S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THESE writ appeals are directed against the judgment dated 2nd November, 2000 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. l3983 of 1989. ( 2 ) WRIT Appeal No. 102 of 2001 is preferred by 7th respondent in the writ petition whereas writ appeal No. 490 of 2001 is preferred by respondents 1, 2 and 3 in the writ petition representing the Government of Andhra Pradesh and respondent No. 4-Wakf Board has preferred WA No. 1107 of 2001. The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition set aside the appellate order dated 18. 9. 1989 passed by the District Collector, Nizamabad in proceedings No. C4/36/1986 under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of mams Act, 1955. ( 3 ) THE question, which arises for consideration in these writ appeals, is whether munthakhab (grant) constitutes wakf burdened with service or a simple grant. ( 4 ) ONE Jamal Shah, son of Suleman Shah who was the predecessor in title to the petitioners was granted inam in respect of the land in question in 1292 Hizri equivalent to 1282 Fasli or 1872 to 1873 A. D. Allegedly in the year 1315-Fasli (1906 A. D.), a proposal was made for acquiring the land for graveyard and the proposal was referred to the Collector by a letter dated 29th Tir, 1315 (equivalent to 3. 6. 1906 A. D. ). It was reported that there would be no necessity for acquisition of the said land. It was further reported that the inamdar was not willing to part with the land. The proposal to acquire the land was therefore, dropped. Upon the death of the last holder of the Inam Jamal Shah, s/o Suleman Shah, succession thereof was granted to his son Nooruddin by the competent authority on 8th Fervardi 1339 Fasli (9. 2. 1930 A. D. ). Rajiuddin and Riayzuddin are the brothers of Nooruddin. In the said succession order which according to the respondents herein in effect and substance, was a re-grant of inam, it had been categorically mentioned that the nature of inam was Madad-e-Mash, a personal grant to the inamdar unburdened with any service conditions. Nooruddin died in the year 1968. The District Collector, Nizamabad, one of the appellants in these writ appeals represents one Committee known as "tanzeemi Committee recognized by the Wakf Board. Nooruddin died in the year 1968. The District Collector, Nizamabad, one of the appellants in these writ appeals represents one Committee known as "tanzeemi Committee recognized by the Wakf Board. The right of Nooruddin for installation of a timber depot thereupon was disputed by the District Collector, pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof. G. O. Ms. No. 254, dated 12. 3. 1965 was issued directing the parties to seek redressal of the dispute in a civil Court. The brother of Nooruddin filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge s Court, Nizamabad for declaration to the effect that he has a right to hold the property and further prayed a decree for perpetual injunction against the said appellant. The said suit was dismissed on 28. 11. 1974. An appeal was preferred thereagainst before this Court, which was numbered as AS No. 290 of 1976. By a judgment dated 20. 7. 1979 in the said first appeal, it was inter alia held to the effect that (A) The plaintiffs writ petitioners are the owners and possessors of the suit land; (b) That the land was not a graveyard; (c) That the land was never acquired by the Government and no compensation was paid; (d) Tanzeemi Committee by reason of the said judgment and decree was restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs (writ petitioners ). ( 5 ) A letters patent appeal, vide LPA No. 108 of 1979, filed thereagainst was dismissed on 2. 6. 1987. An application for grant of special leave to appeal being SLP No. 15065 of 1987 was also dismissed. In the aforementioned LPA, as also in the SLP, it was observed that the findings of this Court in AS No. 290 of 1976 cannot be disturbed and that the appellants can seek appropriate remedy under the provisions of the Abolition of Inams Act. The said Nooruddin died in the year 1968. The respondents - writ petitioners applied for grant of Occupancy Certificate in terms of the provisions of Section 4 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 and the Occupancy Certificate was granted by the primary Tribunal (Revenue Divisional Officer, Nizamabad) on 22. 12. 1977. Allegedly, this Court in AS No. 290 of 1976 in its judgment dated 20. 7. 1979 also mentioned about the grant of such occupancy certificate. 12. 1977. Allegedly, this Court in AS No. 290 of 1976 in its judgment dated 20. 7. 1979 also mentioned about the grant of such occupancy certificate. The matter was remitted back to the Primary Tribunal for de novo enquiry. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Nizamabad upon holding such enquiry, yet once again granted occupancy certificate to the respondents by an order dated 21. 8. 1986. Against the said order, another appeal was filed. The Wakf Board also got itself impleaded in the said appeal. By an order-dated 18. 9. 1989, the Collector allowed the said appeal whereagainst the respondents filed the aforementioned writ petition. ( 6 ) THE controversy between the parties as noticed hereinbefore centered round the question as to whether the grant was burdened with service so as to constitute a Wakf. ( 7 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the rival contentions, we may notice that the Wakf Board also filed a suit - OS No. 145 of 1987 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Nizamabad for declaration of title and perpetual injunction. The said suit was dismissed where against an appeal was preferred by the Wakf Board which was marked as AS No. 1 149 of 1994. The learned single Judge heard both the writ petition and the aforementioned first appeal. ( 8 ) THE primary question, which arose for consideration, was whether the grant constituted a personal grant or service grant. The learned single Judge upon considering the issue held that although the District Collector had considered the evidence on record, he having misconstrued and misinterpreted the grant, committed an error of law and thus, the writ petition was maintainable. The first appeal filed by the Wakf Board was also dismissed. ( 9 ) SRI Seetharamaiah, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants inter alia submitted that the learned single Judge committed serious error in setting aside the order dated 18. 9. 1989 passed by the District Collector insofar as the learned Judge failed to take into consideration that a writ Court cannot go into the question of sufficiency of evidence. Drawing our attention to the evidence relied upon by the appellate authority, the learned Counsel would contend that as there existed sufficient evidence to hold that the grant in question constituted takiadari service grant, the property must be held to have been dedicated to God and thus it was unalienable. Drawing our attention to the evidence relied upon by the appellate authority, the learned Counsel would contend that as there existed sufficient evidence to hold that the grant in question constituted takiadari service grant, the property must be held to have been dedicated to God and thus it was unalienable. The learned Counsel accepted that the learned District Collector committed a manifest error in proceeding on the basis that the lands in question were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Counsel would further concede that the purported Vasul Baqi whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned Collector holding therein that the inam was a service inam, having not been filed, no reliance could have been placed thereupon. ( 10 ) SRI Seetharamaiah, learned Counsel would urge that if an authoritative order is based upon several findings, even if some of the reasonings are wrong, a writ Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction would not set aside the same. The findings can be upheld on the basis of other findings. The learned Counsel would submit that there exists a distinction between an order based on subjective satisfaction and the one on objective satisfaction. In the later case, the Court would be loathe to interfere in exercise of its writ jurisdiction on the ground of sufficiency of material. It was submitted that only where Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness can be applied, a writ of certiorari can be issued by quashing the order passed by the authority. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in Zora Singh v. J. M. Tandon, AIR 1971 SC 1537 and in Madhukar v. D. V. Hingwe, (1987) 1 SCC 164 . ( 11 ) MR. Seetharamaiah would contend that having regard to the expressions used in the Grant, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Grantor was required to render certain service and thus, the Grant being burdened with service would constitute wakf which would be inalienable. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed upon Dr. Paras Diwan s law of Endowments, Wakfs and Trusts . ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel would contend that as the wakf property vests in God, the question of any subsequent Grant thereof would not arise nor can any change be made in the nature and character thereof. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed upon Dr. Paras Diwan s law of Endowments, Wakfs and Trusts . ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel would contend that as the wakf property vests in God, the question of any subsequent Grant thereof would not arise nor can any change be made in the nature and character thereof. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on Angullia v. Estate and Trust Agencies, AIR 1938 PC 202, A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad v. Syed All Mulla, AIR 1985 AP 127 , Sayyed Ali v. A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 . ( 13 ) MR. Prathap Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand, had drawn our attention to the fact that the land in question was the subject-matter of Grant for three times. The learned Counsel drew this Court s attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in Sikander Jehan v. A. P. State Government, AIR 1962 SC 996 and in Rameshwar Rao v. Govind Rao, AIR 1961 SC 1442 , and submitted that the land in question could not have been construed to be a wakf. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to the terms of the Grant. According to the learned Counsel, the grant mentions the occupation of the grantee, but thereby, a grant simplicitor cannot be called to be a grant burdened with service. The learned Counsel would urge that the first grant was made one in the year 1872, second in the year 1304-F (1894 AD) and the last one was made on 9. 2. 1930. Admittedly, this Court is not concerned with the second Grant. The last Grant i. e. , the third Grant made on 9. 2. 1930 has been made by the Collector. Mr. Prathap Reddy, learned senior Counsel would submit that in any event, even if it is held that the Grant dated 9. 2. 1930 was illegal and thereby no title passed through the predecessor in interest of the respondents, they must be held to have acquired title by adverse possession. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778 . ( 14 ) THE original grant in writing is not on record. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778 . ( 14 ) THE original grant in writing is not on record. One Muntakhab bearing No. 223 was issued in 1379f. The said Muntakhab is merely a statement of enquiry. The same shows that an administrative consultative process was made from Taluqdar to Awal Taluqdar (District Collector) and Sadar-ul-Mohami (Minister) and ultimately to the Madar-ul-Mohami (Prime Minister ). Thus, all-important officials who are to deal with the revenue administration had made an enquiry while issuing Muntakhab No. 223. Columns 6 and 7 of the said Muntakhab demonstrate the claim for inam as well as Yoomia cash was approved. The translated version of Column 8 which is the endorsement of Awal Talukdar (Collector) is as under: "the Inam land is proved to be the Royal Grant and that the grant of Yoomia is from the late Maharaja. This is the contention of the claimant. The sanad of Grant has been filed, but the same could not be verified. From the old documents the same document is proved. Hence it is felt just and proper that the sum of Rs. 20-11-6 (Rupees twenty, eleven annas and six paise) be released permanently generation after generation or till the lifetime of the claimant; and the Inam land measuring 8 Bighas 10 Baams which is now released one, be released after deducting four anna share thereof i. e. Rs. 25/- and be released permanently generation after generation. " dated 5th Moharram, 1289 Hijri. ( 15 ) AT one point of time there is some dispute as regards the actual translation of the above endorsement. But, Mr. Pratap Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents agree that the above translation of the Muntakhab be taken into consideration by this Court. ( 16 ) THE contention of Sri Sitharamaiah that the very fact that 8 Bighas 10 Baams of land has been released upon deduction of four annas share i. e. , Rs. 25/- would itself lead to an inference that the inam is for takiadari service cannot be accepted. When an inam is burdened with service or some condition, the same should be specific and conditions of inam cannot be presumed or inferred. 25/- would itself lead to an inference that the inam is for takiadari service cannot be accepted. When an inam is burdened with service or some condition, the same should be specific and conditions of inam cannot be presumed or inferred. There is nothing to show that deduction of 25% of the income was made by way of condition of rendition of service. The inam is to Darwaish to be enjoyed from generation after generation or till the death of the claimant and not to graveyard or for takia. ( 17 ) A property dedicated so as to create Darwaish must be supported by a declaration therefor. Although Jamal Shah was shown as Darwaish and/or described as Takidar, the same is not by itself a proof to show that the inam land was granted to Jamal Shah for takidar service. inam would mean that the person who is given land is exempted from paying the revenue to the sovereign completely or to the extent of grant. In the instant case, 8 Bighas 10 Baams of land had been granted to the extent of 75% share by way of Madad-e-Mash. ( 18 ) BY reason of the description of Jamal Shah as Darwaish and Takiadar, in all probability, the authorities acting for the sovereign gave inam with a religious feeling which is not synonym with endowment for pious, religious or charitable purpose which are the essential ingredients for wakf. ( 19 ) AS noticed hereinbefore, Muntakhab No. 223 is not the original sanad granting inam. The original grant was produced before the authorities. The same had been granted to Jamal Shah after death of his father Suleman Shah. In any event, the very fact that the terms and conditions of the original grant had been varied; the said Muntakhab must be held to be a fresh grant. ( 20 ) IT is one thing to say that an endowment for pious, religious or charitable purpose had been made so as to constitute a wakf which vests in Board and thus is incapable of alienation or change as regards the nature and character thereof; but, it is another thing to say that an inam had been granted with life interest and after the death of the original Inam another document had to be created, which itself is a posture to show that there had been no endowment as such. Furthermore, had a wakf been created, there was no necessity to make a move for acquisition of the lands for graveyard. In the year 1924, the move to acquire the land was abandoned upon taking into consideration the grievance of the Inamdar to the effect that he had no other source of livelihood. ( 21 ) IT is also relevant to note that after the death of Suleman shah, Nooruddin had been granted succession by the Collector by order-dated 9,2. 1930 wherein it was clearly stated that the Inam was Madad-e-Mash which admittedly do not satisfy the ingredients of a wakf. ( 22 ) INTERPRETATION of an ancient document is a difficult task particularly where the original document had not been produced. In interpreting such an ancient document, if the wordings used therein are not clear, even the usage and modern usage may be taken into consideration and for the said purpose even the doctrine Contemporanea Expositio may be pressed into service (See Norton 2nd Edition, 256: (1906) AC 92 at 98, (1980) 17 Chan. D. 535 at 573 and (1882)A. C 131 at 156 ). ( 23 ) ANOTHER important document, which is required to be taken note of at this juncture is the succession certificate given to Nooruddin by the District Collector on 8. 11. 1929 (8th Feverdi 1339f) upon conducting an enquiry. The said succession certification was marked as Ex. A1 in OS No. 77 of 1970 which goes to show that Madad-e-Mash was granted to Jamal Shah in 1292-F and upon his death the succession was granted to Suleman Shah in 1302-F. The extent of the land was Ac. 2. 33 gts. and the same was described as Madad-e-Mash. The very fact that further succession was granted to Nooruddin clearly goes to show that the same was not a takiadari land. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on a letter dated 3rd Dai. 1339f addressed to Awal Taluqdar, Nizamabad wherein explanation had been merely given to the effect that in the case filed by the petitioners the land was being called conditional inam instead of Madad-e-Mash. The said statement was explained away by Nooruddin as based on his misunderstanding. 1339f addressed to Awal Taluqdar, Nizamabad wherein explanation had been merely given to the effect that in the case filed by the petitioners the land was being called conditional inam instead of Madad-e-Mash. The said statement was explained away by Nooruddin as based on his misunderstanding. The District Collector upon considering the statements of Nooruddin, Gumastha Mokhadam Mali and Gumashta Patwari referred to the proceedings of succession issued to Suleman Shah and noticed:"in this proceeding a copy of enquiry statement has been filed by the applicant. In Col. No. 14 of this at first the words madad-e-Mash was written in it, but later on it was corrected and written as mashroot-ul-Khidmat and in the succession proceedings held later and in the recent proceedings it is shown as mashroot-Takiadari . To settle this dispute, the case was pending since a long time. As per the application of Nooruddin dated 1339 Fasli and after the perusal of enquiry statement, this Mash is decided as madad-e-Mash . " ( 24 ) THE aforementioned document also clearly shows that upon consideration of the relevant document and the circumstances attending thereto, the Collector had arrived at a decision that the land in question is Madad-e-Mash. It is also relevant to notice that in OS No. 77 of 1970 which was filed by the respondents herein the defendants thereof putforth the claim that the land was inam land sanctioned in the name of the ancestors of the petitioners as takidar of graveyard. A plea was also raised that the land had been acquired by the Government and was being used as graveyard by the Muslim community. It was found that the land was not graveyard and only Ac. 0. 34 gts. which was earlier found part of S. Nos. 134 and 135 before consideration was a grave-yard. The findings have been upheld by a learned single Judge of this Court and also by a Division Bench in letters patent appeal. Such findings had not been disputed. ( 25 ) AS indicated hereinbefore, the learned Counsel for the appellant admits that the District Collector has proceeded on a misconception that the land had been acquired. ( 26 ) SO far as the letter in File No. 6/86/ 33 dated 28. 1. Such findings had not been disputed. ( 25 ) AS indicated hereinbefore, the learned Counsel for the appellant admits that the District Collector has proceeded on a misconception that the land had been acquired. ( 26 ) SO far as the letter in File No. 6/86/ 33 dated 28. 1. 1924 is concerned, the Collector recorded that dead bodies of those respected persons were only buried and that dead bodies of new persons cannot be allowed to be buried which fact also clearly goes to show that from 1924, the land was not being used as graveyard. This may give rise to a presumption that the dead bodies of holy persons had been buried in private graveyard of the inamdar. The original Muntakhab No. 223 also does not prove the existence of any graves or takias at that point of time, which, in all probability, led the Collector to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondents to the effect that the Inamdar was a Madad-e-Mash. ( 27 ) MR. Seetharamaiah has sought to raise a point to the effect that the land between two graveyards should also be presumed to be a graveyard. Such presumption would arise only if it is found that there existed two graveyards. In the instant case, a finding of fact has been arrived at by the District Collector to the effect that there existed no grave and possibly the dead bodies of some holy persons have been buried. The concept of a public grave is different from the private grave. In the instant case, it has categorically been held by the competent authority that since 1924 no dead body had been graved. Even in the original Muntakhab bearing No. 223 it has been shown that there existed any grave or takiadari at any point of time. Even if the contention of Mr. Seetharamaiah is to be accepted, having regard to the fact that the grant in favour of the predecessor in interest of the unofficial respondent herein must be held to be illegal, they would be deemed to have been in adverse possession of the lands in question. By reason of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right of the beneficiaries shall stand extinguished and the unofficial respondents would be deemed to have acquired a title by adverse possession. In Dalhousie Institute Society (supra), it has been held: 16. By reason of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right of the beneficiaries shall stand extinguished and the unofficial respondents would be deemed to have acquired a title by adverse possession. In Dalhousie Institute Society (supra), it has been held: 16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. In this respect the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the Corporation, but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which, no doubt, is invalid in law. As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Bombay, 1952 SCR 43 = AIR 1951 SC 469 , as follows:. . . the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865. ( 28 ) IN Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant Babusaheb Patil, AIR 1995 SC 895 , the Apex Court observed:"12. Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes that for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title, the limitation of 12 years begins to run from the date of the defendant s interest becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Adverse possession means a hostile assertion i. e. , a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. Under Article 65, burden is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i. e. , possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person, constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i. e. , possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. 13. Where possession could be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another does not by mere denial of that other s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. " ( 29 ) THE finding of fact arrived at by the District Collector, therefore, suffering from the Doctrine of Wednusbury unreasonableness, has rightly been interfered with. The learned single Judge has also arrived at a finding of fact that only an extent of Ac. 0. 34 guntas was shown in the revenue records as graveyards. In the aforementioned situation, graves of persons buried over a piece of land admeasuring Ac. 0. The learned single Judge has also arrived at a finding of fact that only an extent of Ac. 0. 34 guntas was shown in the revenue records as graveyards. In the aforementioned situation, graves of persons buried over a piece of land admeasuring Ac. 0. 34 guntas cannot lead to a presumption that the entire land measuring Ac. 2. 39 guntas in Survey No. 225 was a wakf by user. Even for the purpose of holding that a wakf by user has come into force, sufficient evidence must be brought on record to show that the entire land was a grave or by user. ( 30 ) MR. Seetharamaiah states that when the authorities under the Act had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question, the same would be final. It has although been accepted that some irrelevant material had been taken into account, but, according to the learned Counsel, if a finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence, the Court ought not to have interfered therewith. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in Zora Singh (supra) and Madhukar (supra ). ( 31 ) IN Zora Singh (supra) the Apex Court found that most of the reasons assigned by the Commissioner were found to be relevant and also were found to be sufficient for upholding the conclusions. The Apex Court in that situation laid down the following principles:"10. . . . The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for in its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. There was, in our view, legal evidence before the Commissioner upon which he was entitled to rest his finding that the copies relied on by the appellant were not genuine. " ( 32 ) IN Madhukar (supra), the Apex Court was considering the matter of eviction under C. P. and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949, which provided for a Summary procedure. The question, which arose for consideration in this case, was as to whether Clause 25 of the Rent Control Order, which dealt with allotment in favour of a Government servant, had no application. But, the Apex Court was of the view that even if allotment is made to a person who is both an evictee as well as the Government servant, still if one of the grounds of the order viz. , that he was a Government servant ceased to exist on retirement, the other reason operates i. e. , he was an evictee and still continues to be an evictee, then the allotment would continue. ( 33 ) NO exception to the basic proposition of law as enunciated by the apex Court can be called in question, but, in the instant case, admittedly, the appellate authority proceeded on two wrong premises and drawn his conclusion mostly thereupon. The order of the Commissioner having regard to the construction of the documents and the circumstances attending thereto cannot be upheld and in that view of the matter, the said decisions cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. ( 34 ) ANOTHER aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. It had all along been the contention of the Wakf Board that the property has been acquired. The suit filed by the Wakf Board has been dismissed. The appeal taken thereagainst has also been dismissed. ( 34 ) ANOTHER aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. It had all along been the contention of the Wakf Board that the property has been acquired. The suit filed by the Wakf Board has been dismissed. The appeal taken thereagainst has also been dismissed. The circumstances led into filing of the suit is also a pointer to the fact that at all material times the Wakf Board was and is still contending that the properties had been acquired and thus it cannot be permitted to raise a contradictory and inconsistent plea to the effect that it was a wakf property and thus vested in it. The very fact that an attempt was made to acquire the property clearly goes to show that the concerned authorities including the Wakf Board were of the view that since the property being not a wakf property, the same is required to be acquired. ( 35 ) THE construction of a document gives rise to a question of law. If a mistake is committed in construction of a document leading to the substratum of the claim of the parties, a writ Court may interfere in such a situation particularly when such wrong construction relate to a jurisdictional fact. It is now a well-settled principle of law that even a little variation or an additional fact may lead to two different conclusions in a given situation. ( 36 ) CONSTRUCTION of an ancient document, as noticed hereinbefore, particularly as regards endowment, had all along been a difficult task. More difficulty arises when the question as to whether a property is a wakf property or not has to be decided in the absence of any documents. But, in such cases, what requires to be considered is as to whether taking an overall view of the evidence on record, the party claiming that it is a wakf property succeeds in establishing that there had been a permanent dedication of the property, the onus was on the appellants. They failed to discharge such onus before the learned single Judge. They failed to discharge such onus before the learned single Judge. It is a well-settled law that a person who sets the law in motion and seeks a relief before the Court, must necessarily be in a position to prove his case and get the relief moulded by the law and in no case, he can be allowed to stand on the legs of the defendant, whatever may be the position or stand the defendant takes, for the very reasoning that the defendant is expected to answer the claim and allegation made by the plaintiff in the suit. ( 37 ) IN the absence of any statutory provision, the statutory presumption as regards the property to be wakf property can be drawn only in the event the conditions precedent therefore are satisfied. In the instant case, the conditions precedent has not been satisfied. The learned single judge has referred to a large number of cases and analysed the same for the purpose of deduction of the principles, which are to the following:1. Mohammedan Law of wakf owes its origin to a rule laid down by the Prophet and means "tying up of property in the ownership of God and Almighty and the devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings"; (See Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami, AIR 1922 PC 123 ). 2. When a founder dedicates the property for a wakf, the ownership of the founder is completely extinguished: . See Vidva Varuthi v. Baluswami, AIR 1922 PC 123 and Mohd. S. Labai v. Mohd. Hanifa, AIR 1976 SC 1569 ). 3. When once it is declared that a particular property is wakf or any such expression is used implying wakf or the document shows that there is dedication for a pious or charitable or religious purpose, the right of the person is extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty. The manager of wakf is Mutawalli. Though Mutawalli is the administrator, governor, superintendent or curator of the waqf property, he has no right in the property belonging to the wakf. The property is not vested in Mutawalli and he is not a trustee in the technical term; (see Vidya Varuthi v. Balu Swami, AIR 1922 PC 123 and Zainyar Jung v. Director of Endowments, AIR 1963 SC 985 ). 4. The dedication need not specifically be in favour of a place of worship, kankah, Dargah, cemetery etc. The property is not vested in Mutawalli and he is not a trustee in the technical term; (see Vidya Varuthi v. Balu Swami, AIR 1922 PC 123 and Zainyar Jung v. Director of Endowments, AIR 1963 SC 985 ). 4. The dedication need not specifically be in favour of a place of worship, kankah, Dargah, cemetery etc. It is enough if the dedication is made for the purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, charitable or religious; (see A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad v. Syed Ali Mulla, AIR 1985 AP 127 and Sayyed Ali v. A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 542 ). 5. Service inam granted to individuals burdened with service for the purposes which are pious, religious or charitable, answers description of all the ingredients of wakf; (see A. P. Wakf Board. Hyderabad v. Syed Ali Mulla, AIR 1985 AP 127 and Sayyed Ali v. A. P. Wakf Board. Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 ). 6. A takia property so called is itself an institution recognised by law and a grant or endowment to the same is valid as wakf and a grant or endowment to the same is valid as wakf as to a khankah, dargah or mosque (See Mohammad Hamid v. Mian Mahomed, AIR 1922 PC 384; Hussain Shah v. Gul Muhammad, AIR 1925 Calcutta 420 and Haji Ali Md. v. Anjuma-i-Islamia, AIR 1931 Lahore 379 ). 7. There may be cases where religious takia is merely a place where certain class of people assemble for different purposes other than religious purposes, if the purpose for which people assemble at a takia is devoid of all religious character, Mohammedan law of wakf and its incidents would have no application. In order to determine the religious character of a takia, in the absence of direct proof of dedication, one must take into consideration the history of the institution the existence of religious association, holy atmosphere about it and the general setting in which the property claimed to be wakf is placed; (See Haji AH Md. v. Anjuma-i-Islamia, AIR 1931 Lahore 379 ). 8. v. Anjuma-i-Islamia, AIR 1931 Lahore 379 ). 8. When once the property is held to be wakf, it always retains its character as a wakf and the grant of patta to service inamdars and persons in possession, does not in any manner change the character of wakf; (See R. Doraswamy Reddy v. Board of Wakf, 1978 (2) APLJ 399 : A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad v. Syed Ali Mulla, AIR 1985 AP 127 and Sayyed Ali v. A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 ). 9. In a case where the inam is service inam for rendering service in connection with a pious, religious and charitable purpose, it does not mean that the holder of the inam burdened with service acquires title to that property. Hence, if the land is resumed from such inamdar for non-performance of service and re-granted to another person it not only means that the wakf is entrusted to another individual to perform service; (See R. Doraswamy Reddy v. Board of Wakf, 1978 (2) APLJ 399 ; A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad v. Syed AH Mulla, AIR 1985 AP 127 and Sayyed AH v. A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 ). 10. The dedication of property to the wakf should be specifically proved by clinching evidence. In the absence of any documentary evidence, an overall view of the evidence on record is to be taken to establish that there is a permanent dedication of the property as a wakf; (See Sayyed AH v. A. P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 ). ( 38 ) THE learned single Judge, having regard to the aforementioned principles in mind, has arrived at the decision. We do not see any reason to differ with the conclusions. ( 39 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The teamed single Judge disposed of WP No. 13983 of 1989 and AS No. 1149 of 1994 by reason of the impugned judgment. The appeals herein are directed against the judgment in the writ petition. No appeal appears to have been preferred from the judgment and order rendered in AS No. 1149 of 1994. By reason of the said judgment, the appeal preferred by the Wakf Board dismissing the suit had been dismissed. The findings of the Civil Court have acquired finality. The appeals herein are directed against the judgment in the writ petition. No appeal appears to have been preferred from the judgment and order rendered in AS No. 1149 of 1994. By reason of the said judgment, the appeal preferred by the Wakf Board dismissing the suit had been dismissed. The findings of the Civil Court have acquired finality. ( 40 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee fixed at Rs. 2,000/ -.