Judgment B.N.P.Singh, J. 1. Petitioners, officers of Life Insurance Corporation of India, who have been prosecuted along with Gajendra Prasad Shrivastava, a non-official person, he being agent (accused no. 3 in the petition of complaint), have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, assailing the finding of the Court below, by which cognizance of the offence, alleged to have been committed by the petitioners and one another accused, was taken by the Court below by order dated 5.10.2001, to put them on trial. 2. For appreciation of manifold contentions that were raised at Bar on behalf of the petitioners and also the opposite party, a brief narrative of facts is apt to be discussed. The factual matix, as alleged in the petition or complaint and also the narratives made by the witnesses, during inquiry, are that on 27.2.1999, petitioners along with Gajendra Prasad Shrivastava, having visited residence of opposite party no, 2, motivated his wife Mrs. Phulwati Devi, to secure a life insurance policy on her life for an assured sum of Rs. one lakh and for which an application too was deposited to the Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter called the Corporation) on that day along with the first annual premium of Rs. 10,012/- in cash for which a receipt too had been issued to Mrs. Phulwati Devi, and opposite party No. 2, it was alleged, was appointed nominee under the policy in question. As ill luck would have it, it is alleged that said Fulwati Devi died on 11th April, 1999, in Kurji Holi Family Hospital at Patna for which accused no. 3 was informed on 30th April, 1999, and even oh persuasion, the Corporation did not honour the contract made with the party, and ensured amount of the policy was not released in favour of the nominee. It was opposite party no. 2, who launched prosecution against the petitioners and Gajendra Prasad Shrivastava on these accusations under Sections 406, 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). During inquiry, as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, three witnesses were examined on behalf of opposite party no. 2 and the learned Magistrate, on being satisfied about there being a prima facie case, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 409 and 420 IPC, directing issuance of summonses against the petitioners and the other accused to put them on trial. 3. 2 and the learned Magistrate, on being satisfied about there being a prima facie case, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 409 and 420 IPC, directing issuance of summonses against the petitioners and the other accused to put them on trial. 3. It is brought to my notice by the learned counsel for both the parties, which is not disputed, that legal notice too was issued against the petitioners to honour the contract made by the Corporation. 4. Contentions raised at Bar on behalf of the petitioners had been primarily threefold which need consideration. Firstly, it is urged that taking the prosecution version to be true on its face value, as transpiring from the petition of complaint and also statement of the witnesses examined during inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no offence, much less any offence under Sections 409 and 420 IPC is made out to make the petitioners answerable for commission of any offence and to put them on trial. It is sought to be urged that there has been no evidence about entrustment of property, which were either misappropriated by the officials of the Corporation or they converted the said property to their own use. As for applicability of Section 420 IPC, it was urged that evidences and also the circumstances of the case fail to suggest that even at the time when offer was made by the deceased for insurance cover of her life, there was any intention to cheat the deceased. The other limb of argument pressed on behalf of the petitioners was that on scrutiny of the proposal form and also declaration form, it was found that the deceased had submitted two different dates of birth, as in the proposal form, the date of birth was mentioned as 12th April, 1957 whereas in the declaration form duly sworn by her uncle Mishri Lal Sah, the date of birth of the deceased was shown as 12th February, 1958. The learned counsel would urge that there being variation in the two statements, as about the date of birth of the deceased, there has been no acceptance of the proposal of the deceased by the Corporation for insurance cover of her life. Resisting these arguments, it is urged on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 and also the State, that since the petitioners had received the first annual premium of Rs. Resisting these arguments, it is urged on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 and also the State, that since the petitioners had received the first annual premium of Rs. 10,012/- for which a receipt was granted to the deceased, the Corporation was under contractual obligation to honour the claim of the deceased for payment of the ensured amount and from which they have subsequently backed out, and had been insisting on opposite party no. 2 for payment of bribe of Rs. 20,000/- to honour the claim of the deceased. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners in answer to the contentions raised on behalf of the opposite party would urge that since the proposal for insurance was not accepted by the Corporation by its affirmance, the contract between the deceased and the Corporation remained unconcluded and the Corporation, as such has not incurred liability to the claim of the deceased. It is stated that unless proposal for life insurance is accepted by the Corporation by its affirmance, liability of the Corporation did not commence in any eventuality, and as for the first premium paid by the deceased, it is urged that shortly after information was received about the death of Phulwati Devi, opposite party no. 2 was duly informed by the Corporation to withdraw the proposal premium. 6. Other contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that even a parallel proceeding was launched by the opposite party no. 2 against the Corporation before the District Consumer Forum, claiming a sum of Rs. one lakh together with interest at the rate of 18% and also Rs. 25,000/- towards physical and mental loss. Interestingly, it is urged that in the petition before the District Consumer Forum, no allegation about asking illegal gratification was ever mentioned by the complainant. Yet it is urged that since the deceased was a female, she was not eligible for insurance cover of Rs. one lakh, unless she would have been a salaried woman and on this ground too, the allegations are sought to be refuted by the petitioners, and the last argument was that as the petitioners are entitled to protection for their action, committed in good raith, as contained under Section 47 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, they cannot be prosecuted on that count also. There being variation in the dates of birth between the two documents, as referred to above, it is urged that in case of suppression of material facts which are noticed, a life insurance policy would vitiate on that count also and there would not be even right to refund of money paid by the insured to Insurance Company, and reliance on this score was placed on a decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Mithoolal Naik V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India ( AIR 1962 SC 814 ). As for untenability of the claim of the opposite party no. 2 for payment of the insured amount by the Corporation on premises of payment of first instalment, my attention has been drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India V/s. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Kamba and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1014 ) in which following observations were made : "A contract of insurance will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer has been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making the offer. Though in certain human relationship silences to a proposal might convey acceptance but in the case of insurance proposal, silence does not denote consent and no binding contract arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify his acceptance. Mere delay in giving an answer cannot be construed as an acceptance, as, prima facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. Similarly, the mere receipt and retention of premium until after the death of the applicant or the mere preparation of the policy document is not acceptance." (From placitum) 7. The observation made by the Apex Court is a complete answer to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners about untenability of the claim and prosecution of the petitioners on that count. The receipt of first premium instalment without acceptance of the offer, which can be signified by affirmance, did not conclusively suggest a contract of binding nature between the parties for which the petitioners may be made answerable, and that apart, the petitioners have their protection also under Section 47 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, as what was done by them was done in good faith to enter into a contract with the offerer. Though parallel proceeding both before the criminal Court and the District Consumer Forum are pending, admittedly in some cases pendency of the proceeding between two forums are not impermissible. Even accusations attributed to the petitioners do not make out any offence, much less offence under Sections 420 and 409 IPC. 8. This revision application accordingly succeeds and the order dated 5.10.2001 passed by the Court below is accordingly set aside as against the petitioners. The first premium paid by the deceased, however, shall be refunded to opposite party no. 2. Whatever has been said herein, is only for the purpose of disposal of this application, which should not be construed as comment on merit of the case and should not prejudice the parties at trial against whom the prosecution would remain pending before the Court below.