ORDER : 1. In this writ petition, the petitioners are assailing the notification P/1 issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for shot “the Act”) on 9-5-2000 and declaration P/2 issued under section 6 of the Act, the invocation of section 17(1) for the acquisition of land for company, notice under section 9 and the award R-5/6 passed on 31-7-2002 be quashed. 2. Petitioners claim to be the Bhumiswamis of certain agricultural land situated at village Maddhepur, Tahsil Huzur, District-Rewa. Petitioners submit that the public purpose mentioned in section 3(f) of the Act excludes the acquisition of land for a company, the acquisition in question is for a private company J.P. Bela Cement Plant/respondent No. 5, thus, the same cannot be said to be a public purpose. The land has to be acquired as per Part VII of the Act. 3. It is further averred that J.P. Cement Ltd. moved an application before the revenue authorities for laying down railway line for a railway siding to enable them to transport cement from their plant to nearest railway station Turki on Satna-Rewa railway line. The notification P/1 was issued on 9-5-2000, public purpose was shown in column 6 of the notification as railway siding and railway line construction. It is further averred by the petitioners that invocation of section 17(1) in a case of Company and dispensation of the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act is illegal. Petitioners are still in possession of the land; there is gap of two years after issue of notification under section 4 and objections could be entertained under section 5-A and decided. There is special provision contained in section 39 of the Act which requires consent of the appropriate Government and agreement to be entered. Procedure for acquisition of land for Company was not adopted. Petitioners were served with a notice under section 9 writ petition was preferred. It is submitted that acquisition is illegal, mala-fide and colourable exercise of powers. By way of amendment, on objection being raised by the respondents that award has been passed, relief has been incorporated to quash the award dated 31-7-2002. 4. In the preliminary submissions filed on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4 it is contended that two petitions challenging the same notifications were filed earlier before this Court, thus, third petition cannot be entertained. 4. In the preliminary submissions filed on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4 it is contended that two petitions challenging the same notifications were filed earlier before this Court, thus, third petition cannot be entertained. The first petition WP No. 6229/2000 was filed by Ram Kumar son of Ramayan Singh Patel who is duly elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Madhepur, Tahsil-Huzur, District-Rewa. The same was filed in the shape of Public Interest Litigation; in that petition petitioner had filed representation moved by the villagers before the Collector, Rewa on 25-5-2000. Son of petitioner No. 1 Mahraniya namely, Lakhan Singh who is the brother of petitioner No. 2 had filed a representation. Petitioner No. 3 Girija Shankar has himself filed a representation therefore, the first writ petition filed by Sarpanch was also for and on behalf of present petitioners. The writ petition was disposed of vide order R/3 dated 29-11-2000 with a direction that petitioners and his co-villagers may make a fresh representation within two weeks from the date of the order which shall be considered by the State Government and thereafter pass reasoned order within a period of four weeks. Another Writ Petition No. 1605/2002 was filed by way of Public Interest Litigation by Sarpanch of Village Madhepur; this writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 4-4-2002 by a Division Bench of this Court in which this Court observed that petitioner can raise the objections before the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act instead of approaching this Court. Petitioners were aware of the factum of filing of previous writ petitions hence the present one deserves to be dismissed. 5. A detailed return has been filed by respondent No. 5 M/s J.P. Cement Ltd. In addition to taking aforesaid objections, it is contended that no fresh representation was filed before the competent authority as was directed by this Court and passing of the orders in two writ petitions earlier has been deliberately suppressed in the writ petition. It is contended that all necessary formalities, etc. have been gone into and adhered to; an agreement was entered into; procedure of acquisition for company was followed. Petitioners have not objected to the acquisition; they filed their objections before the Land Acquisition Officer about quantum of compensation and also demanded service for one member of their family in lieu of acquisition of their land. have been gone into and adhered to; an agreement was entered into; procedure of acquisition for company was followed. Petitioners have not objected to the acquisition; they filed their objections before the Land Acquisition Officer about quantum of compensation and also demanded service for one member of their family in lieu of acquisition of their land. Their grievances were duly considered and appropriate provisions under the agreement were made; award has been made; compensation has been determined; petitioners can receive it whenever, wherever they so desire. 6. Rejoinder has been filed by the petitioners pointing out that Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat never consulted the petitioners and petitioners came to know about writ petition No. 6229/2000 and Writ Petition No. 1605/2002 when return was filed on behalf of respondents. Sarpanch or any other member never represented the interest of the petitioners in the said writ petitions. 7. An affidavit has been filed of Shri A. K. Pandey, General Manager, Jaypee Cement Ltd., Rewa on 18-10-2002 pointing out that as per applications R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5 compensation was claimed by petitioners before the Land Acquisition Officer and award R-5/6 has been passed on 31-7-2002. It is further mentioned in para 3 of the affidavit that no objection to the acquisition was raised, but the objection was raised only in respect to quantum of compensation and also demand for giving service to one member of the family as per qualification of the incumbent; for which respondent No. 5 has already agreed and shall abide by the undertaking. 8. Shri S.L. Saxena, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners submitted that acquisition is not for public purpose as defined in section 3(f), procedure of Part VII for acquisition has not been followed which is applicable in case of a company. The submission is that no agreement was entered into and no consent was obtained which is pre-requisite under section 39 of the Act; report under section 40 was not obtained and agreement as contemplated by section 41 has not been entered into and agreement has not been published in the Gazette as mandated by section 42 of the Act. The submission is that no agreement was entered into and no consent was obtained which is pre-requisite under section 39 of the Act; report under section 40 was not obtained and agreement as contemplated by section 41 has not been entered into and agreement has not been published in the Gazette as mandated by section 42 of the Act. No report was obtained under section 5-A of the Collector as the enquiry was dispensed with and no report even otherwise which is mandated by section 40 was called before giving consent by the appropriate Government, thus, basic fundamental for acquisition of company were not followed, thus, it is a case of nullity and passing of award is inconsequential and has to be ignored. His further submission is that mention of public purpose in column 6 of notification P/1 issued under section 4 does not show that acquisition was for company. It has been shown as if it was for a public purpose. It ought to have been mentioned specifically that acquisition is for company. His further submission is that section 17(1) cannot be invoked in case of acquisition of a company and enquiry under section 5-A of the Act could not be dispensed with. Thus, the acquisition is bad in law and petitioners have filed the applications for claiming adequate compensation reserving their rights as writ petitions were earlier field before this Court, thus, passing of award in the case of acquisition which lacks jurisdiction cannot create any obstacle in the way of the petitioners to assail the acquisition as a nullity and in quashment of the same by this Court. He has also placed reliance on various decisions to be referred later on. 9. Shri N.C. Jain, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 5 has contended that agreement was entered into; consent was granted by the revenue department of State Government as mentioned in Para 2 of the award R-5/6. He has also placed reliance on various decisions to be referred later on. 9. Shri N.C. Jain, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 5 has contended that agreement was entered into; consent was granted by the revenue department of State Government as mentioned in Para 2 of the award R-5/6. The writ petition is vague as to which part of Part VII of the Act was not complied with; the provisions of Part VII has been complied with; in view of the directions made by this Court to the petitioners in the previous two writ petitions they did not approach to the competent authority by way of filing the objections, in any case, petitioners did not file any objection to the acquisition and they were having the knowledge of the acquisition proceeding and it is wrongly mentioned in the rejoinder that they came to know of filing of previous two writ petitions when the returns in the present writ petition were filed. In the objections filed by them before the Land Acquisition Officer, it is mentioned in Para 9 of R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5 that they were well aware that writ petitions were preferred by Sarpanch and another PIL was filed as the fact finds place in the representations; still petitioners participated in the proceedings for award; claimed compensation and when compensation was determined in July; thereafter only in August taking a chance of award being passed in their favour, writ petition has been filed as an after though. Once award has been passed, invalidity, if any, of the acquisition proceedings cannot be set up and acquisition becomes complete. Even otherwise, in his submission, there is no illegality or irregularity in the acquisition proceedings; the provisions have been followed and as petitioners submit that possession has not been taken and there was a direction made by this Court to submit the objections in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, the objections should have been submitted but none of the petitioners filed any objection, thus, petitioners cannot be heard, at this stage, saying that they have been deprived of opportunity of filing the objections by dispensing with the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. 10. The first question for consideration is whether the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been followed which are applicable in a case of acquisition for a company. 10. The first question for consideration is whether the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been followed which are applicable in a case of acquisition for a company. Pleadings in this regard in the writ petition are absolutely vague. Whatever is pleaded with respect to not following provision of the acquisition for company is to be found in Para 5.10 and 5.11 of the writ petition; the same are quoted below:- “5.10 That respondent No. 5 is a company and has considerable influence over the revenue authorities. Part VII of the Act makes a special provision for acquisition of the land for a company and lays down a special procedure. The revenue authorities ignored the provisions of Part VII of the Act. Section 39 of the Act provides:- “The provisions of section (6 to section 16) (both inclusive) and section 18 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force nor acquire land for any company (under this part) unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government nor unless the company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned.” 5.11. From the facts narrated above it is apparent that the revenue authorities in their zeal to help a private company, did not follow the procedure laid down for acquisition of land for a company and adopted a procedure which for the reasons stated above was not applicable.” 11. If Para 5.10 and 5.11 are read in the context two things emerges that consent of the appropriate Government has not been obtained and agreement has not been executed; though only provision has been quoted on facts there is no whisper in the pleadings raised that no such agreement was entered into, but if award is perused and the return filed by respondent No. 5 is taken into consideration, it is clear that the consent was granted by the revenue department of State Government on 5-6-99 and it is also mentioned in the award that agreement has been entered into in accordance with the provisions of section 41 of the Act. Thus, provisions of Part VII have been complied with as to consent and entering in an agreement. There is no factual pleading with respect to any other infirmity and any other non-compliance of the provisions of Part VII of the Act. Thus, provisions of Part VII have been complied with as to consent and entering in an agreement. There is no factual pleading with respect to any other infirmity and any other non-compliance of the provisions of Part VII of the Act. There is no pleading that enquiry before granting consent by the State Government was not made as contemplated under section 40. Section 40 of the Act reads as under:- “40. Previous enquiry - (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the (appropriate Government) be satisfied, (either on the report of the Collector under section 5-A, sub-section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided:- (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith: (aa) that such acquisition is need for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. (2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the (appropriate Government) shall appoint. (3) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible, in the same manner as is provided by the (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) in the case of a Civil Court.” 12. It is apparent from the reading of above section 40 of the Act that if acquisition is for construction of some work and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public consent can be give. Purpose of acquisition is such which is useful for public; Cement Plant has to avail the facility of railway in order to supply the cement which is meant for public utility which is manufactured for the purpose of public use. Thus, consent has been granted, in my opinion, properly and purpose is useful to the public. Purpose of acquisition is such which is useful for public; Cement Plant has to avail the facility of railway in order to supply the cement which is meant for public utility which is manufactured for the purpose of public use. Thus, consent has been granted, in my opinion, properly and purpose is useful to the public. It is not the pleading that enquiry as provided under section 40 was not held before granting the consent; it is not the pleading that agreement was not entered into and published, thus, even otherwise when the fact is mentioned in the award that agreement was entered into after grant of consent there is presumption of correctness of the official act in favour of acquisition proceedings. Though in absence of the specific pleadings on facts petitioners cannot contend that provisions of part VII of the Act were not followed and complied with in the instant case. Though, I have considered the said submission on merits, but, it is not necessary at all to go into the merits of challenge made in the petition as petitioners on their own case never raised any objection to the acquisition. Even after direction was issued by this Court in PIL, it does not appear that any objection was filed by petitioners; on the contrary petitioners as per R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5 claimed compensation and demanded employment to one of the family member in accordance with the policy. By way of caution they have mentioned in para 9 that some other writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition. In WP 1605/2002 an order was passed on 4-4-2002 by Division Bench of this Court and it was directed that objections can be raised before the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. It does not appear that petitioners preferred any objection challenging the validity of the notification on any of the grounds set up in the instant writ petition nor cared to file writ petition before this Court on their own. In R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5 petitioners claimed compensation in March, 2002 and they have also participated in the proceeding of passing of award on 31-7-2002. The petitioners had taken chance of award being passed in their favour and only after the award was passed on 31-7-2002 they have filed the instant writ petition before this Court. In R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5 petitioners claimed compensation in March, 2002 and they have also participated in the proceeding of passing of award on 31-7-2002. The petitioners had taken chance of award being passed in their favour and only after the award was passed on 31-7-2002 they have filed the instant writ petition before this Court. Once award has been passed, in my opinion, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another vs. Shah Hyder Being and Others, AIR 2000 SC 671 , Para 17, the Apex Court held as under:- “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent case C. Padma vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627 . This Court observed as below:- “The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries, dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpatta District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in G.O.Ms. No. 816 Industries, dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of the land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in G.O.Ms. No. 439 Industries, dated 10-5-1985. In G.O.Ms. No. 546 Industries, dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O.Ms. No. 439 Industries, dated 10-5-1985. In G.O.Ms. No. 546 Industries, dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O.Ms. No. 1392 Industries, dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus, the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.” 14. In C. Padma vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627 similar view was taken. 15. In Rambharose vs. State of M.P. 2002 (3) MPLJ 378 , Bench comprising of brother Dipak Misra, J. has also followed the decision of Apex Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and it has been held that:- “12. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the record was produced before the Court and on a scrutiny of the same it is quite perceptible that Hariram had appeared before the Land Acquisition Proceeding. Once Hariram had participated in the proceeding and award was passed in his presence, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel that the petitioners were not aware of the land acquisition proceedings. The learned senior counsel has made an endeavour to take me through the award to show that Hariram had not participated in the said proceeding but the aforesaid submission is sans substance in view of the order recorded in the land acquisition proceeding and further the reference made by the land acquisition officer to the Civil Court wherein, as per return of the respondent No. 11, Hariram appeared and conceded in favour of the certain respondents. Thus the fact remains that the award was passed in presence of Hariram and once the award is passed the notification under the Act is unassailable. In this context, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyde Beig and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 48 . Thus the fact remains that the award was passed in presence of Hariram and once the award is passed the notification under the Act is unassailable. In this context, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyde Beig and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 48 . In paragraph 17 of the said judgment the Apex Court held as under:- “In any event after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder.” Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel laboured hard to distinguish the said decision on the ground that in the said case there was a belated approach but in the present case the petitioners immediately coming to know about the proceeding assailed the same. The aforesaid submission looks quite attractive on first flush but pales into insignificance inasmuch as the respondents have been able to prove that the owner. Hariram had participated in the proceeding before the land acquisition officer in the year 1963 and, therefore, the challenge cannot be made by the legal heirs of Hariram at this stage and hence, the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Shah Hyder Beig (supra) would be squarely applicable. Thus, I am of the considered view the writ petition does not deserve to be entertained at this belated time.” 16. In view of the fact that petitioners themselves claimed the compensation and did not prefer any writ petition before this Court prior to passing of award in case they were serious in challenging the acquisition proceedings, the writ petition ought to have been preferred and petitioners ought not to have claimed compensation as done by them as per applications R-5/3, R-5/4 and R-5/5; by their conduct they are estopped to turn round and seek quashment of award having claimed compensation and employment to one of the family member. 17. Learned counsel has further places reliance on decision of the Apex Court as to jurisdictional incompetence of the authorities on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 in Para 338 it has been held that:- “338. 17. Learned counsel has further places reliance on decision of the Apex Court as to jurisdictional incompetence of the authorities on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 in Para 338 it has been held that:- “338. The scope of the exclusionary clauses contained in the statutes has been considered in great detail with reference to the decisions of the superior courts in England and also the decisions of the Supreme Court of India by Justice G.P. Singh (former Chief Justice, M.P. High Court) in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 6th Edn. (1996) at p. 475. The law is stated thus:- “(1) An Exclusionary Clause using the formula “an order of the tribunal under this Act shall not be called in question in any court” is ineffective to prevent the calling in question of an order of the tribunal if the order is really not an order under the Act but a nullity. (2) Cases of nullity may arise when there is lack of jurisdiction at the stage of commencement of enquiry, e.g., when (a) authority is assumed under an ultra vires statute; (b) the tribunal is not properly constituted, or is disqualified to act; (c) the subject-matter or the parties are such over which the tribunal has no authority to enquire; and (d) there is want of essential preliminaries prescribed by the law for commencement of the enquiry. (3) Cases of nullity may also arise during the course or at the conclusion of the enquiry. These cases are also cases of want of jurisdiction if the word “jurisdiction” is understood in a wide sense. (3) Cases of nullity may also arise during the course or at the conclusion of the enquiry. These cases are also cases of want of jurisdiction if the word “jurisdiction” is understood in a wide sense. Some examples of these cases are: (a) when the tribunal has wrongly determined a jurisdictional question of fact or law; (b) when it has failed to follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, e.g. has passed the order without giving an opportunity of hearing to the party affected; (c) when it has violated the fundamental provisions of the Act, e.g., when it fails to take into account matters which it is required to take into account or when it takes into account extraneous and irrelevant matters; (d) when it has acted in bad faith and (e) when it grants a relief or makes an order which it has no authority to grant or make; as also (f) when by misapplication of the law it has asked itself the wrong question.” With great respect to the learned author, I would adopt the above statement of law, as my own.” 18. Learned counsel has further relied on Deepak Pahwa vs. Ltd. Governor of Delhi and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1721 , Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P. and Another, AIR 1962 SC 1621 , Smt. Shrisht Dhawan vs. M/s Shaw Brothers, AIR 1992 SC 1555 . Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur vs. Gokul Narain and Another, AIR 1996 SC 1819 to contend that the basic procedure prescribed for acquisition for a company, if not followed, award and acquisition is a nullity, but I find on facts, the provisions of Part VII have been complied with and ratio of aforesaid dictum is not attracted and there is an agreement entered into and consent was granted by State Government in the year 1999. Thus, no benefit can be derived on the decisions aforesaid. 19. There is yet another aspect to reject the challenge to the acquisition made by the petitioner in the instant case. The notification was issued under section 4 on 9-5-2000 and declaration under section 6 was also issued on 21-7-2000. Thus, no benefit can be derived on the decisions aforesaid. 19. There is yet another aspect to reject the challenge to the acquisition made by the petitioner in the instant case. The notification was issued under section 4 on 9-5-2000 and declaration under section 6 was also issued on 21-7-2000. Writ petition has been filed belatedly after two years; in such matters delay of two years and also the fact that awards has been passed petitioner took chance of getting the compensation and thereafter has preferred the writ petition and also claimed employment for one of the family member which has been assured in the affidavit filed of Shri A.K. Pandey, General Manager of J.P. Cement Ltd. Rewa wherein it is unequivocally stated that company has agreed and shall abide by the undertaking of giving service to one member of the family as per qualification of the incumbent; that should be enough to satisfy the claim of the petitioner with respect to employment as per policy. 20. The other submission that mention of public purpose in column 6 in the notification was vague and enquiry under section 5A was illegally dispensed with cannot be raised by the petitioner at this stage though the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Chaitram Verma vs. Land Acquisition Officer and Others, 1993 MPLJ 572 . In my opinion, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise these pleas at the belated stage in the light of decision rendered in Ahmed Nagar Municipal Council (supra) and, in my opinion, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner. As per the directions given in PIL also the petitioner did not raise any objection in accordance with the directions issued by this Court but on the contrary the petitioner claimed compensation and claimed employment; having done so petitioner cannot be allowed to turn round and challenge the acquisition after passing of award. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any ground to make an interference in the acquisition. 22. Resultantly the Writ Petition is dismissed.