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2002 DIGILAW 1080 (MP)

Dhyani Bai v. Union of India (UOI).

2002-12-11

BHAWANI SINGH, S.L.JAIN

body2002
Judgment ( 1. ) THROUGH this order we propose to decide this batch of four Letters Patent Appeals, being L. P. A. No. 725/2002 (Smt. Dhyani Bai v. Union of India and Ors.), L. P. A. No. 726/2002 (Bhawanideen v. Union of India and Ors.), L. P. A. No. 727/2002 (Manik Chand v. Union of India and Anr.) and L. P. A. No. 728/2002 (Ratan Chand v. Union of India and Ors. ). Common question of law is involved in all of these appeals which arise out of separate orders passed by learned Single Judge in the writ petitions filed by the appellants. ( 2. ) BRIEFLY stated, proceedings under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 were initiated against the appellants. The Estate Officer, Southern Railway, Bilaspur, by his order held that the land in the occupation of appellants is railways land. The order of the Estate Officer was challenged by appellants herein by filing civil appeals before IIIrd Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Shahdol. The Court dismissed the appeals holding that the appellants have paid the rent to the railway for several years and the appellants could not establish that the railway is not the owner of the land occupied by them. ( 3. ) THE appellants challenged the order of Estate Officer and that of the Appellate Court by filing writ petitions before this Court. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions. However, the liberty to file a civil suit was given to the appellants if that remedy is available to them. The learned Single Judge held that the question of title was carefully considered by the Estate Officer and also by the Appellate Court, and no interference is called for in the impugned orders. ( 4. ) WE have heard Shri K. K. Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners at length at the admission stage and perused the records. ( 5. ) THE learned Counsel submits that a civil suit is pending between Municipal Council, Budhar and Union of India with regard to the land in question, therefore, respondents title to the land in question is subjudice. ( 6. ( 5. ) THE learned Counsel submits that a civil suit is pending between Municipal Council, Budhar and Union of India with regard to the land in question, therefore, respondents title to the land in question is subjudice. ( 6. ) ADMITTEDLY, the appellants have paid the rent of the land in question to the railways for several years and a person brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord cannot question the title of the landlord at the time of settlement. If he is allowed to do so, extreme confusion would result in the matter of relationship of landlord and tenant. Therefore, the equitable principle of estoppel is incorporated in Section 116 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows:-- "116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.--No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy; a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given. " ( 7. ) THE creation of relation of landlord and tenant has the effect in law of estopping the tenant from denying his title which he had admitted to exist in the landlord. Once the appellants admit that they had been paying rent to the railways, the rule of estoppel comes into operation against them which prevents them from denying the authority and title of the landlord. ( 8. ) IT is also the contention of the appellants that when they constructed shops they were not prevented by the railways. However, it is not their case that they constructed the shops with the permission of the railways or after bringing the same to the knowledge of the authorities concerned. Therefore, the Estate Officer has rightly found that the appellants arc in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. Of course, if the appellants are able to establish that the land in question belongs to the State Government and not to the railways, they can deny the title after they give up the possession restoring the status quo ante. Therefore, the Estate Officer has rightly found that the appellants arc in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. Of course, if the appellants are able to establish that the land in question belongs to the State Government and not to the railways, they can deny the title after they give up the possession restoring the status quo ante. Having admitted that they had been paying rent to the railways for several years, the appellants cannot set up the superior title of a third person. Having once admitted that the appellant had been paying rent to the railways, they cannot rely on the defect of the title to their advantage or to act to the detriment of the landlords right. ( 9. ) WE do not find any perversity in the orders passed by the Estate Officer and maintained by the Appellate Court as well as by the learned Single Judge. Normally, High Court will not interfere with finding of fact unless the order is perverse. The question of title was carefully considered by Estate Officer and also by the Appellate Court. ( 10. ) WE, therefore, find no merit in these appeals and consequently, they are dismissed in limine.