JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. These appeals arising out of judgments and decrees passed in the suits by the Sub-Ordinate Judges exercising original jurisdiction have been listed for passing appropriate order for transfer of these pending appeals to the Courts of concerned District and Additional District Judges for disposal in the light of the recent amendment made in Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887. 2. To amend Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Court Act. 1887 (in short the Act of 1887) in its application to the State of Jharkhand the Legislature of Jharkhand enacted Bengal, Agra, and Assam Civil Court (Jharkhand Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 11 of 2002) whereby certain provision of 1887 Act has been amendment. 3. By the aforesaid Amendment Act, 2002 the pecuniary appellate jurisdiction of the District Courts has been increased to Rs. 2,50.000/-. 4. I have heard at length Mr. Debi Prasad learned Sr. counsel appearing for the appellant. I also invited other counsels to make their submissions and they adopted the argument advanced by Mr. Debi Prasad. 5. Mr. Debi Prasad firstly submitted that all those pending appeals filed before the Amendment Act, 2002 came into force, should be heard and disposed of by this Court instead of transferring those pending appeals to the Courts of District and Additional District Judges. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly the District Courts who were not competent to hear these appeals prior to Amendment Act, 2002 and since that Act had no retrospective operation, these appeals can not be transferred to the District Courts. Learned counsel further submitted that the right to appeal is a vested right which can not be taken away by the Amending Act, 2002 and, therefore all pending appeals can only be disposed of by this Court. Learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Narain v. Additional District Judges, AIR 1964 SC 489 . 6. Learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Narain v. Additional District Judges, AIR 1964 SC 489 . 6. At the very outset, I would like to quote the following passage appearing at page 462 of Salmonds Jurisprudence (12th Edition) : "Whether I have a right to recover certain property as the question of substantive law, for the determination and protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what court and within what time I must initiate proceeding are question of procedural law, for they relate merely to the mode in which the Court fulfills their functions." 7. Before appreciating the submission made by the learned counsel it is desirable to take note of I would like to state the brief history of the legislation. Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Civil Courts Act in Bengal (North Eastern Provinces & Assam) which were then administered by the Lt. Governor of Bengal. Section 3 provides constitution of Civil Courts. Section 4 lays down the number of the District Judges, Sub-ordinate Judges and the Munsif. Sections 6 and 7 provide the procedure for filling of the vacancies of the District and Sub-ordinate Judges. Section 11 of the Act prescribes procedure for transfer of proceeding on vacation of the offices of the Sub-ordinate Judges. Section 13 empowers the State Government to fix the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Courts. Sections 14 and 15 prescribe places and sittings of Courts and vacation of Courts. Sections 18 and 19 prescribe the extent of original jurisdiction of the District Judges, Sub-ordinate Judges and the Munsifs. Section 20 provides that an appeal from a decree or order of the District Judge or the Additional District Judge shall lie to the High, Court. Section 21 prescribes the forum of appeal from a decree or order passed by Sub-ordinate Judges. Section 20 provides that an appeal from a decree or order of the District Judge or the Additional District Judge shall lie to the High, Court. Section 21 prescribes the forum of appeal from a decree or order passed by Sub-ordinate Judges. Section 21 is relevant for deciding the present issue which reads as under : "Section 21.--Appeals from Sub-ordinate Judges and Munsifs.--(1) Save as aforesaid; an appeal from a decree or order of a Sub-ordinate Judge shall lie- (a) to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or orders was made did not exceed five thousand rupees, and (b) to the High Court in any other case. (2) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Munsifs shall lie to the District Judge. (3) Where the function of receiving any appeals which lie to the District Judge under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) has been assigned to an Additional Judge, the appeal may be preferred to the Additional Judge. (4) The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, direct by notification in the official Gazette, that appeals lying to the District Judge under Sub-section (2) from all or any of the decrees or orders of any Mun-sifs shall be preferred to the Court of such Sub-ordinate Judge as may be mentioned in the notification and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly." 8. The aforesaid Act of 1887 for the first time was amended by the legislature of State of Bihar in its application to the State of Bihar. Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1959 read as under :-- 2. Amendment of Section 21 of Act XII of 1887.--In Clause (a) of Sub- section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (XIII of 1887), for the words "did not exceed five thosuand rupees, the words, "was less than ten thousand rupees" shall be substituted. 3. Amendment of Section 21 of Act XII of 1887.--In Clause (a) of Sub- section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (XIII of 1887), for the words "did not exceed five thosuand rupees, the words, "was less than ten thousand rupees" shall be substituted. 3. Retrospective operation.--(1) The provision of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (XII of 1887), as amended by Section 2 shall apply irrespective of the fact that the suits proceedings, decrees or orders out of which the appeals, referred to therein arise were instituted or made prior to the commencement this Aet. (4) Savings.--Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect any appeal instituted prior to the commencement of this Act. 9. From bare perusal of the Amendment Act, 1959 it is clear that while increasing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District & Additional District Judges to hear the appeals from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-, the prospect of the appeals pending in the High Court was saved by Section 4 of the said Amendment Act. 10. In 1988 again the Act of 1887 was amended by Bihar Act 19 of 1987. By Section 3 of the Amendment Act again the pecuniary appellate jurisdiction of the District & Additional District Judges was increased from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 60,000/-. 11. After creation of the State of Jharkhand the Legislature of the State came with a new Amendment Act called as "Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Jharkhand Amendment) Act, 2002" amending certain provisions of the Act of 1887 in its application to the State of Jharkhand. By Section 2 of the said Amendment Act Section 21 of the Act of 1887 has been amended whereby the appellate jurisdietion of the District & Additional District Judges to hear the appeals has been increased upto two lacs fifty thousand and after Clause (b) of Sub- section (1) of Section 21 a proviso has been added. For better appreciation Section 2 of the Amendment Act, 2002 is reproduced herein below :-- "2. Amendment of Section 21 of the Act.--(i) in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, for the words "sixty thousand", the words "two lac fifty thousand" shall be substituted. For better appreciation Section 2 of the Amendment Act, 2002 is reproduced herein below :-- "2. Amendment of Section 21 of the Act.--(i) in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, for the words "sixty thousand", the words "two lac fifty thousand" shall be substituted. (ii) After Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, the following shall be added as a proviso : Provided that the High Court may at any time decide/direct that any Appeal, or clause or group of appeals filed before it at any time, shall be transferred to a District Judge or Addl. District Judge, and on such decision being taken or order being passed by the High Court, such appeal or class or group of appeals shall so stand transferred to such a transferee Court which shall hear and dispose of such an appeal or class or group of appeals as if the same had been filed before it under Clause (a)." 12. From bare perusal of the aforementioned Act time to time amended by the State of Bihar it appears that for the first time, while amending Section 21 of the Act by Jharkhand Amendment Act, 2002, a proviso has been added which empowers the High Court to decide or direct that any pending appeal or appeals filed before it at any time shall be transferred to the District Judge or Additional District Judge and on such decision being taken or order being passed by the Court, such appeal or group of appeals shall so stand transferred to such a transferee Court which shall hear and dispose of such appeals, as if, the same had been filed before it. 13. The intention of the Legislature in amending the provisions of the Act appears to be mainly for quick disposal of appeals pending in the High Court for the last few decades. 13. The intention of the Legislature in amending the provisions of the Act appears to be mainly for quick disposal of appeals pending in the High Court for the last few decades. Because of acute paucity of time in the High Court, as this Court spends most of its time in deciding criminal appeals and constitutional matters under Article 226 of the Constitution and other relates constitutional provisions, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to increase the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judges and to empower the High Court to transfer pending appeals arising out of a suit in which the valuation is less than rupees two lacks fifty thousand, so that all such appears could he disposed of as early as possible. 14. Mr. Debi Prasad put reliance in the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narains case (supra). The facts of the case before Supreme Court was that a first appeal against a decree passed in a suit involving valuation of less than Rs. 10,000/- was filed in the Allahabad High Court in 1952 and the appeal remained pending in the High Court. In the meantime, the Bengal, Agra & Assam Act, 1887, was amended in its application to the State of U.P. whereby the appellate jurisdiction of the District Courts to entertain first appeal was increased up to a valuation of ten thousand rupees. The learned Chief Justice in the light of the said amendment and exercising power under Section 24(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, on his own motion without notice to the parties concerned, transferred that pending appeal in the Court of First Addl. District Judge at Allahabad. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order passed by the learned Chief Justice by filing writ petition which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. The appellant then preferred an appeal which was also dismissed by a Division Bench and the matter finally came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court taking into consideration. Section 3(1) of the Amendment Act held that in the face of Section 3(1) it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of ten thousand or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and appeals from which were pending before the High Court. Section 3(1) of the Amendment Act held that in the face of Section 3(1) it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of ten thousand or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and appeals from which were pending before the High Court. Their Lordships observed :-- "With all respect, the High Court has completely misdirected itself in interpreting the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act, which must govern this case. That section runs as under : Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt, decree, liability, or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court. The High Court has not given effect to the words "any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court". Now, giving full effect to the words just quoted of Section 3(1) of the Act, the High Court and the High Court alone would be competent to hear and decide the appeals pending before it. In other words, the District Courts were not competent to hear such appeals, and, therefore, the High Court could not have transferred those appeals to be heard by the District Judge or Additional District Judge, inasmuch as Section 24 postulates that the Court to which the suit or appeal or other proceeding is transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. On the date the appeal in question was preferred in the High Court, the District Court were not competent to hear such a case. The competency of those Courts to hear such cases arises by virtue of the amendment to Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, aforesaid. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving clause, like the one introduced by Section 3(1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving clause, like the one introduced by Section 3(1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in the face of Section 3(1) of the Act, it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of ten thousand rupees or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and appeals from which were pending before the High Court." 15. In the Jharkhand Amendment Act, 2002, while amending Section 21 and increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the District Courts the Legislature has not put such a saving clause like Section 3(1) of the U.P. Amendment Act rather the Legislature added a proviso making the District Courts competent to hear such appeals pending in the High Court if transfer to the District Courts. In my opinion, therefore, in absence of any corresponding saving clause in the Jharkhand Amendment Act, 2002, the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narains case will not apply in the instant case. In the instant Amendment Act, 2002 applicable to the State of Jharkhand proviso to Section 21, empowers the High Court to transfer to the District Judge an appeal filed in the High Court before commencement of the Amendment Act where the valuation of the suit exceed Rs. 10,000/-. The language used in the proviso to Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, as inserted, makes it clear that legislature was anxious to give retrospective effect to the said proviso. 16. It is well settled law that the statute should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right. The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it can not be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed. 17. At this juncture, few decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with somewhat similar situations need to be discussed herein below. 18. 17. At this juncture, few decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with somewhat similar situations need to be discussed herein below. 18. In the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhary and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 540 , the question came for consideration before the Supreme Court was with regard to effect of vested right of appeal before the Federal Court after Constitution of India came into force. The lordships observed : "From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge.--(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceeding all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigation and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." 19. In the case of Da Costa and an Jose Ors. v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornln and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1843 , the Supreme Court observed : "Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the central legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind to well established principles. In the case of Da Costa and an Jose Ors. v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornln and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1843 , the Supreme Court observed : "Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the central legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind to well established principles. The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually in admissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions, which tough a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not be applied retrospectively in the absence express enactment or necessary intendment" (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, 54 Ind App 421 : AIR 1927 PC 242. The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the Institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the arrear of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz., (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the Court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (see Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, 1957 SCR 488 : AIR 1957 SC 540 and Coloniel Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369." 20. In the case of Maria Christine v. Maria Zurna, AIR 1979 SC 1352 , the Supreme Court dealing with similar matter observed : "It is no doubt well settled that the right of appeal is a substantive right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is commenced in the Court of the first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be effected by any repeal of the enactment conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes such right or remedy in respect thereof. This position has been made clear by Clause (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of the Central Act XXX of 1965 which substantially correspond to Clause (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This position has been made clear by Clause (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of the Central Act XXX of 1965 which substantially correspond to Clause (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This position has also been settled by the decision of the Privy Council and this Court (vide The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369 and Garikaptti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, 1957 SCR 488 : AIR 1957 SC 540 , but the forum where such appeal can be lodged is indubitably a procedural matter and, therefore, the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act." 21. According to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, (12th Edition) at page 22 :-- "In general, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." 22. The effect of a change in the law between a decision at first instance and the hearing of an appeal from that decision was discussed by the House of Lords in Att-Gen. v. Vernazza. Lord Denning, said (at p. 978) that it was "clear that in the ordinary way the Court of Appeal cannot take in to account a statute which has been passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance, because the rights of litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the proceeding. But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect or because it deals with matters of procedure only, for then Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending proceeding, and the Court of appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospective intent as well as a court of first instance. 23. As noticed above, the proviso added in Section 21 of the Amendment Act, 2002 the intention of the Legislature is very clear to give the amendment provision of the Act retrospective effect. 23. As noticed above, the proviso added in Section 21 of the Amendment Act, 2002 the intention of the Legislature is very clear to give the amendment provision of the Act retrospective effect. In other words the amended provision expressly and by necessary intendment is retrospective inasmuch as the High Court has been empowered to decide or direct any pending appeal or appeals valuation of which is less than Rs. 2,50,000/- may be transferred to the District Courts for disposal. 24. Besides the above, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the number of Additional District Judges have been substantially increased in the light of the recent creation of Fast Track Courts, where these newly created Courts would deal with the criminal matters leaving District Judges and Additional District Judges with more time for hearing civil cases. It is well settled that first Appellate Court is a final court of facts and is bound to give an independent consideration to the evidence. It should enter into all questions including appreciation of evidence given at the trial. The District and Additional District Judges are competent enough, as final courts of facts, to dispose of appeals pending before this court valuation of which is less than Rs. 2,50,000/-. 25. Taking into consideration all these facts and also law discussed herein- above and also to avoid greater hardship to the litigants it is directed that all these appeals pending before this Court involving valuation of Rs. 2,50,000/- or less stand transferred to such transferee court namely, the District Judges of the respective districts having territorial jurisdiction to hear such appeals. The District Judges shall hear those appeals and/or transfer the same to the file of Additional District Judges posted in their respective districts and ensure quick disposal of these appeals.