ORDER : 1. The above appeal has been filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Mehsana in Sessions Case No.39/92, who were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, but, on appeal filed by the State in Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 1992 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, came to be convicted, by reversing the verdict of acquittal. Accused No.1, who was convicted by the learned Trial Judge, which was affirmed on appeal by the High Court also, is the brother of accused No.2 and accused No.3 is the son of accused No.2. They were charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded from the evidence placed on record, was that: on 03.11.1991, at about 5.30 PM, the deceased Bhupatsinh went to his field to collect Bajri, followed by his mother Ajuben, PW-2 and wife Jasuben. At the lane (Naliya) approaching the field at some distance away from the house of the accused near a curvature, all the three accused attacked and assaulted the deceased. It was said that accused Nos.1 and 2 were armed with Dhariya and accused No.3 was armed with Sickle and all the three started attacking the deceased and inspite of an attempted intervention by Ajuben and Jasuben, they were pushed away and the accused achieved their object and by the time an alarm was raised, the accused ran away, accused No.3 with the Sickle also. Even, as the deceased was being attacked, on being informed about the same by one Shantaben Ramjibhai, Kanaksingh, PW-4, the brother of the deceased was said to have rushed to the police station and informed the police and requested to send police immediately for protection. Thereupon, accompanied by the police, PW-4 came to the place of incident and witnessed the dead body of his brother. The mother of the deceased, PW-2 gave a complaint which was recorded by the investigating officer -PW-11. The accused seems to have absconded and later only on 7.11.1991 could be apprehended. On the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was laid for the offences noted above. T 3. The mother of the deceased, PW-2 gave a complaint which was recorded by the investigating officer -PW-11. The accused seems to have absconded and later only on 7.11.1991 could be apprehended. On the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was laid for the offences noted above. T 3. he learned Trial Judge found that the deceased died a homicidal death and on the point for consideration as to whether the prosecution has proved without any doubt that the accused or anybody had the intention to do so, came to the conclusion that the deceased was murdered on account of the enmity and considering the intention of the accused No.1, the learned Trial Judge fixed him with the commission of the murder. In that respect, though the learned Trial Judge chose to refer to the contentions of the parties, on certain general legal principles, normally governing consideration of such cases, chose to find a positive corroboration also for his finding about the commission of the offence by accused No.1 alone, from the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory as to the presence of the 'O' group of blood which was the group of blood of the deceased, on the sleeves and shoulder of the white shirt of accused No.1, which was also sent for examination and report. On the mere reasoning that the other accused, A-2 and A-3 could not be so fixed with the occurrence, by any matching of the blood group and the further fact that the weapon said to have been handled by the other accused and recovered subsequently, did not contain the same group of blood as of the deceased, the learned Trial Judge choose to extend the benefit of doubt to them, keeping in view also the admitted longstanding enmity between the two families of the deceased and the accused. In dealing with these accused alone the Trial Court also felt that the variation as to the place of occurrence in the evidence of PW2 and PW3 renders their evidence even not reliable. 4. As noticed earlier, the State went on appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 and the accused No.1 filed an appeal against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life with a further fine of Rs. 1000/- imposed. 4. As noticed earlier, the State went on appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 and the accused No.1 filed an appeal against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life with a further fine of Rs. 1000/- imposed. The learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court, having regard to the perfunctory nature of consideration of the materials, without even any specific reference to the relevant witnesses examined and the vital information placed on record chose to consider the materials, disclosed from the examination of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-7 and PW-11 and taking into account the presence of human blood in the other weapons recovered, though, it could not be with precision decipher the group of such blood, thought fit, in our mind deservedly, to interfere with the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 and convicted A-2 and A-3 also for the same offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 32 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed sentence of life imprisonment, in addition to a fine of Rs. 200/- with a default clause. The conviction of A-1 came to be affirmed by dismissing his appeal and there is no appeal further at his instance. The approach of the High Court as well as what weighed with the learned Judges to call for such an interference with the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 is best indicated in the judgment, and it would be useful to set out the relevant portion of it itself, which reads as follows :- "The learned trial judge has believed the evidence of the eye witness Ajuben and has recorded conviction of the accused on the basis of the said evidence. However, without assigning any reason, has recorded acquittal of the accused Nos.2 and 3. The learned Judge has also manifestly erred in observing that the muddamal sickle was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory or that there were no injuries on the body of the deceased which could have been caused by a sickle. The opinion of the doctor in this regards is unambiguous. He has in no uncertain terms opined that the injuries inflicted upon the deceased could have been caused by the sickle. The muddamal sickle was recovered from the place of the incident and was found to be blood stained. The opinion of the doctor in this regards is unambiguous. He has in no uncertain terms opined that the injuries inflicted upon the deceased could have been caused by the sickle. The muddamal sickle was recovered from the place of the incident and was found to be blood stained. It was also sent for forensic examination, however, the group of the blood found on the sickle could not be determined. The learned judge has also erred in holding that since the deceased had suffered amputation of two fingers, the muddamal sickle must have belonged to him and while using it for his defence, he must have suffered amputation of two fingers. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the deceased was armed with sickle. On the contrary, Ajuben - the eye witness had stated that neither the deceased, nor the witness, nor her daughter-in-law Jasuben had any tool including a sickle. The learned Judge has also erred in holding that no blood was found on one of the dhariyas. The FSL report establishes that human blood was found on both the muddamal dhariyas. The blood on one the dhariyas was that of group 'O', while on the other it could not be determined. Merely because the group of the blood found on muddamal weapons i.e. one of the dhariyas and the sickle could not be determined, the learned Judge could not have held that the said weapons were not used at all. The learned Judge having held that the evidence on record proved the intention of the accused no.1 to commit murder of Bhupatsinh, has manifestly erred in acquitting the accused nos. 2 and 3 whose presence at the place of the incidence and whose act of assaulting the deceased with deadly weapons has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Further the fact that all the accused were absconding after the incident, has been recorded by the learned Judge as against the accused no.1 alone. The learned Judge has not given any reason why no adverse inference should have been drawn against the accused nos. 2 and 3 also. Considering the totality of the evidence, we hold that all the accused had assaulted the deceased Bhupatsinh with a common intention to kill him. In our view, the acquittal of the accused nos. 2 and 3 has resulted into gross mis-carriage of justice. " 5. 2 and 3 also. Considering the totality of the evidence, we hold that all the accused had assaulted the deceased Bhupatsinh with a common intention to kill him. In our view, the acquittal of the accused nos. 2 and 3 has resulted into gross mis-carriage of justice. " 5. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the prosecution version, as disclosed by the witnesses, particularly, PWs.2 and 3 stood rendered wholly un-reliable due to shifting of the place of occurrence and varying versions of it spoken by them. In addition, the learned counsel laid stress also on the fact that PW-4 when he gave a report to the police, mentioned about the name of only one person, A-1 and that the subsequent addition of the names solely on the ground of long-standing enmity between the two families, would bely the claim of the prosecution about the involvement of A-2 and A-3 in the occurrence. The learned counsel also submitted, that when the credibility of the witnesses has been assessed by the Trial Judge who had an opportunity to watch their demeanour and performance of the witnesses before him, it was not for the High Court to substitute their own view on this aspect and in doing so, the High Court committed a grave error, particularly, in reversing the order of acquittal. According to the learned counsel, the High Court has completely lost sight of the enmity factor and the necessary weight to be given to it unlike the consideration of the same by learned Trial Judge, while recording an acquittal in favour of A-2 and A-3. Finally, it has also been contended that even assuming that the view taken by the High Court could be one more possible view of the matter on the materials on record, it was not given to the High Court to reverse an order of acquittal by the Trial Court merely on that account unmindful of the fact that the view taken by the Trial Court was equally a possible view and in such a case the benefit should always be extended to the accused. Consequently, according to the learned counsel, the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 by the Trial Court was well merited and did not deserve interference in the hands of the High Court. 6. Consequently, according to the learned counsel, the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 by the Trial Court was well merited and did not deserve interference in the hands of the High Court. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent - State invited our attention to the materials which have been relied upon by the High Court, which according to him justified the reversal of acquittal made without proper and complete consideration of all the materials on record, as was expected of the learned Trial Judge. 7. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. 8. In our view, this can not be said to be a case where the learned Trial Judge arrived at proper conclusions and recorded findings, without merely detailed reasons or elaborate consideration. On the other hand, even a cursory reading of the judgment would go to show that there was total non-application of mind to many vital materials on record, which are found to have been conveniently glossed over and ignored and the case against appellants seems to have been decided merely on the absence of same blood group as that of the deceased on the weapons seized and the so called variation as to the place of occurrence. From the mere and only fact, that there appear to be some semblance of variation in the place of occurrence, as spoken to by PW-2 and PW-3, which itself, in our view, may not be the correct reading of the evidence and with no other justifying reason, the oral evidence could not have been totally ignored, is unreliable. It is seen and there can be no dispute on the factual position as disclosed from evidence that at the scene of occurrence, blood spots at two places, one near the curvature in the land (Naliya) and one opposite the door of the house of accused were found of which the blood spot near the curvature was larger than the one near the house of the accused. The distance between the two spots is said to be 194 ft. (73 steps). The reference to the same in different manner alone cannot be considered to be sufficient to totally condemn and reject the evidence of PWs 2 and 3. The distance between the two spots is said to be 194 ft. (73 steps). The reference to the same in different manner alone cannot be considered to be sufficient to totally condemn and reject the evidence of PWs 2 and 3. The samples of the blood stained earth collected from the two spots were also got examined and the reports marked as Exhibits 46 and 47, disclosed that it was human blood. Viewed on the basis of above factual position and the evidence that after imposing the fatal blows, the body has been dragged also to some distance and left at the place where it was ultimately found, there can be hardly any justification for the learned Trial Judge to have surmised a complete variation as to the place of occurrence so as to cast any doubt about the credibility of the prosecution case, as disclosed from the evidence. The findings of the learned Trial Judge, according to us, are vitiated not only for lack of any or proper reasoning but also for ignoring the relevant and vital materials, which, as noticed by the High Court, if had been adverted to and duly considered, the learned Trial Judge could not have came to such a conclusion, as to exonerate the appellants. Such perfunctory findings, in utter disregard of overwhelming evidence available on record do not deserve any legal credence, as proper findings of a court of law. 9. We are unable to appreciate or accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the view taken by the learned Trial Judge was one possible view and though the view taken by the High Court could be yet another possible view, such a course should not have been adopted by the Appellate Court to disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court in this case. As a matter of principle, though, the submission may sound attractive, but, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned trial Judge, in our view, as observed by the High Court, could not have came to such conclusions as were arrived at by him, except by ignoring and giving a go bye to numerous vital and relevant materials and consequently such recording by him could not be given due credit as a 'possible view' at all on the materials on record. The findings of the learned Trial Judge, in our view, are manifestly erroneous and vital, relevant and important evidence on record and the conclusion thus rendered not only defies logic but could not have been arrived at by any reasonable person or authority obligated to decide objectively an issue on the basis of the materials placed before it. Having regard to this, in our view, the High Court was well justified in interfering with the verdict of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Judge and we see no infirmity whatsoever to call for our interference in this appeal at the instance of accused A-2 and A-3. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed.