DIPAK MISRA, J, J. ( 1 ) MARRIAGE was conceived as an institution to save the race of home sapiens from the tyranny of sex, but, in the case at hand, as the factual matrix depicts, the accused/appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused') succumbed to his carnal desire by giving into the inferior endowments nature and epitomized his proclivity not only marrying Sharda Bai (since deceased) but also was able to, may be forcibly or under prevailing circumstances, totally forgetting about the relationship [as at places it has appeared that the accused is the uncle of Sushila (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-4) (the informant)] first made Sumitra bai a victim of his lascivious libido and eventually got into the wedlock and rested with the procreation of three children and thereafter as it appears that unsatiated urge of the accused, as if to live up to the concept that one feels more hungry, where one is more satiated, he wanted to have a sexual sortie with Sushila, a young girl in her teens, who had come to the house of accused while she was infant, aged about one, and expressed his inclination to make her his paramour and to achieve the said purpose exhibited the seductive obsession of Nessus, which ultimately being objected to by the deceased, the uncontrollable sexual hunger that had given rise to the hidden anger flowing from innestuous expression, culminated in an infliction of an injury in the abdominal region of the deceased whose life spark got extinguished at the spot, the small hutment of the accused. ( 2 ) WE have begun the judgment with the aforesaid note as Mr. Manish Datt, learned counsel appearing for the accused, as an alternative submission had proponed that a singular blow having been given in a fit of passion, the accused deserves leniency warranting conversion of the offence from one Section 302, IPC to one under 304, Part-II of IPC. We shall dwell upon this facet at a later stage, but presently, to the facts of the case in brief. The prosecution case, sans unnecessary details, is that the husband of the deceased Babbu expired which led the deceased to remain as the wife of the accused. She accompanied the accused to his house along with her daughter, Sumitra Bai, aged about 10 years; and Sushila (PW-1), an infant of one year. The prosecution case, sans unnecessary details, is that the husband of the deceased Babbu expired which led the deceased to remain as the wife of the accused. She accompanied the accused to his house along with her daughter, Sumitra Bai, aged about 10 years; and Sushila (PW-1), an infant of one year. The accused, a sweeper, got himself indulged in the process of procreation and three children namely pammi, Tara and Sunil born in the wedlock. With the passage of time, Sumitra, the young girl, who had accompanied her mother blossomed into a full grown woman and the accused taking advantage of the situation impregnated her which ensued in the disaster of breaking the marriage between Sumitra and her husband. The pregnancy being noticed, she was driven away from her husband's house and there being no alternative, she came back to the house of her mother where the accused kept her as his concubine. The process of procreation started and Sumitra gave birth to four children. There is material on record to indicate that the deceased was not happy with the situation and was trying time and again to blame the accused who was responsible for destroying the life of Sumitra. The overwhelming lust of the accused paved the path of uncontrollability and on many an occasion he suggested that he would keep sushila as his wife. The said amorous suggestion was not palatable to the deceased-sharda, the first wife of the accused as well as Sumitra, the second woman who had under compelling circumstances had yielded to the passion of the accused. On the fateful day, in the mid of May, 1989 at about 5. 30 p. m. , as the prosecution story proceeds, the accused came back from his work place, sat in the open varandah and expressed his perverse desire to have sexual relationship with Sushila. The other two women protested. As per the FIR, the accused dragged sushila to the inner portion of the house which was seriously opposed to by Sumitra. The mother of Sushila being intolerant of this sex oriented behavioural pattern of the accused, living up to the role model of mother, intervened which invited the wrath of the accused who picked up a knife and forcefully penetrated it into the abdominal region of Sharda who fell dead at the spot. The mother of Sushila being intolerant of this sex oriented behavioural pattern of the accused, living up to the role model of mother, intervened which invited the wrath of the accused who picked up a knife and forcefully penetrated it into the abdominal region of Sharda who fell dead at the spot. Sushila and Sumitra shrieked which attracted the attention of the neighbours who have been examined as PW-2 and PW-3 who were able to get hold of the accused by application of force. In quite promptitude, sushila proceeded to the Police Station and lodged the FIR (Ex. P-1 ). After the criminal law was set in motion, the investigating agency arrived at the spot, did 'panchanama' of the dead body, sent it for post-mortem which was conducted by the concerned doctor, R. K. Gupta, PW-8, examined the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of criminal Procedure and thereafter under 164 of the Code, seized the weapon in question which was discovered by the Investigating Officer at the instance of the accused while he was in custody and eventually submitted the charge-sheet before the competent Court which in its turn committed the matter to the Court of Session. The matter was ultimately tried by the learned Ist Additional sessions Judge, Chhindwara in Sessions Trial No. 122/90 who on scrutiny of the ocular and medical testimony came to hold that the accused was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the indian Penal Code (in short 'the IPC') and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of life. ( 3 ) IT is apposite to mention here that the prosecution in order to establish its case examined eight witnesses in to to. PW-1 is sushila, the informant, PW-4 is Sumitra, the sister of the informant, PWs-2 and 3 are the post-occurrence witnesses. PW-5 is the In-2004 Cri. L. J. /69 III vestigating Officer, PW-8, Dr. R. K. Gupta, is the Surgeon who had conducted the autopsy, and the other two witnesses are formal in nature. ( 4 ) THE accused pleaded false implication with a positive stand that Sushila was the culprit and she had committed the murder of her mother, the wife of accused, but the entire blame had been put on the accused. ( 5 ) ASSAILING the judgment of conviction, it is submitted by Mr. ( 4 ) THE accused pleaded false implication with a positive stand that Sushila was the culprit and she had committed the murder of her mother, the wife of accused, but the entire blame had been put on the accused. ( 5 ) ASSAILING the judgment of conviction, it is submitted by Mr. Manish Datt, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that there is unacceptable discrepancy between the FIR (Ex. P-1) and the testimony of P. Ws. 1 and 4 in Court and when such discrepancy has earned the status of material contradiction, the significance of it should not be marginalised and should be treated as a dent in the prosecution warranting dislodgment of the order of conviction passe'd by the learned trial Judge. It is further canvassed by Mr. Datt that P. Ws. 2 and 3 who have been examined by the prosecution have stated with regard to the occurrence but their version being founded on hearsay should not be given any credence. Learned counsel has also further canvassed that P. W. 8, Dr. R. K. Gupta, who had conducted the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased had submitted his report which has been proved as Ex. P-10-A is silent with regard to the factum that the injuries caused were sufficient, in ordinary course of nature to cause death and, therefore, the deceased cannot be found guilty of an offence punishable under S. 302 of IPC. Alternatively, it is argued by Mr. Datt that, even if, the prosecution story is accepted in entirety, it clearly frescces a picture that there was some sort of scuffle and altercation between the deceased and P. W. 4 at one hand and the accused on the other and due to that in a fit of anger and sense of fury the accused inflicted a single blow and thence, the offence deserves conversion to a lesser one. To bolster his alternative submission, he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Bhera v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 225 ; Thakaji Hiraji v. Thakore kubersing Chamansing, AIR 2001 SC 2328 . ( 6 ) PER contra, Mrs. Chanchal Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer for the State, has submitted that the discrepancy which has been highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant is minor in nature and at best. ( 6 ) PER contra, Mrs. Chanchal Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer for the State, has submitted that the discrepancy which has been highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant is minor in nature and at best. it can be treated as an exaggeration which is quite normal to human conduct in a case of this nature and, in fact, such discrepancy lends more credence to the witnesses as they have not behaved parrot like. It is submitted by her that there is no reason or justification that P. Ws. 1 and 4 would implicate the accused in a crime of this nature and the plea which has been taken by the accused that Sushila being angered wanted to stab the accused but as the circumstances would have if the mother received the blow, is a figment of futile imagination having no iota of truth lending support to it. It is also canvassed by her that had Sushila been the person who had committed the crime then sumitra who had mothered the children of the accused would not have deposed against him as that runs counter to normal human conduct. Smt. Chanchal Sharma, learned panel Lawyer for the State, further submitted that in all cases a single injury does not warrant conversion of the offence as it is dependant on many a connected factor and when in the present case perversity of sex is writ large the accused deserves no leniency. To bolster her submission, she has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Mahesh Balmiki Alias Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3338 . ( 7 ) TO appreciate the rival submission raised at the Bar, we have carefully perused the judgment of the learned trial Judge. The learned counsel for the parties have taken us through the evidence on record. Mr. ( 7 ) TO appreciate the rival submission raised at the Bar, we have carefully perused the judgment of the learned trial Judge. The learned counsel for the parties have taken us through the evidence on record. Mr. Manish Datt, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while pointing out the inconsistencies in the FIR vis-a-vis the version of p. W. 1, the informant, has submitted that the said witness while lodging the FIR had alleged that the accused had been making a proposal to get married to her and had shown advances but in the version in Court, she has deposed that after the accused came back from his place of work, wanted to commit sexual assault on her and with that purpose dragged her Inside the house to which place the deceased reached and objected to. The learned counsel has also pointed out that there is discrepancy in the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 4 though both claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. He has drawn our attention to the said part of the testimony wherein Sushila's version runs contrary to that of Sumitra, p. W. 4, wo in her testimony has stated that the accused initially assaulted Sumitra and thereafter caught hold of Sushila (P. W. 1} and threw her on the floor. We have carefully perused the testimony of these two witnesses. The discrepancies which have been pointed out by Mr. Datt endeavouring to make them appear monumental, in our considered opinion, they are not so and, in fact, are to be regarded as an exaggeration, normal to human under the peculiar circumstances. We may hasten to state here that mr. Datt forcefully contended that the witnesses have changed the sequence and that corrodes the truthfulness of their version making them unreliable. On a close scrutiny, we notice that both P. W. 1 and P. W. 4 have implicated the accused in the crime as far as the assault on the deceased is concerned. The basic allegation that the accused wanted to have a sexual relationship with sushila is patent. The discrepancies which crop up are relatable to the aspect whether the accused had taken Sushila inside the house or threw her on the floor of the outer room. The basic allegation that the accused wanted to have a sexual relationship with sushila is patent. The discrepancies which crop up are relatable to the aspect whether the accused had taken Sushila inside the house or threw her on the floor of the outer room. The other aspect is whether he had called a meeting and gave a proposal or assaulted Sumitra and then like a wolf attacked Sushila. In our view, even if, there is some change in the sequence, the essential character of the evidence has not undergone a transformation and the witnesses have not paved the path of tergiversation. Quite apart from the above, a careful scrutiny of evidence of P. W. 3 Shanker who rushed on hearing the shriek of P. W. 1 and P. W. 4 has clearly deposed that the accused was holding the knife and he along with others at later stage were able to get hold of him. A feeble suggestion was given to all the witnesses that sushila had killed the mother while she tried to assault the accused to save her virginity but the said suggestion is neither here nor there and does not appear demonstrably acceptable and also does not inspire any confidence. The conduct of the accused does not so demonstrate. The suggestion that when Shanker reached the house he found the deceased on the lap of the accused, has been firmly denied by the said witness and we have no doubt in our mind that the witnesses namely P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 have given their version in Court in a truthful manner and there is nothing on record to impeach the same. Hence we are persuaded to rely on their testimony. Quite apart from the above, the accused has led to the recovery of knife, P. W. 1, Sushila has identified the knife belonging to the family. The said knife was sent for chemical examination to the forensic Laboratory at Sagar and the report has been brought on record as Ex. P-14. The cumulative effect of this oral and documentary evidence clearly proves that the accused had assaulted the deceased. ( 8 ) NOW, we shall proceed to deal with the alternative submission putforth by Mr. Datt. It is contended by him that the accused as well as the deceased and her daughters belong to the poor strata of the society. P-14. The cumulative effect of this oral and documentary evidence clearly proves that the accused had assaulted the deceased. ( 8 ) NOW, we shall proceed to deal with the alternative submission putforth by Mr. Datt. It is contended by him that the accused as well as the deceased and her daughters belong to the poor strata of the society. It is urged by him that there is no material on record to suggest whether the accused had forcibly indulged in sex with sumitra or Sumitra seduced the accused. It is also canvassed by him that as the incident depicts the suggestion of the accused having been turned down, he wanted to teach a lesson to the deceased and had no intention to cause her death and had there been intention he would have given further blows but refrained from doing so. As far as the first part of the aforesaid submission is concerned, we have noticed that there is evidence on record that the accused had compelled Sumitra to be his paramour. Had sumitra been able to seduce the accused, she would not have married to a third person only to return when the marriage collapsed because of premarital pregnancy caused by the accused-Sumitra was driven away from her matrimonial home. Sushila [p. W. 1} has categorically asserted that accused had been proposing to keep her as a kept. Thus, this limb of. argument of Mr. Datt is contrary to the material on record. As far as the single blow is concerned, Mr. Datt has placed reliance on paragraphs 24 and 25 of the decision rendered in Thakaji Hiraji (2001 Cri LJ 2602) (supra ). ( 9 ) IN the case of Bhera ( 2000 (10) SCC 225 ) (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph 2 has held as under : "from the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 it is crystal clear that the accused and the deceased had some quarrel in the house of bhana. On the road while they quarrelled with each other, suddenly the accused brought out the knife and save the blow which struck the chest of the deceased. On these facts, it is difficult to hold that the accused gave the blow with the requisite intention of causing murder of the deceased. In this view of the matter, the conviction of the appellant under S. 302 cannot be sustained. On these facts, it is difficult to hold that the accused gave the blow with the requisite intention of causing murder of the deceased. In this view of the matter, the conviction of the appellant under S. 302 cannot be sustained. Since in anger while quarrelling, the accused had given the blow which ultimately resulted in the death of the deceased, the offence would be one under S. 304, Part II. We, therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellant under S. 302 and instead convict him under 3. 304, Part II and sentence him to 5 years. ( 10 ) IN the case of Kunha Yippu v. State of Kerala (2000) 10 SCC 307 , their Lordships expressed the view in following terms :"the next question that arises for consi deration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, as indicated in the testimony of the aforesaid eye-witnesses, the accused can be convicted for the offence of murder under S. 302 or could be convicted only under S. 304, Part II inasmuch as there was absolutely no intention on his part to cause the murder of the deceased. From the evidence of PW-1 it appears that both the accused and the deceased were in a friendly mood when one asked for a glass of juice from the other. Shortly thereafter while the deceased had left the shop of "1, the accused went behind and gave the blow in question and further, the blow in question had been given from the back side and only a single blow had been given. In these circumstances, it is difficult for us to hold that the accused can be said to have had the necessary intention for causing the murder of the deceased while giving the blow in question, though ultimately the blow had become fatal. " ( 11 ) AT this juncture, we think it apposite to refer to the decision rendered in the case of Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna (1999 cri LJ 4301) (SC) (supra) wherein in paragraphs 9 and 10, the Apex Court ruled thus. "9. Adverting to the contention of a single blow, it may be pointed out that there is no principle that in all cases of single blow s. 302, I. P. C. is not attracted. "9. Adverting to the contention of a single blow, it may be pointed out that there is no principle that in all cases of single blow s. 302, I. P. C. is not attracted. Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under s. 302, I. P. C. , in some cases under S. 304, i. P. C. and in some other cases under S. 326, i. P. C. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associate of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely attribute knowledge that the knife blow given by him is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 10. Dr. Singh invited our attention to the following judgments of this Court in Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 : 1984 Cri LJ 478; Ranjitsinh Chandrasinh atodaria v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1060 : 1994 AIR SCW 1210 : 1994 Cri LJ 1425 and Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 472, for altering conviction from S. 302, I. P. C. to S. 304, I. P. C. A perusal of these judgments shows that these are instances of application of the aforementioned principles. We do not, therefore, consider if necessary to refer to them in detail. ( 12 ) WE have quoted from the aforesaid decisions in extenso only to show that in all cases a single blow would not attract the concept of leniency exonerating the accused from the clutches of S. 302, I. P. C. it would depend upon the facts of each case. ( 12 ) WE have quoted from the aforesaid decisions in extenso only to show that in all cases a single blow would not attract the concept of leniency exonerating the accused from the clutches of S. 302, I. P. C. it would depend upon the facts of each case. In the case at hand the accused as is evincible from the evidence gave a blow in the abdomen region. The doctor who had conducted autopsy had found following injuries on the body of the deceased. " (1) One incised wound (penetrated) size 1 1/2" X 1/2" deep into peritoneum mid line in the hypogastric region of abdomen, 1" above the public symphysis is transverse in direction, margins are clean cut and on dissection of wound underlying muscles, blood vessels, sheath, sub-cutaneous tissues and peritoneum found cut, blood found under the wound and in peritoneum cavity. On opening the peritoneum blood present in peritoneum cavity, an incised wound found on interior wall of urinary bladder. The submission of Mr. Datt is that when there is singular injury and one blow, the appellant should be convicted under S. 304, part I, I. P. C. inasmuch as he did not have the requisite intention. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission. The accused had picked up the knife and inflicted the blow on the deceased. In the cases which have been cited by Mr. Datt, there was a sudden quarrel and in a fit of anger blows were given. In the present case, there was no reason on the part of the accused to be in a state of fury. As is manifest, he had been harbouring an idea that any one who is dependent on him he can deal with them in any manner as he liked. It is apparent that he had been making advances towards sushila and had made up his mind to keep her as a kept. As it appears he has a different concept about marriage. After marrying sharda, his sexual thirst did not get quenched and with the passage of time it grew up in geometrical proportions and he developed relationship with Sumitra, the daughter of sharda and thereafter he longed to have sushila as her so-called partner in life. As it appears he has a different concept about marriage. After marrying sharda, his sexual thirst did not get quenched and with the passage of time it grew up in geometrical proportions and he developed relationship with Sumitra, the daughter of sharda and thereafter he longed to have sushila as her so-called partner in life. The bliss with which the marriage is connected has been treated as a commodity by the accused and when his offer was protested to by both the women, namely, Sharda and sumitra to conceive that the accused in a state of fury all of a sudden inflicted the blow would be negation of justice and an anathema to the concept of deterrent punishment. In our considered view the appellant does not deserve any leniency and he definitely had the knowledge that the deceased would be losing her life if a blow of knife is given with such force on the part of the abdomen. In absence of any provocation, the blow was given. In our considered view this was imposition of an act of supremacy without reason and, therefore, we have no hesitation in concurring with the findings of the learned trial Judge that the accused was guilty of an offence punishable under S. 302 of I. P. C. ( 13 ) RESULTANTLY, we perceive no merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .