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2001 DIGILAW 989 (PAT)

Ram Kewal Ram v. State of Bihar

2001-10-17

S.K.KATRIAR

body2001
JUDGMENT S.K. Katriar, J 1. This writ petition at the instance of the under-raiyats (Bataidars) related to proceeding under Section 48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is directed against the order dated 12.2.1999 (Annexure-3), passed by the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bhabhua, whereby he has rejected the four applications before him under Section 48-E of the Act, namely, Case No.4 of 1998, 5 of 1986, 6 of 1998 and 7 of 1998, and it has been held that there is no relationship of landlord (Respondent Nos. 5 to 14 herein) and bataidar. 2. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned Counsel for the petitioners (bataindras) submits that the impugned order was passed during the period of general strike of class III and class IV employees of the Bihar Government during which period the bataidars were not heard and the applications were disposed of by the impugned order after hearing the landlords only. He has next contended that the learned LRDC has disposed of the application without constituting the Board contemplated by Section 48-E (3) of the Act which is a mandatory provision of the law. He relies on the judgments of this Court reported in 1979 PLJR 82 (Para 7) (Lakshmi Prasad Vs. State of Bihar) and 1979 PLJR 247; 1979 BLJ 621 (Para 7) (Dhanji Singh Vs. State of Bihar). 3. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.5 to 14 (the landlords) has submitted in opposition that the impugned order was passed after hearing the bataidars. He next submits that the lands have changed hands during the past 30 years and with which the possession of the lands have also been passing on from person to person, meaning thereby that the bataidars were never in possession. He next submits that the bataidars claim to be in possession for 30 years or so, whereas their age is 30 years or less, meaning thereby that the cases of bataidars are false. He has also submitted that in order that a proceeding under Section 48-E (1) of the Act may be initiated and the Board may be constituted, there has to be a bona fide dispute between the parties which is wholly lacking in the present case, and, therefore, there was no requirement to constitute the Board. He has also submitted that in order that a proceeding under Section 48-E (1) of the Act may be initiated and the Board may be constituted, there has to be a bona fide dispute between the parties which is wholly lacking in the present case, and, therefore, there was no requirement to constitute the Board. In fact, in his submission, the proceeding under Section 48E (1) of the Act was never initiated. 4. I must state in fairness to the Counsel for the parties that elaborate arguments were advanced before me on the merits of this case which I do not wish to consider at all in view of the nature of the order going to be passed in the present case. I must first deal with the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, namely, the period of all-pervasive strike of class III and class IV employees of the State Government and without hearing the petitioner. I regret my inability to accede to its contention on the unsubstantiated version of the petitioner. The following order was passed in this writ petition on 27.2.2001 :- "Put up this case for admission as prayed for on behalf of the petitioners to produce entire order-sheet of the case". Inspite of the opportunity granted to the petitioner, learned Counsel for the petitioner has not produced a copy of the entire order-sheet to substantiate the aforesaid submission. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 5. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.5 to 14 has rightly submitted that a proceeding under Section 48-E can be initiated if the three conditions are, prima facie, satisfied, namely the persons claiming the bataidari right was in cultivating possession, whether or not he is making bona fide claim and whether or not he is threatened with eviction or dispossession. In case the LRDC is satisfied on the basis of the averments made in the application that prima facie a case is made out, then he shall initiate the proceeding in terms of Section 48-E (1) of the Act and shall immediately constitute the Board in terms of 48-E (3). It is, however, equally open to him to conduct a preliminary enquiry for his own satisfaction whether or not proceeding under Section 48-E (1) of the Act ought to be initiated. It is, however, equally open to him to conduct a preliminary enquiry for his own satisfaction whether or not proceeding under Section 48-E (1) of the Act ought to be initiated. It appears to me from a perusal of the impugned order that the learned LRDC had conducted a preliminary enquiry for his satisfaction whether or not proceeding under Section 48-E (1) has to be initiated in the facts and circumstances of the case. He has in substance come to the conclusion that the bataidars do not have a bona fide case and, therefore, did not initiate proceedings under Section 48-E (1). He has assigned a number of reasons in support of this conclusion. The property has changed hands on a number of occasions during the past number of occasions during the past thirty years and with which the possession of the lands in question has also changed hands. He has further observed in the impugned order that there is no relationship of the landlord and bataidar between the parties. Ambika Prasad, one of the vendees, had purchased the land from the then owner of the land and is coming in peaceful possession of the same. In that view of the matter, he has rejected all the four bataidari cases. Furthermore, learned Counsel for the respondents-landlords has rightly invited my attention to the statements made in paragraph 19 to 23 of the writ petition to the effect that the bataidars are claiming bataidari rights for about thirty years and they are themselves near about thirty years of age. The case made out by the bataidars (the petitioners) is untenable, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1993 BBCJ 43 (SC) (Batri Yadav Vs. Shri Sat Narain Das). In the circumstances, I am of the view that the bataidars do not have a bona fide case. They are not in cultivating possession and therefore, the question of their eviction or dispossession of the lands in question does not arise. I agree with the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order. In that view of the matter, there was no requirement in law on the part of the first authority to constitute the Board in terms of Section 48-E (3) of the Act. 6. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed.