Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeks quashing of FIR No. 99 dated 12.7.2002 under Sections 376/420/342/506/34 IPC, registered at Police Station City Faridkot, Annexure P-1 and the proceedings consequential thereto, on the basis of compromise, Annexure P-2. 2. In the compromise-deed, Annexure P-2, it is stated that under some mental tension and because of some misunderstanding, the deponent had given an application against the accused person, namely, Jaspal Singh to some Senior Officers. Consequently, the aforesaid FIR was registered. Thereafter, the Panchayat members and other respectables have intervened. She is now living with the accused as his wife. She is also stated to be four months pregnant. Although very serious allegations have been made against the petitioner in the FIR, yet the respondent appeared before the Court on 21.8.2002 and stated that she is willing to marry the petitioner. It was also stated that she is pregnant from the loins of the petitioner. Mr. Duggal has submitted that in such circumstances, it is open to this Court to quash the FIR and the proceedings subsequent thereto, in the interest of justice. In support of this proposition, the learned counsel has relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Sanjiv Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and another, 1996(1) Sic 735. In that case, in similar circumstances, it has been observed that since the complainant is not likely to support the case of the prosecution, it would be in the interest of justice to put an end to the proceedings. In the present case, the complainant has already made an application to the District Magistrate for withdrawal of the prosecution. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors., 1988(1) Recent Criminal Reports 565 (SC), the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 3. The aforesaid observations are fully applicable in this case. 4. In peculiar circumstances of this case, I am of the considered opinion that it would be futile exercise to permit the proceedings to continue. Powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are extraordinary in nature which are to be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It must, however, always be remembered that although the powers are extraordinary in nature, the same are to be used sparingly and with circumspection to secure the ends of justice. These powers must never be exercised to subvert the course of justice. Although axiomatic, but it must be reiterated that greater the power, greater the care and caution with which it ought to be exercised. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, AIR 1997 SC 1489 held that "in the exercise of the wholesome power under Section 482 of the Code High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed." This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., 2000(1) RCR (Criminal) 707 (SC). In the present case, I am satisfied that it would be in the interest of justice to put an end to the criminal proceedings.
In the present case, I am satisfied that it would be in the interest of justice to put an end to the criminal proceedings. The offence under Section 376 IPC not being compoundable even with the permission of the Court, would not prevent the court from quashing the proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if the ends of justice so require. I find support for this view of mine in an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh v. Manveen Kaur in Special Leave Petition Appeal (Cri.) No. 4391/98 decided on 14.5.1999. While allowing the Special Leave Petition at the motion stage itself, the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "Upon hearing counsel, the Court made the following Order : I.A. No. 5 of 1999 is allowed and petition for dissolution of marriage which is transferred to this Court is allowed to be amended accordingly. There will be a decree for dissolution of marriage between Manveen Kaur and Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh by mutual consent, as prayed. The parties have also recorded terms of compromise between them relating to payment of alimony, withdrawal of proceedings instituted by either party before any court etc. The terms of compromise signed by both the parties and their advocates are taken on record. There will be an order in terms of the compromise so recorded. We also direct that Criminal Case arising out of FIR No. 59 of 1994 dated 26.4.1995 under Section 406/498A IPC filed in the Police Station, Section 26, Chandigarh which has been transferred to this Court is quashed. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly." 5. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that it would be in the interest of justice to put an end to the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent-wife. 6. This view of mine is also supported by the judgment rendered in the case of Ajay Kumar Singla and others v. State of Haryana and another. In this case, it has been held as follows :- "9.
6. This view of mine is also supported by the judgment rendered in the case of Ajay Kumar Singla and others v. State of Haryana and another. In this case, it has been held as follows :- "9. The Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2000(1) RCR(Crl.) 92 (SC) : J.T. 1999(1) SC 147 has held that Section 320 Cr.P.C. which deals with compounding of offences provides two tables therein and only such offences as are included in said two tables can be compounded and none else, in view of the provision contained in sub- section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. that no offence shall be compounded except as provided for by this section. But, in my view this decision will not be applicable to the facts of the present case before this court. The decision of the Honble Supreme Court referred to above was rendered in a criminal appeal. One of the appellants before the Honble Supreme Court had been convicted in an offence under Section 326 IPC which is a non-compundable offence. Therefore, in those circumstances, the Honble Supreme Court held that the court cannot grant leave to that appellant to compound the offence in as much as the offence under Section 326 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. But in the present case, the matter is still pending before the trial court. The petitioners herein have not been convicted, and this is not an appeal against the conviction. The petitioners want the FIR itself quashed on the ground that the matter has been compromised. The second respondent complainant has filed the affidavit that she does not want to pursue the criminal proceedings and that she has no objection to quash the FIR in question. In these circumstances, this Court is not requested to grant leave to compound the offence. The prayer is to quash the FIR and the consequent criminal proceedings on the ground that there is no use of keeping the proceedings pending since the complainant herself is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. Her father has also filed an affidavit to that effect. In these circumstances, I am of the view that though the court cannot grant permission to the parties to compound an offence which is not compoundable in terms of Section 320 Cr.P.C. this court can quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings before the conviction.
Her father has also filed an affidavit to that effect. In these circumstances, I am of the view that though the court cannot grant permission to the parties to compound an offence which is not compoundable in terms of Section 320 Cr.P.C. this court can quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings before the conviction. Inasmuch as it will be a wastage of time and an exercise in futility to allow the proceedings to go on. If the complainant and others are not going to support the case of the prosecution, then the trial court would have only to undertake the exercise of conducting a trial in which there is no chance of convicting the accused. Therefore, instead of allowing this exercise in futility, I am of the view that the FIR in question and the consequential proceedings can be quashed in the interest of justice. Of course, the State has filed reply stating that the charge-sheet has been filed before the trial court, but, in view of the fact that the complainant herself is not willing to support the allegations in the FIR, I am of the view that the filing of the charge-sheet cannot be taken to be a bar to the quashing of the proceedings." 7. I am of the considered opinion that aforesaid ratio of law is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 99 dated 12.7.2002 under Sections 376/420/342/506/34 IPC, registered at Police Station City Faridkot, Annexure P-1 and the proceedings consequential thereto are hereby quashed. No costs.