Judgment ( 1. ) PLAINTIFF aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by the Courts below by which suit of plaintiff seeking eviction of the respondents from the suit shop on the ground of bona fide necessary was dismissed. ( 2. ) PRESENT suit was filed on 22-3-1984 before Rent Controlling authority but after amendment in M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it was transmitted to Civil Court to decide in accordance with law. Suit was filed on the ground that the respondents are tenants of the suit accommodation at the rate of rent Rs. 300/- per month. The aforesaid accommodation is bona fidely needed for the office of hotel of appellant. The present place of office is very small and insufficient to the appellant. Size of present place of office is 86" x 183" which is a room of hotel and in absence of any other accommodation appellant has to carry on his office in the aforesaid room. Plaintiff is also in need of one room for stores which is also not available to him. On this ground the suit was filed for suit accommodation which is suitable for the need of plaintiff. Another ground of eviction is that the suit shop was given to Premchand as a Proprietor of Fine Footwear, but, subsequently, Premchand sub-let it to defendant Nos. 3 and 4, Kripaldas and Bhagchand, and parted with possession of the shop either for consideration or otherwise for which no permission was sought from the appellant. On this ground the suit was filed. ( 3. ) RESPONDENTS filed written statement contesting the suit inter alia, the ground of bona fide necessity and sub-tenancy was denied. Contention of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is that the only purpose of filing suit is to enhance the rent. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are not the sub-tenants but, in fact, they are tenants of suit accommodation. The suit is filed on incorrect facts. ( 4. ) THE Trial Court, after framing the issues, recorded the evidence and held that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are tenants, respondent No. 1 has not sub-let the accommodation to respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The suit accommodation is not bona fidely needed by plaintiff. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. Plaintiff preferred an appeal but by the impugned order, Appellate court dismissed the appeal. ( 5. 3 and 4 are tenants, respondent No. 1 has not sub-let the accommodation to respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The suit accommodation is not bona fidely needed by plaintiff. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. Plaintiff preferred an appeal but by the impugned order, Appellate court dismissed the appeal. ( 5. ) THIS appeal was admitted on 5-12-2001 on following substantial questions of law:- " (1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of the learned First Appellate Court that Premchand (R-l) Proprietor of Fine Footwear has not parted with possession of the suit (sic) when he left India and a partnership firm was created and Kripaldas (R-3) and Bhagchand (R-4) have been inducted as new partners of the firm in place of Premchand (R-l) the sole Proprietor, is perverse and arbitrary ? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of Courts below that the suit accommodation is not suitable for the requirement of the landlord, is perverse and arbitrary ?" ( 6. ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant submits that the findings of the Courts below are perverse and the Courts below have not correctly appreciated the evidence in respect of bona fide necessity and also in respect of the sub-tenancy of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The contention of the appellant in short is as under:- (i) That, in Para 3 of the plaint, plaintiff has pleaded that he is owner of the shop and Premchand, Proprietor of Fine Footwear, and Fine Footwear are the tenants. On 29-8-1986 defendant nos. 1 and 2 who were only the parties, filed their written statement and have admitted this fact in Para 1 of the written statement. This written statement was also signed by Kripal Das who was not a party at the relevant time. In the circumstances, this is an admission by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and respondent no. 2 Fine Footwear was not a registered partnership firm but was a Proprietorship concern. (ii) Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were subsequently impleaded as party. In Para 1 of the written statement filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 they have denied the fact that Premchand was tenant as a Proprietor of Fine Footwear. In Para 7 of the written statement, it is pleaded that plaintiff wrongly impleaded defendant no. (ii) Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were subsequently impleaded as party. In Para 1 of the written statement filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 they have denied the fact that Premchand was tenant as a Proprietor of Fine Footwear. In Para 7 of the written statement, it is pleaded that plaintiff wrongly impleaded defendant no. 1 as party while he was knowing that he is not a tenant and, in fact, defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4 are tenants, who are regularly paying the rent and are obtaining receipt from plaintiff. On this, ground of sub-tenancy was denied. The aforesaid written statements are contradictory to each other. Subsequently, written statement filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was amended and following pleadings were incorporated :-"that the defendant No. 1 and one Kripaldas were doing the business in the suit premises as partners of defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 separated from the partnership vide dissolution deed dated 26-6-1980 and defendant No. 1 retired from the firm with effect from 31-12-79. The firm defendant No. 2 was reconstituted by partnership deed dated 6-3-80 with Kripaldas and Bhagchand as its partners. Thus the defendant No. 1 did not have any interest in the firm defendant No. 2. " though this amendment was incorporated in the written statement of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, but defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have not taken such a plea. (iii) The defendants have not filed any documentary evidence showing the fact that the Fine Footwear was a partnership firm and this firm was tenant. While Fine Footwear was a Proprietor concern and subsequently it was converted into a partnership firm, then it will amount to sub-tenancy. Premchand defendant no. 1, Proprietor of Fine Footwear was the tenant and after converting the Proprietorship concern into partnership firm by inducting respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as partners and subsequently retiring defendant No. 1 Premchand from the partnership will amount to sub-letting the accommodation, and Courts below erred in not decreeing the suit of appellant under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. (iv) So far as bona fide necessity is concerned, plaintiff has proved his case. 3 and 4 as partners and subsequently retiring defendant No. 1 Premchand from the partnership will amount to sub-letting the accommodation, and Courts below erred in not decreeing the suit of appellant under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. (iv) So far as bona fide necessity is concerned, plaintiff has proved his case. Courts below erred in rejecting the ground of bona fide necessity on the ground that appellant is doing hotel business in which he is having other rooms which are being used for customers, who are staying in the hotel and this may be treated as alternative accommodation and on this ground Courts below erred in declining the ground of bona fide necessity of the appellant. The accommodation is used in the business and the passengers are staying in the accommodation which is a part of business and can not be said to be vacant alternative accommodation available to the appellant. Merely room Nos. 11,12, 13 and 16 were let out to Trade Centre for office will not amount that the appellant has got some accommodation and let it out to some other. In fact, room Nos. 11,12,13 and 16 in the hotel were given to Trade Centre for their office. Appellants need is still existing for office. On this ground, appellant contended that the findings of the Courts below are perverse and liable to be set aside. ( 7. ) TO consider first substantial question of law, it is necessary to look into the findings recorded by the Courts below. The Courts below have declined the ground of sub-tenancy on the ground that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were partners in Fine Footwear with respondent Premchand and after retiring Premchand from partnership, defendant Nos. 3 and 4 continued in the partnership. The appellant in his statement has admitted that the suit shop was given to Fine Footwear for footwear business. As respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are partners of the said firm, in the circumstances, decree under Section 12 (1) (b)of the Act was declined. In this regard, the pleading of written statement in para 1 of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is material in which they have specifically admitted that the suit shop was given to Premchand as a Proprietor of Fine footwear. The aforesaid pleading was never amended. Respondent Nos. In this regard, the pleading of written statement in para 1 of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is material in which they have specifically admitted that the suit shop was given to Premchand as a Proprietor of Fine footwear. The aforesaid pleading was never amended. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in their written statement have taken a plea that defendant No. 1 Premchand is not a tenant of suit accommodation, the plaintiff was receiving rent from defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4 and was issuing receipts to these defendants, so the tenancy was with respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and this fact was within the knowledge of plaintiff. Though in the written statement filed by defendant nos. 1 and 2, as quoted hereinabove, amendment was incorporated on 4-4-1998 by which the aforesaid quoted para was incorporated. From the perusal of receipts (Exs. P-l, P-5, P-6, P-10, P-11, P-14 and P-15), these receipts were issued either in the name of Fine Footwear or in the name of Premchand, proprietor Fine Footwear, only the receipts (Exs. P-12 and P-13) were issued in the name of Premchand, Partner of Fine Footwear. These two are dated 3-1-80 and 23-2-96. Except two receipts no other document is on record showing that the rent was paid by the partnership firm. Plaintiff (P. W. 1) in para 15 was cross-examined that the person present in Court was Premchand while he was Kripaldas, and plaintiff identified him as Premchand. He has stated that he was the person who was paying the rent. He identified the same person as Premchand. Thereafter, plaintiff has explained that the shop is in the name of Fine Footwear and he is also issuing receipts in the name of said firm. In Para 18 of cross-examination, he denied the fact whether Fine Footwear is a partnership firm. In Para 22 of the cross-examination, he was asked by the defendants whether defendant No. 1 Premchand obtained consent of the plaintiff to induct defendant Nos. 3 and 4 as partners but it was denied. In para 30 of the statement, he has stated that the tenant was not a partnership firm and the receipts (Ex. P-12 and P-13) were wrongly issued, on which it is written "premchand, Partner Fine Footwear". In Para 33, he has stated that the factum of sub- tenancy came into his notice when defendant appeared in the witness box. ( 8. P-12 and P-13) were wrongly issued, on which it is written "premchand, Partner Fine Footwear". In Para 33, he has stated that the factum of sub- tenancy came into his notice when defendant appeared in the witness box. ( 8. ) THOUGH the defendants Kripaldas and Bhagchand have appeared in the witness box but Premchand has not appeared. Why Premchand was not examined by the defendants, there is no explanation. Kripaldas gidwaani (D. W. 1) in his statement in Para 6 states that Premchand is not in possession of the shop since 1980, he has left the partnership. Subsequently, he states that in the year 1963 Kripaldas had taken this shop on tenancy but the receipt was issued in the name of Premchand. He further admits that partnership was created in the year 1966 with Premchand and he had entered into partnership in the year 1966. In the year 1963 the suit shop was taken at the rate of rent Rs. 300/- which is still continuing. The plaintiff never asked for enhancement of the rent. In Para 19 of statement, he admits that Premchand retired from the partnership with effect from 31st December, 1979 and thereafter plaintiff started issuing receipts in the name of Fine Footwear and name of Premchand was not written in receipt. In Para 20 of his statement, he has stated that he paid Rs. 3600/- to the plaintiff but this fact is not pleaded in the written statement. In Para 22 of his statement, he accepted that the partnership deed was written with the defendant No. 1 Premchand but whereabouts of it, he shown his ignorance. He also admits that dissolution of partnership with premchand was reduced in writing. He has not produced it in Court. Bhagchand son of Kripaldas also appeared in the witness box. In Paras 6 and 7 of his statement, he has denied the factum of sub-tenancy. He submits that receipts were issued on payment of rent which bear his signatures as the payee of the rent. In Para 8 of his statement, he has stated that he is partner of Fine footwear and this fact is in the knowledge of plaintiff. In Para 16 of his statement, he states that he is partners since January, 1980. Partnership was reduced in writing but he has not brought it with him. In Para 8 of his statement, he has stated that he is partner of Fine footwear and this fact is in the knowledge of plaintiff. In Para 16 of his statement, he states that he is partners since January, 1980. Partnership was reduced in writing but he has not brought it with him. Though he has stated that he has filed a copy of the partnership deed on the record but the same is not available on the record. In Para 19 of his statement, he admits that he has not obtained any written consent of plaintiff to take the shop from Premchand but it was oral consent and thereafter, he started to pay the rent and plaintiff did not object to it. In Para 20 he submits that partnership still continues. Where Premchand resides at presently, he is having no knowledge. Considering the aforesaid statements of defendants Kripaldas and Bhagchand, it is apparent that partnership was entered in the year 1966 with Premchand and suit shop was in possession of Premchand since 1963. Partnership deed was not produced by the defendants in Court nor the dissolution deed of partnership is filed in the Court below. All the facts go against the defendants. From the perusal of written statement filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, they had admitted the fact that the tenancy was with Premchand, and Fine Footwear was a proprietorship concern. While in the amendment incorporated in the written statement filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, it is stated that previously premchand and Kripaldas were doing business and the aforesaid partnership was dissolved in the year 1980. This fact is contrary to the fact pleaded by kripaldas and Bhagchand in their written statement. Why the partnership deed and dissolution deed of partnership were not produced in the Court, there is no explanation by the defendants. Merely in the statement of plaintiff some questions in respect of identity of Kripaldas were asked by itself will not give any benefit to the respondents. Such fishy cross-examination can not be permitted in civil cases. When the case of defendants is definite that the tenancy was entered with Premchand and Fine Footwear. After a long time, the fact that the tenancy was with the partnership of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 was introduced. Such fishy cross-examination can not be permitted in civil cases. When the case of defendants is definite that the tenancy was entered with Premchand and Fine Footwear. After a long time, the fact that the tenancy was with the partnership of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 was introduced. Though the defendant No. 3 in his statement has not supported this fact but the fact remains that the previous pleadings of the parties are on record. They were not deleted, and explanation given by defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in the written statement was not proved by them. The Courts below ought to have drawn adverse inference against the respondents by not filing deed of partnership, and dissolution of partnership deed with Premchand. Non-examination of Premchand is also fatal to the defendants. Defendants have not produced any record of assessment of Income-tax which could very well prove that the partnership was in existence since 1966. By suppressing the facts, defendants have tried to defeat the claim of plaintiff which can not be allowed in law. After appreciating the statement of P. W. 1 and D. Ws. 1 and 3, it is proved that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 entered into tenancy with the plaintiff but subsequently Premchand has parted with the possession of suit shop to defendant Nos. 3 and 4. In view of the aforesaid, plaintiff has successfully proved ground of eviction under Section 12 (1) (b) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act and the Courts below erred in declining the decree under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. In this regard, finding recorded by this Courts below is apparently perverse and accordingly is set aside and plaintiffs suit under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act is decreed. ( 9. ) SO far as the substantial question of law in respect of bona fide necessity of plaintiff, the Courts below have declined it on the ground that he is running hotel business in which he is in possession of various rooms and aforesaid rooms are available to the appellant for his necessity and four rooms of the hotel were given to Trade Centre for its office. On these grounds the decree was denied under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the accommodation in possession of the appellant is being used for his hotel business. On these grounds the decree was denied under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the accommodation in possession of the appellant is being used for his hotel business. In the hotel, it is common knowledge, passengers are staying for short time. It is a running business in which passengers are coming and going. It is not the case of respondent that the aforesaid accommodation are lying vacant and is not being used by the appellant for his hotel business. It is settled that alternative accommodation must be available to the plaintiff in a vacant position. But in the present case, it is the case of the defendants that the plaintiff is running a hotel business and the accommodation of hotel is an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for his office need. The accommodation occupied and used in a business can not be said alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for his office need. The case of the plaintiff has to be seen in the light of his business. In the circumstances, the courts below erred in denying decree of eviction to the appellant on the ground that the accommodation in the hotel is an alternative accommodation available to the appellant. Merely plaintiff has given four rooms of hotel to trade Centre will not disentitle plaintiff for his need. If the plaintiff is in need of some more accommodation for his hotel business then it can not be said that the need is not bona fide. Plaintiff stated that the present place of office is inadequate. He has to keep his several goods in the office and in this regard, he needs the suit accommodation for his business. The business of plaintiff was not considered by the Courts below. Every case has to be decided on its own facts. The case of plaintiff is for the bona fide necessity for his office for hotel. The accommodation used in the hotel can not be said to be alternative accommodation until and unless it is established that the such accommodation is available to the plaintiff is apart from the accommodation use in the hotel. In the circumstances, Courts below erred in denying the decree to the plaintiff for bona fide necessity. Finding of the Court below is perverse and accordingly it is set aside. In the circumstances, Courts below erred in denying the decree to the plaintiff for bona fide necessity. Finding of the Court below is perverse and accordingly it is set aside. The plaintiff has successfully proved his bona fide necessity for the suit accommodation where plaintiff wants to shift his office. Present accommodation in office is insufficient. In the circumstances, judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the suit of plaintiff is decreed under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act, as well. ( 10. ) IN view of the aforesaid, this appeal is allowed, judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit for eviction is decreed under Section 12 (1) (b) and (f) of the Act. ( 11. ) AS the respondents are occupying the suit shop and they are running their business therein and they may not get other accommodation immediately, in the circumstances, in the interest of justice, respondents are allowed some time to vacate the accommodation on following conditions:- (a) respondents will file an undertaking in the Trial Court within 30days from today that they will vacate the suit shop on or before 31st March, 2003, peacefully without any hindrance or creating any third party interest; (b) respondents will deposit entire arrears of rent within 30 days from today and will continue to pay rent as required under Section 13 of the Act; and (c) In case of non-compliance of any of the conditions, the appellant shall be entitled to execute the decree forthwith. ( 12. ) WITH the aforesaid, this appeal is allowed with cost which is quantified at Rs. 2000/ -. Second Appeal allowed.