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2002 DIGILAW 1035 (RAJ)

Kera Ram v. State of Raj

2002-05-21

N.P.GUPTA

body2002
JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner seeking to assail the order Annex. dated 13.1.2002, whereby the petitioner, working as Gram Sewak, Gram Panchayat Nimbau, District Jalore has been transferred to the post of Gram Sewak, Sankhada, Panchayat Samiti Pokaran, Dist. Jaisalmer. This order has been passed purportedly on the recommendations of the Village Level Vigilance Committee, and the transfer has been ordered exercising powers conferred by the State Government vide Circular Gr. 1/99 dated 2.7.99. 2. According to the petitioner there was some dispute between the petitioner and the Sarpanch, as the Sarpanch pressurised the petitioner to sign the cheques, so as to enable the Sarpanch to withdraw money from the Panchayat Fund for his own use, to which the petitioner declined, on the ground that he can sign only those cheques which are against genuine payment for the work done by the Gram Panchayat, and the Panchayat Fund cannot be used by the Sarpanch for his own use, as it can be used only for development purposes. 3. According to the petitioner the Village Level Vigilance Committee was constituted on 11.8.2001, wherein the Sarpanch was Chairman, Hari Ram Bishnoi, Headmaster, and Smt. Phooli Devi Ward Member were nominated as members of the Committee, and one post of member to be filled by the senior most retired employee was vacant, as no member as available. It is in this background that the order Annex. 1 dated 31.1.2002 has been passed on the complaint of the Village Level Vigilance Committee. According to the petitioner on receipt of this order he contacted the members of the Committee, whereupon Shri Hari Ram Bishnoi, Headmaster, and Smt. Phooli Devi, Ward Member stated that they have never sent any such resolution or complaint of Village Level Vigilance Committee on 30.1.2002 to the Divisional Commissioner, and the Sarpanch only informed that he had made a complaint against the petitioner before the Division Commissioner in the name of Village Level Vigilance Committee of Gram Panchayat, and he has done so because the petitioner has refused to sign the cheques. With these facts it has been contended that the Divisional Commissioner has no jurisdiction, under the Service Rules, or any other rules, to transfer any employee from one district to another district. In other words the order Annex. 1 has been contended to be wholly without jurisdiction. With these facts it has been contended that the Divisional Commissioner has no jurisdiction, under the Service Rules, or any other rules, to transfer any employee from one district to another district. In other words the order Annex. 1 has been contended to be wholly without jurisdiction. A reference has been made in the writ petition to the earlier judgments of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3664/2000, Atma Prakash v. State of Rajasthan decided on 7.10.2000 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1296/2001, Bali Devi v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 23.8.2001 wherein it has been held that the order dated 2.7.99 is unenforceable. A prayer has been made for quashing Annex. 1. 4. Vide order dated 20.2.2002 show cause notice was issued, and ad interim stay order was granted staying operating of the impugned order. Thereafter reply has been filed, and after few adjournments the case came up. Since more than 10 cases of this nature has come to be listed, having been filed in succession, in some of them writ petitions have bee admitted by me, and ad interim stay order has been granted, wherein applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution have been filed, while in other cases no ad interim order had been passed. In this view of the matter, at the request of the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petitions are being taken up for final hearing at this stage itself, and accordingly I have heard learned counsel on merits, in this case as well: 5. In the reply few preliminary objections have been taken, viz. that the petitioner has not come with clean hands before the Court, and has concealed material and importance facts from this Court, and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Other objections taken is that the petitioner is not working with sincerity, and therefore, complaint was lodged against the petitioner by the villagers, in "Prasashan Gaon Ke Sang" at Nimbau being Annex. R/i. It is also contended that prior to this complaint, Sarpanch had also lodged a complaint against the petitioner on 8.7.2001, Annexure R/2. Other objections taken is that the petitioner is not working with sincerity, and therefore, complaint was lodged against the petitioner by the villagers, in "Prasashan Gaon Ke Sang" at Nimbau being Annex. R/i. It is also contended that prior to this complaint, Sarpanch had also lodged a complaint against the petitioner on 8.7.2001, Annexure R/2. It is also contended that the petitioner has concealed the facts to the effect that he is discharging the duties with utmost sincerity, and there is no complaint whatever from the villagers about the working of the petitioner, inasmuch as the petitioner has committed grave irregularity in discharging his duties. While distributing ration cards, he has taken Rs. 25/- per card and did not issue any receipt to anybody for the same, those persons were categorised under the 'Below Poverty Line', were granted general ration card, so that they could not get the benefit of policies and stood deprived of the loan facilities, and had not issued ration card to everybody, it is also alleged that the petitioner was also found guilty of not presenting all the resolutions, passed in the meeting of Gram Panchayat before the Vikas Adhikari, which effected the development work, and the petitioner was also found guilty of demanding bribe of Rs. 3000/- to forward the application forms under the Indira Housing Scheme. It is then alleged that the remained absent from the headquarters, and most of the time he is found at home, and fills forged muster roll, and misuses the Government fund. The petitioner was also alleged to have been guilty of committing irregularities in constructing Rajeev Gandhi Pathshala, and did not submit all the accounts, therefore he was found guilty of misusing the Government fund, which is a subject of enquiry. It was in this background that the villagers were unhappy, and requested for his transfer, in the camp held in "Prashashan Gaon Ke Sang". With this preface it is contended that the respondent No. 2 i.e. the Divisional Commissioner is the competent authority to transfer the petitioner. For competent reference has been made to Section 98 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act 1994, which is alleged to empower the State Government to authorise any officer to perform a particular function, and that the Divisional Commissioner has been authorised to issue such orders vide notification dated 16.2.2002. 6. For competent reference has been made to Section 98 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act 1994, which is alleged to empower the State Government to authorise any officer to perform a particular function, and that the Divisional Commissioner has been authorised to issue such orders vide notification dated 16.2.2002. 6. An alternative argument has been raised that even if the Divisional Commissioner is assumed to be not having competence in the matter, no interference is required to be made by this Court, as "the writ court is not bound to interfere with an order, merely on the technical grounds, where the action has been taken in view of public policy and statutory provisions". Reference has been made to judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Mohammed Swaleh v. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut, reported in AIR 1988 SC 94 . It is also contended that the petitioner has obtained interim order from this Court by concealing the fact that he has been relieved w.e.f. 20.2.2002, and thus the petitioner is guilty of concealing material facts and fraud. With pleading these facts, reliance has been place on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, report in (2000) 3 SCC 581 wherein it has been observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together". Then reference has been made to various other judgments in this regard, by pleading that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud, or made misrepresentation, and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions. 7. Then another contention has been raised in para 8 of the reply that even if the order is found to be bad/illegal/without jurisdiction, the Court may not interfere "if setting-aside the order amounts to reviving an invalid order". To support this proposition reference has been made to certain judgments of this Court, and Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 8. Then in parawise reply, disputing the allegations of the petitioner about his working with sincerity, reference has been made to both the complaints referred to above. Then in para 3 it has been pleaded that the Committee was constituted in pursuance to order dated 2.7.1999, 14.7.1999, 15.3.2000, circular dated 10.12.2001 and notification dated 16.2.2002. Copies of which all orders are also produced. Then in para 3 it has been pleaded that the Committee was constituted in pursuance to order dated 2.7.1999, 14.7.1999, 15.3.2000, circular dated 10.12.2001 and notification dated 16.2.2002. Copies of which all orders are also produced. Regarding competence of the Divisional Commissioner it has been pleaded that, under Section 98 the Divisional Commissioner has been sub-delegated the power vide notification dated 16.2.2002, whereby the State has conferred required competence to issue such transfer orders in pursuance of the complaints filed by the villagers. During the course of arguments the averments in the writ petition, and the reply were practically reiterated, and the cases mentioned in the pleadings of the parties were cited. In addition the learned counsel for the respondent cited a Division Bench judgment of this Court dt. 10.4.2002 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (writ) No. 53/2002, State of Rajasthan v. Narpat Ram , wherein it has been held that in view of the order dated 2.7.99, the State Government empowered the Divisional Commissioner to transfer employee from one district to another district and, when the order dated 2.7.99 is not under challenge, the transfer order could not be quashed by the learned Single Judge. Since the validity of the order dated 2.7.99 is not under challenge before me in this writ petition, in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court for the purpose of present writ petition, I have to proceed with the assumption that the order dated 2.7.99 is to be considered to the subsisting. 9. It is however made clear that I should not be understood. to have upheld or accepted the validity of the order dated 2.7.99. The order dated 2.7.99 has been produced as Annex. R-3 at page 38 of the paper book being circular No. Pa.6(28)Anu.-3%99 dated 2.7.99 whereby the consent of His Excellency the Governor was conveyed for constitution of a Village Level Standing Committee at Panchayat Headquarter to ensure the availability of the categories of employees mentioned therein at the headquarter, and it was contemplated that if any employees is absent from the headquarter, the Committee would report to the controlling officer and would also set a report to the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner whereupon the controlling officer shall take appropriate departmental/administrative action and intimate to the committee within one month, and that the Divisional Commissioner, in accordance with circular No. P18(5)Pra. Su./Group-1/99 dated 2.7.99 Will be competent to transfer such employee in other district. This order No. 1/99 dated 2.7.99 has not been produced by any of the parties on the file of this writ petition. Since there are two orders of the State Government dated 2.7.99 and it is not clear from the judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench as to which order dated 2.7.99 was contemplated to have not been challenged in other writ petition, the things are in obscurity. Be that as it may. During the course of arguments my attention was. invited to the aforesaid other order dated 2.7.99, which has been produced by some parties in the other writ petition, which is also listed today before me, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1351/2002, wherein it has been produced as Annex. 4, so also as Annex. R/9, 'hereinafter referred to be as order No. 1/99 dated 2.7.99', a perusal of this order shows that this order contemplates action to be taken in the event of the employee being found absent from the headquarter and the matter being reported by the Village Level Committee to the Controlling Officer, and to the Divisional Commissioner. It is also provided in this order that in cases of certain employees being found absent during the tours of Hon'ble the Minister/Divisional Commissioner, or the Collector, in that event also the matter will be reported to the Divisional Commissioner. Then in para 3 it has been contemplated that in the event of such reports being received, the Divisional Commissioner is authorised to order transfer of the employee to other district "after taking into account the facts and circumstances", and information about such transfer shall be given to the head of department, and that such transfer shall not be cancelled by the department, and can be altered only after approval of the Cabinet Sub Committee. 10. In rejoinder argument, it has been contended that the judgment rendered by this Court in Atma Prakash and Ball Devi's case has not been assailed in appeal, with the result that they acquired finality, and since in Atma Prakash case it was clearly held by this Court that such circular being in contravention of law has to be ignored, in view of the law laid down in Ram Ganesh Tripathi v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1997 SC 1446 . Elaborating the finding it was held that the service conditions of Teachers are governed by Rajasthan Education Subordinate Service Rules, 1971. The power of transfer, admittedly is only with the educational authorities. Consequently any other authority, which has not been conferred such powers under the Statute, or Statutory Rules, cannot be overridden by any executive instructions, or circular of the Government. For this reliance has been placed by this Court on a Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sant Ram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910 . Then it was also considered that apart from the power of transfer, even the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, is with the Educational Authorities. In that case the allegation was about the petitioner being involved in undesirable activities, it was held that the matter could have been brought to the notice of the Educational Authorities, and the Educational Authorities could have passed the appropriate orders. The judgments in Atma Prakash's case was subsequently f .ilk wed in Bali Devi's case decided on 23.8.2001. 11. A pointed question was put to the learned counsel for the respondent as to whether these judgments in Atma Prakash and Bali Devi have been appealed against or not ? And the learned counsel stated that, no appeal has been filed against these judgments. In that view of the matter it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by the time the writ petition in Narpat Ram's case was filed, the judgments of this Court in Bali Devi and Atma Prakash did hold good, with the result that the order dated 2.7.99 was not required to be challenged in the writ petition. Not only this even before the Division Bench it was not pointed out that, even before the Single Bench in Narpat Ram's case, the order of transfer passed by the Divisional Commissioner was not sought to be supported on the basis of the order dated 2.7.99, and it was for the first time, that before Division Bench transfer order was sought to be supported, on the basis of the order dated 2.7.99, having been produced before the Division Bench, as Annex. 1, and taking ground in para 4 of the special appeal. 1, and taking ground in para 4 of the special appeal. It is also contended that significantly the same learned counsel, who appeared before the Single Bench in the cases of Atma Prakash, Bali Devi, so also in Narpat Ram's case, who filed appeal before the Division Bench, and had argued appeal before the Division Bench. In that view of the matter it is contended that the order has been obtained from Division Bench by suppressing material facts by learned counsel, by not pointing out to the Division Bench, the judgments passed In Atma Prakash and Bali Devi's case, by the same learned counsel, who had appeared in those cases, and those judgments were very much in his knowledge, and despite their having become final. 12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Division Bench Judgment in Narpat Ram's case, has thus been obtained by practicing sharp practice and fraud by the present respondents, and since even according to the stand taken by the respondents "fraud and justice never dwell together" this judgment in Narpat Ram's case cannot be pressed into service by the respondents. It is also contended that in any case, in view of above the judgment in Narpat Ram's case is per in curium, having been passed without noticing the judgments in Atma Prasad and Bali Devi's cases, which had become final, and per force thereof, the order dated 2.7.99 was not required to be challenged, which omission is the basis of judgment in Narpat Ram's case. 13. It is then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of transfer, though transfer is taken to be exigency of service, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, it is punitive in nature, inasmuch as under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act and the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, the seniority of the person is maintained at the local level, and in the even of employee being transferred outside district, seniority is to be computed on the basis of length of service. However, in the even of transfer being sought by the employee, and such transfer being made, the employee is placed at bottom seniority. However, in the even of transfer being sought by the employee, and such transfer being made, the employee is placed at bottom seniority. The order dated 2.7.99 or other subsequent orders, nowhere contemplate holding of any enquiry, regarding the allegations made in the recommendations of the Village Level Standing Committee, with the result that there is no machinery available with the employee to establish the allegations to be false, and in any case even is somehow, or by taking recourse to some system, the authority also comes to the conclusion that the complaint made was false, still nothing is provided in the order dated 2.7.99, that the action would be reversed, by setting the hands to clock back, and reinstating the incumbent to the original district. With the obvious result that in the event of the employees somehow coming to know of the authorities having come to the conclusion about falsity of complaint, and on that basis, the employee making request to transfer him to original district, and the Government purports to be compassionate, and grants re-transfer, still the person shall be placed at bottom seniority, with the result that simply on account of the fact that a false complaint happened to be lodged in the form of recommendation by the Village Level Committee, and the Divisional Commissioner happens to pass the order of transfer, it result into imposition of penalty of forfeiture of seniority of the employee permanently, which is in the nature of major penalty, and is visited upon the employee without following any procedure which may be in accordance with the principles of natural justice and fair play, and therefore the order dated 2.7.99 is bad. 14. Before proceeding to consider the submissions of the parties on merits, I think it better to deal with the main preliminary objections raised, against maintainability of the writ petition on the anvil of fraudulent conduct of the petitioner, non permissibility of interference on. technical grounds, where the action has been taken "in view of the public policy, and statutory Provisions", about petitioner having concealed the material fact of his having been relieved on 20.2.2002, so also non interference in the writ even for quashing a bad/illegal/or without jurisdiction order, if the setting aside of the order amounts to 'reviving of an invalid order'. 15. 15. I may at once point out that it was clearly conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent that, apart from Annex. R-1 and R-2, there are no other complaints against the petitioner. Likewise so far concealment of material fact of petitioner being relieved on 20.2.2002, it concerned, the writ petition was filed on 18.2.2002, wherein on 20.2.2002 ad interim stay order staying the operation of the impugned order has already been passed. Thus there is hardly any ground to substantiate the objection taken by mere using of high sounding words to prejudice the Court. When the attention of the learned counsel for the respondent was pointedly invited to this position, and was called upon to substantiate the preliminary objection, learned counsel frankly conceded her inability to substantiate the contention. So far as the pleading about dishonesty and fraud is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent could not point out any factual aspect on which the contention is founded. On the other hand, what I find is that it is the respondent who appears to be more smart in. concealing facts, inasmuch as, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, despite appeals having not been filed by the respondents against the judgments in Atma Prakash and Bali Devi's case, holding the order dated 2.7.99 to be unenforceable, the respondent chose still not to disclose this fact before Division Bench, and by clandestinely attempting to produce that order before the Division Bench, obtained the order by contention that the order dated 2.7.99 is not under challenge in Narpat Ram's case, notwithstanding the fact that in view of the judgments in Atma Prakash and Bali Devi, the order dated 2.7.99 was not even required to be challenged. It is really strange that a litigant with such conduct musters courage to level allegation of dishonesty, and fraud against the petitioner without disclosing any particulars.Coming to the objection about non interference on the technical ground, where the action has been taken "in view of the public policy, and statutory provisions", suffice it to say that, the contention is wholly misplaced, inasmuch as, in view of Atma Prakash and Bali Devi's case, the action cannot be said to be taken, 'in view of any statutory provision', and so for public policy is concerned, on the other hand, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner do make it clear that the impugned action is opposed to the public policy, inasmuch as it tantamounts to imposing major penalty without following the principles of natural justice, or any procedure supportable by law. 16. Coming to the last preliminary objection about non interference, on the ground of, interference resulting into 'revival of invalid order', again suffice it to say that nothing has been shown as to which 'invalid order will be revived' in the event of interference being made in the writ jurisdiction. On the other hand, the interference would result into a very little thing, being upholding the principles of natural justice and rule of law. As would be dealt with in the forthcoming paragraphs, that the impugned actions are being taken in a wholly arbitrary, casual, and perfunctory manner, and for considerations not known, whether to law, or even the order dated 2.7.99. 17. So far as the allegation about concealment of material fact, about lack of sincerity, of petitioner in discharging duties is concerned, sufficient it to say that the allegations made in para 4 of the preliminary objection are covered by complaint Annex. R-1 and Annex. R-2, and may be matter which may attract action against the petitioner, whether administrative, or departmental, or civil, or criminal whatever it is, but then for the purpose of assailing transfer, which has been ordered without any authority of law, it cannot be said that non-disclosure of the complaints Annex. RA, and R-2 by the petitioner, tantamounts to suppression of material facts, more particularly when, so far as Annex. R-2 is concerned, there is nothing to show that the petitioner was ever made aware of these complaints, or any enquiry was held on these complaints, within the knowledge of the petitioner. RA, and R-2 by the petitioner, tantamounts to suppression of material facts, more particularly when, so far as Annex. R-2 is concerned, there is nothing to show that the petitioner was ever made aware of these complaints, or any enquiry was held on these complaints, within the knowledge of the petitioner. However, the petitioner in para 5 of the writ petition has already pleaded that on his coming to know about the complaint having been filed against him, he contacted the members of the Village Level Vigilance Committee. Thereupon he was informed that only Sarpanch has made complaint against the petitioner in the name of Vigilance Committee, for the reason mentioned in para 5 of the writ petition. Thus whatever facts were in the knowledge of the petitioner have already been disclosed, and there is no concealment of material facts on the part of the petitioner. 18. May be that Government feels that the administration is paralysed, or is running in a wholly inefficient manner, which required immediate administrative reforms, by way of public policy, but then I am constrained to observe that, under the Constitutional set up, rule of law prevails, and therefore, whatever actions are to be taken, have to be taken in accordance with law, and obviously validly promulgated law, whether it be legislative enactment, or subordinate legislation, or delegated legislation, of course also by complying with basic principles of natural justice. While the impugned action does not at all stand to any of these tests. Thus, the preliminary objections, to say the least, are wholly misconceived, and misplaced. 19. While the impugned action does not at all stand to any of these tests. Thus, the preliminary objections, to say the least, are wholly misconceived, and misplaced. 19. Coming to the merits of the sustainability of the impugned transfer order, even on the anvil of the assumption of validity of the order dated 2.7.99, 1 may at once observe that, I find force in the submission made on the side of the learned counsel for the petitioner, about the impugned action of transferring the employees being punitive in nature, In the peculiar circumstances of the case, inasmuch as valid eventuality has been projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner about Irreversibly transferring the incumbent to the other district on a wholly false pretext, and thereafter even purpotedly extended benevolence, and justice to the incumbent, is likely to result into forfeiture of his entire seniority, in view of such drastic consequences being likely to ensue, the matter of requirements of the order dated 2.7.99, was also required to be" strictly followed, if any action is sought to be taken, by purportedly exercising power conferred by the said order. 20. In this background, if I examine the facts of the present case on the anvil of the order dated 2.7.99, what I find from the record is that, two complaints are said to have been filed against the petitioner one being Annex. R-1 and the other being Annex. R-2, and none of these complaint are either filed by the Village Level Committee, constituted under Circular dated 2.7.99, nor are these complaints addressed to the Village Level Vigilance Committee, who may have forwarded them with recommendations to the Divisional Commissioner. Secondly a perusal of the complaint Annex. R-1 shows that this is with respect to the alleged demand of illegal gratification by the petitioner, and improper discharge of duties by him in drafting the resolutions of Gram Sabha meeting, and misbehaving with the members of the Gram Sabha, during the course of meeting. While the complaint Annex. R-2 is also substantially against the conduct of the petitioner, viz. While the complaint Annex. R-2 is also substantially against the conduct of the petitioner, viz. that the petitioner is not properly discharging his duties of Gram Sewak, he incorrectly draws the resolutions, commits irregularity in the development and relief works, does not correctly enter the names of the person working on the muster rolls, does not apprise the Sarpanch and other members of the information required by them, wields pressure on the Sarpanch to sign the muster roll, and accounts, as per the desires of the petitioner, and abuses the level of literacy of the Sarpanch. Allegations have also been made about demand of Rs. 25/- per ration card, while receipt was given for Rs. 22/- only, and with this bundle of complaints, a passing allegation has also been made that the petitioner does not come in the meeting on scheduled time. In the background of these two complaints, a look at the pleadings taken in the reply, especially para 4 of the preliminary objection, shows that the transfer was effected because the villagers were unhappy with the work of the petitioner, and as alleged in para 2 of the preliminary objection, that the complaints were filed against the petitioner.It is significant to note that, in the reply no reliance has been placed on the circular dated 2.7.99, to support of the impugned order Annex. 1, inasmuch as in para 4 of the parawise reply, a categoric stand has been taken, to the effect, that the Divisional Commissioner has been sub- delegated the powers under Section 98 of the Act of 1994, vide notification dated 16.2.2002, to issue transfer order, in pursuance to the complaints filed by the villagers, and in the concluding part of para 4 it has been categorically pleaded that the Vigilance Committee filed a complaint against the petitioner, and in pursuance of that complaint, dated 31.1.2002 was passed by the Divisional Commissioner. Suffice it to say that the complaints Annex. R/1 and R/2 do not at all fulfill any of the requirements of the circular dated 2.7.99. 21. So far as the notification dated 16.2.2002 is concerned, admittedly till passing of the order Annex. 1 it had not seen the light of the day. As such it cannot be said that the transfer order has been passed exercising powers conferred by the notification dated 16.2.2002. Thus the impugned order of transfer Annex. 21. So far as the notification dated 16.2.2002 is concerned, admittedly till passing of the order Annex. 1 it had not seen the light of the day. As such it cannot be said that the transfer order has been passed exercising powers conferred by the notification dated 16.2.2002. Thus the impugned order of transfer Annex. 1 is not supported by any authority of law or, the circular dated 2.7.99 or even the notification dated 16.2.2002. 22. I am not able to resist myself from observing at this place about the conduct of the respondent viz. that the impugned order purports to be passed by relying upon the powers purportedly conferred vide circular dated 2.7.99, as against this in the reply an entirely different stand has been taken to the effect that the orders has been passed in view of the power conferred on Divisional Commissioner vide notification dated 16.2.2002, which admittedly even did not exist at that time, and is not shown to be retrospective, or to be purporting to ratify the previous actions. 23. The net out come is that the writ petition is allowed, and the order Annex. 1 is quashed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.It is, however, made clear that if the respondents really feel the petitioner to be faltering in discharge of his duties, or being guilty of misconduct, the respondents are always free to take such other additional course of action against the petitioner as they may stand advised, and of course, in accordance with law.Writ Petition Allowed. *******