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2002 DIGILAW 105 (PNJ)

Kundan Lal v. State Of Haryana

2002-01-24

HARJIT SINGH BEDI

body2002
Judgment H.S.Bedi, J. 1. Petitioner No. 2 Devinder Kumar was married with Jainmati sister of Tirlok Chand, respondent No. 2, on 21.2.85. As the relations between the parties became strained. Respondent No. 2 lodged an F.I.R. No. 21 dated 30.1.1989 for offences punishable under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code in Police Station Sohana District Gurgaon, making allegations that demands for dowry had been made and that the dowry articles given at the time of the marriage of his sister had not been returned by the accused. The matter was taken up by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Gurgaon who vide his order dated 24.4.1990 held that no case was made out against the accused and they were accordingly discharged. Tirlok Chand took the matter in appeal and the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, vide his order dated 12.1.1991 (Annexure P-3) set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon and held that the matter could not be decided without evidence and accordingly directed that the matter be referred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for framing of the charge. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filled in this Court seeking the quashing of the F.I.R. as also the order (Annexure P-3) dated 12.1.1991. The matter came up before this Court on 18.3.1991 and this Court while issuing notice to the respondents as also the Advocate General, Haryana stayed the further proceedings before the trial Court. It is the conceded position that the said stay order continues to be in operation as of today. 2. In the course of the hearing today, Mr. Virinder Singh, the learned counsel appearing for petitioners 2 to 4 (Kundan Lal, petitioner No. 1 having died during the pendency of the case) has urged that the matter pertained to the year 1989 and in the light of the fact that the divorce petition filed by the wife making allegations of cruelty and demand for dowry against the husband had been dismissed by the Matrimonial Court on 9.2.1988 whereas an application filed by the husband seeking decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion had been allowed on 2.3.1989 with a positive finding that there was neither any cruelty nor any demand for dowry made by the husband and that to continue with the present proceedings at this stage be an utter travesty of justice. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Aggarwal, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 has filed a reply today in Court and has urged that though the Appellate Court had clearly given a finding that no demand for dowry had been made and that the wife had not been subjected to cruelty yet there was no finding of any Court that the dowry articles handed over to the petitioners had been returned by them and as such the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code should be permitted to continue. 4. I have considered the arguments and have also gone through the record including the Judgments dated 9.2.1988 and 2.3.1989 placed on record by Mr. Virinder Singh in support of his arguments. 5. The F.I.R. was lodged in the year 1989 and the further proceedings were directed to be stayed on 18.3.1991. It is also clear from the judgments produced in Court today that the allegations of cruelty and demand for dowry made by the wife against the husband had been specifically repelled by the matrimonial Court in the judgment dated 9.2.1988 in the divorce application and that the same had been dismissed whereas the application for divorce filed by the husband on the grounds of cruelty and desertion had been allowed under judgment dated 2.3.1989. This makes the date of filing of the F.I.R. significant as the F.I.R. had been lodged on 30.1.1989, i.e. after the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the wife had been dismissed and shortly before an application filed by the husband on 10.6.1988 had been allowed on 2.3.1989. 6. I am, therefore, of the opinion that to continue with the present proceedings at this stage would be an utter travesty of justice. The present petition is accordingly allowed, the F.I.R. and the order (Annexure P-3) dated 12.1.1991 are quashed. Petition allowed.