S. B. Sinha ( 1 ) CORRECTNESS or otherwise of a Division Bench decision of this court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Pragati Builders and N. R. D. C. India and another, reported in 45 (1991) DLT 264, having been doubted, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. , reported in AIR 1967 SC 1801 , the matter was referred to the Larger Bench by a Division Bench of this court by an order dated 13th March, 2002. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS are the owners of the premises in question. Either lift or air conditioner or both are installed therein. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, in purported exercise of its power conferred upon him under Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (in short the dmc ) issued the following Notification on 23. 10. 1989 and 24. 10. 1989, which reads thus: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI PUBLIC NOTICE lift contained or situated in or upon any building form an integral part of such building for its more beneficial enjoyment and is not plant or machinery contained or situated in or upon any land or building. However, to put this matter beyond any point of doubt, with the approval of Standing Committee, it is hereby notified under Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal corporation Act, 1957 that lift shall be deemed to form part of land and building for the purposes of determining the rateable value of such land and building under Sub-section (1) of Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation act, 1957. " ( 3 ) ALTHOUGH the aforementioned notification had been issued in respect of the lift admittedly no Notification was issued in respect of the air conditioning machine. ( 4 ) THE contention raised in these writ petitions is that having regard to the fact that, by reason of Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of DMC Act an unguided, unbriddled and naked power has been conferred upon the Commissioner without laying down any guidelines therefor, the same is ultra vires. Strong reliance, in this regard, has been placed on New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Strong reliance, in this regard, has been placed on New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, reported in 59 (1995) DLT787 (SC)= (1995) 3scc 716andmum. Corp. v. National Res. Dev. Corp. , reported in 1988 RLR 221 . ( 5 ) MR. Bharat Bhushan Jain, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would contend that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Pragati builders (supra), having not considered the aforementioned decision of the Apex court in New Manek Chowk Spg. And Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), the same cannot be said to have laid down a good law. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel no rateable value, having regard to the delhi Municipal Corporation (Determination of Rateable Value) Bye-laws, 1994 (in short the said Bye-laws ), could have been applied in relation to lifts and air conditioners installed in the buildings the same having been exempted, the first part of Sub-section (3) of Section 116 must be held to be unconstitutional. The learned counsel would contend that so far as Bye-law No. 2 (l) (f) (i) and (ii) of the said Bye-laws are concerned, the same had also been held to be ultra vires in Delhi Urban house Owners Welfare Association and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 60 (1995) DLT 644 (DB), which decision has upheld by the Apex Court in Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Delhi Urban House Owners Welfare Association, reported in 69 (1997) DLT 391 (SC ). ( 7 ) MR. Anil Grover, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that lifts and air conditioners would come within the definition of "building" and "premises" as contained in Sections 2 (3) and 2 (38) of the DMC Act, as lifts and air conditioners would be fittings in the building and are meant for proper use and enjoyment thereof and, thus, the decisions cited by Mr. Jain have no application. Learned Counsel pointed out that the provisions of the delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 differ in material particulars and, thus, the aforementioned decisions which have been rendered in terms of the other statutes cannot be said to have the value of a binding precedent. Jain have no application. Learned Counsel pointed out that the provisions of the delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 differ in material particulars and, thus, the aforementioned decisions which have been rendered in terms of the other statutes cannot be said to have the value of a binding precedent. ( 8 ) DELHI Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 was enacted to construe and amend the law relating to Municipal Corporation of Delhi. "land" had been defined in section 2 (24) of the DMC Act to mean: " land includes benefits to arise out of land, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and rights created by law over any street. "section 2 (3) of the DMC Act defines "building" to mean: " building means a house, out-house, stable, latrine, urinal, shed hut, walls (other than a boundary wall) or any other structured whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or other material but does not include any portable shelter. " ( 9 ) THE expression "premises" has been defined in Section 2 (38) of the DMC Act to mean: "premises means any land or building or part of a building and includes: (a) the garden, ground and out-house, if any, appertaining to a building or part of a building; and (b) any fittings affixed to a building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. " ( 10 ) IN terms of Delhi Municipal Corporation (Determination of Rateable value) Bye-laws, 1994 meaning of the words "cost of the premises" has been laid down. Bye-law 2 (l) (f) defines "rent" inter alia to include: "2 (1) (f) rent includes (i) Licence fee, commission, supervision charges, ware-housing charges or such other payments, by whatever name called, made by the occupier for vise of the premises and the amenities provided therein; (ii) Charges for fixtures and fittings air-conditioning, lifts, elevators, etc. and other similar payments. ( 11 ) IN terms of Section 113 (l) (a) of the DMC Act property tax is to be levied. Such tax is leviable as a certain percentage of the rateable value of the property. and other similar payments. ( 11 ) IN terms of Section 113 (l) (a) of the DMC Act property tax is to be levied. Such tax is leviable as a certain percentage of the rateable value of the property. Section 116 thereof specifies the mode of determination of rateable value, in terms whereof the rateable value of any land or building assessable to property tax would be the annual rent to which such land or building may reasonably be expected to let from year to year less (a) sum equal to ten per cent of the said annual rent which shall be in lieu of an allowance for costs of repairs and insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain the land or building in a State to command the rent. Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the DMC Act empowers the Commissioner of the corporation that after obtaining approval of the Standing Committee to notify by public notice any inclusion of such plant and machinery contained or situate in or upon any land or building whereupon the same shall be deemed to form part of the land or the building for the purpose of determining the rateable value thereof under sub-section (1) thereof. ( 12 ) THE contention of the petitioner in effect and substance is that lift and air conditioning machines being plant or machinery within the meaning of the said provisions, issuance of a notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the dmc Act was imperative. As noticed hereinbefore, according to the learned counsel, Sub-section (3) of Section 116 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of power and thereby an unguided and unbriddled power has been conferred upon the Commissioner and, thus, the same is ultra vires. ( 13 ) WITH a view to consider the question involved in these writ petitions, it is necessary to compare the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, Bombay Provincial Municipal corporation Act, 1949 and Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, which are in the following terms: ( 14 ) ON a bare comparison of the provisions of the aforementioned statutes, it would appear that the definition of "building" and "premises" in DMC Act are wider than that of any other legislative enactment. In terms of Section 2 (38) (b) even any fitting affixed to a building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof could be a part of the premises. No such provision exists in b. M. C. Act, 1888 and B. P. M. C. Act, 1949. Similarly in Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the DMC Act, all plant and machinery contained or situate in or upon any land or building are specifically stated, which expression does not find place in any other enactment. Yet again even in the said Bye-laws charges for fixtures and fittings, air conditioning, lifts, elevators, etc. and other similar payments is included in the definition of rent. ( 15 ) NOTIFICATION dated 23. 10. 1989 would clearly show that the same had been issued ex majori cautela. Lift s and air conditioners are fittings and fixtures need not necessarily be plant or equipment. As a lift being permanently embedded on the land, the same would form part of the land. Property tax is levied both on land or building. Whether it is land or a building, for the purpose of determination of the rateable value, composite rateable value of both are required to be taken into consideration. Rateable value of lifts, elevators air conditioners may form part of value of the land. ( 16 ) IN a situation of this nature, thus, we are of the opinion that it is not even necessary for us to go into the question, as to whether Sub-section (3) of Section 116 is unconstitutional or not, inasmuch as it is well known that for the purpose of construction of a statute the terms which are statutorily defined must be given the same meaning throughout the statute unless the context otherwise requires but we shall briefly advert to the said question a littler later. Keeping in view the fact that by reason of such statutory definition enlarged meaning had been given to the words "building", "land" and "premises", the same must be held to be applicable for the purpose of Sub-section (1) of Section 116 as also the DMC (Determination of rateable Value) Bye-laws, 1994. ( 17 ) IN Pragnti Builders (supra), upon consideration of a large number of decisions including the decisions of the Apex Court in CA Nos. 617 and 618 of 1971 decided on 19/27th April, 1979, it was held: "21. ( 17 ) IN Pragnti Builders (supra), upon consideration of a large number of decisions including the decisions of the Apex Court in CA Nos. 617 and 618 of 1971 decided on 19/27th April, 1979, it was held: "21. We can cull from the above discussion the following points which are to be kept in mind while determining the rateable value of a building: (a) Has the machinery installed in a building become part of the said building on account of some degree of annexation? (b) Is the said machinery so annexed to the building for its better enjoyment and enhancement of its utility? (c) Whether any hypothetical tenant would be ready to occupy the said building with all its available facilities and amenities? (d) What reasonable return a tenant would be called upon to pay on the total investment of the owner for raising such a building alongwith all its annexures and fixtures so as not to exceed its standard rent? 22. It can be safety concluded from above that in case a machinery is so annexed to the building that it has become a part thereof, and it is there for its better enjoyment, in that eventuality it is to be taken into account for the determination of its rateable value. We are thus of the view, from the conspectus. . . . of the above authorities that a lift is very much a part of the building and thus is to be taken into account for fixing the rateable value. " ( 18 ) THE said view appears to be reasonable to us and we, with respect, agree therewith. ( 19 ) IN New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court was considering imposition of property tax on textile mills, factories, buildings of universities and not on a residential building. " ( 18 ) THE said view appears to be reasonable to us and we, with respect, agree therewith. ( 19 ) IN New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court was considering imposition of property tax on textile mills, factories, buildings of universities and not on a residential building. ( 20 ) RULE 7 (2) of the Rules framed under B. P. M. C. Act the interpretation whereof was the subject matter of consideration therein was in the following terms: "rule 7 (2) All plant and machinery contained or situate in or upon any building or land and belonging to any of the Classes specified from time to time public notice by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Corporation, shall be deemed to form part of such building or land for the purpose of fixing the rateable value thereof under Sub-rule (1) but, save as aforesaid, no account shall be taken of the value of any plant or machinery contained or situated in or upon any such building and land. " ( 21 ) IN terms of the definition of land as contained in Section 2 (30) of the b. P. M. C. Act, although things attached to the earth or permanently fastened thereto would come within the purview of the definition of "land", the same was excluded for the purpose of determination of the rateable value and as such it was held that ratability of plant and machinery dependent on judicial decisions as to the meaning of the word "land" and as such there was no reason as to by those decisions, as to what was comprehended by the term "land", could be accepted when in the statutes plant machinery had been excluded therefrom. It was held: "27. It, therefore, appears to us that Rule 7 (2) of the rules framed under the bombay Act of 1949 was beyond the legislative competence of the State. The rule also suffers from another defect, namely, that it does not lay down any principle on which machinery is to be specified by public notice by the commissioner to be deemed to form part of such building for the purpose of fixing the rateable value. To this, Mr. Setalvad argued that if the building was equipped with machinery for the purpose of running a textile mill, whatever machinery was there for the purpose would be valued. To this, Mr. Setalvad argued that if the building was equipped with machinery for the purpose of running a textile mill, whatever machinery was there for the purpose would be valued. According to him, the question would be, which of the machinery would help in the enjoyment of the property and thereby add to its rateable value. Unfortunately, the specification of the classes is done from time to time by the Commissioner with the approval of the Corporation irrespective of the question as to where they are to be found. It, therefore, depends on the arbitrary Will of the Commissioner as to what machinery he would specify and what he would not. Moreover, he is the only person who can examine this question. There is no right of appeal from any specification made under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 except that the commissioner is to act under the directions of the Standing Committee. Rule 7 (2) shows that all plant and machinery may not be taken into account for the purpose of valuation and any such plant or machinery which is not included in the classification may escape ratability, however, much they may be prized by the tenant who takes the premises on rent. It seems to us, therefore, that Rule 7 (2) is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 is also invalid on account of excessive delegation of powers by the Legislature. " ( 22 ) HOWEVER, in the instant case the Commissioner is not the only person who can determine, as to whether any plant and machinery contained or situated in or upon any land or building and belonging to (sic.) of the classes specified from time to time by public notice shall be deemed to form part of the land or building but therefor he was required to obtain the approval of the Standing Committee. Thus, it cannot be said that wholly unguided and uncanalized power was conferred upon a statutory authority. ( 23 ) IN Hindustan Level Ltd. (supra), one of the contentions raised was that, as to whether cost of air conditioning machinery amounting to Rs. 5,91,767. 50 and cost of false ceiling amount to Rs. 7,80,289/- should have been added to the cost of construction. The type of air conditioning device put up therein was different. ( 23 ) IN Hindustan Level Ltd. (supra), one of the contentions raised was that, as to whether cost of air conditioning machinery amounting to Rs. 5,91,767. 50 and cost of false ceiling amount to Rs. 7,80,289/- should have been added to the cost of construction. The type of air conditioning device put up therein was different. They were embedded and mounted on a concrete foundation and the building has been so designed as to have the whole of it centrally air-conditioned. For the said purpose, a provision was made for concrete cooling towers on the terrace and steel pipes have been laid down to ensure the circulation of the cooling water from the tower to the ground floor and then back to the tower where for false ceiling on each floor was required to be installed. ( 24 ) THE Apex Court referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Poona municipal Corporation v. Shankar Ramkrishna Jabade, reported in (1957) 60 Bom. LR 25, and distinguishing the same it was held: "9. Relying on Chagla, CJ. s judgment in Poona Municipal Corporation case and the aforesaid English decisions, Mr. Nariman submits that as the air conditioning machinery in the present case had been embedded in the building and became its integral part, the same must be deemed to become a part of the building, the value of the same has to be included in fixing rateable value of the building. To put it differently, the submission is that the machinery which is exempted by Section 154 (2) is one which has its separate existence, which submission has been advanced because of the use of the expression "contained in" or "situate upon" in the sub-section. We cannot accept this contention, because in that case this provision would be rendered otiose, as rightly urged by Mr. Ganesh, inasmuch as the type of machinery which Mr. Nariman has in mind cannot in any case form part of rateable value. When the Legislature sought to exclude the value of machinery of the type mentioned in Sub-section (2) from forming a part of rateable value, some meaning has to be ascribed to the provision, otherwise the intention of the legislature would get frustrated. Nariman has in mind cannot in any case form part of rateable value. When the Legislature sought to exclude the value of machinery of the type mentioned in Sub-section (2) from forming a part of rateable value, some meaning has to be ascribed to the provision, otherwise the intention of the legislature would get frustrated. We, therefore, state that the fact that a machinery gets embedded to a building or becomes an integral part of it has relevance while deciding the question of applicability of the exemption provision. " ( 25 ) THE said decision, therefore, again has no application in the instant case having regard to the fact that interpretation of the expression land , "building", etc. of the DMC Act and BMC Act were different. ( 26 ) IN Delhi Urban House Owners Welfare Association and Another (supra), it was held that the Bye-laws have been framed on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Act and on the basis of the law as laid down in the various judgments of the supreme Court and this Court. However, Explanation II to Rule V, Bye-law 3 (1) (e) was found to have been widely worded holding: "20. We find Explanation II to Rule V, Bye-law 3 (l) (e) is widely worded. In new Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Others, AIR 1967 SC1801, the Court was considering the relevant rule framed under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation act under which all plants and machinery contained or situated inor upon any building or land could be deemed to form part of such building or land for the purpose of fixing the rateable value. It was submitted before the Court that such a provision was beyond the competence of the State as otherwise even plant and machinery in the factory premises could be taken into account for arriving at the rateable value. It was submitted before the Court that such a provision was beyond the competence of the State as otherwise even plant and machinery in the factory premises could be taken into account for arriving at the rateable value. The Court said that a hypothetical tenant would certainly take into consideration the machinery in the building if he was going to rent it for the purpose of running a textile factory, and if the same legislature had power to levy a tax only on land and building it could not be seen how the same would be levied on machinery contained in or situated on the building even though the machinery was there for the use of the building for a particular purpose. This Explanation, therefore, has to be given a limited meaning with reference to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In this connection reference may also be made to decision of the Supreme Court in hindustan Lever Ltd. s case (supra ). " ( 27 ) IT is not a case where the plant and machinery are fitted in a factory. It is also not a case where a central air conditioning plant has been fitted. It is also not a case where, on plain reading of the provisions of the Act, lift and air conditioner cannot be said to be a part of the fittings and fixtures to the building. The said decision, therefore, does not run counter to the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents. ( 28 ) ONCE it is held that the afore-mentioned Notification had been issued only by way of an abundant caution and the lifts and air conditioning machines would otherwise come within the purview of the definitions of "land", "building" and "premises", we are of the opinion that the decisions cited by Mr. Jain are not applicable in the instant case. It is now trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced thereform. Furthermore a decision rendered in relation to one State Act cannot be mechanically applied although the scope and purport of the interpretation clause are entirely different. ( 29 ) IN Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. M/s. Jagdama Oil Mills and another, reported in I (2002) SLT 571 =jt 2002 (1) SC 482, the law is laid down in the following terms: "19. ( 29 ) IN Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. M/s. Jagdama Oil Mills and another, reported in I (2002) SLT 571 =jt 2002 (1) SC 482, the law is laid down in the following terms: "19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 ac 737 at P. 761, Lord Mac Dermot observed: "the matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissimavertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge. "in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. , 1970 (2) All ER 294, Lord Reid said, "lord atkin s speech. . . . . is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances". Megarry, J. in (1971) 1wlr1062 observed: "one must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell LJ. as if it were an Act of Parliament". And, in Herrington v. British railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537, Lord Morris said: there is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. " ( 30 ) FOR the reasons afore-mentioned, we are of the opinion that the decision of this Court in Pragati Builders (supra), has laid down the law correctly. There is thus no merit in the writ petitions which are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.