Judgment Jasbir Singh, J. 1. Respondent Mangtu Ram, landlord, filed an application for eviction of petitioners from demised premises on the ground of non-payment of rent, sub-letting and change of user. On notice of that application, petitioner Ganpat appeared before the Rent Controller on January 19, 1981, on which data service qua other respondents was not complete and the matter was adjourned to February 28, 1981, for their appearance. 2. On perusal of record, it is apparent that on February 28, 1981, March 25, 1981 and April 23, 1981, Presiding Officer (Rent Controller) was on leave and the case was then fixed for June 15, 1981. On that date, Petitioner No. 1 tendered rent but the same was not accepted and case was adjourned to August 24, 1981, regarding service of remaining respondents before Rent Controller. During trial, issue No. 1 was framed to the following effect: - "1. Whether the respondent has not made a valid tender? if so, to what effect? OPP 3. Rent Controller, after appreciation of evidence on record, opined that present petitioner No. 1 Ganpat was the original tenant and since he had not tendered rent within fifteen days from the date of his appearance, i.e, January 19,1981, tender made subsequent thereto was not valid and due to that, eviction of petitioners was ordered. Present petitioner went in appeal. That was also dismissed. Hence this civil revision. Counsel for the parties heard. 4. Main contention of Shri Sanjay Mittal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of petitioner, is that on January 19, 1981 i.e., first date after notice, petitioner No. 1 only put up his appearance before the Rent Controller and since qua others, service was not complete, it cannot be considered as first date of hearing. As such, he was not under an obligation to tender rent within fifteen days thereafter. 5. Shri Daljit Singh, Advocate, appearing for the respondents, has vehemently controverted the arguments raised by counsel by petitioners. He has contended that as per provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short the Act) it was incumbent upon petitioner No. 1, who was held to be original tenant, to tender rent within fifteen days from January 19, 1981, and since he had failed to do so his eviction had rightly been ordered by Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority. 6. 6. As to what should be treated as first date of hearing has already been decided by their lordships of the Supreme Court in various judgments. Shri Sanjay Mittal, Advocate for the petitioners, has placed reliance upon a decision in Sudershan Devi and Anr. v. Sushila Devi and Anr. (2000-1)127 Punjab Law Reporter 452, in which the words first date of hearing came up for interpretation before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In paragraph No. 6 of that judgment, in similar circumstances, following point was framed for consideration: "(1) What is the meaning of the word "hearing in the group of words "the first hearing of the suit" in Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act (Act 13 of 1972) and in the Explanation added there to by U.P. Act 28.76?" 7. After discussion various judgments on the said point, in para No. 26 of that judgment, following answer was given to the above mentioned question: "26. Thus both in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui and Advaita Anand this Court construed Section 20(4) and the Explanation to say that the date of first hearing of the suit would not be the date fixed for filing the written statement but would be the date proposed for the hearing i.e., the date proposed for applying the Courts mind to determine the points in controversy and to frame issues, if necessary. These decisions are binding on us. Point 1 is decided accordingly." Provisions of the Act are parimateria with the provisions of U.P.Act. 8 Even at an earlier point of time, provisions of the Act regarding "first date of hearing" came up for interpretation before Honble Supreme Court in Sham Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Atma Nand Jain Sabha (Regd.). Dal Bazar. AIR 1987 Supreme Court 197, and their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined that "firs date of hearing" for the purpose of provisions of Section 13(2)(i) of the Act would be after following of written statement, when the Court applied its mind to the controversy involved. Relevant paragraphs No. 11 and 13 of that judgment read as under:- "11. It appears that there is consensus in regard to the interpretation of the expression first day in the context of the rent legislations of several other States, for instance, the Gujarat High Court in Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v. Shah Babaldas Dayabhai, AIR 1964 Guj. Relevant paragraphs No. 11 and 13 of that judgment read as under:- "11. It appears that there is consensus in regard to the interpretation of the expression first day in the context of the rent legislations of several other States, for instance, the Gujarat High Court in Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v. Shah Babaldas Dayabhai, AIR 1964 Guj. 9 dealing with the identical question as to the meaning of the words "the first day of the hearing of the suit" as provided in Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 12 of Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, has observed after considering several decisions that "that words the first day of hearing as meaning not the day for the return of the summons or the returnable day, but the day on which the Court applies its mind to the case which ordinarily would be at the time when either the issues are determined or evidence taken." "13. It was tried to be contended that these decisions being rendered in connection with the suit cannot be taken into consideration in the case of a proceeding before the Rent Controller. We do not find any substance in this contention which seeks to draw a distinction without a difference in substance. It is appropriate to point out in this connection that the object of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act as stated in the Preamble to the Act is to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and eviction of tenants therefrom. From the objects Of this Act it is abundantly clear that this Act was enacted with the object of affording protection to the tenants against arbitrary increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas as well as from eviction of the tenants from the rented premises. In this context, it is imperative that the words "the first hearing of the application" have to be interpreted in a manner which promote the object of this beneficial legislation. Viewed from this aspect we cannot but hold that the words, "Erst hearing of the application" as used in proviso (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the said Act does not mean the day fixed for return of the summons or the returnable day but the day when the Court applies its mind to the case." 9. Viewed from this aspect we cannot but hold that the words, "Erst hearing of the application" as used in proviso (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the said Act does not mean the day fixed for return of the summons or the returnable day but the day when the Court applies its mind to the case." 9. Shri Daljit Singh, Advocate appearing for the respondents-landlord, has failed to show any law to the contrary. 10. Ratio of the above mentioned judgments of the Honble Supreme Court clearly indicates that the words "first date of hearing" would mean the date, when the Court applied its mind to the facts of the case, and probably, the date would be, when the issues were framed. 11. So far as the facts of this case are concerned, respondent No. 1 Shri. Ganpat put up his appearance on January 19, 1981, for the first time. Service qua other respondents was not complete. Thereafter case was adjourned to various dates and it was fixed for June 15, 1981, when petitioner No. 1 had tendered rent, which was not accepted. As is apparent from the record, issues were framed on July 30, 1982, which date could have been treated as first date of hearing in this litigation. 12. In view of reasoning given below, this revision petition is allowed and the order dated August 2, 1982 passed by the Rent Controller as affirmed by Appellate Authority on April 17, 1984, are hereby set aside. Application of landlord for eviction of petitioner from demised premises is also dismissed.