ORDER :- The writ petition has been filed to quash the order of the first respondent dated 13-12-1994 in G.O.D. No. 313 Local Administration and Water Supply Department where-under relaxation was granted to the fourth respondent’s building from the application of certain building rules. 2. The petitioner has filed O.S. No. 161 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, Pollachi seeking a decree for mandatory injunction directing the fourth respondent herein to demolish the superstructure put up by him on the ground that the same is in contravention of the building regulations and also without prior permission of the authorities. The said suit was dismissed on 17-8-1994 on the ground that the matter was pending before the Government for relaxation. 3. Against the same, the petitioner herein filed an appeal in A. S. No. 130 of 1994 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Udumalpet, which was also dismissed on 31-7-1998. After disposal of the suit by the trial Court, the first respondent seems to have passed the impugned order. 4. I perused the concerned file of the first respondent. I find that the fourth respondent made a representation for the relaxation of the rules by enclosing a copy of the judgment in the suit. When that be so, the first respondent ought to have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Now, the main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the civil suit was pending between the petitioner and the fourth respondent and the first respondent being a party to the said proceedings, the first respondent ought to have given an opportunity of hearing the petitioner and the failure to do so would violate the principles of natural justice. 6. Now, the other attack is that the impugned order does not reveal the application of mind by the concerned authority. Whenever any exemption is being granted, it is for that authority to consider as to the need for such exemption and state the reasons for granting such exemptions. In the absence of the same, the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. Hence, the order is liable to be set aside. 7. Even though the writ petition was admitted on 16-8-1999, and listed twice before the Court, except the third respondent, none of the respondents filed any counter. In the absence of the same, the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. Hence, the order is liable to be set aside. 7. Even though the writ petition was admitted on 16-8-1999, and listed twice before the Court, except the third respondent, none of the respondents filed any counter. The third respondent being only the municipality, they have nothing to do except to forward the requisition of the petitioner to the first respondent. The main concerned persons - the first and fourth respondents have not filed any counter. Hence, I called for the files from the first respondent. From the files also, I do not see any note to find out the reasons for granting the exemption. The fourth respondent appeared neither in person before this Court nor through counsel not only today, but also on the earlier occasions. 8. Admittedly, a civil litigation was pending against the petitioner and the fourth respondent. After the dismissal of the suit filed by the petitioner, the fourth respondent, enclosing a copy of the judgment of the civil Court, made a request to the first respondent for relaxation. The first respondent was also a party to the civil litigation. In such circumstances, it is but necessary for the first respondent to hear both the petitioner as well as the fourth respondent before ever any relaxation is being granted to the fourth respondent herein. The failure to do so naturally offends the principles of natural justice and on this short ground, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 9. Apart from that, in the cases granting exemption, the Supreme Court laid down the principles as to how the authority should act, in a recent judgment in the case of Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 SC 3060 . It is also a case of dealing with the powers under S. 113 of the Town and Country Planning Act. The Apex Court has said that even if the section is silent about the recording of reason, it is obligatory on the part of the Government, while passing orders under S. 113 of the Town and Country Planning Act to record the reason in the following terms : “When such a wide power is vested in the Government it has to be exercised with greater circumspection. Greater is the power, greater should be the caution. Greater is the power, greater should be the caution. No power is absolute, it is hedged by the checks in the statute itself. Existence of power does not mean to give one on his mere asking. The entrustment of such power is neither to act in benevolence nor in the extra statutory field. Entrustment of such a power is only for the public good and for the public cause. While exercising such a power the authority has to keep in mind the purpose and the policy of the Act and while granting relief has to equate the resultant effect of such a grant on both viz., the public and the individual. So long it does not materially effect the public cause, the grant would be to eliminate individual hardship which would be within the permissible limit of the exercise of power. But where it erodes the public safety, public convenience, public health, etc. the exercise of power could not be for the furtherance of the purpose of the Act. Minor abrasion here and there to eliminate greater hardship, may be in a given case, be justified but in no case effecting the public at large. So every time Government exercises its power it has to examine and balance this before exercising such a power. Even otherwise every individual right including fundamental right is within reasonable limit but if it inroads public rights leading to public inconveniences it has to be curtailed to that extent. So no exemption should be granted effecting public at large. Various development rules and restrictions under it are made to ward off possible public inconvenience and safety. Thus, whenever any power is to be exercised, Government must keep in mind, whether such a grant would recoil on public or not and to what extent. If it does then exemption is to be refused. If the effect is marginal compared to the hardship of an individual that may be considered for granting. Such an application of mind has not been made in any of these impugned orders. Another significant fact which makes these impugned orders illegal is that S. 113 empowers it to exempt but it obligates it to grant subject to such condition as it deems fit. In other words, if any power is exercised then Government must put such condition so as to keep in check such person. Another significant fact which makes these impugned orders illegal is that S. 113 empowers it to exempt but it obligates it to grant subject to such condition as it deems fit. In other words, if any power is exercised then Government must put such condition so as to keep in check such person. We find in none of these sixty-two orders any condition is put by the Government. If not this then what else would be the exercise of arbitrary power. We find in the present case, under the garb of its wide power, it has exercised it illegally and arbitrarily beyond its powers vested under the said section without application of mind. We heard both learned counsel for the State and other affected respondents. They could not submit anything for us to draw inference contrary to the above. Thus after examining each of said G. Os., in view of the finding recorded above, all these 62 G. Os. are not sustainable in law and are hereby quashed." 10. If the above principle is taken as a guideline to decide the case on hand, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the impugned order is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of power by the first respondent,especially when the impugned order does not reveal any reason for the grant of exemption. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground of non-application of mind also. 11. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the first respondent for fresh consideration. The first respondent is directed to hear both the petitioner as well as the fourth respondent and pass final orders within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Till such time, the parties are directed to maintain status quo. No costs. Consequently, the above WMP is dismissed as unnecessary.