Judgment 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The order as contained in Annexure 1 has been questioned in this writ application whereby and whereunder the petitioners have been put under suspension. 3. The question as to whether the order of suspension passed with retrospective effect is sustainable, has fallen for consideration. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from the impugned order as contained in Annexure 1 it is manifest that both the petitioners have been put under suspension in exercise of the power under section 69(4) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") with retrospective effect. Learned counsel further submitted that for the event which took place in the year 1993 where the petitioners were facing a criminal charge, now they have been put under suspension with retrospective effect i.e. from 21.5.93 to 27.5.93. Learned counsel also submitted that the order impugned suspending the petitioner with retrospective effect is wholly without jurisdiction and not sustainable in law. At the same time learned counsel submitted that since the authorities were aware of the event where the petitioners were alleged to have committed an offence in the year 1993 itself, they had no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioners after a lapse of about 8 years of the actual event and, therefore, the order impugned is liable to be quashed. 4. Learned counsel for the university, on the contrary, submitted that the petitioners initially were put under suspension as they were taken into custody in exercise of the power under section 69(1) of the Act and no sooner they were released from custody, the order of suspension was revoked and ultimately when the petitioners were convicted in the trial, they have been put under suspension by the impugned order with effect from the date of the event. 5. It appears that the petitioners were made accused for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and since they were taken into custody for the criminal charge they were initially put under suspension and after their release from jail custody the order of suspension was revoked. 6. Section 69 of the Act is pari materia the same as Rules 99 and 100 of the Bihar Service Code. 6. Section 69 of the Act is pari materia the same as Rules 99 and 100 of the Bihar Service Code. Section 69(1) of the Act confers power upon the authorities to put a university employee under suspension on account of his detention for a criminal charge and sub section 4 of section 69 of the Act empowers the authorities to suspend a university employee on account of a criminal charge. For the period the petitioners were detained in custody they were suspended in exercise of power under sub section 1 of section 69 of the Act and immediately after they were released on bail, the deemed order of suspension ceased to operate and thereafter the petitioners were allowed to join under the university authorities and now when they have been found guilty in the trial and they have been convicted, the power as envisaged under sub section 4 of section 69 of the Act has been exercised by the university putting the petitioners under suspension with retrospective effect. The question, as to whether an employee of the university who is being put under suspension on a criminal charge in exercise of power under sub section 4 of section 69 of the Act with retrospective effect, is no more res integra and it has been set at rest by holding that the order of suspension passed against the delinquent employee cannot be made retrospective. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Bachcho Lal Das V/s. State of Bihar and ors. reported in 1983 P.L.J.R. Page 561. In the case Bachcho Lal Das (supra) a Bench of this court held that the order of suspension with retrospective effect is wholly impermissible and without jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the order as contained in Annexure 1 which is an order of suspension with retrospective effect, therefore, must be held to be wholly without jurisdiction. 7. Now coming to the second question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners now should not be suspended after a lapse of more than eight years when the university was aware of the situation where the petitioners were facing a criminal charge, learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard has referred to the case of Rajiv Dutta Verma V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1998 (3) P.L.J.R. page 217 and to the case of Chandra Bhushan Sinha V/s. The State of Bihar and ors. reported in 2000 (1) P.L.J.R. page 670. In the case of Rajiv Dutta Verma (supra) a learned single Judge of this court held that the order of suspension after seven years of the event which was known to the authorities is not valid and is without jurisdiction. The same view has been reiterated by another learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Chandra Bhushan Sinha (supra). 8. In the case at hand, it appears that the university authorities were aware of the fact that both these petitioners were facing criminal charge and for that they were put under suspension by virtue of an order passed on 14.10.1993 itself as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application which was revoked subsequent to the release of the petitioners on bail and now the authorities have passed the impugned order as contained in Annexure 1 suspending them from retrospective effect. The order of suspension passed against the petitioners, therefore, must be held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. 9. For the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed and the order as contained in Annexure 1 is set aside. 10. No order as to costs.