JUDGMENT : - D. K. Seth, J.: Two orders passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal have since been challenged in this writ petition. The first order that has been challenged is order No. 29 dated 30th April, 2001 and the second order is order No. 30 dated 16th May, 2001. By the first order a prayer for leave to rely on certain other documents has since been refused and by the second order certain amendment, which was asked for, his since been declined. Mr. Debal Banerjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the learned Tribunal had allowed similar application filed by the workmen, to adduce certain documents by an earlier order, while refusing that of the petitioner/employer. According to him, these documents were related to the paying capacity of the petitioner, which were relevant for the purpose of determining the real question at issue and, therefore, it ought to have been allowed in view of the provision contained in section 11 sub-section (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He relied on several decisions in order to sustain the paying capacity as one of the factors, on which the fixation of wage structure is dependent. He had also contended that the application for leave, to file certain documents, was refused on the ground of that the order passed by this Court, by which the matter was remitted for a decision on issue No.2, did not permit it. He further 'contends that the said order of this Court is to be read according to its context. He has specifically pointed out the scope cannot be confined to a particular factor when the remand is open. It is presumed to be open unless it is specifically confined to a particular question. He further contends that the workmen had been permitted to rely on the revised charter of demand, which can be met without additional evidence, which the petitioner/employer wants to produce; otherwise it would be denying justice to the petitioner. He had pointed out from the revised charter of demand that Dearness Allowance (D.A.) has since been incorporated in the wages, although the question of D.A. is a subject matter of a separate reference pending before the Tribunal. He had pointed out from the revised charter of demand that Dearness Allowance (D.A.) has since been incorporated in the wages, although the question of D.A. is a subject matter of a separate reference pending before the Tribunal. He had also contended that the amendment was formal in nature and it was necessary in view of the change of nomenclature or name of the company and these are also necessary for determining the real question at issue. He had also relied on various decisions to which reference should be made at appropriate stage. 2. Mr. M. Dutta, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the order of the learned Tribunal is quite justified and need no interference by this Court. So far as the documents that are sought to be relied are not relevant since the contention of paying capacity is no more a good law. He has also cited certain decisions in support of his contention. He further contended that the question is to be decided on the basis of the order of remand, which, confined the scope of the adjudication, trusted upon the learned Tribunal. In fact, the reference was made in 1983 pursuant to a charter of demand served in 1981. The application has since been made only to delay the process. It has to be dismissed on the ground of belatedness of mala fide. That apart the application does not disclose any merit on its own. It is absolutely vague and as such the applications are rightly rejected. He, however, contends that section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not contemplate conferring of any power of amendment to the Tribunal and as such no amendment can be allowed. He relied on Arun Kumar Ghosh and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., 2001 (1) CHN 589 , in support of his contention and contended that the Court cannot direct to do something, which is, otherwise, impermissible in law and for which statute does not provide. He relied on a decision in Workmen of Reptakos Brett and Company Limited vs. Management, 1992(1) LLJ 340 , in support of his contention with regard to paying capacity, which is not at all necessary. Therefore, this petition should be dismissed. 3. I have heard the respective Counsel at length. 4. To appreciate the situation it would be necessary to refer to the relevant facts. Therefore, this petition should be dismissed. 3. I have heard the respective Counsel at length. 4. To appreciate the situation it would be necessary to refer to the relevant facts. Some times in 1981, a charter of demand was served upon the employer. The same, having not been accepted, an order of reference was made in August 1983. The Written Statements were filed and on certain points the matter traveled to this Court in writ jurisdiction. In the said proceeding, by an order dated 19th December, 1986 issue No.2 was framed and the same was remitted to the learned Tribunal. Thereupon an award was passed on 11th December, 1996, since published on 20th. January, 1997. The matter again came to this Court and ultimately disposed of by the Division Bench on appeal. The Division Bench had again remitted the matter of deciding issue No.2 on the basis of the revised charter of demand. The workmen had filed an application for leave to bring on record certain materials with regard to the structure of pay of other category of workmen, in order to support the increase or rationality of wages on 6th September, 2000. The learned Tribunal had permitted the workmen to bring those materials on record by an order dated 27th March, 2001. On 13th March, 2001, the employer filed an application for special leave to file certain documents. It also filed an application for amendment of Written Statement on 24th April, 2001. These two applications were rejected by the two orders referred to at the beginning. These two orders have since been challenged. 5. Section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act permits the Tribunal to exercise certain jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to (a) the matters of enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commission for examination of the witnesses; and (d) certain other matters that might be prescribed. It further provides that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. In the light of the above provision, we may now examine how far the law relating to production of documents could be attracted in an adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal. In the light of the above provision, we may now examine how far the law relating to production of documents could be attracted in an adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal. Clause (a) Oral evidence: Enforcing attendance of witness: 5.1. The evidence to be submitted in industrial adjudication may be (i) "oral" consisting of statements made verbally by the parties or their witnesses at the hearing; or (ii) "documentary", consisting of letters, agreements, deeds, statements of accounts, balance-sheets and other documents put in by either side. This clause vests the Tribunal with the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court in the matter of enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath. This power includes the power to recall a witness for further examination or cross-examination [Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Pvt. Ltd. vs. Work• men of North Chirimiri Colliery, (1968) II LLJ 261 (263) (M.P) (D.B), per Bhave, J.; Shambhu Nath & Sons Ltd. vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, (1957) II LLJ 287 (Punj.) per Bishan Narain, J.]. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in this behalf are section 27 to section 32 and Orders 16 and 18 section 27 to section 32 deal with "summons and discovery". Order 16 deals with "summoning and attendance of witness" and Order 18 deals with hearing of the suits and examination of witnesses. Clause (b): Documentary evidence: Discovery, production and inspection of documents.- 5.2. This clause invests the Tribunal with the powers of Civil Court under section 30 and section 32 and Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of "compelling production of documents and material objects". Section 30 deals with the power of the Court, inter alia, of discovery of documents arid section 32 gives the Court some penal rights to compel the compliance of the orders under section 30. Order 11 deals with the discovery and inspection of the documents. Rule 24 of the Industrial Disputes (Central Rules, 1957 also, inter alia, gives the powers under Order 11 to the Tribunals in the matter of "discovery and inspection of documents." The combined effect of section 11(3)(b) and Rule 24 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 is that the Tribunal's powers in the matter of production, discovery and inspection of documents are strictly governed by the provisions of Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5.3. 5.3. An industrial adjudicator has jurisdiction to direct a party to produce any document that may be in possession of such party for the purpose of proper adjudication of any issue referred to it by the Government or framed by it [Employees of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd., 1978 Lab I.C. 799 (80l) (Cal.) per M. M. Dutt, J.] 5.4. The adjudicator is only entitled to consider documents put in evidence. He ought not to allow himself to be influenced by documents, which might have come into his possession but have not been put in as evidence. For principles relating to documentary evidence, we may refer to section 61 to section 90 of Evidence Act, 1872 and for exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence, to section 91 to section 100 of that Act. The adjudicator should take a careful note of the evidence called or put in before him or of any legal points raised in the course of the hearing. 5.5. Thus, it appears that the Labour Court can direct production of documents and may also permit production of documents. It had permitted production of documents to the workmen. But refused the same leave to the employer. Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance Sheets: 6. Now, let us examine how far the Balance Sheet and other accounts could be relevant and be produced in relation to the determination of the wage structure. 6.1. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1959 (I) LLJ 644 (663) (SC) per Gajendragadkar, J. for the purpose of working out the bonus formula, the Supreme Court stated as a general rule that the amount of "gross Profits" ascertained in the Profit & Loss Account of the employer, is to be accepted without submitting such statement to a close scrutiny. Nevertheless, if it appears that entries have been made on the debit side deliberately and mala fide to reduce the amount of 'gross profit', it would be open to the Tribunal to examine the question and if it satisfied that the impugned entries have been made mala fide, it may disallow them. Likewise, the tribunal may also exclude any items either on the credit or the debit side, if such items are wholly extraneous or entirely unrelated to the trading profits of the year. Likewise, the tribunal may also exclude any items either on the credit or the debit side, if such items are wholly extraneous or entirely unrelated to the trading profits of the year. It was, however, pointed out, that it is only in glaring cases where the impugned item may be patently and obviously extraneous, that a plea for its exclusion should be entertained and the Tribunal must resist the temptation of dissecting the Balance Sheet too minutely or of attempting to reconstruct it in any manner. On the same day, the same Bench of the Court, in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1959 (II) LLJ 357 (362) (SC), per Bhagwati J., accepted the Balance Sheet of the company as good evidence to prove that certain amounts out of the returns were actually used as working capital. Since, these two cases did not talk of the requirement to prove the correctness of the items included in the Profit & Loss Account Statement or the Balance Sheet, it gave scope for the view that these documents could be relied upon for proving that the amounts of expenses stated therein were correct and were available for using as working capital and that it showed that they were in fact so used. But, from the report of the case, it appears that, as a matter of fact, it was conceded that the reserves in fact were used as working capital. Presumably to meet the contention that the Balance Sheet had not been proved, Bhagwati, J. observed, "moreover no objection was urged in this behalf, nor was any finding to the contrary recorded by the Tribunal". But shortly afterwards, the ratio of the Indian Hume Pipe Co. (supra) was explained in Khandesh Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, 1960 (1) LLJ 541 (SC), where Subha Rao, J. pointed out that the observations of Bhagwati, J. in that case were not intended to lay down the law that the Balance Sheet by itself was good evidence to prove as a fact, the factual utilization of reserves as working capital and the Court would not have accepted the items in the Balance Sheet as proof of user if it was not satisfied that no objection was taken in that behalf. In support of this view, it was stated that since the accounts to the company were prepared by the management and so also the Profit & Loss Account statements and Balance Sheets, there would be tendency on the part of the employers to def1ate the figures of rehabilitation etc. and labour has no concern with it and when so much depends upon a particular item in the Balance Sheet, the principles of equity and justice demand that the industrial adjudicator should insist upon a clear proof of the same and also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employer (Ibid. at p. 544., see also: Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1969 (1) LLJ 785 (792) \SC), per Shelat, J.). Thus, in this case, the Court clearly envisaged the requirement of the proof of the items included by the employer in the Balance Sheet and the right of the labour to test the veracity of the evidence adduced by the employer to prove such items. The question as regards the sufficiency of the Balance Sheet itself to prove the fact of utilization of any reserves as working capital was also considered in Trichinopoly Mills Ltd. vs. National Cotton Textiles Workers' Union, AIR 1960 SC 1003 (1004), per Gajendragadkar, J. where, reiterating the requirements of Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Co. (supra) the Court said that the Balance Sheet does not by itself prove any such fact and that the law requires such an important fact as the utilisation of a portion of the reserves as working capital has to be proved by the employer by evidence given on affidavit or otherwise and after giving an opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross examination. The necessity of proof of the correctness of the statements in the Balance Sheet was again precisely pointed out in Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. The necessity of proof of the correctness of the statements in the Balance Sheet was again precisely pointed out in Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers’ Union, 1960 (I) LLJ 548 (550) (SC) per Das Gupta, J., where it was observed that it could not be presumed that the statements made in a Balance Sheet are always correct and that the burden is on the party who asserts the statements to be correct, to prove the same by relevant and acceptable evidence, In Metal Box Company of India Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1969 (l) LLJ 785 (791-92) (SC), per Shelat, J., the Court said that if an employer claims the deduction of any items, say, depreciation, the burden of proof, that depreciation claimed by him is correct amount in accordance with the provisions of Income-Tax Act, is on the employer and that burden the employer must discharge once his figures are challenged. Peirce Leslie & Co. Ltd. vs. Their Workmen. 1960 (I) LLJ 809 (815-16) (SC), per Das Gupta, J., provides a practical illustration of the application of this principle. The Balance Sheet of the company for the year in question allowed some amount as provision for taxation liability and another amount as provision for proposed dividend on deferred ordinary shares. No evidence was let in by company to show that these amounts were used as working capital in the year in question. The Company did not contend that whatever appeared on the assets side in the Balance Sheet over and above the "paid-up" capital came out of the reserves, apparently on the ground that some of the items shown as "current liabilities and provisions" in the Balance Sheet would have to be met during the year out of the portion of current assets which portion would accordingly not be available for use as working capital, if that was the case as regards the other items under "current liabilities and provisions", the same must be the case as regards the current liability under "liability for taxation other than income-tax" and under "proposed dividend on deferred ordinary shares". In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court held that these "current liabilities" had also to be met out of the current assets during they year in question as the company failed to prove that the amounts were used as working capital. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court held that these "current liabilities" had also to be met out of the current assets during they year in question as the company failed to prove that the amounts were used as working capital. In Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Workers' Union, 1960 (II) LLJ 43 (44) (SC), per Das Gupta, J., the requirement of proving the statements in a Balance Sheet was highlighted by pointing out that before an analysis of the statement in the Balance Sheet is undertaken, it is necessary to establish that the statements in it are, in fact, correct and in the absence of any evidence to show that any particular entry in the Balance Sheet is true, it cannot be presumed that the statements are correct. In Anil Starch Products Ltd. vs. Ahmedabad Chemical Workers' Union, 1960 (II) LLJ 88 (94) (SC), per Gajendragadkar, J., the requirement of proper opportunity being given to the labour, to test the correctness of the evidence given on affidavit on behalf of the management in regard to the user of the reserves as working capital was emphasized. These requirements were taken as settled law in Bengal Kagazkal Mazdoor Union vs. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., 1963 (II) LLJ 358 (361) (SC), per Wanchoo, J., where the Court observed that "it is now well-settled that the Balance Sheet cannot be taken as proof of a claim as to what portion of reserves has actually been used as working capital and that utilisation of a portion of the reserves as working capital has to be proved by the employer by evidence on affidavit or otherwise, after opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross-examination" (Ibid). In U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen, 1971 Lab I.C. 1495 (1503) (SC), per Mitter, J., however, it has been pointed out that though the industrial tribunal is not bound to accept a particular figure appearing in the audited Balance Sheet of the employer merely because it is to be found in such audited Balance Sheet when such figure of expenses reflected in the Balance Sheet is disposed to by a witness who gives a break-up thereof in the examination-in-chief and is subject to cross-examination, the Tribunal should not discard his evidence on this point. In this case, the witness, deposing to the expenses incurred in connection with fuel which were given in the Balance Sheet, gave detailed break-up of the expense in his examination-in-chief and repeated in his cross-examination. In the cross-examination, lasting for about 10 months, no question was asked of him in particular as to how the figure of the expense was arrived at. It was, therefore, held that the Tribunal erred in not accepting the figure of expense as shown in the Balance Sheet and testified by the witness. On a review of some of the earlier decisions in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen. 1971 (II) LLJ 407 (416-17) (SC), per Jaganmohan Reddy, J. See also: Orissa Industries (P) Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, 1976 Lab I.C. 285 (290) (Orr.) (D.B.), per S. K. Misra, C.J.), the Court comprehensively stated the law with respect to the production and proof of documents before the industrial adjudicators in the following words: "When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise are is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When the appellant produced the balance sheet and Profit and Loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged, the appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish, some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. This is both in accord with principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure under Order XIX Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate these general principles. This is both in accord with principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure under Order XIX Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate these general principles. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except in so far as section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed therein permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witnesses who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants in inspection, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection, in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry. The applicability of these principles is well recognised and admit of no doubt." 6.2 But, a rebuttable presumption in favour of the duly audited Profit and Loss Account Statements and the Balance Sheets of the companies has been• enacted by section 23 of the Payment of Bonus Act (See: section 23 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965). 6.3. It is not necessary to go into the question whether capacity to pay is a factor or not. This question has to be gone into by the Tribunal itself. But at this stage, having regard to the position in law as stated above, leave cannot be denied to produce documents when the workmen have been so permitted. Therefore, the order refusing leave to produce documents cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Law of Pleadings : How far applicable in Industrial Adjudication: 7. The Rules of pleadings do not strictly apply to the resolution of the industrial disputes. Still the pleadings could not be disregarded for the purpose of reaching any conclusion considered just and proper. In J. K. Iron & Steel Company Limited vs. Iron & Steel Mazdoor Union, 1956 (1) LLJ 227 (SC), the Apex Court observed: "It is evident from this fact that though these Tribunals are not bound by all the technicalities of Civil Courts, they must nevertheless follow the same general pattern. In J. K. Iron & Steel Company Limited vs. Iron & Steel Mazdoor Union, 1956 (1) LLJ 227 (SC), the Apex Court observed: "It is evident from this fact that though these Tribunals are not bound by all the technicalities of Civil Courts, they must nevertheless follow the same general pattern. Now the only point of requiring pleadings and issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. It is not open to the Tribunals to fly off at a tangent and disregarding the pleadings to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper." 7.1. These observations were referred to with approval in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1969 (l) LLJ 242. The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in going into the- question whether the management even if it decided to effect retrenchment of the concerned workman should have applied the principles "last come, first go" and found out whether these persons could be transferred to other places if they were senior to those retained. Evidence had been led before Tribunal of two workers of the factory at Barakar having been transferred in the post to other places even without a plea having put forward to this effect. Holding that it was not permissible to go into the said point which was not pleaded the Supreme Court had observed thus: "It is not disputed that no such plea was taken in the written statement of the union and with all respect to the Tribunal it was not competent to go into that question at all. There is no evidence here as to the terms of employment of the workers in other units of the factory. The nearest units to the Barakar Factory were the one at Konnagore and the other at Patna at a distance of 200 miles from Barakar. There is no evidence here as to the terms of employment of the workers in other units of the factory. The nearest units to the Barakar Factory were the one at Konnagore and the other at Patna at a distance of 200 miles from Barakar. The point not having been raised by union and without going into the question as to whether it was feasible for the appellant to effect such transfer, the Tribunal should not have attempted to apply the principle of last come, first go." 7.2 In Management of Rashtradoot, Jaipur vs. Rejesthan Working Journalist Union, (1970) 20 FACLR 1 SC, it was urged before the Supreme Court on behalf of the management that the worker concerned had been expelled by the union and hence since the union was not sponsoring his cause there could not have been a reference under the Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "This point was not raised in the written statement and did not form the subject-matter of any issue. No evidence was, in the circumstances, led on this aspect. Shri Sen submitted that this information was made available to the management only during the course of evidence and it was for this reason that this point was sought to be argued without being raised in the pleadings. We do not think that this explanation can be accepted as justification for raising this point without including it in the pleadings. As soon as the management came to know of this aspect, an application should, in our opinion, have been made for amending the written statement so that basic facts could be found on proper plea, issue and evidence. Having failed to do so it was not open to the management to found any argument on assumption of facts, which are not properly proved. Having failed to do so it was not open to the management to found any argument on assumption of facts, which are not properly proved. The fact that the Labour Court had allowed this point to be argued before it is no ground for this Court to entertain this argument at this stage." 7.3 In Tandur and Navandgi and Stone Quarries (Put.) Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1964 (I) LLJ 737, the Supreme Court made observations to the following effect:- "In industrial adjudication Tribunal are naturally reluctant to apply the law of pleadings in all its strictness, and the fact that all aspects of the question in reference to the character of the labourers employment were not set out by the respondents in their written statement, cannot be said to affect the creditability of the evidence led by them at the trial. Pleadings: 8. Normally, in industrial adjudication, the plaint of the workmen is known as "claim statement" to which the employer files the "written statement". Then the workmen may file a "rejoinder" to the "written statement" of the employer. These pleadings are to be made as prescribed by the Rules of the "appropriate Government". Various States have promulgated their own rules detailing the procedure of filing the pleadings. Since under section 10(4), the Tribunal has to confine its adjudication to the points specified in the order of reference and matters incidental thereto, the parties are not permitted to introduce any matters de hors the points of reference and matters incidental thereto. The parties, however, may raise preliminary objections with respect to the maintainability of the reference. 8.1 Pleadings in industrial disputes need not strictly conform to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Not only for the reason that the Code of Civil Procedure has restricted application to the industrial adjudication under the Act, but the fact that the workers generally are illiterate and not conversant with legal formalities, has also to be borne in mind. Hence, the pleadings in industrial adjudication cannot be strictly construed. Not only for the reason that the Code of Civil Procedure has restricted application to the industrial adjudication under the Act, but the fact that the workers generally are illiterate and not conversant with legal formalities, has also to be borne in mind. Hence, the pleadings in industrial adjudication cannot be strictly construed. But, the rules of natural justice require that the pleadings must at least be such as to give sufficient notice to the other party of the case it is called upon to meet [Tin Printers (Put.) Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal, 1967 (II) LLJ 677 (680-81) (Punj.) per Kapur, J. A finding of bias on the part of the enquiry officer without any allegation in the pleadings to that effect was held to be in violation of the rules of natural justice]. In any case, the-pleadings must be definite for laying the foundation of the evidence in the case. It is well settled that no amount of evidence can be looked upon a plea, which was never put forward. The reason is that a party cannot be allowed to benefit himself from such evidence, which is at variance with his pleadings. If he were allowed to do so, the opposite party would be taken by surprise [Lachman Dass vs. Indian Express News Papers (Bombay) Put. Ltd., 1977 Lab I.C. 823 (825) (Delhi) (D.E) per Deshpande, J. relying on Siddik Mohamed Shah vs. Mt. Sarad, AIR 1930 P.C. 57 and NagubaiAmal vs. B. Sham Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 per Venkatrarama Ayyar. J.). Amendments: 9. The Tribunal has power to permit the parties to amend the pleadings in its discretion. The Courts and Tribunals, charged with the duties of administering justice, have to remember that it is not the form but the substance of the matter that has to be looked to and the parties cannot be penalised for inadvertent errors committed by them in the conduct of their cases [Management of Borpukhurie Tes Estate vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Assam, 1978 (1) LLJ 558 (562) (SC) per Jaswant Singh, J. relying on the observations in Western Indian Match Company Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, 1963 (II) LLJ 459 (464), per Das Gupta, J.] The amendments are to be allowed so as to give full effect to the adjudication without, however causing substantial injury to the other party. An injury may be remedied by an amendment and an appropriate order as to costs. The principle governing the amendments of pleadings cannot be better stated than in the words of Shah, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. National Building Material Supply, AIR 1969 (SC) 1267 (1269-70), per Shah, J.: "Rules of procedure are intended to be a hand-maid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleadings of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side '" * * all amendments should be permitted as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties unless by permitting the amendment injustice may result to the other side * * * In our view, there is no rule that unless in an application for amendment of the plaint it is expressly averred that the error, omission or mis-description is due to a bona fide mistake, the Court has no power to grant leave to amend the plaint. The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations." 9.1. Thus, the Tribunal always ought to give leave to amend pleadings of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by his blunder he caused injury to his opponent, which cannot be compensated for by an order of costs. But, there is no rule that in the application for amendment, the party must expressly aver that the error, omission or mis-description was due to a bona fide mistake. It would be sufficient if a prima facie case for the amendment is made out by the applicant. But, there is no rule that in the application for amendment, the party must expressly aver that the error, omission or mis-description was due to a bona fide mistake. It would be sufficient if a prima facie case for the amendment is made out by the applicant. The amendment can only be refused on recording findings that the party applying was acting mala fide or the injury caused to the opposite party by the mistake, omission or mis-description committed by the applying party cannot be compensated for by payment of costs. But where no injury is caused to the opponent and the applying party acted bona fide, the rules of natural justice required that in appropriate cases, the Tribunal may allow the amendment of pleadings. In other words, the industrial adjudicators are competent to allow the parties, when they are not actuated by any oblique motive, to modify their pleadings to sub-serve the interests of justice (Management of Borpukhurie Tea Estate vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Assam, 1978 (I) LLJ 558 (562) (SC) per Jaswant Singh, J. relying on Patna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. Bali Rai, 1958 in LLJ 257 (259) (SC) per Bhagwati, J.). In Management of Borpukhurie Tea Estate vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Assam, 1978 (I) LLJ 558 (561-62) (SC) per Jaswant Singh, J., the Supreme Court on fact held that it was a fit case for allowing the amendment. The case was, therefore, remanded to the Tribunal for disposal after allowing the necessary amendment. In Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation employee's Union vs. State of West Bengal, 1977 Lab 1. C. (NOC) 83 (Cal) per D. K. Sen, J., the Calcutta High Court upheld the validity of an amendment of the written statement for bringing on record the fact that a certain employee was a Nepalese nation because the question of nationality was relevant for the determination of relief to be granted. The Court observed that there was no reason why such amendment be not allowed and it could not be said that it would extend the scope of the dispute or introduce a new dispute. 9.2. So far as the question of amendment sought for herein, is concerned, it appears from the schedule of amendment that those are almost formal in nature and intended to bring on record certain facts, which would be necessary. 9.2. So far as the question of amendment sought for herein, is concerned, it appears from the schedule of amendment that those are almost formal in nature and intended to bring on record certain facts, which would be necessary. Since the designation or nomenclature or the title of the company has changed it would be necessary to record those facts, otherwise, it would be difficult to obtain the relief after the award is passed and when it is sought to be enforced. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that there is no power to amend so far as the Tribunal is concerned since it is not clothed with the power of the Civil Court except the maters enumerated in section 11 (3) of the I.D. Act, in view of the discussion above does not seem to be of any substance. At the same time, the Tribunal is supposed to follow its own procedure and evolve its own system. If certain facts are to be brought on record, in such event it is kept open to the Tribunal to allow such amendment in the pleadings, but it can also refuse it on the ground of the belatedness or otherwise or on the ground of mala fide. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as observed above, the Order refusing leave to produce documents cannot be sustained and the Learned Tribunal ought to have taken the same on record. 10.1. Having regard to the facts of this case, in fact the amendment that has been sought to be brought on record is really a belated one but it cannot be said to be mala fide. If the amendment was allowed, the matter would not have been delayed, but for the rejection it has since been delayed. In the circumstances, the said facts may also b~ brought on record so as to give an opportunity to both the parties to contest the same. 10.2. The decision cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the Court cannot direct the Tribunal to do something, which is impermissible in law, does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. So far as the question of capacity is concerned, it is not necessary to' go into the said question at this stage. 10.2. The decision cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the Court cannot direct the Tribunal to do something, which is impermissible in law, does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. So far as the question of capacity is concerned, it is not necessary to' go into the said question at this stage. This point being kept open, it is not necessary to deal with the decision so cited. Order: 11.1. In the result, the writ petition succeeds the order refusing leave to produce documents viz. Order No. 29 dated 30th April, 2001, is hereby quashed. The application for leave to adduce documents is allowed and the documents shall be filed within a forth night after serving copies thereof on the representative of the workmen. The documents sought to be produced may be taken on record and may be considered in accordance with law, having regard to the contention and counter-contention raised by the respective parties and subject to such objection that might be taken by one and the other and vice versa. It is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Banerjee with regard to the question of capacity of payment. All these questions are kept open. 11.2. Similarly, the order rejecting the amendment viz. The Order No. 30 dated 16th May, 2001, is hereby quashed. Let the leave to amend by allowed and the Written Statement of the employer be amended accordingly. Such amendment is to be incorporated within a week from date and an amended copy of the Written Statement shall be presented before the learned Tribunal within a fortnight from date, after serving copy thereof on the Counsel for the workmen, the workmen may, if so advised, file its rejoinder within a fortnight thereof. 11.3. The Learned Tribunal shall, however, decide the question in terms of the order of remand within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of communication of this order. The Learned Tribunal has to examine the scope of the order as to how far it can go into the questions those have been raised by the respective parties and the necessity of relying upon the evidence so produced, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions that might be made by the respective representative for the parties before it. 11.4 Let it be noted that I have not entered into the merits of this Case. It would be open to the Learned Tribunal to decide the same in accordance with law, according to its own wisdom and discretion. All points are kept open. 12. With those observations, the Writ Petition is, thus disposed of. 13. All parties concerned are to act on a Xerox signed copy of the operative part of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Writ petition disposed of with observations.