No. 32 and Garage No. 2 which is owned by his daughter-in-law and booth No. 31 which is the property of his wife. The entire accommodation is insufficient for his needs. Therefore, he wants that tenant should be evicted from the demised premises. 4. The entire accommodation is insufficient for his needs. Therefore, he wants that tenant should be evicted from the demised premises. 4. Notice of the petition was given to the tenant who filed the reply and denied the allegations. The tenant admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant. However, he pleaded that ground of personal necessity is not available to the landlord as the premises in question is a commercial building. The premises were taken on rent for general trade and the business is being run from the very first day of the tenancy. It was also pleaded by the tenant that number of time the portions of the building in question fell vacant and the same were let out by the landlord and this would show that no ground for personal necessity was ever availed of. The tenant denied the other averments of the landlord and prayed for the dismissal of the ejectment application. 5. From the above pleadings of the parties the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the petitioner requires the premises for his personal use and occupation as alleged in the petition ? OPP 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in view of the preliminary objection taken by the respondent ? OPR 3. Relief. 6. The parties were given the chance to lead the evidence and on the conclusion of the proceedings, the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 29.8.2000 passed the order of ejectment against the tenant directing him to hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises within a period of two months for the reasons given in paras No. 8 to 15 of the said order, which are reproduced as follows :- "8. The onus to prove this issue rested on the petitioner. Mela Ram petitioner himself stepped into the witness box and deposed that he is the owner of SCO No. 809-810, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh. He gave the demised premises on rent to the respondent @ Rs. 5500/- PM in addition to water and electricity charges for general trade. There is another tenant in the same premises doing the business of bakery. The demised premises is required by him for his personal necessity. He want to shift his business from Booth No. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh to SCO. Nos. 5500/- PM in addition to water and electricity charges for general trade. There is another tenant in the same premises doing the business of bakery. The demised premises is required by him for his personal necessity. He want to shift his business from Booth No. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh to SCO. Nos. 809-810, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh as the accommodation available in those booths is insufficient for carrying his business and moreover, he want to settle his son independently in SCO. Nos. 809-810. He has also a godown at the back side of Booth Nos. 31 and 32, which is only for the purpose of keeping the goods and articles. He requires the premises in question as the booths are not serving his well established business and moreover, he want to settle his son independently. 9. To rebut the evidence led by the petitioner, the respondent Dr. J.S. Sodhi, himself stepped into the witness box as RW-1 has testified that the petitioner is having toys shop in Sector 22. He is having double booth. The market where the petitioner is having business establishment in his own premises is fully developed and having good number of shops of jewellers and other shops of general mercantile. The petitioner does not require the premises in question for his personal use and occupation. He has never occupied any portion which fell vacant in the demised premises rather instead of occupying the portion, he left (let ?) out the same number of times to number of tenants. The premises which are in his occupation are much more sufficient than his requirement. The respondent has also examined Dr. Sodhi as RW2, who has also corroborated the statement of the respondent and has stestified that the accommodation available with the petitioner in all the four shops in Sector 22-C, Chandigarh is much more sufficient for his requirement of selling toys. The sole motive of the petitioner is to enhance the rate of rent. Had there been any personal necessity of the petitioner, he would have occupied the portions, which are lying vacant on the ground floor as well as on the second floor of the premises in question for the last 1-1/2 years but he is negotiating to re-let the same on exorbitant rent. The petitioner does not require the premises at all for personal use and occupation. 10. The ld. The petitioner does not require the premises at all for personal use and occupation. 10. The ld. counsel for the respondent argued that since the premises in question i.e. SCO No. 809, Sector 22-A (ground floor), Chandigarh is a non- residential building, therefore, the petitioner-landlord cannot seek the eviction of the respondent from the demised premises. On the other hand, the id. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and another, 1995(2) RCR 672, wherein, it has been held that a landlord can seek ejectment of tenant from non-residential building on ground that he requires the same for his own use. Amendment made in Section 13(3) by Amending Act, 29 of 1956 which deprived the landlords of their right to seek ejectment from non- residential premises struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and original provisions of Section 3(3) restored. The classification created by amendment has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the Honble Supreme Court has decided the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) on 5.12.1995 meaning thereby that on 25.5.1996, when ejectment petition was pending adjudication, the Honble Supreme Court has already pronounced the judgment in Harbilas Rais case and had there been any iota of truth, regarding personal necessity or bona fide need of the petitioner, he would have been the first person to file an application for amendment of the petition. The filing and continuation of the present petition is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC as well as provisions of constructive res judicata. Admittedly, the petitioner earlier filed eviction petition against the respondent on the grounds of non-payment of rent, sub-letting, change of user and materially impairing the value and utility of the building and the same was allowed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh on 25.5.1996 on the ground of materially impairing the value and utility of the premises. The present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner on 7.9.96 only on the ground that the demised premises are required by the petitioner for his personal requirement. The present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner on 7.9.96 only on the ground that the demised premises are required by the petitioner for his personal requirement. Hence, non-filing of an application for amendment of the earlier petition and filing of fresh petition for eviction on entire different ground, in my considered view is no bar nor the provision of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC nor constructive res judicata are attracted. Landlord has the right to file a separate petition on different grounds more particularly, when the ground of personal necessity was not available to the petitioner at the time of filing the earlier petition. 11. The learned counsel fore the respondent further pointed out that as per Law of the land all the three statutory ingredients are required to be pleaded and proved i.e. that the landlord requires the premises for his own occupation (ii) that he does not occupy any other building in the concerned urban area (iii) he has not vacated any such building or portion of the building without sufficient cause after the enforcement of the Rent Act i.e. year 1971. These three statutory ingredients have not only to be pleaded and proved with consistent, cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence. In the instant case, there is no iota of averments in respect of three ingredients and the landlord has deliberately not pleaded the same because in that eventuality, he will be stating lie on oath, as it has come in his cross-examination, that number of portions fell vacant after the enforcement of Rent Act and were available to the landlord and thereafter, the landlord had relet the same. Even the premises which have been let out to the respondent were also available to the petitioner and he opted to let out the same in the year 1980. 12. On the other hand, the stand taken by the ld. counsel for the petitioner is that the demised premises are required by the petitioner for his own use and occupation. Admittedly, the petitioner is running his business in Booth Nos. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh. He requires the SCO No. 809 (demised premises) and SCO No. 810 for expanding his flourishing business as premises in his occupation are insufficient and inconvenient and he wants to shift his business to SCO 809-810 which are much more spacious as compared to booths. Admittedly, the petitioner is running his business in Booth Nos. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh. He requires the SCO No. 809 (demised premises) and SCO No. 810 for expanding his flourishing business as premises in his occupation are insufficient and inconvenient and he wants to shift his business to SCO 809-810 which are much more spacious as compared to booths. More particularly he wants to settle his son independently, who does not occupy or own any non-residential building of his own. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India V. Radha Krishana v. S.N. Loganatha Mudaliar, 1998(2) RCR 219, wherein, it has been held that a landlord running busines in his own building and wanted non-residential premises for business of his son, who did not occupy or own any non-residential building of his own, is entitled to evict the tenant. It has also been further observed by the Honble Court that the legislature intended that a landlord seeking eviction of the tenant could be disentitled from claiming possession of the non-residential premises, where he requires those premises for his own use, if he is occupying a non-residential building of his own. Similarly, the landlord would also be disentitled from claiming possession of non-residential premises for the benefit of a member of his family, if that member of the family was in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. Any other interpretation of this Section would not only be doing violence to the plain language of the Section but would result in absurdity inasmuch as the benefit of the provision would stand denied to the family members of the landlord, who do not occupy any premises of their own and for whose benefit eviction is sought, if the landlord himself is in occupation of a non-residential premises of his own. The fact that the landlord who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family is himself occupying a building of his own cannot operate as a bar to the landlord seeking eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. The fact that the landlord who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family is himself occupying a building of his own cannot operate as a bar to the landlord seeking eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. The respondent has failed to rebut and to prove the contrary that the premises in possession of the petitioner are sufficient to cater his needs and the son of the petitioner is occupying/owning any other non-residential building in the urban area concerned of his own. The respondent has also failed to bring on the record that after the ground of personal necessity for non-residential building came into existence with the pronouncment of the judgment in Harbilas Rais case (supra) that the petitioner has ever re-let the same. The third statutory ingredient required to be satisfied is that he had not vacated any such building or portion of the building without sufficient cause, after the commencement of the Rent Act. Since the eviction on the ground of personal necessity for non-residential building came into existence on 5.12.1995 with the pronouncement of the judgment in Harbilas Rais case, therefore, vacation of any such building or re-letting the same when the ground of eviction on the basis of personal necessity was not in existence, is a sufficient cause. Admitedly, the demised premises where let out to the respondent in the year 1980 and when the petitioner stepped into the witness box in the year 1999, he was aged 57 years meaning thereby that when the demised premises were let out to the respondent in the year 1980, the petitioner must be of the age of 38 years and his son must be of tender age at that time and this is in my considered opinon a valid and sufficient cause for letting out the premises in question to the respondent in the year 1980. 13. The ld. counsel for the respondent further submitted that as held by the Apex Court that the Rent Control legislation has been enacted with a motive to prevent tenants from unreasonable eviction. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Kannan and another v. Tamil Talir Kalvio Kazhagam, 1998(1) RCR(Rent) 496 (SC) : JT 1998 Vol. The ld. counsel for the respondent further submitted that as held by the Apex Court that the Rent Control legislation has been enacted with a motive to prevent tenants from unreasonable eviction. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Kannan and another v. Tamil Talir Kalvio Kazhagam, 1998(1) RCR(Rent) 496 (SC) : JT 1998 Vol. 4 SC page 212, wherein it has been held that when two or more interpretations are possible, the one which subserves to object would be accepted. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, the one which prevents a tenant from unreasonable eviction be accepted. With utmost respect, it is submitted that the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in `Kannans case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the above referred case, an application under Section 9(3) of Pondichery Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 was moved and rent deposited in 1982 before Rent Controller/whether constitutes a default as the Controller was not prescribed authority. It was held that deposit was made in 1982 when Controller was prescribed authority and it was by amendment in 1984 that Deputy Collector became prescribed authority. Hence, in the present case in hand there is no question of any interpretations is involved. 14. The ld. counsel for the respondent further advanced his argument that one of the pre-requisite of asking for additional accommodating is that the landlord has to place on the record site plan that he is asking for ejectment on the ground of insufficient accommodation. Reliance is placed on the judgment of our own Honble High Court in Mohal Lal Jain v. Mohal Lal and another, 1973 RCR(Rent) 380 (P&H) : 1973 PLR 350 wherein, it has been held that when no plan of the house in occupation of the landlord is put on the record to indicate as to whether the premises is the possession of landlord are not sufficient for requirement of his family, it is not possible to give any clear finding that the landlord requires the premises for his own personal use. But in the present case, respondent Dr. J.S. Sodhi and RW2 Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi examined by the respondent admitted that the area of the demised premises is approximately 1000 sq. feet. But in the present case, respondent Dr. J.S. Sodhi and RW2 Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi examined by the respondent admitted that the area of the demised premises is approximately 1000 sq. feet. The total area of all the four booths in possession of the petitioner must be approximately 500 sq. feet. This admission on the part of the respondent clearly shows that the petitioner is in occupation of insufficient accommodation his own personal use. Moreover, nothing has come on the record that the son of the petitioner is occupying/owning any other accommodation of his own and to whom the petitioner want to settle independently. The tenant can not dictate terms to the landlord, as to how and in what manner, the petitioner/landlord should adjust himself. The landlord is the best judge of his own needs. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. M/s Traders and Agencies, 1996(2) RCR(Rent) 233 (SC) : 1997(1) All India Rent Control Journal 395. 15. The words requirement and needs cannot be equated with each other. Word need is qualified with the words bonafide or genuine. Proceedings is an adjective. Required bonafide is mandatory pre-requisite. Requirement has sense of fact need which is outcome of sincere, honest, desire is contra to mere presence or pretext to evict a tenant, the requirement of landlord has to be both bonafide and reasonable, if any of these two elements are missing, no decree for possession can be passed in favour of the landlord. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court of India in M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan 1998(2) RCR 629. In the present case, the petitioner landlord is occupying four booth having approximately area of 500 sq. feet as admitted by the respondent. Out of four booths two booths are used as godowns and are located at nearby places and the area of demised premises is approximately 1000 square feet as admitted by the respondent. Hence, the requirement of the petitioner to do his business in spacious accommodation in comparison to the premises in his possession, which is insufficient and inconvenient being scattered in parts and more particularly, when the petitioner wants to settle his son independently, who does not occupy/own any non-residential building of his own, the requirement of the landlord/petitioner has to be held as bonafide requirement. There is an element of need. There is an element of need. The respondent has failed to produce on the record any documentary or independent corroborative evidence supporting his contention that the petitioner is seeking ejectment in order to get the rent enhanced to market rate or that want to sell it at higher rate after its vacation. The respondent has thus failed to prove any malafide on the part of the petitioner. In the absence of any malafide proved by the tenant- respondent, the requirement of the petitioner has to be held as bonafide, having an element of need. To vacate a premises for bonafide requirement of the landlord would not cause any hardship to tenant statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the landlord is precluded from the tenant for his life even when he bonafide required the premises for his personal use and occupation. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court of India in Harbilas Rai Bansals case (supra). Hence, in view of the aforestated reasons this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent." 7. Issue No. 2 was also decided in favour of the petitioner in view of the famous case of Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab reported as 1995(2) RCR 672 and finally the enjectment petition was allowed as stated above. 8. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, tenant, Dr. J.S. Sodhi, has filed an appeal under Section 15 of the said Act before the appellate authority, Chandigarh and the learned District Judge, Chandigarh exercising the power of the appellate authority, dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 23.3.2001 for the reasons given in para Nos. 7 to 11 of the said judgment, which are reproduced as under :- "7. The case of both the parties mainly revolves around issue No. 1 with regard to the personal necessity of the landlord-respondent. It is necessary at this stage to peep through the evidence led by both the parties. The file clearly spells out that Mela Ram himself stepped into the witness box and disclosed to the Court that he is owner of SCO No. 809/810, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh, and the premises in question was rented out at the rate of Rs. 5,500/- P.A. to the appellant on addition to water and electricity charges for general trade. The file clearly spells out that Mela Ram himself stepped into the witness box and disclosed to the Court that he is owner of SCO No. 809/810, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh, and the premises in question was rented out at the rate of Rs. 5,500/- P.A. to the appellant on addition to water and electricity charges for general trade. There is another tenant in the same premises running the business of bakery and the premises is required by him for his personal use since he wants to shift his business from booth No. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh to SCO No. 809-810, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh as the accommodation available in those booths is insufficient for carrying his business. He further deposed that he is to settle his son independently in the disputed premises and he has also one godown on the back side of booth No. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh which is only for the purposes of keeping the goods and articles, and since booths are not serving his well established business, therefore, he requires the premises in dispute. In order to rebut the evidence led by the landlord, the appellant examined himself as RW1 and disclosed to the Court that the landlord is having toy shop in Sector 22 and he has double booth in the market which is fully developed and there are number of shops of jewellers and other shops of general merchandise and the landlord does not require the premises for his personal use and occupation, nor he had occupied any portion which fell vacant in the demised premises. In fact he let out the portions of the demised building number of times to number of tenants. He further disclosed that the booths already occupied by the landlord are sufficient for his requirement. The respondent has also examined Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi as RW2 who has also corroborated the statement of the respondent and deposed in a similar fashion. 8. On the strength of this evidence, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the disputed premises is a non-residential building and as such the landlord cannot seek his eviction. The respondent has also examined Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi as RW2 who has also corroborated the statement of the respondent and deposed in a similar fashion. 8. On the strength of this evidence, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the disputed premises is a non-residential building and as such the landlord cannot seek his eviction. But this contention of the learned counsel is liable to be noticed only for the sake of rejection in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court on Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and another, 1995 RCR 672, wherein it has been held that the landlord can seek ejectment of a tenant from non-residential building on the ground of personal necessity or in other words, if he requires the same for his own use and occupation and the amendment which deprived the landlords of their right to seek ejectment from non-residential premises was struck down by the Apex Court. 9. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Honble Apex Court laid down the law on 5.12.1995 and in the earlier petition filed by the landlord, the ground of personal necessity or bona fide need was not raised by the landlord, nor he moved an application for amendment of that petition, therefore, on such like circumstances, the present petition is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and it also hits the provisions of constructive res judicata. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not liable to be accepted. It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner earlier filed an eviction petition against the respondent on the grounds of non-payment of rent, subletting, change of user and materially impairing the value and utility of the building which was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 25.5.1996, whereas the present eviction petition has been filed on 7.9.1996 only on the ground that the premises in question are required by the landlord for his personal requirement. Therefore, non-filing of an application for amendment of earlier petition and filing of fresh petition on a different ground is not barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, nor the present petition is covered under the principles of constructive res judicata. Therefore, non-filing of an application for amendment of earlier petition and filing of fresh petition on a different ground is not barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, nor the present petition is covered under the principles of constructive res judicata. The landlord was well within his right to file a separate petition on different grounds and he was supposed to knock the door of the Rent Controller only when the ground of personal necessity was available to him, or in other words when he felt the need of bona fide requirement. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that all the three necessary ingredients in the present petition are missing and the landlord has failed to prove that he requires the premises for his personal use and he does not occupy any other building in the concerned urban area, nor he has got vacated any such building or portion of the building without sufficient cause after the enforcement of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1971, and the landlord has not pleaded these ingredients in his petition, since he has failed to prove these ingredients through reliable and trustworthy evidence, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be rejected for the reasons to be recorded by me in this part of the order. As per the case of the landlord, the premises are required by him for his own use and occupation. It is admitted case of the parties that the landlord is running his business in booth No. 31-32, Sector 22-D, Chandigarh, and as per the case of the appellant, he requires the premises in question for expanding his business and for settling his son independently who does not occupy or own any residential building of his own. The learned counsel for the respondent rightly placed reliance on V. Radha Krishan v. S.N. Lognatha Mudaliar, 1998(2) RCR 219, wherein it has been laid down that a landlord running business in his own building and wanted non-residential premises for business of his son, who did not occupy or own any non-residential building of his own, is entitled to evict the tenant. It was further observed that the legislature intended that a landlord seeking eviction of the tenant could be disentitled from claiming possession of the non-residential premises where he requires those premises for his own use, if he is occupying a non-residential building of his own. Similarly, the landlord would also be disentitled from claiming possession of non-residential premises for the benefit of a member of his family if that member of the family was in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. I have gone through the law quoted above and find that the same is fully applicable to the facts of the case in hand. The landlord who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, if occupies a building of his own, even then, he can seek eviction for the benefit of his family. There is nothing on record which could spell out, nor any evidence has been led by the appellant which could show that the son of the landlord is occupying a building of his own. In other words, the appellant has miserably failed to prove that the premises in possession of the landlord are sufficient for expanding his business nor any evidence has been led by the landlord which could show that the son of the landlord is owning any other non-residential building in the urban area of Chandigarh of his own. The appellant tenant has again failed to lead any evidence which could show that the landlord has ever relet the same nor he has been able to prove that the landlord got vacated any such building or any portion of the building without any sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Act. It is settled law that eviction on the ground of personal necessity for non-residential building came into existence on 5.12.1995 after the decision of the Harbilas Rais case (supra). Therefore, the eviction of any such building or reletting the same when the ground of personal necessity was not in existence is sufficient cause. It is settled law that eviction on the ground of personal necessity for non-residential building came into existence on 5.12.1995 after the decision of the Harbilas Rais case (supra). Therefore, the eviction of any such building or reletting the same when the ground of personal necessity was not in existence is sufficient cause. It is admitted case of the parties that the premises in question were let out to the appellant in the year 1980 and when the landlord stepped into the witness box in the year 1999 he was aged about 58 years and the petitioner-landlord at the time of creation of tenancy would be aged about 38 years and at that time, the premises could not be required for his son who could not run the business at an early age and that is why the respondent had sufficient cause for letting out the premises in question to the appellant in the year 1980. Moreover, the landlord is the best judge of his requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should run his business or in what manner he is to settle his son. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property particularly for the settlement of his son independently. Keeping in view the booth occupied by the landlord in Sector 22-D, Chandigarh it is crystal clear that he requires the present premises for expanding his business for the benefit of his own and the premises available with him are insufficient and inadequate to his need. Nobody can dictate the landlord to run his business in a particular manner and at a particular place. Moreover, I would also like to observe that a businessman would not purchase a premises solely for the purpose of rent after making huge investment. He has to satisfy his needs and for the purpose of expansion of his business, he can certainly knock the door of the Court for the eviction of the appellant from the demised premises keeping in view his personal requirement. In such like circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant referred to Kannan and another v. Tamilk Talir Kalvio Kazhagam, J.T. 1998 Vol. 4 S.C. 212 which has also been cited by the learned Rent controller in para 13 of his judgment. In such like circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant referred to Kannan and another v. Tamilk Talir Kalvio Kazhagam, J.T. 1998 Vol. 4 S.C. 212 which has also been cited by the learned Rent controller in para 13 of his judgment. I have gone through the law quoted above and I find that the learned Rent Controller has rightly concluded that the same is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. In the referred case, an application under Section 9(3) of the Pondichery Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 was moved and the rent was deposited in 1982 before the Rent Controller and the point involved was whether the rent was deposited before the prescribed authority since there was some amendment in this regard in that State and in the instant case, the question of any interpretation or jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is not involved. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant further pointed out that the landlord through this petition seeking additional accommodation and in the absence of any site plan on the record it is not possible to conclude that the landlord is having insufficient accommodation. In order to lead support to his contention, he has referred to Mohan Lal Jain v. Mohal Lal and another, 1973 P.L.R. 350, wherein it was held that when no plan of the house in occupation of the landlord is put on the record to indicate as to whether the premises in possession of the landlord are not sufficient for the requirement of his family, it is not possible to give any clear finding that the landlord requires the premises for his own personal use. But the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not liable to be accepted keeping in view the statement of RW1 Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi and as well as of the tenant wherein they both have admitted that the area in occupation of the landlord out of the demised premises is approximately 1000 sq.ft. the relevant portion of the statement of RW1 runs as under :- "As on today the portions which are in occupation of the petitioner but are lying locked are approximately 1000 sq. ft................................ ................................................................... the relevant portion of the statement of RW1 runs as under :- "As on today the portions which are in occupation of the petitioner but are lying locked are approximately 1000 sq. ft................................ ................................................................... I approximately mentioned the area in my examination in chief, I cannot admit or deny the fact that the total area on the ground floor of SCO in question is measuring about 1000 sq. ft........................................ .............................................................................. I cannot tell the area presently occupied by the petitioner in Sector 22, Chandigarh.................................................................... ............................................................... It is correct that petitioner never let out any portion of SCO in question after the vacation of portion by Bakeman tenant and another tenant on the second floor of SCO in question. It is correct that both the portions vacated by the said tenants are in possession of the petitioner..........". The other witness Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi RW2 son of the appellant tenant admitted before the Court as under :- "............We are in possession of premises measuring 1000 sq. ft......". 11. The statement of the tenant and his son clearly spells out that they have admitted that they are in possession of an area measuring 1000 sq. ft. It is further proved on record that total area of all the four booths in possession of the petitioner must be approximately 500 sq. ft. and this fact clearly spells out that the landlord is in occupation of insufficient accommodation for his personal use. As already discussed above, there is nothing on the record which could spell out that son of the landlord is occupying any other building of his own and it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to in what manner he should adjust himself. The landlord is the best judge of his own needs. The learned counsel for the respondent rightly placed reliance on Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. M/s Traders and Agencies, 1997(1) All India Rent Control Journal 395. In the instant case, the landlord is occupying four booths having an area of approximately 500 sq. ft. and this fact is admitted by the appellant that out of the four booths, two booths are being used as godowns and are located at nearby places and the area of the demised premises is approximately 1000 sq. ft. therefore, the business can certainly be explained by the landlord in the bigger area. ft. and this fact is admitted by the appellant that out of the four booths, two booths are being used as godowns and are located at nearby places and the area of the demised premises is approximately 1000 sq. ft. therefore, the business can certainly be explained by the landlord in the bigger area. He will certainly have spacious accommodation in comparison to the premises in possession of the respondent which is again located at different places. Since he wants to settle his son independently who does not occupy any non-residential building of his own, the requirement of the landlord is certainly a bonafide requirement and the premises in question are really needed by him. Though the tenant has raised a plea that by filing the present petition, the landlord wants to increase the rent, but no evidence has been led in this regard by the tenant. I find that the tenant has failed to prove any mala fide on part of the landlord and in the absence of such evidence, I find that the learned Rent Controller rightly concluded that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide having an element of need. Keeping in view the law laid down in Harbilas Rais case (supra), the petition filed by the landlord for the ejectment of the tenant from the premises in question is maintainable and as such I affirm the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller under both the issues." 9. Still, not satisfied with the concurrent finding of fact given by the Rent Controller as well as well as the appellate authority, the present revision has been filed by the tenant. 10. I have heard Shri M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Arun Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant has assailed the finding of the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority on different grounds and his first argument was that both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had failed to take notice of the subsequent proved facts as required under the law and if those facts are taken into consideration it can be safely held that the need of the landlord was not bonafide rather it was male fide. The grouse of the learned Senior counsel Shri Sarin, was that the tenant filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. for the amendment of the written statement in which he has clearly averred that during the pendency of the present ejectment petition a number of portions have fallen vacant on the ground floor as well as on the second floor. The ground floor portion was in occupation of M/s Bakeman. The area of the said portion was more than 1000 sq. ft. Similarly, the area approximately 100 sq. ft. has also fallen vacant on the first floor. This accommodation has become available to the landlord after 13.9.1999 and by occupation of this accommodation, the need of the landlord can be fully met. Therefore, the present ejectment application may be dismissed after taking into notice the subsequent facts. Counsel Shri Sarin, further submitted that even the Rent Controller has not rightly appreciated the subsequent events. Rather the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC has been declined by the Rent Controller vide his order dated 20.10.1999 on irrelevant reasons by making a mention in the order that the averments of proposed amendment in the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. are vague in nature and do not disclose any subsequent events which according to Mr. Sarin is not a fact. The counsel submitted that if the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. is allowed the case deserves to be remanded to the Rent Controller who may be directed to give a fresh finding as to whether with the vacation of the ground floor and first floor of SCO No. 810, the need of the landlord can be said to be bonafide or not. 12. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the application has been rightly dismissed by the Rent Controller because this application was moved in order to delay the proceedings. Both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority had taken into consideration that the need of the landlord was bonafide when he wanted to start his business in the ground floors of SCO Nos. 809 and 810. The ground floor of SCO No. 810 is not sufficient for the genuine need of the landlord who also wants the possession of SCO. 809 for starting his business. The ground floor of SCO No. 809-810 are adjacent to each other. 809 and 810. The ground floor of SCO No. 810 is not sufficient for the genuine need of the landlord who also wants the possession of SCO. 809 for starting his business. The ground floor of SCO No. 809-810 are adjacent to each other. Rather both the properties form one unit. 13. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant is totally devoid of any merit. First of all, let us see what was the reply given by the landlord to this application. The landlord stated in the reply dated 20.10.1999, that the application has been moved just to delay the proceedings. After closing the evidence by the landlord the tenant took number of dates to examine himself and ultimately he appeared as his own witness on 5.10.1999. He admitted that tenant of the Bakeman had evicted the other half portion of the ground floor about two years back and similarly, a portion of the second floor was also evicted prior to the vacation of the portion by M/s Bakeman on the ground floor. For two years, the tenant was sitting silent over this matter. He did not raise any plea by making an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. and now at this fag end, he has come up with an application. The application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. was dismissed for the reasons given in para No. 4 of the order dated 20.10.1999. The reasons of dismissal of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. are incorporated as follows :- "4. The respondent was filed this application for amendment of the written statement and the perusal of the amendment sought shows that the respondent has only tried to improve the pleadings as already pleaded in para No. 7 of the written statement. Regarding subsequent events, the pleadings mentioned are vague in nature and do not disclose any specific subsequent event. The amendment application filed to fill lacunas, based on vague pleadings cannot be allowed. Furthermore, the application seems to have been filed to delay the proceedings. Hence finding no merit in the application, the same is ordered to be dismissed". 14. I have examined the order dated 20.10.1999 and in my opinion the order passed by the Rent Controller was totally justified. Furthermore, the application seems to have been filed to delay the proceedings. Hence finding no merit in the application, the same is ordered to be dismissed". 14. I have examined the order dated 20.10.1999 and in my opinion the order passed by the Rent Controller was totally justified. The reading of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. nowhere specifies that tenant M/s Bakeman had evicted the ground floor on a particular date. 15. On the contrary, the stand of the landlord right from the very date of the filing of the application, was that his need is vis-a-vis both the ground floors of SCO Nos. 809-810. Though he has filed an ejectment application vis-a-vis SCO No. 809 but he would file the application also vis-a-vis SCO No. 810. It appears that the business of M/s Bakeman could not flourish rather it went to losses. Therefore, M/s Bakeman handed over the possession of the ground floor to the landlord whose need could not be met by the vacation of a ground floor of SCO No. 810. Therefore, he continued with his ejectment application with regard to SCO No. 809. The purpose for which the rented premises was required by the landlord, was to start his business of general store. Such a business is difficult to be run on the first floor of the building, therefore, it is not a valid argument for Mr. Sarin to say that the need of the landlord has diminished or had ceased with the vacation of the first floor of SCO No. 810. Be that as it may, at this juncture, I must say that the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. was rightly declined by the learned Rent Controller and the first appellate authority took into consideration the effect of the vacation of the ground floor of SCO No. 810 while dismissing the appeal of the tenant. Resultantly, I repel the first argument raised by the learned counsel for the tenant. 16. It was then submitted on behalf of the tenant that the ejectment application is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the landlord- tenant has not completed the essential ingredient as required under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act before availing the ground of ejectment on account of personal necessity. According to Mr. 16. It was then submitted on behalf of the tenant that the ejectment application is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the landlord- tenant has not completed the essential ingredient as required under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act before availing the ground of ejectment on account of personal necessity. According to Mr. Sarin, it was obligatory on behalf of the landlord to plead and prove that he requires the demised premises for his own occupation; that he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area and that he had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act in the said urban area. The counsel draw my attention to the statement of Shri Mela Ram who appeared as PW-1 in order to make out his case. The submission raised by the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 17. First of all, let us see what was pleaded by the petitioner in para No. 6 sub-clause (a) and para No. 7 of the ejectment petition dated 7.9.1996. There is a clear recital in para No. 7 of the ejectment petition that petitioner does not own or occupy any other non-residential premises within the urban area of Chandigarh except Booth No. 32 and garage No. 2 which is owned by the daughter-in-law of the petitioner and booth No. 31 is the ownership of his wife and these premises are too small and do not serve the purpose of well established business of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner wants to settle his only son to do the business independently. Further the petitioner- landlord alleged in para No. 7 of the ejectment petition that he had not vacated any such premises after the commencement of the Act, is not the sufficient compliance as suggested by the learned counsel for the tenant. In my opinion, the allegations and averments of the rent application fully comply with the object of the law. 18. Now let us see what has been said by the landlord in his examination-in- chief. It is specifically stated by the landlord Shri Mela Ram that the premises are required by him for his personal necessity. He wants to shift his business from Booth No. 31, 32 to SCO Nos. 809-810 as the accommodation of those booths was insufficient for carrying on his business. It is specifically stated by the landlord Shri Mela Ram that the premises are required by him for his personal necessity. He wants to shift his business from Booth No. 31, 32 to SCO Nos. 809-810 as the accommodation of those booths was insufficient for carrying on his business. Moreover, he wanted to settle his son independently in SCO Nos. 809-810. He further clarified that he has a godown at the back side of booth No. 31 and 32 for the purpose of keeping the goods and articles. He still maintained that he required the premises in question as the booths were not serving his well established business and moreover, he wanted to settle his son independently. With this specific statement made on oath by the landlord, nothing further requires to be done. This is the opinion of this Court and it was so held in 1991(2) RCR(Rent) 117 (P&H) : 1991(2) Rent Control Reporter 163, Chander Mohan Mittal v. Behari Lal Gupta, in which it was held that landowner is not required to state in pleadings that he was not occupying any other house in urban area or that he had not vacated the same when these facts were clear from the ejectment application. Fortunately, for the landlord, in the present case, the pleadings are clear and specific and the statement of the landlord has corroborated the pleadings. In 2000(2) RCR 139 Shanti Mohan v. Krishna Devi, this Court held that in an application for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, the law Courts should not give too much stress on the pleadings of the parties which should be construed if those pleadings are coming from mofussil level. In the present case also, pleadings have been drafted by a lawyer of the headquarter of Chandigarh, therefore, a hyper-technical approach as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant cannot be taken. 19. The next submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner- tenant was that in this case it is not established on the record that need of the landlord was bonafide. Unfolding his submission Mr. Sarin submitted that mere ipse dixit or sweet will of the landlord cannot be termed as a bonafide requirement. In fact, the present accommodation with Shri Mela Ram landlord is enough to continue with his business of general merchant. Unfolding his submission Mr. Sarin submitted that mere ipse dixit or sweet will of the landlord cannot be termed as a bonafide requirement. In fact, the present accommodation with Shri Mela Ram landlord is enough to continue with his business of general merchant. The present ejectment application has been filed in a mala fide manner and that is evident from the fact that earlier the landlord never availed of the ground of bonafide necessity when he filed the first ejectment application. 20. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that bonafide question is a question of fact. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority after proper appreciation of the evidence have given the finding in favour of the landlord. It had also taken into consideration the accommodation of the ground floor of 1000 sq. feet vacated by tenant M/s Bakeman and still the ejectment order has been passed against the tenant. When there is proper appreciation of evidence by the Court on a question of fact, the High Court should not disturb that finding unless the finding is perverse or there is an error of jurisdiction in appreciation of the evidence. 21. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent- landlord has referred to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court and different judgments of this High Court also. AIR 1988 SC 1845 Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s S. Chokosiri and Company, 1988(2) RCR 328 (SC), it was observed by the Honble Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of Rent Restriction Act, that when the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are supported on the evidence on record, the revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own so long as the evidence on the record admitted and supported the one reached by the Court below. It was also observed that the concurrent finding of fact with regard to the exclusive possession of sub-tenancy is not amenable to reversal in revision by the High Court. The ratio of the Honble Supreme Court is applicable with full force to the facts in hand. Similar observation was made by the Honble Supreme Court in 1996(1) RCR 342, Dr. Gyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others. The ratio of the Honble Supreme Court is applicable with full force to the facts in hand. Similar observation was made by the Honble Supreme Court in 1996(1) RCR 342, Dr. Gyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others. Yet reliance was also placed upon 1999(2) RCR 485, Raghunath v. M/s Chaganlal Sudarji and Company, in which the Honble High Court refused to interfere in a finding on question of fact and the Honble Supreme Court held in that such a situation only exceptional circumstances are required in it to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 22. Now, let us see independently whether the need of the landlord was bona fide or not. The case set up by the landlord is that the present accommodation in which he is running his business in Booth No. 31 and 32 is too small these are small booths where hardly 4/5 customers can stand at one point of time. The godown behind these booths is also being used as a store. He wants to shift his business to SCO No. 809 and 810. The area of SCO No. 809 which is in the possession of the tenant is 1000 sq. ft and similarly, the area of SCO No. 810 is also to the same extent i.e. 2000 sq. feet in all. 23. It was the principal argument of Shri Sarin that the existing area with the landlord is enough. Even with the occupation of 1000 sq. feet his need can be fully satisfied. The argument of Shri Sarin cannot be accepted. The Rent Controller or the appellate authority cannot sit over the decision of the landlord. It is for the landlord to decide whether he requires the demised premises for his personal necessity or not. Rider on the decision of the landlord is that his need must be bonafide and not malafide. It is established on the record that the area occupied by the landlord is too small and this fact has come from the mouth of the son of the tenant himself who appeared in the witness box as RW-2 Dr. Sanjiv Sodhi. He admitted that the total area of all the four shops in the possession of the petitioner-landlord must be approximately 500 sq. feet. The landlord is not committing any offence. Sanjiv Sodhi. He admitted that the total area of all the four shops in the possession of the petitioner-landlord must be approximately 500 sq. feet. The landlord is not committing any offence. He wants to establish his business in an area of 2000 square feet as the existing accommodation is insufficient. 24. What is the meaning of bonafide requirement has not been defined in the Rent Restriction Act but the Honble Supreme Court in 1999(2) RCR 485, Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s Chagan Lal Sudarji and Company has laid down the following guide-lines which can be reproduced as follows :- i) Requirement of landlord must be both reasonable and bona fide. ii) The word "reasonable" connotes that requirement is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be mere desire. iii) The word requirement coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. iv) A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. v) It may not be need in praesenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The word bona fide means that need must be honest and not be trained with any oblique motive. vi) Language of provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible for landlord get possession. Construction of relevant statutory provision must strike a balance between right of landlord and right of tenant. vii) Court should not proceed on assumption that requirement of landlord was not bona fide and that tenant could not dictate to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself without getting possession of tenant premises. 25. If the evidence of the landlord is examined in the light of these guide- lines, there is no manner of doubt that his need was genuine and not malafide. 26. It was then submitted on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the son of the landlord has not come in the witness box, therefore, the finding should be given against the landlord. The argument cannot be accepted. It is not the requirement of the law that landlord must produce his son for whose need he requires the premises. The argument cannot be accepted. It is not the requirement of the law that landlord must produce his son for whose need he requires the premises. Rather the case set up by the landlord in the beginning is that he wants to give the present premises to his son so that he may be able to establish his business and he wants to switch over to the demised premises along with the ground floor of SCO No. 810. Therefore, this weak argument of Mr. Sarin has to be rejected. 27. The counsel then submitted that the present ejectment petition is barred under the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. as the ground of personal necessity was never available of by the landlord when he filed the first ejectment application. He adopted another argument by submitting that the present ejectment application is not legally maintainable and the ground of personal necessity is not open to the landlord with regard to non-residential premises situated at Chandigarh and that benefit of the judgment of Harbilas case cannot be availed of by a landlord in Chandigarh. He reiterated his arguments which was addressed by him before this Court in the case of Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, 2000(1) RCR page 110. He submitted that this judgment of Rakesh Vij (supra) was challenged before the Honble Supreme Court and their Lordships were pleased to issue the notice to the landlord as well as to the learned Attorney General of India and that it was also ordered by the Honble Supreme Court that the tenant shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute. The submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is partly correct to the extent that the judgment of Rakesh Vij was challenged by the tenant and the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to issue notice to the landlord and to the Attorney General of India but the operation of the judgment of the High Court which was authored by me incidentally was never suspended. Moreover, this benefit of personal requirement of non- residential premises could always be availed of by the landlord in Chandigarh with the striking down of the part of the provisions of Rent Restriction Act in Harbilas case, 1995(2) RCR (Rent) 672 (supra). When the first ejectment application was filed by Mr. Moreover, this benefit of personal requirement of non- residential premises could always be availed of by the landlord in Chandigarh with the striking down of the part of the provisions of Rent Restriction Act in Harbilas case, 1995(2) RCR (Rent) 672 (supra). When the first ejectment application was filed by Mr. Mela Ram, at that time the position of the law was different. The additional ground of bona fide necessity even with regard to non-residential building became available to the landlords on the pronouncement of the judgment of Harbilas case and therefore, the landlord could always file the ejectment application. Otherwise also, the strict provision of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. should not apply to the proceedings of the Rent Restriction Act. 28. The counsel for the respondent invited my attention to 1984(2) SLR 731, Roshan Jagdish Lal Dugal and others v. The Punjab State Electricity Board, wherein it was observed that if an appeal against the order of the High Court has been filed in the Honble Supreme Court and the operation of the order of High Court has been suspended during the pendency of the appeal, the order of the High Court still has be treated as a binding precedent because the pendency of the appeal does not have the effect of rendering that judgment non est till the disposal of the appeal. 29. Now, I would like to refer to the case law cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the parties. 30. Shri Sarin has invited my attention to 1998(9) JT 40, Maqboolunisa v. Mohd. Saleha Quaraishi and submits that with the availability of the similar area of accommodation on the ground floor or SCO No. 810, the requirement of the landlord has to be fully met and therefore, the ejectment application should be dismissed. Moreover, the landlord has not amended the pleadings. The desire of a large shop by the landlord cannot be equated with a genuine bonafide need. The judgment is distinguishable on facts. The case set up by the landlord was that the existing accommodation in his possession is not sufficient for him. He wants to establish his son also by handing over the possession of the existing premises to him and he wants to come to the new premises forming part of SCO No. 809-810. 31. The judgment is distinguishable on facts. The case set up by the landlord was that the existing accommodation in his possession is not sufficient for him. He wants to establish his son also by handing over the possession of the existing premises to him and he wants to come to the new premises forming part of SCO No. 809-810. 31. In these circumstances, the need of the landlord has to be seen from his angle as I stated above. Reliance was also placed on 2000(1) RCR 354, Molar Mal v. M/s Key Iron Works. The facts of this case are also distinguishable. In the cited case the landlord got three plots through eviction proceedings during the pendency. In these circumstances, the Honble Supreme Court held that the Courts can see to the subsequent events and if with the acquisition of the rented land the need of the landlord has been fully met then it cannot be said that his desire to get the demised premises was a bonafide one. There is no similarity of facts in the present case. 32. The reliance was placed on 1977 PLR 112 : 1977(1) RCR (Rent) 595 (P&H), Shri Banke Ram V. Smt. Sarasti Devi in which it was held that the ground of bonafide necessity must be pleaded by the landlord in the ejectment application and if it is not pleaded the ejectment application is liable to be dismissed. About this aspect of the case I have already discussed in the earlier portion of the judgment by making a detailed reference to the pleadings and evidence. The ratio of the Honble Full Bench cannot be availed of by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. 33. Reliance was then placed on 1973 PLR 350, Mohan Lal Jain v. Mohal Lal. There is no dispute with the preposition of law that the initial onus is upon the landlord to prove his bonafide necessity. In the present case, there is authenticated evidence to show that the need of the landlord was genuine and it was so observed by the Rent Controller as well as the first appellate authority. Yet reliance was placed on JT 1998(6) SC 181, Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani; 1979(2) RLR 226, Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas; 1998(1) RCR 482, M/s Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajender K. Tandon, and 1994(1) Rent Law Reporter 383, P.K. Vijayan v. Kamalakshi Amma and others. Yet reliance was placed on JT 1998(6) SC 181, Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani; 1979(2) RLR 226, Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas; 1998(1) RCR 482, M/s Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajender K. Tandon, and 1994(1) Rent Law Reporter 383, P.K. Vijayan v. Kamalakshi Amma and others. The benefit of these judgments cannot be taken by the tenant. Every case has to be viewed from its own facts. Bonafide necessity is a question of fact depending upon the evidence led by the landlord. If a landlord wants the premises for his son to start his business, it cannot be said that the need of the landlord lacks bonafide. This was so observed by the Honble High Court in 2001(1) RCR 434 Kewal Krishan v. Amrik Singh. In 1998(2) SCR 219, Radhakrishnan v. S.N. Loganatha Mudaliar the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that if ejecment application has been filed on the ground of bonafide requirement with respect to non-residential building and even if it is established that landlord is running his business in his own building, still he can get the demised premises vacated for the business of his son. It was further observed by the Honble Supreme Court in 1998(2) RCR 628, M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan, that bonafide requirement is a question of fact and if two Courts below have given finding that the need of the landlord was bonafide, it is not open to the High Court to differ from the concurrent finding and go into the question of correctness of those findings. 34. I have considered all the pros and cons of this mater. I am of the considered opinion that the need of the landlord was bonafide. Though calling upon a tenant to evict the demised premises in the modern times is hardship to him yet law has to prevail and the genuine need of a landlord cannot be scuttled on the premises of mere hardship. I have also held above that the petition of the landlord is not barred by the principle of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. The ground of bonafide requirement with respect to non-residential premises situated in Chandigarh, Punjab and Haryana is available to the landlord in view of the judgment of Harbilas case, 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 672 (SC). 35. Resultantly, this revision is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. 35. Resultantly, this revision is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. The tenant-petitoner, however, is granted three months time to vacate the demised premises, failing which, it will be open to the landlord to seek the eviction of the tenant from the demises premises by filing execution application before the Rent Controller.