Judgment :- P. SHANMUGAM, J. This is an appeal against conviction for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by a helpless woman having nothing but her honour to defend against the cruel depredation by none else than her husband. 2. The facts of the case as stated by the prosecution is as follows: The deceased is the husband of the appellant. They are agricultural coolies. They were married for 14 years on the date of the occurrence, i.e. On 19.11.1993. They have a boy aged ten years and a girl aged five years. However, their married life was not happy. The husband was a drunkard and used to spend his earnings on drinking liquor and brandi and used to give Rs.5/- or Rs.10/- on the days he goes for work. The rest of the days, he used to quarrel to take the money earned by the wife for his drinking. On 18.11.1993, as usual, the deceased returned from the work in a drunken mood after spending all the money on liquor and demanded the money earned by the wife. At about 6.00 P.M. on 18.11.1993, the appellant refused to concede to the request of the deceased stating that the money available was not sufficient even to purchase food materials for the children and the family and that she would be given her earning only the next day, for which the deceased had replied stating that the money earned by both of them is not sufficient to lead a decent living and nothing could be saved for the past 14 years, and in future also, there was no possibility of any savings and demanded her to accompany him to go to a lodge at Athur or Salem to do prostitution. The appellant pleaded with the deceased stating how can he say like that when they have two children and refused to comply with his illegal demand. He then suggested that she could be a mistress to somebody who will be able to give sufficient money for a comfortable living of their family. He had also suggested that she could enter into sale of illicit arrack and earn money. For this also, the appellant refused. It was 10 pm by that time. He then brandished a knife, threatening to kill her if she did not accompany him that night itself. He had also suggested that she could enter into sale of illicit arrack and earn money. For this also, the appellant refused. It was 10 pm by that time. He then brandished a knife, threatening to kill her if she did not accompany him that night itself. Afraid of her husband using the knife, she had pleaded with him that it was too late to go out and that she would agree for whatever he would say the next day and that he could go to sleep. Thereafter, the deceased went for sleep threatening her that she should not reveal this to anybody and that if she runs away, he would go to the police with a complaint of theft of jewellery, money, etc. against her. Brooding over the prospect of going to a lodge as well as the threat, she was vexed in her life, thinking throughout the night without sleep. Ultimately, she decided to put an end to her husband's life, and by 3.00 am, she took two stones from the backyard of the house and dropped on the head and body of the deceased one by one. Finding that blood was coming out of his head and that he was dead, she went and reported to the Village Administrative Officer at 4.30 am, and an extra judicial confession Ex.P1 was taken from her by the V.A.O. She was taken to the Police Station by the V.A.O. at 6.30 am and on his report and a case was registered as Crime No.1522 of 1993 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was arrested at 7.15 am and was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, who remanded her to judicial custody. At the request of the Investigating Officer dated 22.11.1993, a judicial confession was recorded by Judicial Magistrate No.II, Athur on 24.11.1993. 3. The Investigating Officer commenced the investigation immediately without any delay, and after post-mortem and on completion of other formalities, a charge under Section 302 I.P.C. was framed against the accused by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Salem. 4. The learned Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence and the documents and the material objects has found the accused guilty under S.302 of I.P.C. and sentenced her to undergo life imprisonment. The appeal is against that judgment. 5. 4. The learned Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence and the documents and the material objects has found the accused guilty under S.302 of I.P.C. and sentenced her to undergo life imprisonment. The appeal is against that judgment. 5. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that there is no eyewitness in this case excepting the extra judicial confession and judicial confession of the accused herself, and the conduct of the deceased and the quarrel have been spoken to by P.W.1 to P.W.3 including the father of the deceased P.W.4. The learned Counsel rests his argument on the exception to Section 300 I.P.C. and submits that the sustained threat caused by the deceased justified her action and pleads for a lesser sentence, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigation commenced immediately; and that the prosecution witnesses have spoken to clearly of the motive for the appellant; and the charge has been clearly made out as against the accused. However, he fairly submits that he has no doubt as to the veracity of the confessional statement and the act of the accused which may not come within the definition of murder. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and considered the matter carefully. 8. The fact that the death of the deceased was caused in the manner put forth by the prosecution is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that on 19.11.1993 at 3.00 A.M., the accused by the use of M.O.1 (series) granite blocks had dropped them on the head of the deceased while sleeping, and consequent on which, he sustained grievous injuries and died on the spot. The fact that the deceased immediately reported the matter at 4.30 A.M. to the Village Administrative Officer and also gave an extra judicial confession Ex.P1 is not in dispute. The Village Administrative Officer took her to the Police Station at 6.30 A.M., and First Information Report Ex.P15 was registered at 7.15 A.M. under S.302 of I.P.C. P.W.1 to P.W.3 all in clear terms speak about the persistent quarrel going on between the deceased and the appellant during the years of their family life. The Village Administrative Officer took her to the Police Station at 6.30 A.M., and First Information Report Ex.P15 was registered at 7.15 A.M. under S.302 of I.P.C. P.W.1 to P.W.3 all in clear terms speak about the persistent quarrel going on between the deceased and the appellant during the years of their family life. It is not in dispute that the deceased is a drunkard and used to come home drunk, quarrel with the appellant and beat her. The father of the deceased P.W.4 also admits the behaviour of the deceased. 9. The extra judicial confession was given within an hour of the incident, and a judicial confession was made within four days of the occurrence. The reason stated in the judicial confession is in consonance with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses for the motive for the occurrence. The relevant portion from the confession statement, Ex.P.9 is as follows : We find that the deceased had not supported the family. He not only ill-treated the appellant during the 14 years of their family life, but has also gone to the extent of causing depredation to compel her to open illicit arrack sale, or be a mistress to some wealthy person, or go in for prostitution. Finding that the amount earned by both of them is not sufficient to meet the expenses for his drinking and that they are not able to save anything out of their earnings, the deceased had thought of a scheme of making the accused an earning-machine by making her a mistress of a wealthy man, who will be able to make their living comfortable by giving money, etc. or to subject her to prostitution in one of the lodges in Athur or Salem to meet his expenses. The deceased, even on the night of 18.11.1993, is said to have pulled her hair and dragged her to go to the lodge the same night and also threatened her brandishing a knife that if she did not come and did not concede the demand of the deceased, he will murder her. It is the accused who pleaded that she would concede to his demand in the morning, after prostrating at the feet of the deceased and telling that after taking bath, they can go in the morning for whatever purpose the deceased left her. It is the accused who pleaded that she would concede to his demand in the morning, after prostrating at the feet of the deceased and telling that after taking bath, they can go in the morning for whatever purpose the deceased left her. The accused also states in her confessional statement that after 10.00 P.M., when the deceased had gone for sleep, she was brooding over and thinking whether she can run away and also thought about her husband's threat of lodging a false complaint against her that she had run away with jewels and ultimately she could be caught and she would be left with no other option. She could not sleep the whole night, unable to bear her own husband torturing her in this manner. In those circumstances, in the continued threat of the husband and the provocation, she thought that there was no other option except to act in order to defend herself and ultimately, by 3.00 am, she went to the backyard of her house, took two granite stones M.O.1 (series) and dropped those stones one by one on the head of the husband, causing the injuries resulting in the death of the husband. 10. The learned Sessions Judge found in paragraph 22 of his judgment that in view of the torture for several years, the accused, in order to live peacefully, killed her husband in a mood of desperation. The learned Judge refused to accept that there was immediate provocation as against her husband's compulsion to go for prostitution, she having pacified him. Ultimately, the learned Judge reasoned that she should have sought for a relief through the court or panchayat instead of murdering the deceased and therefore, found that the act of the appellant was intentional to commit the murder of the deceased. 11. P.W.1, the Village Administrative Officer, states that the appellant woke him up in the early in the morning at 4.30 am on 19.11.1993 and informed him that she had killed her husband at 3 am on that early morning. Upon hearing this, he went to the house of the appellant and found the deceased dead and thereafter he took the appellant to the police station. In the cross-examination, the V.A.O. says that he had earlier seen the appellant during the time of distribution of free sarees. Upon hearing this, he went to the house of the appellant and found the deceased dead and thereafter he took the appellant to the police station. In the cross-examination, the V.A.O. says that he had earlier seen the appellant during the time of distribution of free sarees. He had denied the suggestion that the appellant had given the complaint at 4 am and since there was no witness, he was helping the police as an informant for preparing the F.I.R. P.W.3, who is the resident of the house opposite to the appellant's house, states that the deceased used to quarrel with the appellant and beat her and that on the previous night of the occurrence, there was a quarrel in their house. In the cross-examination, he says that inspite of their saying that he should not beat her, he did not heed to their advice. He is clear in his evidence that the deceased was torturing the appellant. The father of the deceased, P.W.4, admits that they were living together, but he used to sleep in a different house during nights. He says that on the previous night of the occurrence, there was a quarrel. P.W.11 states that the deceased appeared before the police station at 6.30 am along with the V.A.O. and Ex.A.2 is the statement given by the V.A.O. and on that basis, the F.I.R. was registered at 6.30 am. 12. From the above oral and documentary evidence, it is clear that the appellant, after the occurrence at 3 am, went to the V.A.O., who took her to the police station at Athur, which is five kilometres away and a F.I.R. was registered under Section 302 I.P.C. and immediately, P.W.11, the Inspector of Police commenced his investigation and went to the scene of occurrence at 7.15 am. The evidence of P.W.1, the statement of the appellant, Ex.A.1 , the complaint of the V.A.O., Ex.A.2 and the F.I.R., Ex.A.5, all speak in unison as to the torturous conduct of the deceased. 13. The appellant has given a judicial confession statement on 22.11.1993, which was recorded by P.W.6 as Ex.A.9, wherein she repeats the compulsion of the deceased to go in for prostitution. 13. The appellant has given a judicial confession statement on 22.11.1993, which was recorded by P.W.6 as Ex.A.9, wherein she repeats the compulsion of the deceased to go in for prostitution. The appellant, in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. before the Second Additional Judge, Salem, in her answer to Question No.17, states that her husband compelled her to go in for prostitution and on her refusal, she was threatened by him that she would be killed and therefore, she had beaten him with the two stones and that he fell down on the stone near the door and died. In her defence statement, she has repeated the same statement that there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased which went on for an hour during the night on 18.11.1993 and when the appellant refused to go in for prostitution, she was dragged out of the door of the house by the deceased and when she refused to come out of the house, he took a knife and threatened her that she would be killed, and fearing that he may kill her, she had put the two stones on her husband's head. 14. The fact that the appellant had been continuously tortured and ill-treated by the deceased husband has been spoken to by all the witnesses and this kind of torture was going on for years together. It is only on the previous night of the occurrence, it went to the extent of forcing the appellant to go in for prostitution. Though this aspect of compulsion on the part of the deceased is not independently heard or spoken to by anybody else excepting the appellant, considering the cogent evidence in this case, namely Ex.A.1, Ex.A.2, Ex.A.7, the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as well as her defence statement, we have no reason to doubt the veracity of the statement of the appellant. Even the learned Sessions Judge has found that the torture was going on for several years and unable to bear the torture, for living a peaceful life and out of desperation, she should have committed the murder. 15. The confession made by the appellant must be used either as a whole or not at all. Even the learned Sessions Judge has found that the torture was going on for several years and unable to bear the torture, for living a peaceful life and out of desperation, she should have committed the murder. 15. The confession made by the appellant must be used either as a whole or not at all. The prosecution cannot rely on a portion of it for the purpose of proving the guilt of the accused without taking into account the remaining portion of the confession which mitigates the severity of the offence. In HANUMANT VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 343), it was held that it is settled law that an admission made by a person, whether amounting to a confession or not, cannot be split up and part of it used against him. An admission must be used either as a whole or not at all. 16. In the light of these serious allegations, we are of the view that the deceased is guilty of the use of criminal force assault with an intent to outrage the modesty of the appellant, the appellant is entitled to the right of private defence of her body and person. The appellant though, the wife of the deceased, cannot be deprived of her right to life and liberty. She is entitled to choose her profession and cannot subject her energy or body to the likes of her husband. Therefore, in order to defend her right and in the face of the sustained threats to the life of her person and body, the appellant had committed the act, with the knowledge that death of the deceased will be the likely result, by exceeding the said right. It cannot be a murder since the appellant has exercised her right of private defence in good faith that otherwise, she will be killed for her failure to go in for prostitution. The threat given by the deceased was real and continuing. We have take into account the rustic nature and the background of the appellant that she was an illiterate agricultural coolie woman in penury with two children who wanted to maintain her honour and dignity. The threat given by the deceased was real and continuing. We have take into account the rustic nature and the background of the appellant that she was an illiterate agricultural coolie woman in penury with two children who wanted to maintain her honour and dignity. She was faced with several threats at the same time, namely to sell arrack or to go in for prostitution in the lodges or to be a mistress of a wealthy person or to face police complaint of theft in case she runs away or if found in the house, she would be killed by her husband on her refusal to concede to his illegal demands, which were all alive to the appellant and continued. Considering the fact that the deceased had been torturing the appellant, as deposed by all the prosecution witnesses including the father of the deceased, it is not improbable that the deceased was capable of assaulting her with an intention of subjecting her to prostitution, which might have reasonably caused the apprehension in the mind of the appellant that grevious hurt will be otherwise the consequence. Therefore, it is a clear case of exceeding the right of self-defence coming within Exception (2) to Section 300 I.P.C. 17. In this male dominated country, women are too little disposed to help themselves. They submit themselves to the cruel depredations even to the most outrageous acts at the hands of persons, which includes their own husbands and they have remarkable adaptability and submissiveness to their domination. Every attempt of women to raise their voice is discouraged by parents, in-laws and the community as a whole; with a result, the spirit of self-defence has been lost in women. No wonder that the appellant had been bearing the torture at the hands of her husband for 14 long years. In these circumstances, to take a view that the appellant should have gone to the panchayat or the court for a divorce against her husband who compels her to go in for prostitution and wait for the ultimate relief, in our opinion, is too much to expect from a poor agricultural coolie, in the circumstances of the case. In these circumstances, to take a view that the appellant should have gone to the panchayat or the court for a divorce against her husband who compels her to go in for prostitution and wait for the ultimate relief, in our opinion, is too much to expect from a poor agricultural coolie, in the circumstances of the case. Looking from the angle of the appellant as a person with no education and support, when everybody including the father of the deceased husband simply allows the torture of the deceased to go on, she would have most probably thought that there was no other way except to defend herself, lest she should submit to the various schemes proposed by her husband, failing which she had to face the threat of her own murder or a criminal complaint against her. Though the hard choice taken by her eliminated the threat by exceeding the right of private defence, she had made herself willingly liable for the guilt of committing culpable homicide. By getting along with her husband, she would have landed in an irretrievable position, though it would have met her husband's needs. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant has not committed a murder and that the act comes squarely under Exception (2) to Section 300 I.P.C. 18. While considering the nature of punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, it is clear that the appellant had committed the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, but without an intention of causing death to the deceased husband. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant is punishable under Part-II to Section 304 I.P.C. It is stated that the appellant has already undergone imprisonment for a period of 2-1/2 years. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that justice will be done if the appellant is awarded the imprisonment of 2-1/2 years or so, i.e. the period of imprisonment already undergone by her as a punishment. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is set aside to the extent indicated above.