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2002 DIGILAW 1013 (PNJ)

State Of Haryana v. Maman Ram

2002-10-03

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, S.S.NIJJAR

body2002
Judgment S. S. Nijjar, J. 1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record of the case. 2. Mr. Chaudhary has vehemently argued that the findings given by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Panipat, (hereinafter referred as to "the Tribunal"), are contrary to the evidence produced. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel. Being impressed by the submissions made by the learned counsel earlier on 29.01.2002, this Court had summoned the record. We have perused the entire re -. cord and find that the petitioner has not produced before the Tribunal the relevant record in the form of Muster Rolls etc. to conclusively prove the number of days on which the respondent had worked during any particular calender year. The management having not produced the relevant record, cannot now be permitted to argue that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal are not based on evidence produced before it. The fact that the management did not produce the Muster Rolls would lead to an adverse inference being drawn against the petitioner. Further more, we have seen from the record that workman has been in the employment of the petitioner since 1983. He has been sought to be retrenched in the year 1994. 3. Mr. Chaudhary has also vehemently argued that the workman had abandoned the job. Therefore, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, would not be applicable. However, a perusal of the award rendered by the learned Tribunal shows that although an issue to this effect had been raised, but the management did not lead any evidence to prove that the workman had actually abandoned the job. Mr. Chaudhary, however, relied on a judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s. Om Parkash and Anr. , (1998)8 S. C. C.733 and submitted that the demand for a reference having been raised by the workman after a period of more than two and half years, from the date of retrenchment would lead to an inference that he had abandoned the job. 4. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid authority is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case the workman a daily rated worker had worked from 10.08.1985 to 30.06.1986. Thereafter, he ceased to report for work. The management had not passed any order of retrenchment. 4. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid authority is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case the workman a daily rated worker had worked from 10.08.1985 to 30.06.1986. Thereafter, he ceased to report for work. The management had not passed any order of retrenchment. The workman simply sought a reference on 11.05.1989. This references answered in favour of the workman. It was held that there was breach of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "interim stay against the impugned award was granted on condition that the amount of back wages is deposited within 15 days. That condition has been satisfied. The High Court, in our view, was wrong in summarily rejecting the petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution because this, in our view, was a fit case where the jurisdiction was erroneously exercised by the Labour Court. The admitted facts show that after the first respondent was appointed with effect from 10.8.1985, he worked up to 30.6.1986 and thereafter ceased to report for work. The employer has not taken any step to terminate his service. He being a Daily-rated workman himself chose to remain absent and it was after a period of almost three years that he raised a demand and the same came to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The second question is whether there was a violation of Sec.25-F of the Act. The authority below has come to the conclusion that he had worked for a period from 10.8.1985 to 30.6.1986 which would be less than one year. Therefore, the authority was wrong in concluding that he had worked for 240 days during 12 months immediately preceding the date of eessation of work. Besides no information was laid before the authority as to how many days during that period he had worked for but in any case, he had not worked for 12 calender months". 5. The aforesaid observations make it crystal clear that Supreme Court was consider ing the peculiar facts of that case. In the present case, admittedly, the management did not lead any evidence on the issue of abandonment. Not only this, the management did not even care to produce the relevant record with regard to the days on which the work man was employed. In the present case, admittedly, the management did not lead any evidence on the issue of abandonment. Not only this, the management did not even care to produce the relevant record with regard to the days on which the work man was employed. However, from the record we have seen that the workman had been in the employment of the petitioner off and on for about 11 years. We are of the consid ered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it would be wholly inap propriate for this Court to interfere with the well reasoned award rendered by the learned Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.