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2002 DIGILAW 1051 (RAJ)

Shiv Dayal Gupta v. State of Rajasthan

2002-05-22

ARUN KUMAR, P.P.NAOLEKAR

body2002
Honble KUMAR, C.J.–By this Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dt. 9.11.2000 compulsorily retiring him from the post of Addl. District Judge in the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. The petitioner was appointed as Munsiff Magistrate, vide order dated 6.05.1970. He was confirmed in the Rajasthan Judicial Service w.e.f. 14th May 1972. Vide order dated 7.01.1994, the petitioner was granted selection scale in the Rajasthan Judicial Service w.e.f. 2.09.1992. w.e.f. 1.01.1993, he was granted super time scale in the Rajasthan Judicial Service vide order dated 25.6.99. On 26th May 1993, the petitioner was promoted to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge. On 9.11.2000, the impugned order of compulsory retirement from service was passed qua the petitioner under sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rajasthan Service Rules (Old/Rule 53(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996. (2). Rule 53(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996, reads as under: ``Rule 53- Compulsory retirement on completion of 25 years qualifying service: (1) At any time after a Government servant has completed twenty five years of qualifying service or has attained the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier, he may be required by the appointing authority to retire in the public interest and in the case of such retirement, the Government servant shall be entitled to a retiring pension. (3). The aforesaid rule 53(1) was amended vide notification dated, 1.12.1999 and the said rule has been substituted as under : ``53. Compulsory retirement on completion of 15 years qualifying service : (1) At any time, after a Government servant has completed 15 years qualifying service or has attained the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier, the appointing authority, upon having been satisfied that the concerned Government servant has on account of his indolence or doubtful integrity or incompetence to discharge official duties or inefficiency in due performance of official duties has lost his utility, may require the concerned Government servant to retire in public interest. In case of such retirement, the Government servant shall be entitled to retiring pension. (4). Relying on the above rule, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there was no material on record to lead to the conclusion that the petitioner had lost his utility for the post he was holding. In case of such retirement, the Government servant shall be entitled to retiring pension. (4). Relying on the above rule, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there was no material on record to lead to the conclusion that the petitioner had lost his utility for the post he was holding. It was submitted that the said rule requires that the Appointing Authority should be satisfied that the concerned Government servant, has on account of his indolence or doubtful integrity or incompetence to discharge official duties or inefficiency in due performance of official duties has lost his utility. Although, it is a subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority, yet, it has to be based on various aforesaid factors enumerated in the Rules itself. In other words, the contention is that there should be material on record to justify the subjective satisfaction of the Appointing Authority as envisaged in the rule. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no such material on record and therefore, the alleged subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority was without any basis and it showed non application of mind. (5). It is settled law that in matters requiring subjective satisfaction, a Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go into sufficiency of material for arriving at subjective satisfaction. The Court has only to be satisfied that there was material on record and the decision of the concerned authority is based on material on record. A subjective satisfaction can also be challenged on the ground of malafides on the part of the concerned authority. Fortunately, in the present case, there is no allegation of malafides against anyone nor any argument was raised suggesting malafides on the part of any person or authority involved in the decision making process. (6). The law on the subject of compulsory retirement is fairly well settled and has to be applied to the facts of a particular case in hand. (7). In Baikuntha Nath Das and another vs. Chief (District Medical Officer, Baripada and another (1), the Supreme Court enumerated the following principles in this behalf : ``(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma not any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. It implies no stigma not any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) malafide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short; if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks loss their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. (8). These principles have been generally followed by the Courts. Thus, so far as the impugned order in the present case is concerned, it only says that the competent authority ``is pleased to retire Shri S.D. Gupta in public interest from service... Such an order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as punishment. It does not imply any stigma nor there is any suggestion of misbehaviour in it. The power to compulsorily retire an officer is meant for being used to improve efficiency in Government service. Such an order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as punishment. It does not imply any stigma nor there is any suggestion of misbehaviour in it. The power to compulsorily retire an officer is meant for being used to improve efficiency in Government service. The Officers who are not able to efficiently discharge their official duties and become a liability to public service on account of doubtful integrity, inefficiency or incompetence need not be continued in service. It has been often said that dead wood has to be chopped off. The safeguards to the Government servant in this behalf are that the decision regarding compulsory retirement has to be based on an over all assessment of the entire record of service of the Officer. This function of an overall assessment is undertaken by the Appointing Authority itself or by an equally high ranking body/committee at the instance of the Appointing Authority. It is a painful decision which is to be taken only in the interest of and for improving efficiency in service. In other words, it is a decision to be taken in public interest. (9). In reply to the writ petition, it has been stated on behalf of the High Court that in the year 1983, the petitioner was not assessed as a good officer and his integrity was found doubtful. In 1984, he was reported to be a corrupt officer. Representations against these adverse entries stood rejected. In response to the averments made on behalf of the petitioner that he had been granted selection grade and he had earned promotion to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service in 1993, it was submitted that at the relevant time when selection grade or promotion was granted to the petitioner these adverse entries were not under consideration. As per normal practice, the service record of immediate past five or seven years is considered on such occasions and therefore, these adverse entries were not taken into consideration by the authorities while granting selection grade to the petitioner or while promoting him as Additional District Judge. It was also pointed out that the petitioner had been superseded in the matter of grant of selection scale and super time scale in 1991 and in promotion to the post of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate several times. It was also pointed out that the petitioner had been superseded in the matter of grant of selection scale and super time scale in 1991 and in promotion to the post of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate several times. Since at the time of consideration of a case for compulsory retirement, the entire service record of the concerned, officer is looked into, the position is entirely different. It is an over all assessment of the performance of an officer during his entire tenure of service. The High Court produced the relevant service record of the petitioner for perusal of the Court at the time of hearing. A committee of four Judges of the High Court had been constituted to review cases of officers for compulsory retirement. The committee recommended action against quite a few officers. The committee noticed that the performance of the petitioner in 1973 was poor. He was advised to bestow attention to improve his judgment writing. In 1974, it was remarked that he should be watched and quality of case work was found unsatisfactory. On both the occasions i.e. 1973 and 1974, these remarks were communicated to the petitioner. In 1977 there is an entry that he should improve the quality of his judgments. In 1983, he was not assessed as good officer and his integrity was found doubtful. His representation against adverse entry was rejected in 1984. He was reported as a corrupt officer. His representation against the said adverse entry was rejected. It was also recorded that his judgments were not upto the mark and he failed to inspire confidence in subordinate staff and the lawyers. In 1993, his disposal was found low. The committee also noted that the officer had been superseded while being considered for promotion. In 1983, a departmental enquiry under Rule-16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 led to a finding against the petitioner of being negligent and grossly careless in discharging his judicial functions. However, minor penalty of censure was imposed and he was warned to remain careful and cautious while discharging judicial functions. On the basis of overall assessment of the service record of the petitioner, the Review Committee consisting of four Judges of the High Court found that the officer had proved to be a liability to the Judicial Service and public interest warranted that he should be compulsorily retired. On the basis of overall assessment of the service record of the petitioner, the Review Committee consisting of four Judges of the High Court found that the officer had proved to be a liability to the Judicial Service and public interest warranted that he should be compulsorily retired. The decision of the Review Committee was accepted by the Full Court in its meeting held on 8.11.2000. This led to the passing of the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The petitioner had made a representation against the said order of compulsory retirement which was rejected vide order dated, 2nd March 2001. (10). Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a perusal of the order of compulsory retirement showed that the ingredients contained in the relevant rule were not taken into consideration before passing the impugned order. The contention is that the order itself should show which ingredients of the Rule were satisfied. In support of this proposition, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Rajat Baran Roy and others vs. State of West Bengal and others (2). In our view, the said decision is not attracted in the facts of the present case. In the present case, the impugned order refers to the rule under which it has been passed and it states that the order was passed in public interest. An order of compulsory retirement need not detail the entire material which forms the basis for the order. If this was to be insisted upon, it will give rise to an argument that the order is stigmatic or punitive. The settled law is that compulsory retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. If details of material found against an officer are to be contained in the order itself, it may be said to be stigmatic and punitive. As already observed, it is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority and the Court has to ensure that the order was passed on the basis of material on record i.e. the subjective satisfaction was arrived at by the appropriate authority on the basis of material on record. In the present case, we find that the there was material on record on the basis whereon the appropriate authority arrived at its subjective satisfaction for retiring the petitioner compulsorily in public interest. The order, therefore, cannot be said to be without any basis or arbitrary. In the present case, we find that the there was material on record on the basis whereon the appropriate authority arrived at its subjective satisfaction for retiring the petitioner compulsorily in public interest. The order, therefore, cannot be said to be without any basis or arbitrary. A Committee consisting of four senior Judges of the High Court first reviewed all the cases in the zone of consideration for compulsory retirement and made recommendations. The recommendations of the Review Committee were considered by the Full Court of the High Court. The Full Court accepted the recommendation in case of the petitioner and made the recommendation to the Governor of the State, who is the Appointing Authority, to pass an order of compulsory retirement which led to the impugned order being ultimately passed. (11). Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the fact that the entries regarding corruption pertain to the years 1983-84 and the decision compulsorily retiring the petitioner taken in the year 2000 was too distant in point of time. The entries were too remote to lead to justify the conclusion regarding compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service in public interest. This argument may look attractive on its face. However, in view of the fact that it is a matter of overall assessment of the entire service record of an officer, entries of the earlier period cannot be ignored. (12). Recently, in State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Kumar Jain, (3), decided on 14th March 2002, the Supreme Court observed, vigour sting of an advirse entry is not wiped out merely it is relatale to 11th or 12th years of passing of the order of compulsory retirement. Further the Court observed that, single adverse entry in itself was sufficient to compulsorily retire a government servant. Thus, we find no merit in the argument that the entries regarding petitioner being corrupt officer were too remote in point of time and need not have weighed with the authorities. In this context, it is to be noted that the rule regarding compulsory retirement permits such a decision being taken only after a specified period of service having been rendered by the Government servant. Therefore, it may often happen that by the time the stage for taking a decision with respect to compulsory retirement is reached, the adverse entries become distant in point of time. Therefore, it may often happen that by the time the stage for taking a decision with respect to compulsory retirement is reached, the adverse entries become distant in point of time. However, as the decision is based on an overall assessment of the entire service record, it cannot be said that the entries which are distant in point of time have to be ignored. This also answers another argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that only two years service was left with the petitioner when the decision was taken. Rules permit such a decision being taken only after an officer has rendered a fairly long period of service and, therefore, the decision cannot be faulted on this ground. We have already noted that the mere fact that meanwhile, the officer had earned promotion or had been granted selection grade will not render the decision regarding compulsory retirement illegal. The factors which are taken into consideration for granting selection grade and promotion are different from those taken into consideration while considering a case for compulsory retirement. (13). In the present case, we have found that the rules permit compulsory retirement of an officer. The decision for compulsorily retiring the petitioner has been taken in accordance with the rules. The decision is based on overall assessment of performance of the petitioner in service as per material on record. It is a bonafide exercise of power under the rules and the decision is taken in public interest. The decision is neither arbitrary nor malafide. In fact such decision are necessary to improve efficiency in service. The decision of the respondents to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service needs no interference. (14). The writ petition accordingly fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.