JUDGMENT: The appellant herein is the plaintiff who filed the suits O.S. Nos.64 and 66 of 1979 on the file of District Munsif, Tindivanam to evict the respondent herein from the suit properties and for recovery of possession as well as arrears of past and future rent on the basis that the respondent took the subject matter of the suit property on lease and executed Ex.A-6 the unregistered rent agreement. There was an understanding that the respondent should pay the monthly rent of Rs.50 and also to pay the municipal tax. Since the respondent failed to pay the arrears of rent upto 31.7.1978 and also the municipal tax, the same were accrued to the tune of Rs.2,950 and to recover the same the suit is were laid. 2. The respondent herein contested the claim of the appellant contending that the suit property is in occupation of one Selvaraj. The understanding between the appellant and the respondent is that the appellant would evict the said Selvaraj and hand over vacant possession to the respondent and after taking vacant possession a registered lease agreement will be entered into between the parties. However, the said Selvaraj was not evicted by the appellant and no vacant possession was handed over to the respondent. Hence, the relief sought for is a misconceived one against a wrong person; especially when there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 3. The respondent also filed an additional written statement stating that though the subject matter of the suits consist of two different door numbers, the lease agreement being only one, two suits are not maintainable. 4. The appellant filed a reply statement contending that the respondent having executed the lease deed, it is not open to him to deny the relationship of the landlord and tenant. Though earlier the said Selvaraj was the tenant, eviction proceedings were initiated against him before the Rent Controller to evict and in the proceedings the said Selvaraj was evicted. Only after eviction the subject matter of the suits were handed over to the respondent on the basis of the lease agreement entered into between the parties. 5. The appellant has let in both oral as well as documentary evidence. The respondent had examined himself as D.W.1 and no other evidence was let in. Only after eviction the subject matter of the suits were handed over to the respondent on the basis of the lease agreement entered into between the parties. 5. The appellant has let in both oral as well as documentary evidence. The respondent had examined himself as D.W.1 and no other evidence was let in. The learned District Munsif, after due consideration of the records as well as evidence available before him, by this judgment and decree dated 24.12.1981 decreed the suit finding that the respondent is the tenant in respect of the door Nos.418 and 419 which are the subject matter of the suits. The respondent was directed to pay a sum of Rs.2,316-89 in O.S.No.64 of 1979 and Rs.2,148.48 in O.S. No.66 of 19769 representing the arrears of rent as well as the arrears of municipal tax along with future interest till the delivery of possession. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed appeals A.S. Nos.41 and 42 of 1982 on the file of Sub Court, Tindivanam. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the appeals, however, took a different view and consequently allowed the appeals by his judgment and decree dated 18.7.1984 and dismissed both the suits. Hence, the present second appeals. 7. At the time of admission the following substantial question of law was formulated: “Whether the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated by its failure to consider the evidence on record and apply the correct principle of law?” 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ex.A-6 the unregistered lease agreement and Ex.A-7 the miscellaneous receipt would clearly establish that the respondent was entrusted with the vacant possession of the suit premises and he is the tenant from the date on which he took possession of the suit property. The trial Court has rightly found that one Mr.Varadaraj who paid rent under Ex.A-7 is the manager of the respondent herein. The suit premises is under the control and occupation of the respondent herein and when once he is the tenant, he is liable to pay the rent to the appellant. The default on the part of the respondent having been established the trial Court decreed the suit. There is absolutely no reason to differ from the findings of the trial Court. The default on the part of the respondent having been established the trial Court decreed the suit. There is absolutely no reason to differ from the findings of the trial Court. The lower appellate Court, totally on misconception of the evidence available on record, found that Selvaraj is the tenant and he was not vacated from the suit premises inspite of the order of eviction in the earlier rent control proceeding. Consequently the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. 9. On the basis of the arguments advanced before this Court, the substantial question of law arises for consideration is whether it is open to the respondent to take a contrary plea, having signed Ex.A-6, the lease agreement? 10. It is a well laid principle that no party can be permitted to let in oral evidence contrary to the recitals in a written document, when there is a written document wherein the rights and liabilities of the parties are covered. The defence put forth by the respondent is that he was not handed over possession of the suit premises and consequently there is no landlord and tenant relationship. 11. Ex.A-6 the unregistered lease agreement executed between the appellant and the respondent is as follows: 12. From the above recitals in Ex.A-6 signed by both the parties, it is clear that the appellant took possession of the suit property from the erstwhile tenant Selvaraj in E.P. Nos.819 and 820 of 1973 in R.C.O.P. Nos.10 and 11 of 1971. When the certified copy of the recording of delivery had been marked by the appellant as Ex.A-5 in the present proceeding and that has not been challenged by the respondent, his plea that the appellant did not take delivery from his erstwhile tenant falls to the ground. 13. Coming to the question of taking delivery by the appellant, the above extracted recitals in Ex.A-6 clearly reveal that the respondent was put in possession on the terms of payment of rent and municipal tax. The execution Ex.A-6 is admitted by the respondent. But, however, his plea is that after taking delivery of the properties by the respondent the execution of a registered agreement between the parties was contemplated. There is no such term or condition in Ex.A-6. A plain reading of Ex.A-6 reveals that the respondent was put in possession of the property on the conditions stipulated therein. But, however, his plea is that after taking delivery of the properties by the respondent the execution of a registered agreement between the parties was contemplated. There is no such term or condition in Ex.A-6. A plain reading of Ex.A-6 reveals that the respondent was put in possession of the property on the conditions stipulated therein. The, further condition being, the tenancy is for one year period and after the expiry of the lease period the respondent has to hand over vacant possession. Ex.A-6 also contemplates the default clause. When that be so, the plea of the respondent that execution of a further agreement or the registration of Ex.A-6 itself was contemplated between the parties cannot be accepted. The respondent did not also make any attempt to examine the said Selvaraj as a witness. As per the recitals in Ex.A-6 it is more explicit that the respondent agreed to pay the rent to the appellant and the municipal tax in respect of the suit properties. When that be so, the plea put forth by him now in this proceedings is only to continue the possession of the property without payment of rent by prolongation of the litigation. 14. Coming tot he conduct in pursuing the litigation, it also has got some relevance. When the respondent did not send any reply to the notice issued by the appellant giving out an explanation in his oral evidence that his advocate told him that there is no need to send any reply, it is not clear as to where is the need for him to vindicate his non existing right in this litigation by engaging a lawyer and incurring the litigation expenses. When he was advised, there is no need to send a reply to the lawyer’s notice and when he is not a tenant, according to him, there is no need for him to defend the case. Even assuming that at the initial stage, having received the summons from the Court, in response to the same he has to appear, this Court if of the view, by filing the written statement, disowning his relationship, he could have remained ex parte. No one would make himself fool of an ass by spending huge amount by way of litigation when he has no interest in the lis. No one would make himself fool of an ass by spending huge amount by way of litigation when he has no interest in the lis. There was no option to the appellant either to proceed ex parte or to implead the so called Selvaraj. From the certified copy of Ex.A-4, this Court is able to see that the appellant took possession from the said Selvaraj. When the Court records clearly establish that the appellant took possession from the erstwhile tenant Selvaraj, it is for the respondent to establish his plea that Selvaraj continues to be the tenant under the appellant or the said Selvaraj continues to be in occupation of the suit premises. In the absence of any material or evidence to establish the same, the plea of the respondent cannot be sustained. 15. Even assuming for the purpose of argument that the respondent is answerable to the appellants’ claim for arrears of rent and as such if any ex parte decree is passed against the respondent he is liable to pay the arrears of rent, the decree being one for recovery of possession as well as the arrears of rent, definitely the appellant would execute the decree for recovery of possession along with the arrears of rent. The decree cannot be divided and the appellant will execute the same separately for each relief. Hence, when the decree for recovery of possession is put in execution, naturally the person who is in possession of the premises will defend his possession on the ground that he is not bound by the decree as he was not a part to the proceeding. At that time it is for the Court to decide as to whether the said ex parte decree can be executed or not for both the relief for recovery of possession as well as arrears of rent. Even in that case, the respondent cannot have any grievance, if really he is not in possession of the suit properties as a tenant. Hence, his conduct in effectively contesting the claim of the appellant would naturally lead to an interfere that he has some interest in the lis which can be nothing but the tenancy right. 16. A coming to Ex.A-7, the rent receipt, there is a specific mention that one Varadarajan paid the rent on behalf of the respondent. Hence, his conduct in effectively contesting the claim of the appellant would naturally lead to an interfere that he has some interest in the lis which can be nothing but the tenancy right. 16. A coming to Ex.A-7, the rent receipt, there is a specific mention that one Varadarajan paid the rent on behalf of the respondent. In the oral evidence also the respondent admitted that sometimes he would instruct the said Varadarajan to carry out some minor works. If Varadarajan is employed under somebody else, nothing prevented the respondent from examining the said Varadarajan to explain as to on whose behalf he paid rent under Ex.A-7. When both the parties had let in evidence, it goes without saying that the burden of proof have no role to play. Each party is bound to establish their plea by placing materials before the Court. 17. From the above discussion, it is clear that the respondent, having come forward with the specific plea that he was not put in possession of the suit properties by the appellant, miserably failed to establish the same. On the contrary, the appellant has proved their case through Ex.A-6, the undisputed document. Hence this Court is of the view that in view of the recital in Ex.A-6, the appellant will succeed in their claim. 18. Hence, the reasoning of the lower appellate Court to dismiss the suits cannot be sustained. Accordingly the second appeals are allowed with cost Rs.5,000 (one set).