A. KABIR J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal which is directed against the ad-interim order of injunction dated 30th May, 2001, passed by the learned Judge, 5th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Title Suit No. 705 of 2001, has been referred to this Bench by the Hon'ble Chief Justice under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, read with section 98 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the difference of opinion between the learned judges who had heard the appeal and had delivered separate judgments on 18th September, 2001*. ( 2 ) THE defendant/appellant, British Airways PLC, is a company incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom and is not a Government company within the meaning section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The plaintiff/respondent was working as Senior Reservation Assistant, Customers' Service, under the appellant company. It appears that on a charge of in-subordination a disciplinary proceeding was commended against the plaintiff/respondent and he was served with a charge-sheet and was also placed under suspension by an order dated 15th June, 1998. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff / respondent submitted his written explanation on 20th June, 1998, and prayed for withdrawal of the order of suspension and the charge-sheet. Subsequently, by a letter dated 13th July, 1998, the plaintiff / respondent was asked to appear before the Enquiry Officer. The plaintiff/respondent appeared before the Enquiry Officer on various dates and made several applications for production of witnesses and documents and also prayed for the assistance of a lawyer, all of which were alleged to have been rejected by the Enquiry Officer. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report wherein the charges against the plaintiff/respondent were found to have been proved. A show-cause notice was thereafter issued on behalf of the appellant company to the plaintiff / respondent asking him to show-cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report wherein the charges against the plaintiff/respondent were found to have been proved. A show-cause notice was thereafter issued on behalf of the appellant company to the plaintiff / respondent asking him to show-cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the above set of facts the plaintiff respondent filed the instant suit for declaration that the impugned charge-sheet, the order of suspension dated 15th June, 1998, together with the enquiry proceedings and the report of the Enquiry Office as also the proposed order of dismissal of the plaintiff/respondent from service, were illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction and for permanent injunction to restrain the appellant company and its officers from giving any further effect to the impugned charge-sheet and the order of suspension dated 15th June, 1998, and also giving effect to the order of proposed punishment passed in the month of May, 2001, and not to impose any penalty till the disposal of the suit, and for other incidental reliefs. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff/respondent filed an application for injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the suit, to restrain the appellant company from giving any effect to the proposed order of punishment dated 15th May, 2001, till the disposal of the application for injunction. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH, no caveat have been lodged on behalf of the appellant company, learned counsel appeared on its behalf when the said application for injunction was moved and prayed for time to file written objection against the injunction application. As will appear from Order No. 5 dated 30th May, 2001, on behalf of the appellant company it was urged that the suit itself was not maintainable, inasmuch as, the appellant company was not a statutory authority and a suit for specific performance of contract would not be maintainable against the said company in respect of contractual service. Despite such objection, the learned Court below by its order dated 30th May, 2001, passed an ad interim order of injunction restraining the appellant company from giving effect to the proposed order of punishment dated 15th May, 2001, till the disposal of the injunction application. Despite such objection, the learned Court below by its order dated 30th May, 2001, passed an ad interim order of injunction restraining the appellant company from giving effect to the proposed order of punishment dated 15th May, 2001, till the disposal of the injunction application. ( 7 ) AS indicated hereinbefore, this appeal is directed against the said order of the learned Court below and was heard by the Division Bench presided over by Tarun Chatterjee, J. ( 8 ) ON consideration of the submissions made and the decisions cited on behalf of the respective parties, Tarun Chatterjee, J. was of the view that the suit was not maintainable in law for obtaining the reliefs claimed in the suit and the trial Court was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case in granting an ex parte ad interim order of injunction on the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction. ( 9 ) ASHIM Kumar Banerjee, J. however, took a different view and held that since the learned Court below had not decided the question of maintainability of the suit and directed the matter to be heard on affidavits, an opportunity should, at least, be given to the learned trial Court to decide that issue. The learned Judge observed that refusal to pass an ad interim order in the suit would make the suit infractuous. It was further observed that a person who has been in employment should be given adequate opportunity to defendant himself against any disciplinary proceeding and that when violation of natural justice has been specifically alleged the Court was not so powerless that it would not examine the issue and dismiss the litigation in limine, merely on the ground that the relationship between the parties was in the nature of a private contractual employment. The learned Judge held that the learned trial Court was right in granting injunction which had not caused any prejudice to the appellant, at least, not to the extent which the respondent might suffer if his prayer for injunction had been refused. ( 10 ) APPEARING in support of the appeal, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, reported and reiterated the submission which had been made by him before the Division Bench at the time of hearing of the appeal. Mr. ( 10 ) APPEARING in support of the appeal, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, reported and reiterated the submission which had been made by him before the Division Bench at the time of hearing of the appeal. Mr. Mukherjee urged that having regard to the well settled principles embodied in section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the suit was not maintainable since contract of personal service could not ordinarily be specifically enforced. ( 11 ) IN support of his submissions Mr. Mukherjee firstly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors. (AIR 1976 SC, Page 888) wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and that the Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the Will and consent of the employer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made three well-recognised exceptions to the above rule, namely, (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be re-instated on being dismissed under the industrial law and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if the three exceptions could not be found in a particular case, a declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service in such case would not be permissible under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherjee next referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and Others (AIR 1981 SC, Page 122) wherein, the appellant before the Supreme Court, had filed a suit challenging the termination of her service, which suit was partly decreed in her favour for arrears of pay and a further sum towards compensation in respect of her contribution towards Provident Fund. On appeal, the High Court unfelled the money decree on the finding that though the appellant's dismissal was wrongful she was entitled to a decree for damages only and not to a declaration that she continued to be in service of the respondent and to a consequent order for reinstatement. The said view of the High Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with some modification regarding the amount payable to the appellant. ( 13 ) REFERENCE was then made to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. (AIR 1990 SC Page 255) where in it was observed that relief of reinstatement and back wages was available only under the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of a workman and such relief could not be granted by the Civil Court. ( 14 ) MR. Mukherjee lastly referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. , Rae Bareli v. Badri Nath Dixit (AIR 1991 SC Page 1525) wherein in explaining the provisions of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court restated the principle that a contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against employer, except in the case of the exceptions enumerated in the Vaish Degree College case (supra) and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to sue for damages. ( 15 ) MR. Mukherjee urged that the question of maintainability of the suit was capable of being decided on the pleadings in the plaint itself and was not dependant on any affidavit that might be filed on behalf of the defendant/appellant. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in the plaint itself it had been stated that the appellant company is a company incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom and the plaintiff / respondent was an employee of such company. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the same was sufficient to support the stand taken on behalf of the appellant company that the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff/respondent to continue in the service of the appellant company was not available to the plaintiff/respondent in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act which were explained in the Vaish Degree College case (supra) and also in the Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. case (supra ). Mr. Ltd. case (supra ). Mr. Mukherjee submitted that even if the termination of the plaintiff's services was held to be bad, the only remedy available to him was by way of damages. ( 16 ) MR. Mukherjee urged that the learned trial Court had failed to consider the objection taken on behalf of the appellant company in the perspective of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act since admittedly the appellant company was not a statutory authority or even a Government Company within the purview of section 617 of the Companies Act so as to bring the suit within the exceptions indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Vaish Degree College case (supra ). ( 17 ) REGARDING extension of the ad interim order of injunction during the pendency of the appeal and the maintainability of the appeal on account thereof, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision of the Division Bench in Supratik Ghosh and Anr. v. M/s. Pasari Housing Development Pvt. Ltd. CAL LT 2000 (3) HC 97 : (2000 (1) CHN Page 614) wherein it was held that merely because the order extending the order under challenge had not been challenged separately, the appeal against the Original Order was not rendered infractuous and was maintainable even though no appeal had been preferred against the subsequent order of extension of the Original Order. ( 18 ) APPEARING for the plaintiff/respondent, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee submitted that when the minimum requirement of natural justice had been denied to the plaintiff/respondent, the civil Court was within its jurisdiction in interfering with such arbitrary action on the part of the appellant company and restraining it from giving effect to the same. ( 19 ) MR. Bhattacharjee submitted that it was well-established that a person against whom a disciplinary proceeding is initiated must be afforded a proper and reasonable opportunity to defend himself in respect of the charges levelled against him and failure on the part of the authorities to do so would vitiate the proceedings and render the same amenable to civil action. ( 20 ) MR. Bhattacharjee submitted that this case did not come within the scope of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act as the plaintiff/respondent was not trying to enforce his contract of employment in service, but was questioning the method adopted in the disciplinary proceeding. Mr. ( 20 ) MR. Bhattacharjee submitted that this case did not come within the scope of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act as the plaintiff/respondent was not trying to enforce his contract of employment in service, but was questioning the method adopted in the disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Bhattacharjee urged that the suit was maintainable in its present form and in the absence of the defendant's pleadings and the framing of a specific issue regarding the maintainability of the suit, no interference was called for with the ad interim order of injunction passed by the learned trial Court. ( 21 ) FROM the submissions made and the facts as disclosed, the main question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether in view of the case made out in the plaint and the reliefs prayed for therein, the learned trial Court could have passed an ad interim order of injunction. ( 22 ) AS per the case made out in the plaint, the appellant company is a company incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom. It is neither a statutory authority nor a Government Company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. A suit to enforce a contract of personal service would not, therefore, be maintainable against the appellant company since the plaintiff is not a public servant whose removal would attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, nor is he a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor is the appellant company a statutory body which has acted in breach of the mandatory provisions of the statute. It is not necessary to consider any other material other than the pleadings contained in the plaint and the reliefs prayed for in order to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. The reliefs prayed for in the suit are designed to continue the contractual relationship of master and servant between the plaintiff/respondent and the appellant company, which the latter wishes to repudiate on the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff/respondent. In view of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, no injunction can be issued which has the effect of forcing an unwilling employer to retain the personal services of an employee. The remedy, if any, of an employee in such circumstances is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or breach of contract. In view of section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, no injunction can be issued which has the effect of forcing an unwilling employer to retain the personal services of an employee. The remedy, if any, of an employee in such circumstances is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or breach of contract. ( 23 ) THE concept of natural justice is no doubt relevant in a case involving disciplinary proceedings and dismissal from service as a result thereof, but the same cannot validate an order passed in a suit which is otherwise not maintainable. From the frame of the suit it is prima facie evident that the reliefs as prayed for cannot be granted. No injunction can, therefore, be granted in aid of such reliefs. The learned trial Judge appears to have completely lost sight of the above principles while granting an ad interim order of injunction on the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction. ( 24 ) HAVING regard to the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Vaish Degree College case subsequently followed in Smt. J. Tiwari's case and various other cases and in the case of Jitendra Nath (supra), I agree with the views expressed by Tarun Chatterjee, J. that since the suit as filed by the plaintiff/respondent is not maintainable for obtaining the reliefs claimed in the suit no ad interim order of injunction could have been passed on the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction, and I respectfully disagree with those expressed by Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. I, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Court impugned in the appeal. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the application for temporary injunction at an early date. The interim order passed in this appeal on 8th October, 2001, is hereby vacated. There will be no order as to costs. If an urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant expeditiously, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. Appeal allowed