P. K. CHATTOPADHYAY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are the employees of Calcutta Port Trust who claimed payment of overtime wages for 48 hours per week during the period from January 1968 to 30th September 1983. The petitioners though preferred the aforesaid claim before the various authorities of the Calcutta Port Trust but according to the petitioners no step was taken up by the respondent, Calcutta Port Trust Authorities for the redressal of their grievances. Accordingly, petitioners filed a claim application before the respondent No. 1 claiming a total sum of Rs. 1,24,72,713/- as it was the contention of the said petitioners that the said amount was wrongfully deducted from the overtime wages of the petitioners during the period from January 1968, to 30th September 1983. ( 2 ) SINCE the aforesaid claim of the petitioners was beyond the statutory period of limitation, a prayer was also made by the petitioners for condonation of delay in filing the application before the authorities. It has been stated by the petitioners that the learned lawyer representing the petitioners before the respondent No. 1 did not inform the petitioners about the date fixed by the respondent No. 1 for hearing the application filed by the petitioners for deciding the issue of limitation and as such none of the petitioners could appear on the said day before the respondent No. 1. Furthermore, the lawyer representing the petitioners also did not appear before the respondent No. 1 without assigning any reason. Since none appeared on behalf of the petitioners at the time of hearing of the application before the respondent No. 1, the prayer for condonation of delay made on behalf of the petitioners in filing the claim application was rejected. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 1 passed an order to the following effect: ?that the case be and the same is dismissed being barred by limitation and the application is not admitted. ? Challenging the validity and/or legality of the said order of the respondent No. 1, the petitioners filed the present writ petition before this Court. ( 4 ) THE petition was moved on 17th June 1992, before this Court when learned single Judge of this Court passed an Order directing the parties to file affidavits in the matter. ? Challenging the validity and/or legality of the said order of the respondent No. 1, the petitioners filed the present writ petition before this Court. ( 4 ) THE petition was moved on 17th June 1992, before this Court when learned single Judge of this Court passed an Order directing the parties to file affidavits in the matter. It may be mentioned that the learned counsel of the respondents never raised any objection on the ground of maintainability of the writ petition. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, when the matter was taken up for hearing, a specific objection was raised on behalf of the respondents on the ground of maintainability of the writ petition. Learned advocate of the Port Trust Authorities submitted that the present writ petition is not at all maintainable in view of the fact that the impugned order passed by the authority of Payment of Wages Act, dismissing the application made by the petitioners under section 15 (2) of the said Act is an appealable order and in terms of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act an appeal should have been preferred. Learned counsel of the respondent Port Trust Authorities submitted that the petitioners herein cannot challenge the order of the respondent No. 1 in the instant writ petition without preferring the statutory appeal as has been provided specifically under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. The learned counsel of the respondents submits that the petitioners cannot avoid the provision of statutory appeal under any circumstances and since in the instant case petitioners did not prefer an appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) MR. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 1 was not an order on merit under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, appeal would only lie in the event application filed under section 15 (2) is decided on merit. Referring to the order passed by the respondent No. 1, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that the application of the petitioners was not admitted by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and as such the application was never decided on merit. Mr. Referring to the order passed by the respondent No. 1, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that the application of the petitioners was not admitted by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and as such the application was never decided on merit. Mr. Bhattacharyya accordingly contended that as the application filed by the petitioners under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act was never decided by the respondent No. 1 on merit, no appeal could be preferred under section 17 of the said Act. Mr. Bhattacharyya referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1955 Bom 75 and submitted that the petitioners herein had no other alternative but to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Hon'ble Court as the prescribed authority refused to assume jurisdiction on the ground of limitation and did not decide the application of the petitioners herein filed before the said prescribed authority on merits. ( 7 ) MR. Bhattacharyya further submitted that provision of appeal under section 17 of the said Act should be treated as an alternative remedy available to the petitioners. Referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that non-availability of the alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar for filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of the contention that the alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar in filing a writ petition, Mr. Bhattacharyya cited the following decisions: (1) 1985 (3) SCC 267 (Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana ). 2) AIR 1959 SC 725 (K. K. Kochunni v. State of Madras) (3) AIR 1999 SC 688 (Mewa Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee ). ( 8 ) THE prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act refused to admit the application of the petitioners herein on the ground of limitation. The said prescribed authority rejected the prayer for condonation of delay and dismissed the application of the petitioners being barred by limitation and thus the application filed by the petitioners has not been decided by the prescribed authority on merits. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, the said order was passed dismissing the application filed under sub-section 2 of section 15 and section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, the said order was passed dismissing the application filed under sub-section 2 of section 15 and section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act. Under section 17 of the said Act, an appeal lies against an order dismissing an application made under sub-section 2 of section 15 or against the direction made under sub-section 3 or sub-section 4 of that section. Therefore, in my opinion the impugned order passed by the authority refusing to admit the application and dismissing the same being barred by limitation is clearly an appealable order and the petitioners could prefer an appeal under section 17 of the said Act. I do not agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of C. S. Lal (supra ). ( 10 ) IN the case of Chhetriya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Second Additional District Judge, reported in (1992)2 LLN 830, Allahabad High Court held that an order condoning the delay under section 15 (2) can be challenged in an appeal under section 17. Prescribed authority passed an order rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the application under section 15 (2) of the said Act. The said order of the prescribed authority on an application filed under section 15 (2) is appealable under section 17 of the said Act. Merely because no order was passed on merits by the prescribed authority, the same will not bring the case outside the purview of section 15 (2) of the said Act and as such the same can be challenged in an appeal under section 17 of the said Act. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned advocate of the Port Trust authorities that in view of the provision of the statutory appeal, instant writ petition is not at all maintainable. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel of the respondents, alternative statutory remedy would be a bar in entertaining this writ petition by this Hon'ble Court. In my view, provision of alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar for the High Court in case of entertaining a writ petition. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel of the respondents, alternative statutory remedy would be a bar in entertaining this writ petition by this Hon'ble Court. In my view, provision of alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar for the High Court in case of entertaining a writ petition. The Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademark, reported in (1998)8 SCC categorically held that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in spite of the alternative statutory remedy is not affected. ( 13 ) IN the present case, writ petition was admittedly moved on 17th June 1992 in presence of the learned advocate of the respondents but no objection was raised on the ground of maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of the respondents. After a lapse of a period of long 10 years at the time of final hearing of the writ petition, respondent Port Trust authorities are seeking dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of maintainability for not preferring the statutory appeal against the order of the prescribed authority. The Supreme Court in a recent decision reported in 2001 AIR SCW 509 (M/s. Somani Steels Ltd. and Another v. Collector of Central Excise and Others) observed thus: ?in our view, the ground of alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a factor which has to be taken into consideration while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court and, therefore, dismissing the writ petition after 8 years on the ground of alternative remedy would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction. The learned Additional Solicitor General has fairly submitted that on this ground it is not possible to sustain the order under challenge. Accordingly, the order under challenge is set aside. The writ petition is restored to the file of the High Court. The case is remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law by allowing this appeal. ? ( 14 ) THE Payment of Wages Act is no doubt a beneficial legislation for the workmen. This Act was enacted to ensure that the wages payable to employees covered by the Act are disbursed by the employers within the prescribed time limit. ? ( 14 ) THE Payment of Wages Act is no doubt a beneficial legislation for the workmen. This Act was enacted to ensure that the wages payable to employees covered by the Act are disbursed by the employers within the prescribed time limit. In the present case, petitioners herein filed an application before the prescribed authority under the Act claiming a considerable amount which according to the employees were unlawfully deducted from their overtime wages. Instead of adjudicating the said claim of the employees of the petitioners herein on merits, the prescribed authority rejected the prayer for condonation of delay and dismissed the case of the petitioners being barred by limitation and refused to admit the application of the petitioners filed under section 15 (2) of the said Act. ( 15 ) THE prescribed authority should have taken liberal view in dealing with the prayer of the petitioners for condonation of delay in the matter of filing an application under section 15 (2) of the Act and the said application should have been decided on merits after adjudicating the claims of the petitioners. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the learned lawyer representing the petitioners before the prescribed authority did not inform anyone of the petitioners about the date fixed by the prescribed authority in respect of the hearing of the application as a result whereof none of the petitioners could attend the proceedings on the day of hearing of the said application of the petitioners before the prescribed authority. ( 16 ) IT has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the reasons for non-appearance of the learned advocate of the petitioners before the respondent prescribed authority are not known to the petitioners. In any event, the petitioners cannot suffer on account of the laches and lapses on the part of the lawyers. The Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq v. Munshilal, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 also held as hereunder:3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?. ( 17 ) THE prescribed authority should have taken a lenient view while considering the prayer for condonation of delay made on behalf of the petitioners herein, as the Supreme Court, in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Ananta Nag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 categorically held that while considering the prayer for condonation of delay, Courts should adopt liberal approach. The reasons for adopting such approach have been specifically mentioned in the said judgment and the relevant portion from the said judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted hereinbelow: and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out of the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) ?every day's delay must be explained? does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. ? A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. ? ( 18 ) FURTHERMORE, principle on which relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is the accrual of third party interest by reason of the delay in initiating the proceeding. The same is not the case here. Admittedly, no rights of the third party have accrued in the instant case on account of delay in filing the claim petition by the petitioners herein. Accordingly, in order to ensure a justice oriented approach, I am satisfied that sufficient grounds have been furnished by the petitioners for condoning the delay in filing the claim petition. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, the impugned order of the prescribed authority dismissing the application of the petitioner filed before it on the ground of limitation is not at all sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside and hence the same is set aside. Delay is condoned. The matter is remitted to the prescribed authority for disposal of the same on merits. Since a considerable time has already been lapsed, the respondent No. 1 shall take necessary steps for disposal of the aforesaid claim application of the petitioners as expeditiously as possible but positively within a period of 4 months from the day of communication of this order. The writ petition is thus allowed in the manner indicated above. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be given to the learned advocate for the parties. Petition allowed